


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
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




THE NAVAL HISTORY OF
GREAT BRITAIN

VOLUME THE FOURTH







ADMIRAL SIR THOMAS COCHRANE, 1ST BARON COCHRANE

ENGRAVED BY W. BURNETT

THE
NAVAL HISTORY
OF
GREAT BRITAIN

FROM THE DECLARATION OF WAR BY FRANCE
IN 1793
TO THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE IV.

BY
WILLIAM JAMES

*A NEW EDITION, WITH ADDITIONS AND NOTES
BRINGING THE WORK DOWN TO 1827*

VÉRITÉ SANS PEUR

IN SIX VOLUMES
VOL. IV.

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NAVAL HISTORY OF GREAT BRITAIN.

SIR RICHARD STRACHAN'S ACTION.

VICE-ADMIRAL LORD COLLINGWOOD, now the commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean fleet, continued throughout the greater part of the remainder of the year at his station off Cadiz, watching the 10 or 11 shattered enemy's ships that lay at anchor within it. Four days after the action Vice-admiral François-Etienne Rosily arrived at the port direct from Paris, to supersede Vice-admiral Villeneuve in the command. Instead of 18 fine fresh ships, the new admiral found five disabled ones, or rather four, the *Héros* having considerably kept herself in so efficient a state, that she was able at once to hoist the flag of Admiral Rosily, and even to carry him to sea, had such been his intention, and no blockading force been cruising off the harbour. There were still four ships of the combined fleet present at the battle of Trafalgar, whose movements require to be traced. These, it will be recollected, were the four French ships that escaped to the southward, under the command of Rear-admiral Dumanoir, in the 80-gun ship *Formidable*.

Having by dark on the day of the battle gained a safe offing, M. Dumanoir commenced repairing the few damages which his squadron had sustained; few, indeed, for his ships, in making off, carried royals upon a wind, and to the British, who were attentively observing them, exhibited no signs of injury. One or two of the ships, however, were certainly struck in the hull by some of the British ships, most probably by the *Minotaur* and *Spartiate*; for the *Formidable* made a good deal of water, and had three of her guns dismantled, and the *Duguay-Trouin* had one petty officer mortally and four others slightly wounded. Upon looking into the rôles d'équipage of the four ships, we

cannot discover that they sustained any other loss in the battle of Trafalgar.

With the wind as it blew, the French admiral would have steered towards Toulon, had he not received intelligence that Rear-admiral Louis, with a squadron of four or five sail of the line, was cruising in the neighbourhood of the Straits. Nothing now remained but to proceed on a cruise, or to endeavour to make a home port to the northward. Fortunately for British interests, M. Dumanoir chose the latter alternative, and, having stood to the westward until the squadron doubled Cape St. Vincent, which it did not do until the 29th, he steered north, intending to enter the road of the isle of Aix.

The celebrated Rochefort squadron of five sail of the line, three frigates, and two brigs, under Rear-admiral Allemand, had escaped from their anchorage since the preceding July, and was now at sea, playing sad havoc with British commerce. Two or three squadrons were seeking M. Allemand, and every British cruiser was on the alert, in the hope of hearing some tidings of him. In the latter part of October the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate Phoenix, Captain Thomas Baker, steering, with sealed orders, to a prescribed spot, a short distance to the westward of Scilly, received intelligence from two or three neutrals, that the Rochefort squadron had recently been seen in the bay of Biscay. Considering that the importance of this communication would justify him in prematurely breaking open his despatches, Captain Baker did so, and found they merely contained an order to proceed to what was likely to prove to the Phoenix and those on board of her a profitable cruising-ground.

Without a moment's hesitation in the choice between private interest and public duty, Captain Baker made all sail towards the bay of Biscay; and, having crossed it, had just reached the latitude of Cape Finisterre, when, on the 2nd of November, at 11 A.M. standing on the starboard tack, with the wind at north-north-west, the Phoenix discovered and chased four large sail, bearing west-north-west. Soon after noon the strangers bore up, under all sail, in chase of the Phoenix; who thereupon bore up also, and steered south, Captain Baker being aware that a British squadron under Sir Richard Strachan was cruising off Ferrol; and into whose hands he hoped to be able to lead, what he believed to be, a part of the Rochefort squadron.

At 3 P.M. the Phoenix discovered four additional sail of large ships bearing south. In a quarter of an hour more the four sail first seen, having made the same discovery, hauled to the wind

on the starboard tack. Immediately the Phœnix, then steering south-south-east, hauled up to south by west, the better to keep sight of the ships first seen. These, which were, as it will be conjectured, the French 80-gun ship Formidable, and 74s Mont-Blanc, Scipion, and Duguay-Trouin, under Rear-admiral Dumanoir,¹ subsequently wore and stood to the eastward; and the Phœnix, firing guns and covering herself with signals, stood again to the south-south-east, to join the four large sail seen in that direction, and judged, but not yet ascertained, to be friends.

Much about the time that the Phœnix gained a sight of the four ships of M. Dumanoir, bearing from her west-north-west, the British 38-gun frigate Boadicea, Captain John Maitland, and 18-pounder 36-gun frigate Dryad, Captain Adam Drummond, discovered and chased them in the east by south. At about 8 h. 45 m. P.M. the Phœnix saw the Boadicea and Dryad; but, as the latter were between herself and the supposed Rochefort squadron, the rockets they threw up failed to produce the desired effect, and the Phœnix continued to stand from them. At about 9 h. 30 m. the Boadicea and Dryad discovered to leeward the same four ships, towards which the Phœnix was hastening, together with three others at no great distance from them, making seven sail in all. These were a British squadron under Sir Richard Strachan, which had been detached from the Channel fleet since the 29th of October, in search of the Rochefort squadron, and consisted of the

Gun-ship.

80	Cæsar	Captain	Sir Richard John Strachan, Bart.
74	{ Hero	,,	Hon. Alan Hyde Gardner.
	{ Namur	,,	Lawrence William Halsted.
	{ Courageux	,,	Richard Lee.
	{ Bellona	,,	Charles Dudley Pater.

Gun-frig.

36	Santa-Margarita	,,	Wilson Rathborne.
32	Æolus	,,	Lord William Fitz-Roy

Having, without getting any answer to their signals, arrived within two miles of the Cæsar, which was the weathermost ship of this squadron, and then standing close hauled on the larboard tack, the Boadicea and Dryad, at about 10 h. 30 m. P.M., tacked to the north-east, and soon lost sight of friends and foes. At 11 P.M. the Phœnix passed under the stern of the Cæsar, steering as before about north by east; and, after the receipt of a shot and the interchange of a few hails, discovering the ship

¹ For the names of the captains see vol. iii., p. 386.

to be what she was, Captain Baker informed Sir Richard Strachan that the Rochefort squadron, or four ships at least of it, were then not far distant upon his lee bow.

Sir Richard's squadron being at this time very much scattered, the commodore directed Captain Baker to make sail to the south-south-east, and hasten forward the ships astern. The *Cæsar* then bore away under all sail, with the wind at west-north-west, followed at a great distance by the *Héro*, *Courageux*, and *Æolus*. Scarcely had the *Phoenix* stood away from the *Cæsar* before the light of the moon discovered to Sir Richard the objects of his chase, then in the east-north-east, under a press of canvas, in the act of bearing away, closely formed in a sort of bow and quarter line. The *Cæsar* and her three nearest consorts continued the pursuit until the setting of the moon, at about 1 h. 30 m. A.M. on the 3rd, accompanied by hazy blowing weather, concealed the enemy from view; they then shortened sail, to await the coming up of their friends astern.

At daylight on the 3rd, by which time the wind had veered to west-south-west, the *Santa-Margarita* joined the *Cæsar* and her three companions; and at 7 h. 30 m. A.M. Cape Ortugal appeared in sight, bearing south-east half-east distant 36 miles. At 9 A.M. the French ships again showed themselves in the north-north-east; and the British ships, spreading everything they could set, immediately chased in that direction. At 11 A.M. the *Namur*, preceded by the *Phoenix*, and followed at some distance by a frigate which afterwards proved to be the *Révolutionnaire* 38, Captain the Honourable Henry Hotham, appeared far astern, using every effort to get up. At noon the French ships were about 14 miles distant, and in the same line of bearing as when first seen, the wind south-south-west, blowing strong. Towards 3 P.M. the *Santa-Margarita*, by her superior sailing, became the leading ship in the chase; and the *Phoenix*, upon joining in the evening, was despatched ahead, to assist the former in harassing the enemy's rear. To the great mortification of her officers and crew, the *Bellona* had by this time parted company.

On the 4th, at daylight, owing to the indifferent sailing of the *Formidable*, aided by the partial influence of the wind in its fluctuations throughout the night, and which now blew moderately from the south-east, the British ships had gained so far in the chase, that scarcely six miles intervened between the *Cæsar*, still the leading line-of-battle ship of her squadron, and the *Scipion*, the rearmost ship in the French line. Such also, during the preceding night's chase, had been the zeal and acti-


vity on board the *Santa-Margarita*, that, by 5 h. 45 m. A.M. this frigate got near enough to fire her starboard foremost guns at the *Scipion*; who, in a quarter of an hour afterwards brought her stern-chasers to bear, and presently killed the boatswain, and badly struck the hull, of the *Santa-Margarita*. At 9 h. 30 m. A.M. the *Phoenix* got up, and opened a fire from her larboard guns into the *Scipion*'s starboard quarter. In this way the two British frigates, practising every feasible manœuvre to keep clear of the broadsides of their formidable opponents, continued to harass the French rear. Meanwhile the *Cæsar*, *Hero*, and *Courageux*, now formed in line ahead, and just favoured by a shift of wind to south-south-east, were rapidly approaching, to give a more decided feature to the combat.

At about 11 h. 45 m. A.M., finding an action unavoidable, the French admiral threw out the signal for his ships to take in their small sails, and haul up together on the starboard tack, with their heads to the north-east by east. This they presently did, and then fell into a line ahead in the following order: *Duguay-Trouin*, *Formidable*, *Mont-Blanc*, *Scipion*. From the last-named ship the *Cæsar* at this time bore about south by west rather more than a mile distant: consequently she was well on the weather-quarter of the French rear. The *Namur* and *Révolutionnaire* had been great gainers by the slight change in the wind. They were now running with it upon the quarter, and bore from the commodore and his line, the one south-west, or nearly astern, distant about 14 miles, the other west-south-west, or a little upon the lee-quarter, distant about seven miles. A trifle to the westward of the *Révolutionnaire*'s line of bearing, and just out of gun-shot from the enemy, lay the *Æolus*; and, much nearer, the *Santa-Margarita* and *Phoenix*, who had already performed so well, and who were still doing their utmost to cripple the rearmost French ship.

Having announced to Captains Gardner and Lee, by hailing, that he should attack the centre and rear of the enemy, Sir Richard edged away for the French admiral; as did the two former, in like manner, for M. Dumanoir's two seconds astern. At about 15 minutes past noon the *Cæsar* opened her larboard guns upon the *Formidable*, then, as well as her three companions, carrying topsails and topgallantsails with courses clewed up, and having the wind, as before, about a point abaft the starboard beam. In a minute or two after the *Cæsar* had begun firing, the *Hero* and *Courageux*, in quick succession, discharged their broadsides into the *Mont-Blanc* and *Scipion*. The

three French ships instantly returned the fire, and a spirited action ensued. At this time the *Namur* was about 10 miles astern, using every effort to get up.

At about 50 minutes past noon the *Cæsar* hoisted the signal for close action. At 0 h. 55 m. P.M. the *Duguay-Trouin* gallantly luffed up, with the intention of raking the *Cæsar* ahead; but the latter, luffing up also, avoided the salute. This period of the action we have endeavoured to illustrate by the following diagram:—



Either by accident or design, the *Duguay-Trouin* went in stays, and, while rapidly passing, on the larboard tack, under the lee, successively, of the *Cæsar* and *Hero*, received from each of them, particularly from the latter, which ship she almost touched, a heavy and destructive fire.

The French admiral, in the mean time, having made a signal to that effect, tacked to support his gallant second ahead, and was followed in the manœuvre by the two ships in his wake; but, having had her rigging much disabled by the *Cæsar*'s fire, and being at best a bad-working ship, the *Formidable* could not get round quick enough to regain her station in the line. The latter thereupon became third instead of second, the French ships, when on the larboard tack, ranging as follows: *Duguay-Trouin*, *Mont-Blanc*, *Formidable*, *Scipion*; having the wind about half a point before the beam.

At about 1 h. 20 m. P.M. the *Cæsar*, being too much disabled in her rigging to tack, wore; but the *Hero*, and, we believe, the *Courageux* succeeded in tacking. Finding that the *Cæsar*, after she had got round, was making but slow progress in the chase, Sir Richard, at 1 h. 40 m. P.M., signalled the *Namur*, then on the weather-bow of the French ships, to attack the enemy's van.

and at the same time made the Hero's signal to lead on the larboard tack. The Hero, followed at some distance by the *Courageux*, and at a much greater distance by the *Cæsar*, edged away towards the French squadron.

About this time, observing that the *Namur* was lying to, as it appeared, out of gun-shot of the enemy, the *Cæsar*, by way of enforcing attention to the signal she had previously made, fired at the former ship "two guns shotted." Of this fact we were fully aware when drawing up the account for our first edition; but, observing among the official papers in the *Gazette* a "General Memorandum," communicating Sir Richard Strachan's thanks to his captains for their "zealous and gallant conduct," we considered that there might have been some mistake in the log-entry, and refrained, upon a principle which we still feel to be just, from making the slightest allusion to it. We have since learnt that the *Namur* was fired at in the manner stated; but that Sir Richard, whose impatience, we believe, is not always of the most discriminative kind, subsequently acknowledged that he had been unnecessarily harsh. Even in this view of the case we should perhaps have withheld the statement, had not our previous omission been attributed to motives incompatible with the impartiality which gives to these pages their principal value.


At a few minutes before 2 P.M., while running down to close the *Formidable*, the Hero recommenced the action by firing her starboard guns at the *Scipion*; who, losing in consequence her maintopmast, fell to leeward. Here the *Scipion* was engaged by the *Courageux* to windward, and by the *Phoenix* and *Révolutionnaire* (which latter had just joined) to leeward. The Hero, in the mean time, had got upon the weather-beam of the *Formidable*, and kept gradually fore-reaching until she gained a station upon the latter ship's larboard bow. At about 2 h. 45 m. P.M. the *Namur* arrived up astern of the Hero, and began engaging the *Formidable*. The Hero then made sail to close the *Mont-Blanc*; which ship, as well as the *Duguay-Trouin*, had occasionally raked the former while engaging the *Formidable*.

At 3 h. 5 m. P.M., having had her mizentopmast shot away and her foretopmast and mainmast left in a tottering state, and observing the *Cæsar*, who had since refitted her damaged rigging, in the act of opening her fire, the *Formidable* hauled down her colours, and was taken possession of by the *Namur*; who,

¹ Log of Hero.

having had her main-yard cut in two by the French 80-gun ship's fire, was incapacitated from making sail. At 3 h. 10 m. P.M., just as the Duguay-Trouin and Mont-Blanc had bore up, to form a fresh line ahead of the Scipion, the latter ship, having, by the united fire of the Courageux and frigates, had her fore-topmast and main and mizen masts shot away, struck her colours, and was taken possession of by the Phœnix and Révolutionnaire.

Seeing the fate of the Scipion and Formidable, the Duguay-Trouin and Mont-Blanc endeavoured to make off; but they were soon overtaken by the Hero and Cæsar. After a close and well-maintained carronade of about 20 minutes' duration, in which the British 80-gun ship's heavy broadsides were most sensibly felt, the two French 74s, being reduced to a shattered and defenceless state, and observing the Courageux ready to open her fire, hauled down their colours, the Duguay-Trouin to the Hero, and the Mont-Blanc to the Cæsar. This occurrence took place at about 3 h. 35 m. P.M.; when the ships of both squadrons were nearly in the positions represented in the following diagram:—



The Cæsar lost four men killed and 25 wounded; the Hero, as a proof of the conspicuous part she took in the action, one second-lieutenant of marines (Robert Morrison) and nine men killed, one lieutenant (John Shekel), one second-lieutenant of

marines (Cornelius James Stevenson), one purser, (Thomas Titterton), and 48 men wounded; the *Courageux*, one man killed, her first-lieutenant (Robert Clephane), one master's mate (Thomas Daws), one midshipman (John Gibbs Bird), her gunner (John Austin), and nine men wounded; the *Namur*, four men killed, one captain of marines (William Clements), one lieutenant (Thomas Osborne), one midshipman (Frederick Beasley), and five men wounded; the *Santa-Margarita*, her boatswain (Thomas Edwards), killed and one man wounded; the *Révolutionnaire*, two men killed and six wounded; the *Phoenix*, two killed and four wounded; and the *Æolus*, three wounded: making a total of 24 killed and 111 wounded. None of the British ships had any spars shot away, except the *Cæsar* her maintopgallantmast, the *Hero* her foretopsail-yard, and the *Namur* her main yard; but the *Cæsar* and *Hero* had received considerable damage in their masts generally, as well as in their rigging and sails.

The loss sustained by the French ships was extremely severe. The *Formidable* had 200 killed and wounded, including among the latter Rear-admiral Dumanoir in two places; the *Scipion*, the same number, including among the wounded her captain; the *Mont-Blanc* 180, and the *Duguay-Trouin* 150, including among the latter's killed her captain: making a total of 730 in killed and wounded.¹ All four French ships had been so struck in their masts, that, soon after the action ended, the foremasts of the *Formidable* and *Mont-Blanc* were the only sticks left standing. This, coupled with the heavy loss just enumerated, affords a decisive proof that the French ships did not surrender until they were compelled to do so: it proves, also, that the British ships fired their guns, which is not invariably the case, with both quickness and precision.

The force of the four French ships has already appeared (see vol. iii., p. 460); but it must in justice be stated, that in this action the *Formidable* mounted 65 guns only, three having been dismounted in the battle of Trafalgar (see p. 1), and 12 of her quarter-deck 12-pounders having been thrown overboard during the chase of the squadron by Sir Richard Strachan. This fact is stated on oath in the written depositions of the *Formidable's* late officers, lodged in the admiralty prize-court, and is confirmed by the official return of the prize-broker, it there appearing that no more than 68 guns were found on board the ship.

In the battle of Trafalgar, neither the French nor the British

¹ *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvi., p. 195.

frigates fired a shot : in this battle all four British frigates, three of them especially, contributed their full share towards achieving the victory. It is true that the official letter, the extraordinary brevity of which has been so admired by some and blamed by others, states that, when the French ships tacked, "the frigates were to leeward of the enemy." But Sir Richard surely never intended to have it thence inferred, that they took no further part in the action. An officer of one of the line-of-battle ships, apparently the *Namur*, in a letter published on the same day as the official account, considers that the tacking of the French ships "gave the frigates in the rear the credit of taking a good share in the action." The French indeed represent, that every one of the ships, when the squadron got on the larboard tack, found herself assailed by a ship of the line to windward and a frigate to leeward, the latter placing herself in a comparatively safe but harassing position on the quarter. This is saying too much. What the frigates really did may be thus stated : The *Phoenix*, by her skilful manœuvres, decoyed the French squadron within sight of the British squadron. This frigate, then, accompanied by the *Santa-Margarita*, gallantly fought, and considerably annoyed, the rearmost French ship ; so much so, doubtless, as to have checked the way of all the French ships, and thereby enabled Sir Richard the more quickly to overtake them. When the French squadron tacked, the *Santa-Margarita* got thrown out, because she had received a dangerous shot in the magazine, besides several other shot in her starboard side ; to stop the holes of which the ship was obliged to be kept on the heel for two hours. But the *Santa-Margarita's* place was ably supplied by the *Révolutionnaire*, who, with the *Phoenix*, gave the finishing blow to the *Scipion*. The *Æolus* exchanged a few distant shot with the French ships as they passed to windward, and made herself useful in taking possession of the *Mont-Blanc* after that ship had struck to the *César*.

The capture of *M. Dumanoir's* squadron may fairly be considered as an emanation from the battle of *Trafalgar*. So that, out of the 18 sail of the line which France possessed on the morning of the 21st of October, in a fortnight afterwards she could count only five, and those five shut up in a Spanish port, helpless to themselves and useless to their country. The news of these sad reverses reached the French emperor in Austria, in the midst of his brilliant triumphs. Napoleon is said to have flown into the most violent rage, and to have declared, in allusion to *Byng's* fate, that he would "teach French admirals how

to conquer.' "Je saurai bien apprendre aux amiraux français à vaincre." In a little time, however, Buonaparte's habitual duplicity resumed its sway over his mind; and he was weak enough to imagine that, because he told the legislative assembly that a few of his ships had been lost in a storm,² and the *Moniteur* and other French papers refrained from publishing a word on the subject, the world at large were a jot less wise respecting the real fate of the Franco-Spanish fleet.

The French emperor subsequently gave a gracious reception to Captains Lucas, Infernet, Magendie, and Villemadrin; saying to the first two: "Those captains who, instead of closing with the enemy, kept out of gun-shot, shall be prosecuted, and if there is cause, shall be made a striking example of;" "Les capitaines de vaisseau qui, au lieu d'aborder l'ennemi, se sont tenus hors de portee de canon, seront poursuivis, et, s'il y a lieu, il en sera fait un exemple éclatant;"³ and to the last two: "You are among those who fought well; you shall have your reward." "Vous êtes du nombre de ceux qui se sont bien battus, vous prendrez votre revanche."⁴

Napoleon's intentions respecting M. Villeneuve are not very clear. This unfortunate admiral, having obtained his parole, sailed from Plymouth in a cartel on the 9th of April, and on the night of the 22nd landed at Morlaix; intending, it was understood, to proceed straight to Paris to justify himself before the French emperor. A few evenings afterwards M. Villeneuve, while waiting at the *Hôtel de la Patrie* at Rennes for Napoleon's orders respecting his future movements, was found dead in his bed, stabbed in several places, as alleged, by his own hand, but, as very generally suspected, by the agency of Buonaparte. Buonaparte has since denied this;⁵ but who would confess such an act? On the 20th of October, 1809, and not before, Rear-admiral Dumanoir, for his conduct on the 21st of October, 1805, was tried by a court of inquiry, which had been summoned by Napoleon's orders, and was acquitted. The court sat at Paris, and was composed of the two senators, the Comtes de Fleurieu and Bougainville, and the two Vice-admirals Thevenard and Rosily; who gave it as their opinion, "That Rear-admiral Dumanoir manœuvred conformably to signals and the dictates of duty and honour." "Que le contre-amiral Dumanoir a manœuvré conformément aux signaux, et à l'impulsion du devoir et

¹ *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvi., p. 197.

² See vol. iii., p. 456.

³ *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvi., p. 198

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ See O'Meara's *Napoleon in Exile*, vol. i., p. 56.

de l'honneur." "That he did all that the wind and circumstances would permit to succour the commander-in-chief." "Qu'il a fait ce que les vents et les circonstances ont pu lui permettre pour venir au secours de l'amiral." "That he engaged, as closely as he could, all the ships that he met in his way to the centre." "Qu'il a combattu, d'aussi près qu'il a pu, tous les vaisseaux qu'il a rencontrés jusqu'au centre." "In short, that he did not individually abandon the contest until forced to do so by the damages of his ship, and in particular by the impracticability of manœuvring, owing to the state of his masts and rigging." "Enfin, qu'il n'a personnellement quitté le combat, que forcé par les avaries de tout genre de son vaisseau, et particulièrement par l'impossibilité de manœuvrer dans l'état où se trouvait sa mâture."

On the 29th of December, 1809, the same court of inquiry set to investigate M. Dumanoir's conduct on the battle of the 5th of November. The members would not question the bravery of a French admiral, but they found fault with his tactics. There was some colour for this; and the question still lies open, "Why did not M. Dumanoir, on the 4th, or on the day preceding the battle, with his four sail of the line, tack and fall upon the three British sail of the line and three frigates then solely in pursuit of him?" Not satisfied with the sentence pronounced upon him, M. Dumanoir demanded and obtained a naval court-martial. It was held at Toulon, and honourably acquitted him. M. Dumanoir is now the fifth vice-admiral on the list. Captains Maistrail and Epron outlived Napoleon's displeasure; and the name of the survivor of the two, Captain Epron, is not eclipsed in honorary marks of distinction by that of any officer of the same rank in the "Etat Général de la Marine."

Sir Richard Strachan carried his four prizes in safety to Plymouth, and they were all added to the British navy; the *Formidable*, under the name of *Brave*, the *Duguay-Trouin*, under that of *Implacable*, and the remaining two under their own names. The *Implacable* and *Scipion* were the only ships that afterwards went to sea. On the 9th of November, two days before his despatches reached the admiralty, and consequently without reference to his recent success over the enemy, Sir Richard was promoted to the rank of rear-admiral. On the 29th of the ensuing January, Sir Richard, for his conduct in the action of the 5th of November, became invested with the order of the Bath; and, about the same time, the rear-admiral, and the

captains and officers who served under him, received the thanks of parliament. Gold medals were also distributed, and the first-lieutenants of the line-of-battle ships, we believe, made commanders.

Light Squadrons and Single Ships.

On the 21st of January the British schooner *Gipsy* (tender to the flag-ship at Port Royal, Jamaica), of ten 4-pounders and 45 men and boys, commanded by Lieutenant Michael Fitton, while lying to off Cape Antonio, waiting to deliver despatches from the commander-in-chief to the 36-gun frigate *Princess Charlotte*, Captain the Honourable Francis Fayerman Gardner, was chased by two schooner and three felucca privateers from under the land. Lieutenant Fitton immediately filled and stood out to the offing, in the hope that the privateers would separate in the chase, and afford him a chance of capturing one or two of them. In a short time the largest of the two schooners got considerably ahead of her companions. By way of encouraging this vessel to continue the pursuit, the *Gipsy* paid a cable out of her stern-port, which slackened her way, and appeared to produce its intended effect. Having run the leading privateer to a sufficient distance from the rest, the *Gipsy* tacked and stood for her. The privateer immediately put about, and a running action ensued between her and the *Gipsy*; so much, however, to the former's disadvantage, that she ran on the *Colorados* reef, and was totally wrecked. Seeing the fate of their companion, the remaining four privateers crowded sail away, and left the *Gipsy* to remain unmolested upon her station. In three days afterwards the *Princess Charlotte* arrived on the spot, and Lieutenant Fitton delivered to Captain Gardner the despatches with which he had been charged.

On the 3rd of February, at daylight, Cape Caxine in sight bearing south, as the British ship-sloop *Arrow*, Captain Richard Budd Vincent, and bomb-ship *Acheron*, Captain Arthur Farguhar, having in charge (except one which had foundered in a squall three days before) the whole of a convoy of 35 merchant-vessels from Malta bound to England, were steering west by north, with a light breeze from the north-east, two large sail were discovered bearing east-south-east of the *Acheron*, then in the rear of the fleet. At 8 h. 30 m. A.M. the course of the fleet was altered by signal to west-north-west. At 10 h. 30 m. A.M., in obedience to a signal from the *Arrow*, the *Acheron* wore and

stood towards the strangers, to ascertain their character. At 11 h. 15 m. A.M. Captain Farquhar communicated that they were suspicious, and presently afterwards, that they were frigates. The vessels of the convoy on each quarter were now signalled to close. At noon Cape Albatel bore south by west half-west distant 10 or 11 leagues.

At two minutes past noon the Arrow cast off the brig which she had been towing, wore, and hauled to the wind on the larboard tack, for the purpose of joining the Acheron; who had also wore and was returning to the convoy, under all sail, with light winds from the eastward. In the course of the succeeding quarter of an hour, the customary signals were made to the convoy for its safety; and the Duchess of Rutland, a warlike-looking transport, was directed to lead the fleet on its course. At half-past noon the Acheron hoisted her colours and fired a gun. The chasing ships paying no attention to this, not a doubt remained that they were enemies; and a signal to that effect was immediately made to the ships of the convoy, with orders for them to make all possible sail to the appointed rendezvous. At 2 P.M. the Arrow, having tacked to the northward, brought to for the Acheron. At this time the two strangers, which were the French 40-gun frigate Hortense, Captain Louis-Charles-Augusto La Marre-le-Meillerie, and 38-gun frigate Incorruptible, Captain Simon Billiet, continued their course about west-north-west, under all sail, with light winds. These frigates, having parted from the Toulon fleet in a violent gale of wind,¹ had since cruised near the Straits of Gibraltar for some days, and not finding their fleet at the appointed rendezvous, were now on their return to Toulon.

At 4 h. 30 m. P.M. the Acheron joined the Arrow; and it was determined by the two commanders that they would keep between the convoy and the French frigates, who were now about five miles distant. At 5 P.M. it became quite calm; the convoy then bearing from the Arrow and Acheron north-west by west distant three miles, and the land between Cape Albatel and Cape Tennis south-south-west half-west, distant 11 leagues. At about 11 P.M. a light air sprang up from the south-west. The body of the convoy at this time bore from the Arrow west-north-west distant four miles; and the French frigates, who were on the larboard tack steering towards the convoy, bore north-north-east, distant three miles. The Arrow and Acheron

¹ See vol. III., p. 337.

were also on the larboard tack, standing in line ahead in close order.

At about 4 h. 15 m. A.M. on the 4th the Hortense, having tacked, passed to leeward of and hailed the Arrow, but did not fire. On arriving abreast of the Acheron, the frigate was herself hailed. After hailing in return, the Hortense opened a fire of round and grape upon the Acheron; which considerably damaged her rigging and sails, and carried away the maintop-gallant-yard and the slings of the main yard, but did not injure any person on board. The Acheron returned the fire with her starboard guns, and then hove about and discharged the opposite ones. The Arrow, who had in the mean time bore up, raked the Hortense astern, as the latter stood on to the westward. At 5 h. 30 m. A.M. the Incorruptible, whom the light and baffling winds had somewhat separated from her consort, passed, without firing, under the lee of the Arrow, then lying to on the starboard tack. Shortly afterwards, in wearing round on the starboard tack, the Incorruptible exposed her stern to the Acheron's guns, and received from them, at too great a distance probably for carronades to be effective, two rounds of shot. The Incorruptible at length came to the wind, and then stood after her consort.

Daylight, which had been anxiously looked for by the weaker party, showed the two frigates with their heads to the southward and their colours flying. Soon afterwards the Hortense hoisted a broad pendant at the main. At 6 A.M. the Arrow made the signal "for action" to the Duchess of Rutland, she being the most effective ship of the convoy; but although even a show of coming to the assistance of either of the men-of-war would have been of service, the Duchess of Rutland neither answered nor obeyed the signal. The Arrow then made sail on the starboard tack, followed in close order by the Acheron; the wind still very light from the north-west, and the convoy about four miles to windward, mostly on the larboard tack, much scattered, and making all sail to the westward. In a little while the two French frigates wore to the eastward, and hauled on the larboard tack; apparently with the intention of engaging the British ships to leeward.

At about 7 h. 25 m. A.M., being abreast of the Arrow, within half musket-shot distance, the Incorruptible opened her broadside, and received that of the Arrow in return. In five minutes more this frigate arrived abreast of and began engaging the Acheron. The Hortense having, in the meanwhile, closed with

the Arrow, the action became general between all four ships. As the French ships were wearing to renew the action on the opposite tack, the Arrow put her helm hard a-weather, and raked them : but, the lightness of the wind preventing her from steering, the Arrow, in her turn, became exposed to a heavy fire from both frigates. The Acheron then hauled close to the wind, to clear her consort, and, in passing, became again engaged with the Hortense ; who, after having poured a destructive fire into the starboard quarter of the Arrow, hauled after the Acheron.

The Arrow, in her immovable and shattered state, was now left to the Incorruptible, and a warm and close action ensued between these ships. At length, at about 8 h. 30 m. A.M., just one hour and 20 minutes since the two had begun engaging, having had her running rigging shot to pieces, her lower masts badly wounded, her standing rigging, yards, and sails much cut, many shot between wind and water, and the ship leaky in consequence, four guns dismantled, her rudder machinery disabled, and having, moreover, incurred a severe loss in killed and wounded, the Arrow struck her colours. In 20 minutes more the Acheron, who, on the Arrow's surrender, had made all sail to the southward, having also been much disabled in masts, sails, and rigging, and had a part of her stern-post carried away, and finding it in vain to attempt escaping from a ship that sailed so much faster, hauled down her colours to the Hortense.

The Arrow's guns consisted of twenty-eight 32-pounder carronades, 24 of them on a flush deck ;¹ and her complement at quarters, including seven invalid male passengers,² was 132 men and boys. Of these, she had 13 killed and 27 wounded. The Acheron, exclusive of her two bombs, mounted only eight 24-pounder carronades, with a complement of 67 men and boys ; of whom (although omitted to be stated in the gazette-letter) she had three men killed and eight wounded.

The Hortense was a fine new frigate, mounting 48 long guns and carronades, 18-pounders on the main deck ; with a complement of 340 or 350 men, exclusive of about 300 troops. Her loss cannot be ascertained, but was probably trifling. The Incorruptible mounted 42 guns, the same, we believe, as those specified at No. 6 in the small Table at p. 59 of the first volume.

¹ See vol. I., p. 456, note Q*, where the Arrow and her sister-vessel are described.

² One lady, her female attendant, and a very young child, were also unfortunately on board.

Her complement, including troops, extended to 640 men. Of these the *Incorruptible* doubtless sustained a greater loss than one killed and five wounded, the amount stated in the *Moniteur*, otherwise her damages would not have detained this frigate in port on the second departure of the Toulon fleet.¹

The noble defence made by this sloop and bomb-vessel did something more than display an additional proof of the bravery and devotedness of British seamen: it preserved from capture 31 out of 34 sail of merchantmen, (the *Duchess of Rutland* and two others were all that fell into the hands of the frigates,) and the captured men-of-war had been so long and so bravely defended as to be useless in the French service. Indeed scarcely had the surviving crew and passengers been removed from the *Arrow*, and that by the French boats, her own having been destroyed by shot, than the ship settled on her beam-ends and sank; and the shattered state of the *Acheron* induced the captors, as soon as her people were removed, to set that vessel on fire.

Had the *Arrow*, with her powerful battery and gallant crew, fallen in with the *Incorruptible* alone, under such circumstances of wind and weather, as would have allowed the former to maintain a close position, the combat might have resembled, in its result, that fought in the preceding war between the British brig *Pelican* and the French frigate *Medéc*.² As it was, the conduct of both commanders received its just reward in their almost immediate promotion to post-rank. We regret to be obliged to add, that the brave defence of the *Arrow* failed to produce for her late officers and crew the slightest sympathy in the breast of Captain *Billiet*; who, in the treatment of his prisoners, appears to have fallen very little short of the celebrated Captain *Lejoille*.³

On the 8th of February, at daybreak, the British 16-gun brig-sloop *Curieux*, Captain *George Edmund Byron Bettesworth*, being about 20 leagues to the eastward of Barbadoes, discovered on her lee bow a large brig, that immediately bore up and made all sail. Chase was given; and, after a run of 12 hours, during which the brig tried every point of sailing to escape, the *Curieux* got within point-blank shot. The former, which was the French privateer *Dame Ernouf*, then took in her studding-sails, brought to on the starboard tack, hoisted French colours, and commenced a brisk fire of great guns and small arms. As soon

¹ See vol. iii., p. 339.

² See vol. i., p. 397.

³ See vol. ii., p. 264.

as she had arrived within musket-shot upon the privateer's weather-quarter, the *Curieux* opened her fire. The action continued with great obstinacy for 40 minutes; when the *Dame Ernouf* ceased firing, and, after three cheers had been given by her crew, steered for the *Curieux's* lee-quarter. Aware of the intent, Captain Bettesworth put his helm a-starboard, and caught his opponent's jib-boom between the *Curieux's* after fore-shroud and foremast. In this exposed situation the *Dame Ernouf* remained until her decks were completely cleared by the guns of the *Curieux*; when, just as the latter was about to board the former, the two vessels parted, the fore topmast of the *Dame Ernouf* falling over the side just as she dropped clear. The privateer continued a short time firing musketry, and then hauled down her colours.

Both ships mounted 16 long French 6-pounders.¹ The *Curieux* had a complement of 67 men and boys; of whom she lost five, including the purser, Mr. Maddox (who, in the absence of the first-lieutenant, gallantly volunteered his services, and was killed at the head of the small-arm men), killed, and four, including her commander, by a musket-ball in the head,² wounded. The *Dame Ernouf* commenced action with 120 men, of whom she had 30 killed and 40 wounded: a sufficient proof that her officers and crew persevered in their resistance while any hope remained. In his modest account of an action so creditable to himself and his brig's company, Captain Bettesworth omits not to pass a very handsome encomium on the gallantry of his antagonist.

On the 13th of February, at 5 A.M., as the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *San-Fiorenzo*, Captain Henry Lambert, was in latitude 19° 35' north, longitude 85° 25' east, standing on the starboard tack, with a light wind at west-south-west, in search of the French (late privateer,³ but now) 32-gun frigate *Pysché*, Captain Jacques Bergeret, reported to be off Vizagapatam, three sail were discovered at anchor under the land to the southward. These, which were the *Pysché* and two ships, her prizes, immediately weighed and made sail, pursued by the *San-Fiorenzo*. Light and baffling winds continued during the day, and towards midnight it became quite calm. At about 20 minutes

¹ The *Curieux* had been captured the preceding year, see p. 3. By admiralty order of December 10, 1804, the *Curieux* was ordered fourteen 18-pounder carronades, but it is believed retained her French guns, until, by admiralty orders of August 9 and September 12, 1805, she

was established with eight long 6-pounders and ten 24-pounder carronades.

² He had also received three wounds at the cutting out of the brig he now commanded. See vol. iii., p. 247.

³ See vol. iii., p. 269.

past midnight, a light breeze having sprung up, the San-Fiorenzo braced round on the larboard tack, and made all sail, trimming and wetting them to quicken her progress. In this way the chase continued throughout the remainder of the night, the San-Fiorenzo gradually gaining until 5 h. 30 m. p.m. on the 14th; when the Pysché and her companions hoisted English colours, as did also the San-Fiorenzo. At 7 h. 30 m. p.m. the latter arrived within hail and took possession of the sternmost vessel of the three, the Thetis, late country-ship, and which had just been abandoned by the Pysché, then a short distance ahead. From the crew of the Thetis it was ascertained, that the other prize had been the Pigeon country-ship, but was now the Equivoque privateer, of 10 guns and 40 men, commanded by one of M. Bergeret's lieutenants.

Continuing the chase under all sail, the San-Fiorenzo, at 8 p.m., got within gun-shot of, and fired a bow-chaser at, the Psyché, who returned it with two guns from her stern. In 10 minutes more the two frigates commenced a furious action, at the distance of about 100 yards, and continued hotly engaged until a few minutes before 9 p.m., when the Psyché fell on board the San-Fiorenzo. In about a quarter of an hour the Psyché got clear, and the cannonade was renewed with spirit, the Equivoque occasionally taking a part in it, to the no slight annoyance of the San-Fiorenzo. At about 9 h. 40 m. p.m. the latter shot away the Psyché's mainyard, and the firing still continued with unabated fury. At 11 h. 30 m. p.m. the San-Fiorenzo hauled off to reeve new braces and repair her rigging. At midnight, being again ready, the latter bore up to renew the conflict; but, just as the British frigate was about to re-open her broadside, a boat from the Psyché came on board with a message to Captain Lambert, stating that Captain Bergeret, out of humanity to the survivors of his crew, had struck, although he might have borne the contest longer.

Of her 253 men and boys on board, the San-Fiorenzo had one midshipman (Christopher H. B. Lefroy), eight seamen, one drummer, and two marines killed, and one lieutenant (William Dawson), her master (James Finlayson), one lieutenant of marines (Samuel Ashmore), one midshipman (Samuel Marsingal), 30 seamen, and two marines wounded; total, 12 killed and 26 wounded. Severe as this loss was, that on board the Psyché was far more so. The latter ship had her second captain, two lieutenants, and 54 seamen and soldiers killed, and 70 officers, seamen, and soldiers wounded.

The San-Fiorenzo mounted, besides her 26 long 18-pounders on the main deck, 14 carronades, 32-pounders, and two long nines on the quarter-deck and fore-castle, total 42 guns. Since her affair with the Wilhelmina, the Psyché had been purchased for the national navy by General Decaen, the governor of the Isle of France; and Rear-admiral Linois had allowed the enterprising officer to whom she had belonged to continue in the command of her. Her 36 guns appear to have been the same that she mounted as a privateer, and will be found at a preceding page.¹

Comparative Force of the Combatants.

		San-Fiorenzo.	Psyché.
Broadside-guns . . .	{ No.	21	18
	{ lbs.	467	252
Crew	No.	253	240
Size	tons.	1032	848

The 10-gun ship Equivoque is here left out, partly because the calibers of her guns are not known, and partly because the aid she afforded the Psyché was not constant, but occasional. As to the two frigates, although nominally equal, they were very far from being a match, and yet what a resistance the Psyché's was! Her loss in killed and wounded amounted to more than half her crew; and among the killed were the second captain and her two lieutenants. Her third-lieutenant was on board the Equivoque. This act of Captain Bergeret's surpassed what had been expected even of him;² and every Frenchman who wishes well to the navy of his country should hold in honourable recollection the heroic defence of the Psyché. The prize became added to the British navy as a 12-pounder 32-gun frigate; but owing partly to her age and partly to the damage done to her by getting aground, the Psyché did not continue more than a few years in the service.

On the 16th of February, at daybreak, in latitude 28° north, longitude 67° west, the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate Cleopatra, Captain Sir Robert Laurie, Bart., saw a ship in the south-east, standing to the east-north-east, with the wind at north-west, and immediately went in chase of her. At 11 A.M. the stranger was discovered to be a large frigate, with 15 ports of a side on the main deck. The Cleopatra, whose force was that of her class,³ with the exception that four of her sixes had been exchanged for ten 24-pounder carronades, making her guns

¹ See vol. iii., p. 759.

² See vol. i., p. 361, and vol. ii., p. 266.

³ See II in the Table at p. 101, of vol. i.

in all 38, cleared for action, and hoisted American colours, to induce the stranger to bring to. Instead, however, of doing so, the latter made more sail. She was the French 40-gun frigate *Ville-de-Milan*, Captain Jeane-Marie Renaud, armed with 46 guns, eight more long 8-pounders than the establishment,¹ no carronades apparently, and her two aftmost main deck guns left at Martinique; from which island she was 19 days, with despatches for France, and with express orders not to speak any thing during the passage.

Under these circumstances, a trial of speed was alone to determine whether or not there should follow a trial of strength. Each ship spread all the canvas she could set, and night left the two frigates still in chase. At daybreak, on the 17th, they were only about four miles apart. The British frigate continued to gain upon the French frigate; and, at 10 h. 30 m. A.M., the *Ville-de-Milan* took in her studding sails, and hauled more up. The *Cleopatra*, as soon as she approached within three-quarters of a mile, did the same. At 11 h. 30 m. A.M. the *Ville-de-Milan* hauled up her mainsail and kept more off the wind; but, upon the *Cleopatra's* steering to close with her upon her quarter, the *Ville-de-Milan* again set her mainsail and staysails, in the hope to gain the wind of her adversary, that being her own best point of sailing. Each ship now hoisted her colours; and, the *Ville-de-Milan* seeming to draw rather ahead, the *Cleopatra*, when at the distance of about half gun-shot, fired her bow-chasers. An occasional well-directed fire in return from the stern-chasers of the *Ville-de-Milan* obliged the *Cleopatra* to steer more upon the latter's quarter; a course which, although it prolonged the chase, became necessary, in order to avoid being raked by what were now discovered to be heavy shot.

At 2 h. 30 m. P.M., latitude at noon $29^{\circ} 24'$ north, longitude $64^{\circ} 20'$ west, just as the *Cleopatra* had got within 100 yards of the *Ville-de-Milan*, the latter luffed close to the wind, and gave her two broadsides. The former, as soon as she had approached to half the distance, returned the compliment, and a warm action ensued; both ships trimming sails, and steering, sometimes close to the wind, and at other times about three points free, in which latter case the *Cleopatra* had considerably the advantage. At about 5 P.M., having shot away the *Ville-de-Milan's* maintop-sail-yard, the *Cleopatra* forged ahead, and this although the mizentopsail was squared and both jib-stay and halliards gone,

¹ See No. 5 in the Table at p. 59 of vol. i.

Having neither fore nor main clue-garnets left by which to haul up the courses, her running rigging being cut to pieces so as to render it impossible to shorten or to back her sails, the main and the spring stay being shot away, and the mainmast supported only by the storm stay-sail-stay, the *Cleopatra* prepared to cross her opponent's bow, so that by luffing up she might rake the *Milan*, in preference to exposing her stern to the latter's powerful broadside. Just as the *Cleopatra* was in the act of attempting this manœuvre, a shot struck the wheel, and the broken spokes, becoming jammed against the deck, rendered the rudder, already choked by splinters, totally immovable.

Availing herself of this ungovernable state of her antagonist, and of her own windward position, the *Ville-de-Milan* bore up and gave the *Cleopatra* her stem; running her head and bowsprit over the latter's quarter-deck, just abaft the main rigging. Covered by a heavy fire of musketry, the French crew now attempted to board, but were repulsed. A continued stream of musketry from the *Ville-de-Milan's* forecastle and tops soon cleared the *Cleopatra's* decks; and all the resistance the latter could offer in return was by two main deck guns, which, as their shot passed in a line with the *Milan's* lower deck, did very little injury. In this dilemma, with her principal sails shivering, or partly aback, and a ship more than a third larger pressing upon her with all the accumulated force of a strong wind and heavy sea, the *Cleopatra* attempted to hoist the foretopmast staysail and set the sprit-sail; but the fire from the French musketry, and from the swivels in the enemy's tops, was too destructive to admit of its being done. At length, at about 5 h. 15 m. p.m., the *Ville-de-Milan* boarded and took possession of her shattered and defenceless antagonist. Almost immediately afterwards the *Cleopatra's* fore and mainmasts went over the side, her bowsprit soon followed; and she lay almost in a foundering state under the bows of the *Ville-de-Milan*.

Being 10 able seamen short of her complement, the *Cleopatra* mustered at quarters, including one supernumerary lieutenant, only 200 men and boys; and several of these were so sick as to be of very little service. Of this comparatively small crew the *Cleopatra* had 16 seamen, three marines, and one boy killed, her first and second lieutenants (William Balfour and James Croke), one acting lieutenant (Charles Mitchell), one supernumerary lieutenant (William Bowen), one lieutenant of marines (Thomas Appleton), her master (John Bell), boatswain (John M'Carthy), one midshipman (Robert Standly), 23 seamen, and seven

marines (two of the latter mortally) wounded: total, 22 killed and dead of wounds, and 36 wounded.

The loss on board the *Ville-de-Milan*, out of a crew, as deposed to by her officers, of 350, although admitted to have been severe, has not been enumerated. The last shot fired by the *Cleopatra* killed Captain Renaud; and a previous shot had badly wounded the frigate's second in command, M. Guillet. The surviving crew of the *Ville-de-Milan*, after the action had ceased, amounted to 340, including the wounded. This would give 10 as the number killed, which is perhaps near the amount. As a proof that the *Cleopatra's* shot had done considerable execution on board the *Ville-de-Milan*, the latter's main and mizen masts went over the side in the course of the night succeeding the action.

Comparative Force of the Combatants.

		Cleopatra.	Ville-de-Milan.
Broadside-guns	No.	19	23
		lbs.	282
Crew	No.	200	350
Size.	tons	689	1097

Had it not been for the carronades of the *Cleopatra*, more than a twofold disparity in weight of metal would here have been exhibited; and, in crew and size, the relative proportion still stands nearly as seven to four. Moreover the *Cleopatra's* was quite a young ship's company, many of the men being under 20 years of age; and of the marines, three only had joined that corps more than two weeks before they embarked in the summer of 1804.

A less ardent mind than Sir Robert Laurie's might have suggested some reasons, and those of a substantial kind, for not persisting to bring to action a ship so decidedly superior. It will not take a particle from the gallantry displayed upon this occasion, to suppose that the mere circumstance of a ship of such apparent force as the *Milan* flying from the *Cleopatra*, tended greatly to augment the confidence of the officers and crew of the latter. But it was not only a 32 hours' chase, a more than three hours' engagement, close engagement, followed. Nor did the *Cleopatra* yield until a fourth of her crew lay dead or disabled upon her decks; until her sails and rigging were destroyed, her masts left tottering, and her riddled hull pressed upon, and nearly borne beneath the waves by the large and heavy body of her antagonist.

Having disengaged his prize, placed on board of her his first-

lieutenant and 49 petty officers and men, shifted the prisoners, and, partially refitted the two ships, Capitaine de frégate Pierre Guillet, the late first-lieutenant of the Ville-de-Milan, slowly continued his route towards a French port. On the 23rd, at noon, the British 50-gun ship Leander, Captain John Talbot, obtained a distant view of the Cleopatra, bearing south, the weather at this time being hazy, with squalls of wind and rain from the northward. The Leander instantly made sail, but, the haze increasing, lost sight of the chase. At 2 h. 30 m. P.M., the weather clearing a little to the southward, the Cleopatra again presented herself to view, and was now made out to be a frigate, under jury-masts, standing to the south-east. At 3 P.M. another and a much larger ship, also under jury-masts and steering the same course, was seen a short distance ahead of the Cleopatra. In about a quarter of an hour the two frigates closed for mutual support. Each then fired a gun to leeward, and hoisted a French ensign at her main stay. At 4 P.M. the Leander arrived within gun-shot. The two frigates immediately separated, the Cleopatra putting before the wind, the Milan steering with it on the larboard quarter. At 4 h. 30 m. P.M., being within half musket-shot of the Cleopatra, the Leander gave her one of the main deck guns; when, after a slight hesitation, the newly-made French frigate hauled down her colours and hove to.

Those of the Cleopatra's original crew that had been left on board now came on deck and took possession of their recovered ship. Observing this, the Leander directed them to follow her, and immediately made sail after the Ville-de-Milan. In another hour the British 50 got alongside of the French frigate; and the Ville-de-Milan, without waiting for the discharge of a shot on either side, surrendered to the Leander. "It is not possible," says Captain Talbot in his official letter, "for officers to speak in stronger terms than the French officers do in praise of Sir Robert Laurie's perseverance in so long a chase, except it is in the praise they bestow upon him, his officers, seamen, and marines, for their gallant conduct during so long and severe an action." These sentiments, no less than the candid avowal of them, reflect the highest honour upon those by whom they were uttered. Captors of every nation may here take a lesson, and learn how much they exalt themselves by a promptitude in doing justice to the merits of an enemy.

The capture of the Ville-de-Milan and the recapture of the Cleopatra, became a sore subject to the French naval writers. They consoled themselves, however, with the idea, that they

could make up a story, which would both gain credit and give satisfaction on their side of the Channel, without its being confuted or perhaps even seen, on the other. They pretended to believe, that the Cleopatra had exchanged her long 12 for long 18 pounders, being ignorant enough, as naval men, not to know, that the ports for the first would not answer for the second caliber ; and, in short, that the ship was scarcely large or strong enough to carry her battery of twelves. The inference meant to be drawn was, that the Cleopatra, in every respect, was the equal of the Ville-de-Milan ; and that, therefore, the victory gained by the latter redounded to the honour of the French navy.

One admission has slipped out, which, as coming from a Frenchman, is rather important, and so precisely applicable to the case of the Cleopatra and Ville-de-Milan, that, offering our acknowledgments, we adopt the very words : " We should seem here " (alluding to an opinion just given) " to be passing sentence upon several French captains, did we not hasten to remark, that, to be equal in force, it is not enough that two vessels be armed with the same guns, in number and caliber, but they ought to be of an equal strength in their hull, masts, and rigging." " Nous semblerions prononcer ici l'arrêt de plusieurs capitaines de vaisseau français, si nous ne nous hâtions de faire remarquer que, pour être égaux en force, il ne suffit pas que deux bâtimens soient armés d'une artillerie pareille, quant au nombre et au calibre, mais qu'ils doivent être d'une égale solidité dans leur coque, leur mâture, et leur grément."¹

All curiosity about the circumstances that attended the capture of the Ville-de-Milan herself is stifled at once by the sweeping falsehood, that the British 40-gun frigate Cambrian was aiding and assisting the Leander in the very difficult task she had to perform. And yet he, whom, after what has already appeared in these pages, it will be no libel to call the imperial fictionist, and who actually took some interest in this particular case, wholly overlooked the circumstance of the alleged interference of a second British ship. " Il paraît," says Napoleon, in a letter to his minister of marine, dated May 10, 1805, " que la Ville-de-Milan a été prise, mais non la Cléopâtre qui s'est sauvée. Les renseignemens que j'ai me donnent lieu de croire que la Cléopâtre était très-loin de la Ville-de-Milan, et n'a pu prendre part au léger combat qui a eu lieu contre le Léandre ; que le commandant de la Ville-de-Milan, voyant que l'état de

¹ Victoires et Conquêtes, tome xvi., p. 66, note.

délabrement où elle était la compromettrait, lui fit le signal de s'éloigner, et que lorsqu'il la vit hors de danger, il amena son pavillon: c'est dans ce sens que vous devez en parler."¹ The last sentence of this account would lead us to infer, that Buonaparte had, in reality, received no intelligence, but was inventing a story to deceive his minister of marine, and, through him, the public.

Our assertion, that the Cambrian had parted company from the Leander on the night of the 15th, and, at the moment of the Ville-de-Milan's capture, was in the act of coming to an anchor in a harbour of the Bermudas, may not carry conviction to the quarter intended; but the depositions of the two principal surviving officers, late belonging to the French frigate, probably will. Both of them, then, have sworn and certified, and the documents are at hand to be referred to, that no other ship than the Leander was present, either at the recapture of the Cleopatra or at the capture of the Ville-de-Milan. That the Ville-de-Milan's late officers were not the authors of the misstatement is clear from the fact, that the writer in the "Victoires et Conquêtes" complains of having no French official account to resort to, and of his consequent inability to specify the loss which the Ville-de-Milan had sustained.

Sir Robert Laurie, in his official letter, rather incautiously stated, that the Ville-de-Milan had "been intended for a 74." This, as being contrary to the fact, very naturally gave umbrage to the French. The truth is, the Ville-de-Milan was a regular frigate, and instead of being, as a contemporary states, "1200 tons,"² was even a trifle smaller than several French frigates which had previously been captured. The ship was afterwards purchased for the British navy, and classed, under the same name, or rather, under that of Milan, as a 38-gun frigate. It affords us pleasure to state, that the first captain appointed to her was Sir Robert Laurie himself; and that Lieutenant Balfour, late senior lieutenant of the Cleopatra, and already named among her wounded, received the promotion which he had so honourably earned.

On the 20th of March the 18-gun ship-sloop Renard, Captain Jeremiah Coghlan, being in latitude 21° 14' north, longitude 71° 30' west, discovered a ship to leeward, standing under easy sail to the north-west. The Renard immediately chased, and the stranger, which was the French privateer Général-Ernouf, Captain Lapointe, shortened sail to engage. At 2 h. 25 m. P.M.,

¹ Précis des Evénemens, tome xi., p. 259.

² Brenton, vol. iii., p. 509.

being on the weather bow of the *Général-Erneuf*, the *Renard* received her fire; but the latter reserved hers until she had dropped within pistol-shot of her opponent. The *Renard* then opened her broadside with such effect, that in 35 minutes the *Général-Erneuf* was set on fire, and in 10 minutes more blew up with a tremendous explosion. Every exertion was now made by the British to save the lives of their late enemies, and the only boat that could swim was launched for the purpose. By this means 55 persons that were floating on the scattered remains of the wreck, the survivors of a crew of 160, were rescued from a watery grave.

The *Renard*'s establishment of guns was 16 carronades, 18-pounders, with two long sixes, and a complement of 121 men and boys; none of whom are represented to have been hurt in the action. The *Général-Erneuf* had been the British sloop-of-war *Lily*, and was armed with 18 English 12-pounder carronades (four more than she mounted when captured by the *Dame-Ambert*¹), and two long 6-pounders. The fatal precision of the *Renard*'s fire shows the high state of discipline of her crew; and the already-established gallantry of her commander² needs no assurance that, had the *Général-Erneuf* been even more formidably armed, her officers and crew would have found it a difficult task to avoid becoming the prize of the *Renard*. It has appeared somewhere in print, that the *Général-Erneuf*, on first coming alongside, hailed the *Renard*, in English, desiring her to strike, and that Captain Coghlan replied, he would strike, and d—d hard too. If the account be true, the captain amply fulfilled his promise.

On the 23rd of March, as the British 18-gun ship-sloop *Stork*, Captain George Le Geyt, was cruising off the port of Cape Roxo in the island of Porto-Rico, a large armed schooner was discovered lashed alongside a brig in the harbour. For the purpose of cutting out this vessel Captain Le Geyt, in the evening, despatched the pinnace and cutter of the *Stork*, containing between them 18 men, under the command of Lieutenant George Robertson, assisted by Lieutenant James Murray.

As the schooner, which was the Dutch privateer *Antelope*, was preparing to heave down on the following day, her five guns were on board the brig, and the two vessels were defended by 40 out of her 54 in crew. Both the schooner and the brig were boarded simultaneously by the two boats, and gallantly carried, without any other casualty to the British than Lieu-

¹ See vol. iii., p. 276.

² See vol. ii., p. 50

tenant Murray and one seaman slightly wounded. The privateer's men having taken to the water soon after the boats got alongside, 15 prisoners were all that were secured.

On the 5th of April, as the British 22-gun ship *Bacchante*, Captain Charles Dashwood, was cruising off Havana, island of Cuba, information was received that there were three French privateers lying in the harbour of Mariel, a small convenient port situated a little to the westward, and defended by a round tower nearly 40 feet high, on the top of which were three long 24-pounders, and round its circumference numerous loop-holes for musketry. The daring and piratical conduct of these privateers, who plundered and maltreated Americans as well as English men navigating the gulf, determined Captain Dashwood, notwithstanding the strength of their position, to endeavour to cut them out. Accordingly, in the evening, he despatched on that service two boats, containing about 35 seamen and marines, under the command of Lieutenant Thomas Oliver, assisted by Lieutenant John Campbell, with directions to attack and carry the fort previously to entering the harbour, so as to secure a safe retreat.

The boats pushed off, and, on nearing the tower, were discovered and fired at. Seeing that no time was to be lost, Lieutenant Oliver, without waiting for his companion, who was astern, pulled rapidly for the shore, in the face of a heavy fire, which badly wounded one man. Leaving in the boat a midshipman, the Honourable Almeida de Courey, and three men, including the one wounded, Lieutenant Oliver, then, with 13 men, gallantly rushed to the foot of the tower, and, by means of a ladder which his men had brought, scaled, and without any further loss carried, the tower, although garrisoned by a Spanish captain and 30 soldiers, of whom two were killed and three wounded. Having performed this noble exploit, left a sergeant of marines and six men as a guard at the fort, and been joined by Lieutenant Campbell and his boat's crew, Lieutenant Oliver proceeded to execute the second branch of the duty assigned him. To the mortification, however, of both lieutenants, the three privateers had, the day previous, sailed on a cruise.

Not to quit the harbour empty-handed, Lieutenant Oliver took possession of two schooners laden with sugar; and which he gallantly brought away from alongside a wharf, in spite of several discharges of musketry from the troops and militia that were pouring down in numbers from the surrounding country. The name of Thomas Oliver among the commanders of the year

shows that this officer's conduct, as all similar conduct ought, excited the notice of those to whom the power belonged of dispensing rewards to the brave and meritorious.

On the 8th of April, at 1 P.M., the British 12-gun schooner *Gracieuse*, midshipman John B. Smith, tender to the 74-gun ship *Hercule*, the flag-ship of Rear-admiral Dacres at Port Royal, Jamaica, cruising off the city of Santo-Domingo, fell in with and captured a large Spanish schooner, bound from that port to Porto-Rico, with passengers. On the 9th, at 6 A.M., the *Gracieuse* chased and fired at a French sloop within gun-shot of the forts of Santo-Domingo, but could not succeed in overtaking her.

At 4 h. 30 m. P.M. an armed schooner was seen coming out of Santo-Domingo, as if to attack the *Gracieuse*. The latter, accompanied by her prize, immediately hauled off shore, in order to have sea-room, should the schooner attempt to retreat. At 8 P.M. the *Gracieuse* shortened sail and hove to, with her prize the Spanish schooner, under her lee-quarter. At 8 h. 30 m. P.M. the armed schooner, which, according to the report of the Spaniards late belonging to the prize, was a French national vessel, edged down within musket-shot, and opened upon the *Gracieuse* a very heavy fire of musketry and great guns. This the latter quickly returned, and a smart action ensued. At 9 P.M. the schooner bore down with an intention to board the *Gracieuse*; but, seeing the opposition she was likely to experience, hauled her wind and renewed the cannonade. At 9 h. 20 m. the attempt was repeated, but again failed. Upon this the schooner made all sail to escape, firing her stern-chasers and musketry. At 11 P.M. she tacked and stood in for the land; and, after receiving from the *Gracieuse* a heavy fire of grape, canister, and musketry until 3 h. 30 m. A.M. on the 10th, the schooner ran on shore upon Point Vizoa.

Finding it impossible to close with the schooner on account of a reef that intervened, the *Gracieuse* hove to about half a mile off. At 4 h. 30 m. A.M., observing the schooner afloat again, and sweeping alongshore, the *Gracieuse* filled and proceeded in chase, and finally compelled the schooner, at 8 h. 15 m. A.M., to run on shore upon Point de Selma. The *Gracieuse* stood in; and, having anchored with a spring in four fathoms, Mr. Smith sent a boat with a hawser, for the purpose of getting off the vessel, whose crew had by this time landed from her bowsprit. The attempt, however, was found impracticable, the schooner having already filled from the number of shot-holes in her hull.

Her force was found to consist of one long brass 12-pounder, mounted on a circle amidships, two long brass 4-pounder carriage-guns, and four brass 3-pounder swivels, with a crew of 96 men. On the next day, the 11th, Mr. Smith, by means of his boats, brought away the long twelve, and set fire to and destroyed the vessel. The service, thus creditably performed, cost the *Gracieuse* no heavier loss than one midshipman (Robert Marley) and two seamen wounded.

On the 15th of April, while the 14-gun brig-sloop *Papillon*, Captain William Woolsey, was lying at an anchor in the harbour of Savana-la-Mar, island of Jamaica, intelligence was received that a Spanish felucca-rigged privateer was cruising off the west end of the island to the great annoyance of the coast. Being apprehensive that, if the *Papillon* stood out after her, the privateer would make her escape, Captain Woolsey borrowed a shallop from one of the merchant-ships in the port, and disguising her as a drogger, despatched her with Lieutenant Peter Stephen Prieur and 25 men, including the purser, Mr. John Christie, who volunteered his services on the occasion, to endeavour to take the privateer by stratagem.

At 8 P.M. the drogger fell in with the privateer close under the land; and Lieutenant Prieur, with great coolness, allowed her to run alongside and make herself fast. He then ordered his men from below, fired a volley of musketry, and boarded, and in four minutes carried, the Spanish privateer *Concepcion*, of one brass 3-pounder and 25 men, well armed and equipped. In this ably-conducted little enterprise the British sustained no greater loss than two men slightly wounded; but the Spaniards suffered severely, having had seven men killed and drowned, and eight badly wounded.

On the 6th of May, in the morning, Cape François in the island of St. Domingo bearing south-west by south distant eight or nine leagues, the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Unicorn*, Captain Lucius Hardyman, discovered a French armed cutter, distant seven or eight miles on her larboard bow. The prevailing calm rendering a chase by the ship impracticable, Captain Hardyman despatched four boats, under the command of Lieutenant Henry Smith Wilson, assisted by Lieutenant James Tait and Henry Bouchier, Midshipman Thomas Tudor Tucker (a passenger from the *Northumberland*), Lieutenant of marines Walter Powell, and the purser Charles Rundle. After a pull of several hours, the boats reached the object of attack, and in the face of a heavy fire of great guns and musketry, boarded and

carried, without the slightest casualty, the French cutter privateer *Tape-à-Bord*, of four long 6-pounders and 46 men, commanded by Citizen Hemigueth.

On the 4th of May the British 38-gun frigate *Seahorse*, Captain the Honourable Courtenay Boyle, while cruising off Cape de Gata, received intelligence that a Spanish convoy, laden chiefly on government account with gunpowder, ordnance, and naval stores for the gun-boats at Malaga, Ceuta, and Algeziras, was upon the coast. Keeping close alongshore, the *Seahorse*, at 2 P.M., discovered the convoy from her masthead, and at 5 P.M., observed the vessels haul into San-Pedro, an anchorage to the eastward of Cape de Gata, under the protection of a fort, two armed schooners, and three gun and mortar launches.

Covered by the fire of the *Seahorse*, her first-lieutenant, George Downie, in the six-oared cutter, assisted by Midshipman Thomas Napper, in the four-oared boat, went in and gallantly boarded and brought out an ordnance-brig, laden with 1170 quintals of powder and various other stores, and commanded by Don Juan Terragut, a master in the Spanish navy. The *Seahorse*, in the mean time, had, as it was believed on board, sunk one of the gun-launches, and damaged, if not sunk, several of the convoy. Finding that the gun-boats, by their well-directed fire, were constantly striking her, having already had her maintopgallantmast, and several braces and bowlines shot away, and one man killed, and wishing to get from the coast while the breeze and daylight lasted, the *Seahorse* discontinued the engagement and stood out to the offing.

On the 27th of May, the British 12-pounder 36-gun frigate *Seine*, Captain David Atkins, while cruising off Aguadilla, island of Porto-Rico, despatched her barge, under the command of Lieutenant of marines Thomas Bland, in pursuit of an armed schooner; which, after some resistance, but no loss on either side, was captured, and proved to be the *Concepcion*, mounting two long 6-pounders, with a crew of 10 men, besides several passengers, who escaped in a small boat. About three weeks afterwards the same enterprising officer, assisted by Midshipman Edward Cook, being on a cruise in the barque and away from the ship, destroyed a Spanish sloop, and captured, after an action of three-quarters of an hour, a second *Concepcion*, a large felucca, bound from Porto-Rico to Cadiz with a cargo of cocoa and cochineal, and armed with two long 4-pounders and 14 men of whom five were severely wounded. No loss whatever was sustained by the barge.

On the 1st of June the British 38-gun frigate Loire, Captain Frederick Lewis Maitland, being off the coast of Spain, discovered and chased a small privateer, standing into the bay of Camarinas, situated to the eastward of Cape Finisterre. The weather becoming quite calm after dark, Captain Maitland despatched the launch and two cutters, with 35 officers and men, under the command of Lieutenant James Lucas Yeo, assisted by Lieutenant of marines Samuel Mallock, master's mate Charles Clinch, and Midshipmen, Massey Hutchinson, Herbert and Matthew Mildridge, to endeavour to bring the vessel out. Owing to the intricacy of the passage, the boats did not reach the point of attack until break of day on the 2nd; when, instead of one, they found two privateers, and these moored under a battery of 10 guns. Ordering the launch, commanded by Mr. Clinch, to board the smaller vessel, Lieutenant Yeo, with the two cutters, gallantly attacked and carried, without loss, the other; which was the Spanish felucca *Esperanza*, *alias* San-Pedro, armed with three long 18-pounders, four 4-pounder brass swivels, and 50 men. Of her complement, when mustered, 19 were found missing, including several that had been killed by the pike and sabre, the only weapons, to prevent discovery on the part of the battery, used by the British. The launch attacked her opponent, a lugger of two 6-pounders and 32 men, with equal success and freedom from loss.

The weather being still perfectly calm, the two prizes close under the guns of the battery, which, since the moment of their capture, had opened an ill-directed fire upon the British, and the distance from the ship precluding all chance of assistance, Lieutenant Yeo was obliged to abandon the small vessel to secure the other. This he at length effected, with the loss of only three men slightly wounded. In his way out with the felucca, Lieutenant Yeo took possession of three small merchant-vessels, laden with wine for the combined squadron at Ferrol.

Receiving information, from some of the Spanish prisoners probably, that a French privateer of 26 guns was fitting out at Muros, and nearly ready for sea, and being acquainted, by having formerly entered it on service, with the navigation of the bay, Captain Maitland resolved to attempt the capture or destruction of the vessel. Accordingly, on the 4th, at 9 A.M., having prepared the Loire for anchoring with springs and settled the plan of attack, Captain Maitland stood into the bay, with the sea-breeze, having in tow the boats, containing 50 officers and

men, under the command of Lieutenant Yeo, assisted by Lieutenants of marines Samuel Mallock and Joseph Douglas, and master's mate Charles Clinch.

As the Loire hauled round the point of Muros road, a small battery of two long 18-pounders opened a fire upon her. A few shot were returned; but, perceiving that the battery, from its commanding situation, would considerably annoy the ship, Captain Maitland directed Lieutenant Yeo to push for the shore and spike the guns. That active officer, with his men, quickly departed, and the Loire stood on. As she opened the bay, the frigate discovered at anchor within it a long corvette, pierced with 13 ports of a side, apparently ready for sea, and a brig-pierced with 10, in a state of fitting; but, as neither of them fired, they were considered to be, and were, in fact, without their guns. This circumstance enabled the Loire to bestow the whole of her attention upon a fort of 12 long 18-pounders, which now opened to view within less than a quarter of a mile of her, and which immediately commenced a well-directed fire at the frigate, almost every shot striking her hull. Perceiving that, by standing further on, more guns would be brought to bear upon her, and that the Loire would still be at too great a distance to fire her guns with any effect, Captain Maitland ordered the helm to be put down; and, as soon as she had run a little closer in, the frigate anchored with a spring, and opened her broadside. So completely, however, were the Spaniards in the fort covered by their embrasures, that the frigate's fire, although well directed, was comparatively ineffectual. After a few minutes of this unequal warfare, during which the Loire had nine of her seamen wounded, three of them dangerously (one having his leg above the knee, and another the calf of his leg, shot off), the fire from the fort ceased; and, as a reason for it, the British union was just then making its appearance above the walls.

We will now quit the frigate awhile, and attend to the party on shore. Lieutenant Yeo, whom we left proceeding to storm the battery on the point, landed under it; but, as he and his men advanced to execute the service, the Spaniards in the battery, amounting to 18, including eight artillerymen, abandoned their guns and fled. Scarcely had the British seamen time to spike the two 18-pounders, when, at the distance of about a quarter of a mile, and close to the entrance of the town of Muros, was descried the fort, whose destructive cannonade upon the frigate has already been related, and which had just

then commenced its fire. Notwithstanding that it was a regular ditched fort, and appeared a very strong one, relying upon the bravery of his followers, and, in a case of such imminent danger to the ship, readily incurring the responsibility of exceeding his orders, Lieutenant Yeo resolved to attempt its immediate reduction.

Not suspecting an attack by land, and being wholly occupied in firing at the frigate, the garrison had left open the outer gate of the fort. Through this a French sentinel, having fired his musket, retreated, and was quickly followed by the van of the storming party. At the inner gate the garrison, headed by the governor, stood ready to oppose the British; but Lieutenant Yeo, setting a noble example to his men, sprang forward, and, attacking the governor sword in hand, laid him dead at his feet, breaking his own sabre by the force of the blow. The contest now became most severe; the greater part of the officers, who had advanced with the governor, shortly experiencing a similar fate from such of the British as the narrowness of the entrance had permitted to be at hand to second their gallant leader. The boldness and vigour of the assault was irresistible, and the remainder of the garrison, although numbering, at that time, 90 or 100 effective men, fled to the farther end of the fort; from the embrasures of which many of them leaped upon the rocks, a height of about 25 feet. Shortly after this, the survivors within the fort laid down their arms, and the British colours were hoisted on the flagstaff.

Considering the force opposed to them, which at the beginning of the attack consisted of 22 Spanish soldiers, several Spanish gentlemen and townsmen, volunteers, and about 100 of the crew of the French privateer *Confiance*, at anchor in the harbour, the British were fortunate in escaping with only six slightly wounded; Lieutenant Yeo, Mr. Clinch the master's mate, three seamen, and one marine. The loss on the part of the garrison was extremely severe: the governor of the fort, a Spanish gentleman who had volunteered, the second captain of the *Confiance*, and nine others were killed; and 30, including nearly all the officers of the privateer, were wounded.

The character of this achievement, as it here has been detailed, is too obvious to need elucidation by any remarks that can be offered. Yet we cannot quit the subject without showing, to what an extent the brave man's attributes, modesty and humanity, were possessed by the officer who had so distinguished himself on the occasion. Not a word is to be found in *Lieutenant*

Yeo's letter respecting the personal conflict between himself and the Spanish governor. It is Captain Maitland who discloses the fact, and who states that he derived it from the testimony of the prisoners, and of those who accompanied his first-lieutenant to the attack. As a proof that the tenderest sympathy may exist in the boldest heart, we here quote the concluding words of Lieutenant Yeo's letter to Captain Maitland: "To their credit as Englishmen, as well as (to the credit of) their profession, the instant the fort was in our possession, they (the seamen and marines) seemed to try who could be the first to relieve and assist the poor wounded prisoners, who were lying in numbers in different parts of the fort; and I had the pleasure to see their humanity amply repaid by the gratitude the unfortunate men's friends expressed when they came to take them away."

The twelve 18-pounders being spiked and thrown over the parapet, the carriages broken, and the embrasures, with a part of the fort, blown up, the British taking with them 40 barrels of powder, two small brass cannon, and 50 stands of arms, retired from the scene of their exploits to their boats on the beach, and soon pulled back to the Loire. Captain Maitland, meanwhile, had, by an officer and boat's crew, taken quiet possession of the two unarmed French privateers, also of a Spanish merchant-brig in ballast. The *Confiance* was a ship of 490 tons, and had carried 24 guns on a flush deck; probably long 6-pounders, or 18-pounder carronades;¹ her ports being too close together and too small for any higher caliber of long gun or carronade. The brig was the *Bélier*, the same probably that, in the spring of 1803, carried out despatches to Rear-admiral Linois in the East Indies.² Her guns, stated to be 18-pounder carronades, were also on shore; and the vessel herself was quite in an unprepared state, having only her lower rigging overhead.

As soon as possession had been taken of these vessels, Captain Maitland sent a flag of truce to the town, with a message to the effect that, if the inhabitants would deliver up such stores of the ship as were on shore, they should receive no further molestation. This proposal was readily agreed to; and the British brought off all the stores of the *Confiance*, except her guns; which, as the embarkation of them would have occupied some

¹ The guns are called by Captain Maitland twelves and nines; but he evidently had not seen them, nor is it clear that those had who made the report.

² See vol. iii., p. 208.

time, and a large body of troops was in the vicinity, were left behind. A great many small merchant-vessels were afloat in the bay and hauled up on the beach ; but, having a just sense of the inhumanity of depriving the poorer inhabitants of the means of gaining a livelihood, and knowing that the cargoes of such vessels as had any would be worth little or nothing to the captors (of which others, besides himself and his ship's company, formed a part), Captain Maitland left them untouched. As if to give the finish to an exploit so gallantly begun, and so handsomely concluded, the bishop and one of the principal inhabitants of Muros came off to the Loire, to express their gratitude for the orderly behaviour of the British seamen and marines, who had not, they acknowledged, committed one act of pillage, and to offer to Captain Maitland and his officers every refreshment which the place afforded.

Immediately on arriving home, Lieutenant Yeo received his well-earned reward in the commission of commander, and sailed upon his first cruise in the ship which he had been so instrumental in capturing. On the 21st of December, 1807, Captain Yeo was promoted to post-rank, but retained the command of the *Confiance*, by her captain's elevation, now raised in rank from a sloop to a post-ship. It is singular that, although no increase was or could be made in her armament (22 carronades, 18-pounders, and two sixes), the *Confiance* had her complement increased from 121 to 140 men and boys.

On the 13th of June, in latitude 29° north, longitude 62° west, the British 18-pounder 40-gun frigate *Cambrian*, Captain John Poer Beresford, despatched her boats under the command of Lieutenant Robert Pigot, to attack the Spanish privateer schooner *Maria*, of 14 guns and 60 men. Lieutenant Pigot, with the launch as the leading boat, gallantly boarded the privateer ; and, assisted by Lieutenant the Honourable George Alfred Crofton in the barge, gallantly carried the vessel in spite of a stout resistance. Just as this had been accomplished the other boats succeeded in getting up. The loss sustained by the British, in this very spirited enterprise, amounted to two seamen killed and two wounded.

On the 3rd of July, after a chase of 22 hours, the *Cambrian* overtook and captured the French privateer schooner *Matilda*, of, according to Captain Beresford's public letter, "20 guns, 9-pounders ;" but, taking this to be a typographical error (no unfrequent case in the *London Gazette*, as we have already shown), we shall say, of 10 long 8-pounders, and 95 men. The

schooner surrendered in very shoal water ; and, but for the exertions of Lieutenant Pigot with one of the boats, every soul in the privateer would in all probability have been lost.

Having placed Lieutenant Pigot and a party of officers and men on board the prize, Captain Beresford despatched her to St. Mary's river, forming the southern boundary of the United States of America, in search of a Spanish schooner privateer and two captured merchant-ships. On the 6th, Lieutenant Pigot arrived off the harbour of St. Mary's, and on the 7th proceeded 12 miles up the river, through a continual fire from the militia and riflemen stationed on the bank. On arriving within gunshot of the three vessels, he found them lashed in a line across the river ; the privateer being armed with six guns and 70 men, the ship, which was the Golden Grove, late of London, with eight 6-pounders, six swivels, and 50 men, and the brig, which was the Ceres, late of London, with swivels and small-arms. The Matilda immediately opened her fire, and continued it for an hour until she grounded. Lieutenant Pigot then took to his boats ; and, in spite of an obstinate resistance, carried the ship. With her guns he obliged the enemy to quit the brig and schooner ; and, after taking possession of them, he turned the fire of all three vessels upon the militia, about 100 in number, drawn up on the bank, with a field-piece. These he at length completely routed ; but, owing to adverse winds, was not, until the 21st, able to descend the river with his prizes and rejoin the Cambrian.

The loss sustained by the British in this very gallant affair amounted to two men killed and 14 wounded, including among the latter Lieutenant Pigot himself, by musket-balls in three places, two in the head and one in the leg. That brave and enterprising officer would not quit the deck, except to have his wounds dressed, during the whole time this arduous service was performing. The 14 wounded also included master's mate, William Lawson (severely) and Midshipman Andrew Mitchell. Three other midshipmen, Messrs. Thomas Saville Griffinhoofe, Henry Bolman, and George Williamson, are spoken of in similar terms of approbation by Captain Beresford in his despatch. The loss on the Spanish side is represented to have amounted to 25 seamen killed, including five Americans, and 22 seamen wounded. For the gallantry, perseverance, and ability he had displayed, Lieutenant Pigot was justly promoted to the rank of commander.

In the early part of July the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate

Blanche, Captain Zachary Mudge, quitted the squadron of Commodore Michael de Courcy cruising off the east end of Jamaica, bound to the island of Barbadoes, with despatches for Vice-admiral Lord Nelson. On the 17th, when about 40 leagues to the westward of the island of Sombrero, the *Blanche* spoke a British merchant-ship from Grenada to Dublin, and learnt that the homeward-bound Leeward-island fleet were to sail in three or four days after her departure, under convoy of the 20-gun ship *Proselyte*.

On the 19th, at 8 A.M., latitude 20° 20' north, and longitude 66° 44' west, being close hauled on the larboard tack, with a fresh breeze at east, the *Blanche* discovered off the weather cat-head four sail, three ships and a brig, standing on the opposite tack, under easy sail; and which, from the course they steered, and their indistinct appearance through the prevailing haze, were taken for a part of the above-mentioned convoy. The *Blanche* therefore continued to stand on, until, having hoisted the customary signals without effect, Captain Mudge began to suspect that the strangers were enemies, and, making sail, kept more away. At 8 h. 30 m. A.M., when about three miles distant, the French 40-gun frigate *Topaze*, Captain François André Baudin, followed by the ship-corvettes, *Département-des-Landes*, of 20 long 8-pounders on the main deck, and two brass 6-pounders on the poop, or short quarter-deck, Lieutenant René-Jacques-Henri Desmontils, and *Torche*, of 18 long 12-pounders, Lieutenant Nicolas-Philippe Dehen, and by the brig-corvette *Faune* of 16 long 6-pounders, Lieutenant Charles Brunet,¹ bore down under English colours.² "But," says Captain Mudge, in his public letter, "from the make of the union and colour of the bunting, with other circumstances, I concluded they were French."

At 9 h. 45 m. A.M.,³ having advanced still more ahead of her companions, and, as well as they, substituted French for English colours, the *Topaze* discharged her larboard broadside into the starboard quarter of the *Blanche*; who, finding that she could not escape from her pursuers (having at the time very little

¹ Captain Mudge names this officer as commanding the *Torche*.

² The British official account makes the bearing down take place "at ten." This must be another mistake; for, if the French ships were on the *Blanche*'s "weather cat-head at eight, on the opposite tack" to her, it could scarcely have taken them even as much as half an hour to get "abreast:" whereas, at the end of two

hours, namely, till 10 A.M., the two parties, each steering an opposite course, would have been many miles apart. This mistake is important, as it leads to several others in the minutes of the action that ensued.

³ Here again occurs a variation, but it will be best explained when we come to the close of the action.

copper upon her bottom), had shortened sail, and was at the distance of about 500 yards from the Topaze. As soon as the latter arrived within pistol-shot, the Blanche returned the fire, and the action continued with spirit; all the vessels running large under easy sail, "the ships," continues Captain Mudge, "never without hail of each other, the Département-des-Landes on the starboard quarter, and the two corvettes close astern." At about 10 h. 15 m. A.M., the Blanche attempted to cross the bows of the Topaze, and would probably have succeeded, had not the latter suddenly hauled up her foresail, and put her helm hard a-starboard. By this manœuvre the Topaze grazed with her jib-boom the mizen shrouds of the Blanche, and in passing under the latter's stern, poured in a heavy but comparatively harmless raking fire. The engagement continued until about 11 A.M.:¹ when, having her sails totally destroyed, 10 shot in her foremast, several in her mainmast, her rigging cut to pieces, seven of her guns dismounted, and six feet water in the hold, the Blanche struck her colours. At this moment, according to M. Baudin's account, the Département-des-Landes was in the wake of the Blanche, the Torche within gun-shot on her starboard side, and the Faune farther off, "en observation."

The net complement of the Blanche was 261 men and boys; but, having 28 men absent, and being deficient of some others, she commenced the action with only 215. Of these the Blanche had seven seamen and one marine killed, her boatswain (William Hewett), 12 seamen (three mortally), and one lieutenant (Thomas Peebles), and one private of marines wounded. The Topaze had a crew of 340 men and boys, exclusively, Captain Mudge says, of 70 officers and privates of the French army as passengers, making a total of 410. Of these, according to Captain Baudin's account (and there is nothing in the British account to contradict the statement), the Topaze had but one man killed and 11 wounded, two of them mortally. Not a man appears to have been hurt, nor the slightest damage to have happened, on board either of the three remaining French vessels.

The French captain also states, that the Département-des-Landes fired only 18 shot, and the Torche, towards the close of the action, three broadsides. The Faune, upon the same authority, did not fire a shot. Moreover, Captain Baudin positively declares, that Captain Mudge acknowledged to him, that

¹ At noon, according to Captain Mudge's letter; but, as respects the duration of the action, the only important point, the Brit-

ish and the French accounts exactly correspond. See note ², preceding page.

the Département-des-Landes was the only vessel, except the *Topaze*, which had done the *Blanche* any injury, and that injury was confined to the rigging and sails.

The *Blanche*, a fine frigate of 951 tons, was armed upon her quarter-deck and fore-castle with 14 carronades, 32-pounders, and four long nines; making her total of guns 44. The *Topaze*, a remarkably fine frigate of 1132 tons, also mounting 44 guns, including 10 iron carronades, 36-pounders, the first of the kind we have observed in the French navy. The force of the three corvettes has already been given.

Without the aid of a comparative statement, sufficient appears to show that the *Blanche* had, although not a "three to one,"¹ a very superior force to contend with; and that no resistance in her power to offer, without some extraordinary mishap to her principal antagonist, could have absolutely reversed the issue of the battle. By a more close and animated cannonade at the onset, the *Blanche* might, perhaps, have beaten off the French frigate. In that event, the British frigate, if necessary, could have outrun the corvettes, they, as admitted, being slow sailers; or she might have drawn them apart from their consort, and have captured one at least of them. This, if done promptly, and before much damage had been suffered by the *Blanche* or her prize, would have greatly reduced the odds, and been an additional motive for Captain Baudin to have permitted the *Blanche* to proceed to her destination.

The moderate loss sustained by the *Blanche* would lead us to infer that she struck too soon; as would the much lighter loss inflicted by her upon the *Topaze*, that the *Blanche* did not employ her force in a manner becoming a British frigate of her class. M. Baudin states, from the information probably of Captain Mudge himself, that he put more than 30 shot in the *Blanche*, both above and below water; but what was that to perform in a two hours' engagement? He boasts, with greater reason, of having wounded the masts, and cut to pieces the rigging and sails, of his prize, and assigns the delay it would cause to repair them as his motive for setting the *Blanche* on fire. And we feel the more disposed to attach credit to the statements of M. Baudin, on account of the uncommon accuracy with which he describes the force of his prize, giving her "vingt-seize canons de 18 en batterie, quatorze carronades de 32 et quatre canons de 9 sur les gaillards."

Although scarcely five years old and an oak-built ship, the

Blanche had become so thoroughly infected with the dry-rot, that the enemy's shot passed clean through her side, scattering dust instead of splinters. To this, and to her short-manned state, has been mainly attributed the smallness of the *Blanche's* loss, in reference to the time the ship was engaged, the force opposed to her, and the alleged closeness of the action.¹ As respects the British frigate, this reasoning may carry weight; but how are we to explain the truly insignificant loss sustained by the French frigate; as well as the entire state of impunity which, notwithstanding their alleged important share in the action, attended the three corvettes? The *Topaze*, as the British records prove, was a sound ship four years after she had captured the *Blanche*, and went into action, Captain Mudge himself informs us, with a crew nearly twice as numerous as his own.

Admitting, as Captain Mudge alleges, that the *Blanche* did really engage the *Topaze* closely, what was she about with her guns not to do more execution than to kill or wound one man every 10 minutes, or 12 men in two hours? This is the more unaccountable, because the crew of the *Blanche* were a remarkably fine set of men, and the very last from whom such treatment of an enemy was to be expected. If, contrary to what has been officially asserted, the *Blanche*, having mistaken the national character of the *Topaze* and her consorts until the French frigate had begun to open her fire, had been all in confusion when the attack commenced; if, instead of endeavouring to retrieve her error by a prompt and vigorous application of her means of defence, the *Blanche* had sought to avoid a combat by a hurried resort to her means of escape, firing an occasional ill-directed shot at one or the other of her opponents: if, we say, all this had been the case, the very cheap rate at which M. Baudin gained his prize would need no other explanation.

The duty of an historian, who, in most cases, has to elicit truth from conflicting statements, has often obliged us to animadvert, with more or less of severity, upon the bombastical accounts published by the French. In common fairness, therefore, we cannot avoid noticing the three letters, one official and two private, written by the captain of the *Blanche*, and published in all the English, and some of the foreign newspapers. Two of those letters, including the official one, are dated on one day, the 22nd of July. One of the two private accounts is in the

¹ The same cause, although we omitted to notice it, contributed to the slight loss sustained by the *Wilhelmina* in her action with the *Psyché*. See vol. iii., p. 269.

form of an extract from the *Blanche's* log, thus:—"July 19th, at 8 A.M., fell in with a squadron of French ships cruising; at 11 in close action with the same; at half-past 11 reduced to a perfect wreck, ship filling fast; at 12 struck the colours, and at 6 she sank."

The official letter requiring to be more circumstantial and precise, the "French squadron as per margin" is made to consist, with a slight overrating in the force, of the three ships and brig described in our account of the action. "I concluded they were French," says the captain, "and therefore determined to sell the ship as dearly as possible." As a proof that he did so, he declares that a quarter of an hour (not half, as stated in the above private account) before the *Blanche* struck, she was a "perfect wreck;" meaning, not, as might be imagined, that her masts were all shot away, but that her sails were "totally destroyed," and that she had "ten shot in the foremast (expecting it to fall every minute), the mainmast and rigging cut to pieces." The inference here is, making every allowance for figurative language, that the mainmast, being "cut to pieces," was actually in a tottering state. Unfortunately, however, the surgeon of the *Blanche*, in his letter, published on the same day as his captain's, sums up the damages to her masts thus: "Eleven shot received in our foremast, several in the mainmast, and the spanker-boom shot away."

"The crew reduced to 190," proceeds Captain Mudge in his letter, "and the rest falling fast, with no probability of escape, I called a council of officers for their opinion," &c. He then states the surrender of the *Blanche* "at 12 at noon," and that he was immediately "hurried on board the commodore." "At 6," he adds, "the officers who had charge of the *Blanche* returned, and reported the ship to be sinking fast; on which she was fired, and in about an hour after she sunk,¹ for the magazine had been some time under water." In a postscript the captain states, that the ship commenced action with 215 men, and that the loss, as far as came within his notice, amounted to eight killed and 13 wounded. The surgeon, in his letter, states the loss (and he was the officer whose duty it was to report it) at eight killed and 15 wounded, making a total of 23. This number, deducted from 215, leaves 192 men; and yet "the crew was reduced to 190, and they were falling fast."

Captain Mudge's second private letter, according to the public papers, was addressed to his brother-in-law, and bears date on

¹ "At 6 she sank." See the private account above.

board the *Topaze*, August 10. "On my return from Jamaica to Barbadoes," he says, "I fell in with M. Baudin's squadron, cruising for our homeward-bound convoy. I fought the ship till she was cut to pieces, and then sunk. I cannot say what our loss is, as there have been no returns, the crew being all divided between the two frigates and two corvettes which engaged us. Twenty-one fell nobly within my own knowledge: I am afraid many more. I thank God the *Blanche* never wore French colours.¹ Lieutenant Thomas Peebles, of the marines, was the only officer materially wounded: his legs were broken by a splinter. During the severe contest, the squadron was never without hail. I have the consolation of knowing they were so much damaged as to spoil their cruise; they all stood to the northward as soon as repaired, leaving the passage open to the convoy under a 20-gun ship."²

After what has appeared, this letter will require very few comments. We may, however, just notice the extensive application given to the word "fell," as well as the singular circumstance, that Captain Mudge should have had "no returns" of loss, when the late *Blanche*'s surgeon was a fellow-prisoner with him on board the *Topaze*; and when, three days previous to the date of the captain's letter to Major Fletcher, the surgeon had enumerated that loss in a letter to a friend.

One of Captain Mudge's "two frigates," by his own account, mounted 22 guns. Nor was the *Département-des-Landes* so large, or so well armed a ship as the *Constance*, which, in the year 1800, gave Captain Mudge his post-rank; and which, had he fought a battle in her, he would have been very indignant to have heard called a "frigate." M. Baudin was not "on a cruise," but bound straight from Martinique to France, and, besides being in the direct track to Europe, had made an excellent three days' run. The convoy, which did not sail from Tortola until 12 days after the *Blanche*'s capture, was therefore not the French captain's object; nor was the *Proselyte* its only protection, the *Illustrious 74* and *Barbadoes* frigate being in her company.

We will conclude this case with stating, that, although she was "filling fast," at "half-past 11," the *Blanche* did not sink till late in the evening; and not then, the wet state of her magazine preventing an explosion, until she had been burnt to

¹ Nearly the same words occur in the official letter:—"Thank God she was not destined to bear French colours, or to assist the fleet of the enemy."

² See *Naval Chronicle*, vol. xiv., p. 186.

the water's edge by her captors; nor until they had removed every man of her crew, wounded and well, and, no doubt, as many of her stores as they required. Nor, even at this time, had one of her masts fallen. The surgeon says, that the *Blanche*, when she struck, had six feet water in the hold; which accords tolerably well with Captain Baudin's expression, "Déjà de l'eau était dans sa calle," and accounts for his preferring her immediate and certain destruction by fire, to awaiting her tardy, and perhaps, in his opinion, doubtful destruction by sinking. In a respectable French account, M. Baudin is blamed for having destroyed the *Blanche*, when, according to the information afforded to the writer, he might so easily have manned and refitted her.¹

Now that we have taken the trouble to sift the chaff from the grain, we confess our inability to discover anything calculated to distinguish this case of defence and surrender from others that have occurred; not, at least, on the score of superior merit. Captain Mudge defended his ship until he thought it useless to waste more blood; for we are called upon fairly to state, that, after the first half-hour's action, escape was almost impossible, without some very unlikely accident should have happened to his determined opponent.

After having effectually disposed of his prize, Captain Baudin, with his little squadron, made the best of his way home. On the 14th of August, in the evening, when in the latitude of Rochefort, and about 200 leagues from it, the British 20-gun ship *Camilla*, Captain Bridges Watkinson Taylor, discovered and pursued the *Faune*, who had rather separated from her companions. On the 15th, at daylight, the 74-gun ship *Goliath*, Captain Robert Barton, joined in the chase, and at 8 A.M. the *Faune*, with, not, as Captain Mudge had stated, 123, but with 98 men on board (exclusive of 22 late of the *Blanche*), was captured. While the *Camilla* and the prize steered for England, the *Goliath* continued her course to the southward; and, in the same afternoon, just as the latter was joined by the 64-gun ship *Raisable*, Captain Josias Rowley, the *Topaze* and the two ship-corvettes were discovered and chased. The corvettes, by signal, separated from the frigate: one, the *Département-des-Landes*, effected her escape; but the other, the *Torche*, at about 8 P.M., was captured by the *Goliath*, and had on board, not "213,"² but 196, of her own, and 52 of the late *Blanche*'s men.

On the 16th, at daybreak, the *Raisable* and *Topaze* found

¹ *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvi., p. 150.

² Official letter of Captain Mudge.

themselves singly in each other's sight; the latter about three miles ahead of the former, and both ships steering to the southward, under all sail, with a fresh northerly wind. At 9 A.M., when the wind, having begun to fall, was favouring the weather-most ship, and gradually approximating the two, the *Topaze* hoisted her colours, and opened from her stern-chasers a steady and well-directed fire of round and grape, evidently for the purpose of crippling the *Raisable*. At 9 h. 30 m. A.M., by which time her foretopsail had been completely riddled, and her lower studdingsail halliards shot away, the *Raisable* hoisted her colours, and commenced firing her bow-guns at the frigate, then nearly becalmed. In another 10 minutes, and just as she was bringing her broadside to bear, the *Raisable* became also becalmed. Shortly afterwards, on a light breeze springing up from the westward, the *Topaze* wore round, and hauled to the wind on the starboard tack. The *Raisable* succeeded after a while in doing the same; but the frigate, having first got the wind and being on her favourite point, left the former fast, wounding the 64's rigging with her stern-guns, and sending a shot through her main-yard. The *Raisable* continued the chase, but after it became dark saw no more of the *Topaze*; who, with the loss of three men wounded from her opponent's fire, steered for Lisbon, and on the 20th anchored in safety in the *Tagus*.

Shortly after the arrival of the *Topaze* at Lisbon, the British consul, Mr. Gambier, applied for and obtained the release of Captain Mudge and such of the late *Blanche*'s officers and crew as had been transferred to the French frigate. During the stay of Captain Mudge in the Portuguese capital, the French official account, copied from the *Moniteur* of the 12th of September, appeared in the Lisbon papers. In that account M. Baudin not only represented the capture of the *Blanche* as having been effected by the *Topaze*, without any material assistance from either of her consorts; but, judging from the impunity with which his ship and her crew had escaped, insisted that, had the *Topaze* been alone, the same result would have ensued.

On the 14th of October, which was soon after their return to England, Captain Mudge, and the late officers and crew of the *Blanche*, were tried by a court-martial, at Plymouth, for the loss of their ship, and most honourably acquitted. The following has appeared in print, as the speech of Captain John Sutton, the president of that court, on returning Captain Mudge his sword:

“ I feel the greatest satisfaction and pleasure in the discharge of this part of my duty, having to convey to you the just sentiments which the members of this court entertain of your very able and gallant conduct in the defence made by you of his majesty’s late ship *Blanche*, against a very superior force of the enemy’s ships; and likewise of the spirited support afforded you by the officers of every description, as well as the seamen and royal marines, under your command, in the discharge of their duty; and which reflects upon you and them, on that occasion, the highest degree of merit and approbation.”¹

Without meaning to say a word in disparagement of courts-martial in general, we may observe, that an investigation of the causes which have led to the capture of one ship by another ship, or by a squadron of ships, can never be satisfactorily carried on, while the parties to be tried are the only witnesses to be examined. Where one ship of a fleet misconducts, or is supposed to misconduct herself in action, a host of disinterested witnesses may be obtained from among the ships in company. But, where a ship, cruising alone, is engaged by, and surrenders to, an enemy’s ship or ships, that advantage is lost; and, as the smallest boy on board feels himself implicated in the sentence which a court-martial has to pronounce upon the officers and crew, the evil follows of which we have just complained. It is this ex-parte mode of proceeding that has occasioned us, in frequent instances, to blame captors for not doing justice, in their official statements, to the exertions of an unsuccessful antagonist; in order that the public at large, as well as the small conclave assembled to try the crew of the captured ship, may see the grounds upon which a defence, like that of the *Blanche*, is declared to have displayed “very able and gallant conduct” on the part of her commander.²

On the 3rd of August the British 54-gun ship *Calcutta*, Captain Daniel Woodriff, sailed from the island of St. Helena, with the *Indus* Indiaman, three whalers, and two other ships, under her protection, bound to Europe. On the 14th of September she fell in with the British merchant-ship *Brothers*, of London,

¹ See *Naval Chronicle*, vol. xiv., p. 341.

² There cannot be any blame imputed to Captain Mudge for the surrender of his ship; she was fought until she had six feet water in her hold, and all seamen know, that in such a state, a ship is little calculated to escape. The force opposed to her was certainly more than double; and a court-martial having acquitted Captain

Mudge, the public may rest satisfied, that the different captains who formed the court, delivered their opinions conscientiously, that the *Blanche* was bravely defended, and only surrendered when it was hopeless to continue the contest. The discrepancies in the letters referred to are hardly worth notice.—Ed.

which had separated in a gale of wind, along with many other ships, from a fleet of 200 sail, in charge of the 74-gun ship *Illustrious*, from the Leeward Islands.¹ Being very leaky and short of provisions, the Brothers requested and obtained the protection of the *Calcutta*, but was so ill-found, and sailed so heavily, that she detained the convoy at least one-third of its hitherto daily run.

On the 25th of September, at noon, being in latitude $49^{\circ} 30'$ north, and longitude about 9° west, the *Calcutta* discovered several ships in the west-north-west. It was then nearly calm, but a light breeze from the westward enabled the strangers to approach fast. Night came on; and the *Calcutta*, doubtful yet whether her pursuers were friends or foes, kept between them and her charge. At daylight on the 26th the strangers neared the *Calcutta* considerably; all owing to the slow progress of the Brothers. At 11 A.M. the *Calcutta* made the private signal, and, having by noon received no answer to it, hailed the *Indus*, and directed her to make all possible sail ahead with the convoy. The *Calcutta* then dropped astern to speak the Brothers; and Captain Woodriff strongly recommended the master of her to haul upon a wind to the northward, which the latter immediately did.

The Rochefort squadron, which had sailed out under Rear-admiral Burgues-Missiessy on the 11th of January, returned to port on the 20th of May. For some reason, not unconnected, perhaps, with the proceedings of that squadron at the island of Dominique, and which we shall by-and-by have to relate, the French emperor dispossessed M. Missiessy of his command, and appointed M. Allemand, late of the *Magnanime* and the senior captain of the squadron, in his stead. As soon as the ships had refitted, M. Allemand received directions to take the earliest opportunity of putting to sea. He was first to proceed off the Lizard; there to wait awhile for Vice-admiral Ganteaume: if the Brest fleet did not make its appearance, the rear-admiral was to steer for the bay of Biscay, and endeavour to join the combined fleet on its return from the Antilles: if foiled here also, M. Allemand was to proceed straight to Vigo, to await his further instructions. On the 12th of July, as has already been stated, Rear-admiral Stirling, with his squadron of five sail of the line, by orders from Admiral Lord Gardner, raised the blockade of the road of Aix;² and on the 16th M. Allemand weighed and put to sea, with his squadron, consisting of the

¹ See p. 43.

² See vol. iii., p. 353.

Gun-ship.

120	Majestueux ¹	. . .	{ Rear-admiral Zach.-J.-Théodore Allemand.
			{ Captain Etienne-Joseph Willaumez.
74	{	Magnanime . . .	,, Pierre-François Violette.
		Jemmapes . . .	,, Jean-Nicolas Petit.
		Suffren . . .	,, Amable-Gilles Troude.
		Lion . . .	,, Eléonore-Jean-Nicolas Soleil.

Frigates, Armide, Gloire, and Thétis.

Brig-corvettes, Sylphe and Palinure.

On the next day, the 17th, the squadron captured the British 18-gun ship-sloop Ranger, Captain Charles Coote;² but the crew, on seeing that their fate was inevitable, had so damaged the ship, that M. Allemand was obliged to set her on fire. While waiting at his first point of rendezvous, with the additional object in view of intercepting the Illustrious and her convoy, of whose expected arrival two or three captured stragglers had already apprised him, the French commodore fell in with the Calcutta and her convoy; and to what extent he succeeded there we will now proceed to show.

Having taken the steps already noticed for the security of her convoy, the Calcutta made sail to intercept a French frigate, the Armide, of 40 guns, which lay upon her starboard bow, and was drawing up fast with the merchantmen. At 3 P.M., having passed ahead clear of the Calcutta's broadside, the Armide began firing her stern-chasers, and received, in return, the bow-guns of the British ship. After a while, however, the French frigate shortened sail and allowed the British 50 to get abreast of her; when both ships opened their fire, but without any material effect, owing to the distance preserved by the Armide, and to the Calcutta's leading off to the southward, to favour the escape of her convoy, then in the east-north-east. At the end of an hour, the Armide having hauled out of gun-shot, disabled in her rigging, the firing ceased.

This partial cannonade had brought down the whole French squadron, except the Sylphe brig, which had been detached after, and very soon captured, the creeping Brothers. At 5 P.M. the headmost line-of-battle ship, the Magnanime, began firing her bow-chasers at the Calcutta; who still running under all sail to the southward with a light northerly breeze, discharged

¹ In the English translations of the old French navy-lists this ship rates as a 110. Either there was a mistake in this, or the ship had since been lengthened; for, to a certainty, the force of the Majestueux in 1805 was precisely that of the 120-gun ship in the small Table at p. 59 of the first

volume, except that four of her 8-pounders had been withdrawn from the cabin and two brass carronades added to the four on the poop, making her guns in all 122.

² The French say, "of 24 guns," and that, in reality, was the number, including carronades, which the Ranger mounted.

her stern guns at the former. Finding that the *Magnanime* was alone and unsupported upon his starboard-quarter, and the 40-gun frigate *Thétis* at a somewhat greater distance on the larboard-quarter, Captain Woodriff resolved, as the only chance of escape left, to attack and endeavour to disable the 74. With this intent, the *Calcutta* put her helm a-port, and, as soon as she got within pistol-shot, commenced an action with the *Magnanime*. The latter promptly returned the fire, and the cannonade continued, without intermission, for three-quarters of an hour. By the end of that time, having of necessity begun the engagement with all sail set, the *Calcutta* found herself completely unrigged and unmanageable. Her escape being rendered impracticable, as well by her disabled state, as by the near approach of the remaining ships of the French squadron, the *Calcutta* hauled down her colours.

The *Calcutta* had been an Indiaman, and, ever since her purchase in 1795, had been employed as a transport until September 1804, when she was fitted for sea as a cruiser, and armed with 28 long 18-pounders on the lower deck, and 26 carronades, 32-pounders, and two long 9-pounders on the upper deck. The *Calcutta* was a flush ship, and therefore had no detached quarter-deck.¹ Her established complement was 343 men and boys: of these she had six killed and the same number wounded. That the loss on board the *Calcutta* was not greater may be attributed to the high firing of the French ships, whose object evidently was to disable her rigging. In this they so completely succeeded, that the French were obliged to keep the *Calcutta* in tow two days before they could refit her sufficiently to enable her to carry sail. This delay, combined with the course which Captain Woodriff had led the squadron in pursuit of him, enabled the *Illustrious* and her valuable fleet to pass unmolested into the Channel.

It is almost superfluous to state, that the sentence of the court-martial, subsequently assembled to try the officers and crew of the *Calcutta* for the loss of their ship, contained an honourable acquittal of all on board of her, as well as a high encomium upon Captain Woodriff for the skill and bravery he had displayed. The circumstances under which the *Calcutta* was captured do, indeed, reflect very great credit upon her officers and crew. Captain Woodriff's judgment was as conspicuous as his gallantry; and both united saved all his convoy from

¹ See this explained, vol. i., p. 17.

capture, except one slug of a vessel which endangered the others, and occasioned, beyond a doubt, the loss of the *Calcutta* herself.

The Rochefort squadron proceeded straight to Teneriffe, to repair the damages of the *Calcutta* and *Magnanime*, and to take on board a supply of water and provisions. On the 17th it again sailed, and although sought for in every sea, continued cruising until the 23rd of December. On that day M. Allemand, with his prize the *Calcutta*, and about 1200 prisoners, the crews of the latter, and of the *Ranger* sloop, *Dove* hired cutter, and 43 merchant-vessels, which he had destroyed during his 161 days' cruise, anchored in safety in the road of the Isle of Aix.

Having hitherto paid particular attention to M. Linois and his squadron, we shall continue, as far as our limited means will permit, to trace him through the remainder of his long sojourn in a distant, but to him not unproductive, quarter of the world. We left the French admiral at rather an inglorious moment; just as the *Marengo* and her two attendant frigates had been foiled in a combined attack upon the 50-gun ship *Centurion*, in Vizagapatam road.¹ After this, the squadron and merchant-prize (thus making it not quite a bootless enterprise) quitted the Coromandel coast, and steered straight for the Isle of France. Bringing in with him a rich prize which he captured on the passage, M. Linois, on the 1st of November, arrived at Port Louis, and found lying there the *Belle-Poule*, in company also with a prize of some value. One or more of the *Centurion's* shot having struck the 74's hull under water, and the ship in other respects wanting repair, the *Marengo* was here hove down.

On the 22nd of May, 1805, after a stay of nearly six months, during which she had undergone a thorough refit, the *Marengo* sailed on her third cruise, accompanied by the *Belle-Poule* only, the *Atalante* having previously quitted port on a cruise off the Cape of Good Hope, and the *Sémillante*, since the 6th of March, having been detached to the Philippine islands, with the intelligence of the war between England and Spain.

On the 11th of July, off the coast of Ceylon, having cruised unsuccessfully near the entrance of the Red Sea, M. Linois fell in with the Brunswick Indiaman, Captain James Ludovic Grant, in company with the country-ship *Sarah*. The latter, being considerably to windward, made for the land, and although pursued by the *Belle-Poule*, ran on the breakers. The *Sarah*

¹ See vol. iii., p. 286.

was totally lost, but her crew fortunately escaped sharing her fate. The Brunswick, after a slight and ineffectual resistance, was taken by the Marengo.

Receiving intelligence that a superior British force was in this quarter, the French admiral steered towards the Cape of Good Hope. On the 6th of August, in latitude $19^{\circ} 9'$ south, longitude $81^{\circ} 22'$ east, at 4 P.M., in thick hazy weather, the French squadron, then close upon a wind on the larboard tack, standing to the southward and westward, discovered, at about four miles' distance on the lee bow, a fleet of 10 Indiamen, under convoy of a two-decked ship-of-war, steering to the northward. This was the British 74-gun ship *Blenheim*, Captain Austen Bissell, bearing the flag of Rear-admiral Sir Thomas Troubridge, Baronet, bound with a convoy to Madras; where, on his arrival, Sir Thomas was to supersede Rear-admiral Sir Edward Pellew as commander-in-chief to the eastward of Ceylon.

As the *Marengo* and *Belle-Poule*, with French colours hoisted, wore astern of the fleet, the *Brunswick*, by signal, kept her wind, and soon lost sight of her two companions and the enemy. At about 5 h. 30 m. P.M. the *Marengo*, ranging up, opened a distant fire upon the lee-quarter of the *Cumberland* Indiaman, Captain William Ward Farrer (a participator in Commodore Dance's gallant affair), and followed by the frigate, engaged, in passing, several others of the Indiamen. Observing that the *Blenheim* was lying by for them, the two French ships then reserved their fire until they came abreast of her, when a smart cannonade ensued. Owing, however, to the great swell that prevailed, the *Blenheim* could not open her lower-deck ports:¹ hence the British 74 had only a battery of 18-pounders, with a few nines and carronades, to oppose to the whole united broadsides of the French 74 and frigate. Notwithstanding this inferiority, M. Linois did not remain long within gun-shot, but passed on under all sail; interchanging broadsides occasionally with the remaining ships of the convoy, until, at about 6 P.M., he had run ahead of them all.

The *Blenheim* sustained no injury in material except a few shot-holes in her topsails; but unfortunately, a Mr. Cook, a passenger and a fine young man, was killed by a piece of langridge while standing on the quarter-deck. The *Ganges*, also one of the *Marengo's* acquaintances of the 15th of February,

¹ And yet a contemporary dwells upon the effect produced upon M. Linois by the *Blenheim's* "lower-deck guns." See *Bren-*

ton, vol. iii., p. 352. The same writer adds the *Atalante* frigate to the French admiral's force.

1804, but now commanded by Captain Thomas Talbot Harrington, had one man killed by an 8-pound shot. In the half-hour's action that occurred, no other ship in the convoy appears to have sustained any damage or loss.

The *Marengo* received a shot through the fish of her mainmast. Another shot struck her fore-yard; a third passed through the poop; and several perforated her sails. Her loss, according to the French official account, consisted of only eight men slightly wounded. The *Belle-Poule* had her cross-jack yard carried away in the slings, and her foresail so much cut that she was obliged to shift it: the frigate was also twice hulled under the chess-trees, and had two men wounded.

About midnight the French 74 and frigate crossed the hawse of the *Blenheim*, and at daylight lay to about four miles on the weather-bow of the convoy; the ships of which also lay to, in line of battle, expecting a renewal of the attack. At 7 A.M., the *Marengo* and frigate filled and bore down to reconnoitre, but, when about two miles off, again hauled to the wind. At 2 P.M. the *Blenheim* filled and set topgallantsails, and the *Indiamen* also made more sail, still preserving their line. This steady front probably decided the intention of M. Linois, who at 9 P.M. tacked to the southward; while the British convoy pursued its course in an opposite direction, and on the 23rd of the month arrived in safety at Madras.

On the 2nd of August, at 1 h. 30 m. P.M., as the British 38-gun frigate *Phaëton*, Captain John Wood, and 18-gun brig-sloop *Harrier*, Captain Edward Ratsey, were entering the Straits of St. Bernadino, Philippine islands, a strange frigate was discovered lying at an anchor in the road of St. Jacinta. We left the French 36-gun frigate *Sémillante*, Captain Léonard-Bernard Motard, on her way to apprise the governor-general of these islands of the war between Spain and England. The frigate arrived in time to frustrate any attempt at surprise on the part of the British; and, as a further benefit to the settlement, Captain Motard undertook to proceed to Mexico, and bring back a cargo of specie, the want of which was most severely felt at the Philippines, it being two years since the last galleon had arrived. Scarcely had the *Sémillante* quitted Manilla on her voyage, than intelligence that two British cruisers were then among the islands induced Captain Motard to anchor in the road of St. Jacinta; where he knew there were batteries to protect him.

Immediately on discovering the British vessels, the *Sémillante* began warping in-shore, between a battery on the south point of

St. Jacinta and a reef of rocks; in which operation the French frigate was assisted by several boats, and subsequently by her sails, which she loosed in order to take advantage of a light air that sprang up from the north-east. At 2 h. 40 m. P.M., hoisting French colours and a broad pendant, the *Sémillante* commenced firing her stern-chasers at the *Harrier*; from whom the *Phaëton* was then distant about three miles in the north-west. The battery began firing also; and in two minutes afterwards the *Harrier*, being off the north point of the bay, opened her star-board broadside at the frigate. Finding the water to shoal from ten to seven, and then to five and four fathoms, the brig hove to; but still continued a smart fire, receiving a fire in return from the battery and frigate.

At a few minutes past 3 P.M. the *Phaëton* got up and joined in the cannonade; and a round-tower now added its fire to that of the battery at the south point. The British frigate and sloop, although from the difficulty of the navigation and the lightness of the breeze, unable to close as they wished, continued to engage. At 4 P.M. the brig wore and fought her larboard guns, and at 4 h. 30 m. P.M. caught fire in her larboard-waist hammock-cloths, supposed to have been caused by red-hot shot fired from the battery. The fire, however, was soon extinguished. The weather now became nearly calm, and the brig, in consequence, began driving towards the reef. At 5 P.M., finding that the *Phaëton* could not get alongside of the French frigate without warping, and that his boats would, in such a case, run the risk of being cut to pieces by the shot from the battery, Captain Wood ceased firing and hauled off, and signalled Captain Ratsey to do the same. The *Harrier*, by means of her boats, towed her head round; and, in a minute or two afterwards, the action ended.

The *Phaëton* had her sails, rigging, and some of her masts, particularly her mizentopmast, damaged by the enemy's fire. Three of her boats were also injured, and she received nine shot in her hull; but, fortunately, the frigate had only two men wounded. The *Harrier* having, from her nearness to the shore at its commencement, bore the brunt of the action, suffered rather more than her consort. Her rigging and sails were much cut, and all her boats more or less damaged. Her masts were also injured, particularly her mainmast, which she was obliged to fish to prevent it from falling. The fire from the *Sémillante* and batteries had been aimed chiefly at the rigging of the two British vessels; and that it was which occasioned the

Harrier's loss to be no greater than the Phaëton's, two men wounded.

The British stood off for the night, and at daylight on the 3rd, having a fine breeze off-shore, tacked and stood in to reconnoitre. They found that, during the night, the *Sémillante* had warped herself close to the beach; and that, for her further protection, a six-gun battery had been erected on the north point. The Phaëton and Harrier waited off the road until the morning of the 4th; when, finding the French frigate still in the same place, they made sail, and ran through the Straits of St. Bernadino.

What loss the *Sémillante* sustained, in this two hours and a half's engagement, is not recorded in any French account; but it was afterwards understood at Calcutta, that she had 13 men killed and 36 wounded. With respect to the damage done to her hull and masts, all we know is, that she suffered so much as to prevent her from proceeding on her voyage to Mexico. "*La Sémillante avait été très-maltraitée dans ce combat; elle fut forcée de renoncer au voyage du Mexique,*"¹ is an admission that places that fact beyond a doubt.

On the 20th of July, in compliance with the repeated request of Vice-admiral Sir Robert Calder, cruising off Cape Finisterre, to be furnished with a few additional frigates, Admiral Cornwallis, the commander-in-chief of the Channel fleet, detached to join the former the 38-gun frigate *Niobe*, Captain Matthew Henry Scott. On the 29th the 18-pounder 32-gun frigate *Æolus*, Captain Lord William Fitz-Roy, parted company from the Channel fleet upon the same destination; and Lord William was directed, in his way across the bay of Biscay, "to be very careful to obtain intelligence of the enemy's squadrons, if either of them should have put to sea from Rochefort or Ferrol;" and, on falling in with any such squadron, his lordship was to continue, if possible, in sight, until he had ascertained its route, &c.

Scarcely had the *Æolus* made sail upon her mission when the Nile lugger, with despatches from Sir Robert Calder, joined the fleet. These despatches, besides indicating the exact spot at which Sir Robert would be found, requiring to have their contents acknowledged, the admiral threw out to the *Æolus* the signal of recal. The frigate accordingly put back. Having received, with Sir Robert Calder's rendezvous (38 leagues north-west from Cape Finisterre), a letter from Admiral Cornwallis to

¹ Dictionnaire des Batailles, &c., tome iv., p. 5.

Sir Robert, acknowledging the receipt of the latter's despatches, apprising the vice-admiral that they had been forwarded to England, and that he had, some days since, sent the Niobe, and was now sending the Æolus, to join him, Lord William sailed again to the westward.

On the 5th of August, very early in the morning, latitude $45^{\circ} 55'$ north, longitude $9^{\circ} 28'$ west, the Æolus, standing to the westward with the wind at north by west, discovered and bore up for seven strange sail in the south-south-east. At 6 h. 15 m. A.M. one of the seven strangers, evidently a frigate and detached from her consorts, boarded a merchant-ship in the south-east, and shortly afterward set her on fire. At 8 A.M., perceiving that the strangers were an enemy's squadron of five sail of the line, one frigate, and one brig, the Æolus hauled to the wind on the larboard tack, with her head about north-east by east, for the purpose apparently of watching their movements. These vessels, with a frigate or two not then in company, were really the French squadron from Rochefort, so particularly adverted to by the orders under which Lord William had been detached from the Channel fleet. "If," says Admiral Cornwallis, "you should fall in with a squadron of the enemy's ships, continue, if possible, in sight until you can ascertain their route, and then push on before them to make it known to me, or the officer commanding on that station, to which they seem to point their course."

At 10 A.M. the French squadron, which appears to have been lying to, was joined by a frigate and a brig from to-leeward. At 3 h. 30 m. P.M., being then distant from the Æolus about 12 miles in nearly the same direction as when first discovered, the French squadron bore up and steered east-south-east. At 5 P.M. the Æolus, still with her head to the north-east, lost sight of the French squadron. Shortly afterwards the frigate bore away to south; but at 6 h. 40 m. hauled up on the starboard tack, and made all sail in search of the vice-admiral.

On the 7th, in the forenoon, the Æolus brought to an American ship from Bordeaux to Charlestown, and learnt that, two days before, she had been boarded, off Cape Prior, by the British 74-gun ship Dragon, Captain Edward Griffith, cruising in company with eight other sail of the line. As this was undoubtedly the squadron of Vice-admiral Sir Robert Calder, the Æolus, then only 38 leagues distant from Ferrol, crowded sail in the direction of that port.

At 4 P.M., latitude at noon $43^{\circ} 41'$ north, longitude $10^{\circ} 11'$

west, being close hauled on the larboard tack with a light breeze from the north-north-east, the *Æolus* discovered and chased a strange sail in the south quarter, standing under easy sail to the north-west. This was the French 40-gun frigate *Didon*, Captain Pierre-Bernard Milius, two days from Corunna, in search of the squadron from Rochefort under Rear-admiral Allemand, for whom she had important despatches.¹ At 4 h. 30 m. P.M. the *Didon* tacked towards the *Æolus*; but shortly afterwards, on ascertaining that the latter had no connexion with M. Allemand's squadron, the French frigate bore up south-west. The *Æolus* bore up also, and continued in chase until 7 h. 30 m. P.M.: when, having approached near enough to discover that the ship was an enemy's frigate, "with yellow sides, and royal yards rigged aloft," the *Æolus* shortened sail and hauled to the wind on the starboard tack: that is, while the French frigate continued running from the British frigate in the direction of south-west, the British frigate altered her course from south by west to north-west by west. These diverging courses soon shut out each frigate from the other's view; and at about 8 h. 30 m. P.M. the *Æolus* wore round on the larboard tack and resumed the course she was steering when the *Didon* first hove in sight.

While, with light and variable winds, the *Æolus* is slowly making her way to the eastward, we will submit a few remarks upon the very extraordinary circumstance of two frigates, each belonging to a nation at war with the other, voluntarily parting without a contest.

Let us first see how far, on the score of relative force, either of these ships might feel justified in declining to engage the other. Could any circumstance connected with the old rating system of the British navy excite surprise, we should find it in the admiralty-order which classed the *Narcissus*, of 894; *Tartar*, of 895; *Amphion*, of 914; *Æolus*, of 919; and *Medusa*, of 920 tons, all, except the first, built in the year 1801, as 32-gun frigates; while, by another admiralty-order, the four frigates of the same year, the *Meleager*, of 875; *Iphigenia*, of 876; *Shannon*, of 881; and *Tribune*, of 884 tons, were registered as 36-gun frigates. Each class mounted 26 long 18-pounders on the main deck; but the 36s were established with twelve 32, the 32s with ten 24, pounder carronades: making, with four long nines, the total number of guns of the one class 42, and of the other 40. All five of these 32-gun frigates were, however, constructed to carry, and some of

¹ See vol. iii., p. 373.

them subsequently mounted, 42 guns. In point of complement the difference was 10 men; giving to the 36-gun frigate 264, and to the 32-gun frigate 254, men and boys, including the three widow's men. At the time of her meeting the *Didon*, the *Æolus*, according to an entry in her log, mounted the 40 guns established upon her class; but she appears to have mustered at quarters, having probably manned one or two prizes, no more than 233 men and boys.

The *Didon* was a very fine frigate of 1091 tons, and mounted two more guns than the establishment of her class, as given at p. 59 of the first volume, or 46 guns in all; of which 10 were iron (similar to those of the *Topaze*¹), and four the usual brass, 36-pounder carronades. The crew of the *Didon*, according to the deposition of her officers in reference to an action fought by her three days after she had parted from the *Æolus*, amounted to 330 men and boys. These minute but important particulars established, we may present the following as the

Comparative Force of the Two Frigates.

		<i>Æolus.</i>	<i>Didon.</i>
Broadside-guns	{ No.	20	23
	{ lbs.	372	563
Crew	No.	233	330
Size	tons	919	1091

This figure-statement, compared with that in which appears the name of the *Loire*, a ship of the same numerical force as the *Didon*,¹ shows the effect produced in the broadside weight of metal of French frigates by the substitution, to so great an extent, of 36-pounder carronades for long 8-pounders. In the present instance it gives a superiority of nearly three to two; whereas, in long guns only, the *Didon* is not superior to the *Æolus* by much above an eighth. But, according to that rigid law, the custom of the service, the larger of these differences, important as it is, does not excuse a British ship, even if aware that the odds are in that proportion against her, from bringing, or endeavouring to bring, an enemy to action.

Respecting the cause, whatever it may have been, which prevented the *Æolus* from continuing in pursuit of the *Didon*, we shall postpone any further inquiry until we have brought down the proceeding of the *Æolus* to a somewhat later period, and have dipped a little deeper into a new and very important source of information, which the account of Lord William's rencounter with the *Didon*, as it stood in the first edition of this work, has

¹ See p. 40.

² See vol. ii., p. 159.

recently opened to our view. We may here explain how it happens that the case of the *Æolus* and *Didon*, instead of being, as in the old edition, mixed up with the affair between the latter and another British frigate, ranks in the present under a distinct sub-head. It will be sufficient to remind the reader that, when first introducing the head of "Light Squadrons and Single Ships," we stated our intention to notice under it, among others, every case wherein vessels met, "between which, from the relative situations of the parties as to force and other circumstances, an action might reasonably have been expected."¹

Pursuing her route towards the north-west coast of Spain, the *Æolus*, on the 9th, at 6 h. 40 m. p.m., Cape Prior bearing south-east half-east distant five or six leagues, fell in with the *Dragon*, hastening to Sir Robert Calder with the important information that the Franco-Spanish fleet had got into Ferrol and Corunna.² At 6 h. 50 m. the *Æolus* asked, by signal, the situation of the admiral, and communicated in the same manner, that she had been "chased" (No. 406) by an enemy's squadron of five sail of the line. The *Dragon* acquainted the *Æolus* by signal, that the British admiral was in the north-east by east; and in that direction the frigate immediately accompanied the 74. At day-break on the following day, the 10th, the 98-gun ship *Neptune* was fallen in with; and in an hour or two afterwards, the remainder of the Vice-admiral's squadron. Captain Griffith now communicated to Sir Robert the important result of his second reconnoitring visit to Ferrol, and Lord William delivered to the Vice-admiral the letter or letters (for we believe there was a private one) with which he had been intrusted. Shortly afterwards, taking his measures from the *Dragon*'s information, Sir Robert ordered the latter ship to cruise for a certain period, and then, with the remainder of the squadron, proceed to join the commander-in-chief off Ushant. This the vice-admiral effected, as already mentioned, on the 14th;³ but the *Æolus*, having for some cause or other parted company, did not join Admiral Cornwallis until the forenoon of the 20th.

To view the case of the *Æolus* in the most favourable light, we must suppose that Lord William, as in reply to our former remarks on his conduct he has since stated, did really imagine that he was the bearer, not of a letter which, comparatively, was of no consequence at all, but of secret despatches of the utmost importance to the nation. We can readily conceive why

¹ See vol. I., p. 97.

² See vol. III., p. 371.

³ *Ibid.*

a document, containing the rendezvous of a particular squadron is inscribed on the envelope "Secret." It is that the captain may not communicate the contents to any of his officers, nor they to the crew. Otherwise, in case of capture, should even the despatch itself be thrown overboard, the enemy might gain oral intelligence of the exact spot at which he could pounce upon an inferior force. Why not "Rendezvous," with an understanding that it is to be kept within the captain's breast, substituted for the awfully mysterious word "Secret"? And why should a common letter from one admiral to another, with one or more of which almost every vessel is charged that travels from station to station, be dignified with the name of "despatch"?

It is not improbable that the *Niobe* had one of those "despatches" in her letter-bag; and yet, what does her captain do? Why, according to the frigate's log (for we have had no communication with a single officer belonging to her), on the 5th of August, in latitude $47^{\circ} 6'$ north, longitude $14^{\circ} 24'$ west, the *Niobe* fell in with a strange ship, which Captain Scott pursued for three days and nights. At length the strange frigate, or whatever she was, escaped from the *Niobe*; and Captain Scott, instead of joining Sir Robert Calder agreeably to the express tenour of his orders, joined Lord Nelson, and returned with the latter to the Channel fleet. With whatever private censure the *Niobe's* captain may have been visited for this deviation from his orders, a few months only elapsed ere Captain Scott received a public approval of his conduct in being appointed, as the lists inform us, to the *Goliath* 74.

Since the publication by Lord William Fitz-Roy, with so much seeming triumph, of the orders under which he sailed, we are still more surprised that he should have considered his junction with Sir Robert Calder as the only object worthy of his serious attention. Was he not directed to watch, and attend till he ascertained its route, any enemy's squadron he might fall in with, particularly one expected to be at sea from Rochefort, and another from Ferrol? Well, the *Æolus* falls in with the Rochefort squadron early in the morning, hovers to windward of it till 5 P.M., then permits it to go its way. In a few days afterwards the *Æolus* falls in with a French frigate detached from the Ferrol squadron, also named in Lord William's orders.¹ The *Æolus* approaches near enough to make out the stranger

¹ As upon these orders much of the gist of this case depends, we have inserted them in the Appendix. See Nos. 1 and 2.

to be an enemy's frigate; then abandons her, for the sake, as alleged, of delivering in safety the letters with which she is charged.

But the most extraordinary circumstance of all, is the delusion under which Lord William laboured as to the supposed effect produced by the due delivery of the packet he was carrying. "The *Secret* nature of my orders," he states, "none but myself on board were acquainted with, and the immense importance of the despatches in question, which by recalling Sir Robert Calder's whole squadron, and his being afterwards detached by Admiral Cornwallis with a larger one, subsequently led to the important victory obtained by Lord Nelson on the 21st of October of that year, sufficiently proves that in making them my first object I was attending more to the honour and interest of my country than if I had *disobeyed* instructions so plainly marked out, merely for the *chance* of personal profit or distinction. It is, indeed, evident that the responsibility which would have attached to me, had such despatches failed of reaching their destination, involved consequences of greater magnitude than the censure of Mr. James, or of any ill-judging individual."¹

To attempt a serious refutation of the statement thus (we will only say) unadvisedly put forth, would be wasting our own and the reader's time. What else but some such motive imposes silence upon the Dragon's captain, the present Vice-admiral Edward Griffith Colpoys? Was, may we ask, "the chance of personal profit or distinction" the only chance that Captain Lord William Fitz-Roy would have had to look to, had the *Æolus* succeeded in bringing the *Didon* to action? Of "personal distinction" there would have been an excellent chance; but, then, it must be the distinction that is founded, in a great degree, upon the personal danger, which is the never-failing attendant of a struggle for mastery between two fighting ships.

But the captain of the *Æolus* has recently found a champion who, and he is of the naval profession too, will insist that "the character of Lord William Fitz-Roy remains as pure and unblemished as that of any of his most distinguished brother officers."² After a few preliminary observations, among which is the following: "It is sometimes the duty of an officer not to fight; and the sacrifice of reputation, though painful, is indis-

¹ A Brief Statement arising out of a passage contained in the third volume of James's Naval History of Great Britain,

on the conduct and character of Lord William Fitz-Roy, in the year 1805.

² Brenton, vol. iii., p. 388.

sensible," Captain Brenton inserts at length the second order given to Lord William Fitz-Roy, and then proceeds thus: "Let us next see what steps were taken by Lord William in execution of these orders, for which purpose we turn to his log-book; where every transaction in which his ship was concerned is minutely related; and, above all, that transaction which it is asserted should have covered him with disgrace, so clearly exposed, and so openly stated, as to leave us nothing to desire. His lordship explicitly declares, that the strange ship *was* a frigate; and he inserts in the public record of his ship every step which was taken while she was present." The writer then gives, as an extract from Lord William's log, the following words, italicised and punctuated in the manner here shown:— "At four o'clock, stood for a suspicious ship, in the S. S. E. which at *six bore up and made all sail*—the *Æolus* did the same—at half-past seven, the stranger, still running away, shortened sail and hauled to the wind, the *ship a frigate with yellow sides and royal yards; rigged aloft.*"¹

What will Captain Brenton say when he finds, that he has either made use, by mistake, of an extract from some other ship's log, or that he has had palmed upon him, for the captain's log of the *Æolus* (and certainly the description given of the *Didon* is a tolerably just one), a spurious production? The readiest way to prove this will be to subjoin an extract from that which bears the signature of Lord William Fitz-Roy, and is deposited at the navy-office as the genuine log kept by his lordship when captain of the *Æolus*. Here, then, follow the proceedings of the day on which the *Didon* was fallen in with, precisely as they are minuted in the log last referred to: "4, 5, saw a strange sail S^o. made sail in chace 4, 30 the chace tacked & immediately bore up. 7, 30 shortned sail & came to the wind on the st^d. tack, A.M. &c." Signed "William Fitz-Roy."

The log of the master of the *Æolus*, Mr. Francis Prior, chiefly differs from the log of her captain, just quoted, by containing, after the entry of "shortened sail," the following words, as the reason for having done so: "The chase apparently an enemy's ship of war."

Although Captain Brenton's third volume issued from the press within little more than three, and the part devoted to the subject in question must have been written within less than two months from the publication of Lord William's pamphlet, which

¹ Brenton, vol. iii., p. 336.

was to remove the imputation cast upon his lordship's character by the facts disclosed in the first edition of this work, we find an abandonment of that line of defence upon which, to all appearance, Lord William so confidently rested. For instance, by his pamphlet, Lord William declares, in effect, that the secret nature of his orders, and the importance of the despatches of which he was the bearer, induced him to forego the pleasure of attacking the *Didon*; but, having since undeceived himself, apparently, as to his having been sent to recal Sir Robert Calder, and thereby been in any way instrumental "to the important victory obtained by Lord Nelson on the 21st of October,"¹ Lord William instructs Captain Brenton to dwell upon the necessity which he was under, to hasten to Sir Robert Calder with the intelligence of his having fallen in with the Rochefort squadron. Accordingly his lordship's apologist says: "On his way to join the vice-admiral, he fell in with the Rochefort squadron, with whose movements it became a serious part of his duty to make himself acquainted; seeing them burn a merchant-vessel in the morning of the 6th, he watched them narrowly during the whole of that day, and having lost sight of them in the evening, Lord William proceeded in search of the vice-admiral."

Passing by the (we will not say studied, but) highly advantageous obscurity thrown over the time when the French squadron was first discovered by the *Æolus*, as well as the error in the date of burning the merchantman, we will merely advert to what might have been the consequences to Ireland, had Captain Countess, of the *Ethalion*, in September, 1798, been contented with such a "narrow watching" of the *Hoche* and her consorts.² An overweening zeal generally defeats its object. Why need Captain Brenton have laid so much stress upon the necessity that Lord William Fitz-Roy was under of acquainting himself with the movements of a French squadron, which he suffered to make sail from him without an effort to follow it, unless can be called so, the bearing up of the *Æolus*, for a short time, after the enemy had disappeared?

In reference to the *Didon*, Captain Brenton proceeds: "That Lord William did not pursue her, was an exemplary act of obedience to his orders. A night's chase would have led him entirely off the station on which he was so urgently directed by his admiral to seek for Sir Robert Calder, and on which he had,

¹ See p. 60.

² See vol. 4., p. 140.

within 24 hours, seen an enemy's squadron, and gained intelligence of a British squadron being very near him." "On the following morning, at daylight, he fell in with Sir Robert Calder, delivered his despatches, and gave him all the important intelligence of which, by his lordship's log, he appears to have been in possession."¹

Well, what did Sir Robert Calder do, on receiving this intelligence, for which, according to Captain Brenton, the captain of the *Æolus* had "sacrificed his reputation?" Did he not immediately make sail in search of the Rochefort squadron? On the contrary, Sir Robert Calder bent his course towards the Channel; detaching the *Dragon* to ascertain, we rather think, the probable route of that squadron, and, allowing the *Æolus* also to part company, for the purpose, not improbably, of affording to Lord William a chance, unshackled by any orders or despatches, of again meeting the *Didon*.

As a further means of showing the unfounded nature of the charge, that "Lord William Fitz-Roy had run away," Captain Brenton sneeringly says of Captain Milius, of the *Didon*: "The very reverse is the fact. The French captain thought proper to run, and on the 10th fell in with the *Phoenix*." Fortunately for his reputation, Captain Milius, on that very 10th of August, gave a decided proof that, if he had "run away" on the 7th, it was not from any lack of bravery. Enough has already appeared in these pages to show the immense importance which Napoleon attached, and not without reason, to the concentration of his fleets: and the *Didon* was expressly detached from Corunna, to seek the Rochefort squadron, and conduct it to the Franco-Spanish fleet under M. Villeneuve. We have, also, on more than one occasion shown, and shall again and again have to show, that French admirals and captains are frequently restricted by their orders from fighting, unless in the way of defence, or that the odds are so great in their favour as almost to insure success.

Before we dismiss the case of the *Æolus* and *Didon*, we feel bound to mention, as some excuse for any deficiency which may be complained of in the account, that we have been debarred from our usual sources of information by a knowledge of the peculiar situation in which Lord William Fitz-Roy has generally stood with respect to the officers under his command. It is on this account that we have refrained from applying to the officers belonging to the *Æolus* in August, 1805, could we, indeed, from

¹ Brenton, vol. iii., p. 387.

the rapid manner in which, about the same period, the lieutenants of that frigate succeeded each other, have ascertained which of them was on board when the *Æolus* fell in with the *Didon*.

Although some years intervened between this occurrence and the dismissal of Lord William Fitz-Roy from the navy, for having ill-treated one of his officers,¹ and although his lordship, for some reason with which we are unacquainted, was restored to his rank in five months after he had been thus solemnly degraded, and at present actually stands in the list among the officers rewarded for meritorious services,² we shall not, we find, have occasion again to introduce his lordship's name. For that reason we take this opportunity of disclaiming all "malevolence of intention"³ towards Lord William Fitz-Roy. On the other hand, we should indeed be unfit for the office we have undertaken, did we allow the adventitious circumstances of high birth and extensive patronage to sway us in our remarks upon the conduct of individuals. Had the *Æolus* engaged the *Didon*, and, after a well-fought action, been compelled to yield to superior force, we do not believe that Lord William Fitz-Roy would have been tried for disobedience of orders. But, had he been so, and a condemnation been the result, we would have strained every nerve to show the injustice of the sentence, and doubt not that we should have succeeded in satisfying every unprejudiced mind, that the captain of the *Æolus* had acted in the noblest manner.

As to the supposed evil consequence which would ensue to the public from the protracted, or even the non, delivery of despatches,⁴ we think, with submission, that it has been much overrated. At all events, let the order to the commanding officer of the despatch vessel signify, in the plainest terms, that he is not to deviate from his course to chase any suspicious vessel. And, should he then discover an enemy's ship of his own class in a situation to be pursued or attacked, let the captain muster his officers and men, and read to them the peremptory clause in his orders. But, where an officer, from the obscure wording of his orders, is in doubt on the subject, or where, like Lord William Fitz-Roy, he is directed to do that

¹ Court-martial held April 6 and 7, 1811. See the *Naval Chronicle*, vol. xxv., p. 349, and vol. xxvi., p. 397.

² The participation of Lord William Fitz-Roy in the victory obtained by Sir Richard Strachan (see p. 10), and, above all, the baronet's rather extraordinary se-

lection of the *Æolus* to carry home his despatches, appear to have been the grounds upon which Lord William obtained his companionship of the Bath.

³ A Brief Statement, &c.

⁴ *Breiton*, vol. iii., p. 388.

which is incompatible with a countenance in the course he is directed to steer, he will find that, on the score of character, to which, notwithstanding the light manner in which a contemporary treats "the sacrifice of reputation," some attention is due, the safer alternative is always to fight.¹

On the 10th of August, at 5 A.M., latitude 43° 16' north, longitude 12° 14' west, the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate Phœnix, Captain Thomas Baker, standing on the starboard tack with the wind at north-east by east, discovered a sail in the south-west, and immediately bore up in chase. The weather being hazy and the wind light, it was not until 7 A.M. that the stranger, then on the larboard tack with foresail and royals set, but with her mizen topsail aback and maintopsail shivering, was made out to be an enemy's frigate, "with yellow sides, and royal yards rigged aloft." The ship was, in fact, the French frigate Didon; who, since the evening of the 7th, had stood leisurely to the west-south-west, and was now only 32 leagues, or thereabouts, from the spot at which the *Æolus* had fallen in with her.

Why the French captain, having so important a service intrusted to him, should wait to engage an enemy's frigate of the apparent force of the one bearing down, may require to be explained. The fact is, that on the day previous the Phœnix had fallen in with an American vessel from Bordeaux bound to the United States. The master came on board with his papers, and was evidently not very sober. After selling some cases of claret, he requested to be allowed to view the quarters of the Phœnix. No objection was made; and he went round the ship, saw as much as he could see, and departed on board his vessel. On the next morning early he fell in with the Didon; and, in return for the hospitable treatment he had received on board the Phœnix, told Captain Milius, that the ship whose topgallant-sails were then just rising out of the water to windward, was an English 20-gun ship, and that her captain and his officers thought so much of their vessel, that, in all probability, they would venture to engage the Didon. The French frigate then

¹ The Editor begs distinctly to disclaim any participation in the personalities in which *all* parties on this occasion seem to have indulged. Lord William was the best judge as to the importance of his orders. Every remark tending to throw any slur upon his character would have been erased, had not the pamphlet of his lordship rendered it requisite that Mr.

James should have substantiated his charges or withdrawn his assertions. It would therefore be very unfair to Mr. James had this answer to Lord William been withheld; and it would be treating Captain Brenton with too much disrespect not to notice his elaborate defence of his brother officer.

lay to in the manner related, and the American merchant-ship pursued her way.

It so happened that the Phoenix, a very small frigate at best, had been disguised to resemble, at a distance, a large sloop of war, and the position in which, for a long time, she was viewed by the Didon, coupled with the assertions of the American, prevented Captain Milius and his officers from discovering the mistake until the action, which we shall proceed to relate, had actually commenced.

At 8 A.M., being still on the larboard tack waiting for the Phoenix to close, the Didon hoisted her colours and fired a gun to windward, and at 8 h. 45 m. opened a smart fire upon the former; who, to frustrate any attempt of the Didon to escape, resolved to engage to leeward. To attain this object, and to avoid as much as possible her opponent's line of fire, already doing damage to her rigging and sails, the Phoenix steered a bow and quarter course, and reserved her fire until she could bestow it with effect. On the other hand, having in view to cripple the Phoenix that she might not escape, and to maintain a position so destructive to the latter and safe to herself, the Didon filled, wore, and came to again on the opposite tack, bringing a fresh broadside to bear upon the bows of the Phoenix. The manœuvre was repeated three times, to the increased annoyance of the latter; who, impatient at being so foiled, eager to take an active part in the combat, and hopeless, from her inferior sailing, of being able to pass ahead or astern of the Didon, ran right at her to windward.

This bold measure succeeded, and at 9 h. 15 m. P.M. the two frigates, both standing on the larboard tack, brought their broadsides mutually to bear at a pistol-shot distance, each pouring into the other an animated fire of round, grape, and musketry. See the diagram at p. 69. Owing to the press of sail under which the Phoenix had approached, and the nearly motionless state in which the Didon lay, the former ranged considerably ahead: whereupon the Didon, having, as well as her opponent, fallen off from the wind while the broadsides were exchanging, filled, hauled up, and stood on, discharging into the Phoenix, as she diagonally crossed the latter's stern (diagram, No. 1¹) a few distant and ineffectual shot. Profiting by her new position and the damaged state of her opponent's rigging, the Didon bore up, and, passing athwart the stern of the Phoenix,

¹ Having no dates to guide us in the details, we are obliged to adopt this mode of referring to the different positions.

raked her (No. 2), but, owing to the precaution taken by the British crew in lying down, without any serious effect. The Didon then hauled up again on the larboard tack, and endeavoured to bestow her starboard broadside in a similar manner; but the Phoenix had by this time repaired her rigging sufficiently to enable her, worked as she was by one of the best disciplined crews in the service, promptly to throw her sails aback, and prevent the Didon from again taking a position so likely to give an unfavourable turn to the combat.

This manœuvre brought the Didon, with her larboard bow, or stem rather, pressing against the starboard-quarter of the Phoenix (No. 3); both ships lying nearly in a parallel direction, and one only having a gun that, in the regular way of mounting, would bear upon her antagonist. This gun was a brass 36-pounder carronade upon the fore-castle of the Didon; who might also, but for some reason of which we are not aware, have brought an 18-pounder long gun to bear through the main-deck bowport. The instant the two ships came in contact, each prepared to board the other; but the immense superiority of numbers that advanced to the assault in the Didon obliged the Phoenix to defend her own decks with all the strength she could muster. Having repulsed the French boarders, chiefly with her excellent marines, the Phoenix hastened to take advantage of the means which she exclusively possessed of bringing a main-deck gun to bear upon an antagonist in the position of the Didon.

Having, in his zeal for the good of the service, ventured to overstep one of its rules, Captain Baker had caused the timber or sill of the cabin-window on each side next the quarter to be cut down, so as to serve for a port, in case a gun would not bear from the regular stern-port next to the rudder-head. Unfortunately the gunner had neglected to prepare tackles sufficiently long for transporting the aftermost main-deck gun to the new port. The omission was of serious consequence; for, during the whole time occupied in substituting other means to place the gun in the port, the Didon, by her powerful body of marines, stationed along the whole length of the larboard gangway, kept up an incessant fire into the stern-windows of the Phoenix, strewing the cabin-deck with killed and wounded.

At length the exertions of Captain Baker, and of the few officers and men that remained of those assisting him in this perilous but necessary duty, were crowned with success. The gun was run out, and the direction in which it pointed showed,

at once, that its importance had not been overrated. It was fired, and by its first discharge, as subsequently acknowledged on the part of the enemy, laid low 24 of the *Didon's* crew: it swept the ship from her larboard-bow to her starboard-quarter, and was truly awful in its effects. Meanwhile the marines and musketry-men on the quarter-deck were exerting themselves in the most gallant and efficacious manner: one party, posted at the stern, kept up a spirited fire at the *Didon's* marines on the gangway; while another party (the men of both parties on account of their exposed station stooping to load and rising to fire), directing their fire at the carronade upon the *Didon's* fore-castle, prevented the French sailors from discharging it.

After the two frigates had remained on board of each other for upwards of half an hour, the *Didon* began to fore-reach. In an instant the *Phoenix* brought her second aftermost gun to bear, and by its first discharge cut away the head rails of the *Didon*, and, what was far more important, the gammoning of her bowsprit. The *Didon* as she continued to forge ahead, also brought her guns successively to bear, and a mutual cannonade recommenced between the frigates, yard-arm and yard-arm (No. 4), to the evident advantage of the *Phoenix*, whose crew had been constantly trained at the guns, and that, as much as possible, and far more than the regulation of powder and shot allowed, by practising the real, not the dumb motions of firing. In consequence of that, and of her lighter guns, the *Phoenix* fired nearly half as quick again as the *Didon*; and the shattered hull and disabled state of the latter, as, with her maintopmast gone and foremast tottering, she passed out of gun-shot ahead, proved that quickness of firing was not the only proficiency which the crew of the *Phoenix* had attained.


Although not materially injured in hull or lower masts, the *Phoenix* was so damaged in rigging and sails as to be nearly unmanageable (No. 4), her main royal-mast, maintopsail-yard and her gaff were shot away. The gaff had fallen just as the two ships got foul; and the fly of the British white ensign, at the gaff end having dropped upon the *Didon's* fore-castle, the Frenchmen tore it off, and carried the fragment aft as a trophy. As a substitute for their ship's mutilated colours, the seamen of the *Phoenix* immediately lashed a boat's ensign to the larboard and a union jack to the starboard cross-jack yard-arm.

Taking advantage of the suspension of firing, each frigate now began repairing her damaged rigging, that she might be ready to renew the engagement the instant a return of the breeze

would admit of manœuvring. Although the maintopmast of the Didon, and the main royal-mast, topsail-yard, and gaff of the Phoenix, were the only deficient spars, both frigates exhibited a woful appearance, on account chiefly of the quantity of sail under which they had engaged. Instead of a cloud of canvas swelling proudly to the breeze, rope-ends and riddled sails hung drooping down from every mast and yard.

One of the characteristics of a well-disciplined crew is the promptitude they display in refitting their ship after an action; and, if anything could animate the men of the Phoenix to additional exertions, it was the sight of their opponent's foremast falling over the side. This happened at about noon, and was caused by the motion of the ship acting upon the mast in its terribly shattered state. Very soon afterwards, such had been the diligence of her crew, the Phoenix had knotted and spliced her rigging, rove fresh braces, and trimmed her sails, so as to profit by the air of wind which had just sprung up. In this refitted state, the Phoenix made sail on the larboard tack towards the Didon, then with her head the same way, upon the former's weather-bow. Having arrived within gun-shot, the British frigate was in the act of opening her fire, when, being from the fall of her foremast and other previous damage in a defenceless state, the French frigate, at about 15 minutes past noon, hauled down her colours.

The following diagram has been prepared to elucidate the evolutions of these frigates, after the commencement of the close action:—



Of her 260 men and boys, the *Phoenix*, when she commenced the action, had on board, including 10 or 12 who were too sick to attend to their quarters, only 245. Of these she had her second-lieutenant (John Bounton), one master's mate (George Donalan), and 10 seamen killed, her first-lieutenant of marines (Henry Steele, dangerously in the head), two midshipmen (Aaron Tozer, dangerously, and Edward B. Curling¹) 13 seamen, and 12 marines wounded, several of them badly; total 12 killed and 28 wounded. The loss on board the *Didon*, according to the report of Captain Milius, amounted to 27 officers (including her second captain), seamen, and marines killed, and 44 badly wounded, out of a crew, as stated in the British official account, and sworn to by the French officers, numbering 330.

Until Captain Baker's appointment to her, the *Phoenix* had been armed precisely according to the establishment of her class, as described a few pages back;² but being of opinion that the complement allowed to an 18-pounder 36-gun frigate was not sufficient for fighting her to advantage, Captain Baker applied for and obtained the exchange of his 26 long 18-pounders for an equal number of medium guns of the same caliber; which, requiring a less number of men than the former, left so many more for attending to the other duties of the ship. The guns of the *Didon* having already appeared,³ we may present the following as the

Comparative Force of the Combatants.

Broadside-guns	} No. lbs.	Phoenix.	Didon.
		21	23
Crew	} No.	444	563
		245	330
Size	tons.	884	1091

Here is a statement which, in every branch of it, exhibits, on the French side, a decided superiority of force. Few cases occur wherein we have not to offer some remarks, tending to increase or diminish the effect which the figures alone are calculated to produce. But the shorter range of the *Phoenix's* 18-pounders, at the distance at which the action was fought, being compensated by the increased facility of working them, the above statement conveys a clear idea of the disparity of force in

¹ This youth, not quite seventeen, was wounded in an extraordinary manner. While with jaws extended he was sucking an orange, a musket-ball, which had passed through the head of a seaman, entered one of his cheeks and escaped from the other,

without injuring even a tooth. When the wound in each cheek healed, a pair of not unseemly dimples were all that remained.

² See p. 56.

³ See p. 57.

guns that existed between the parties. So it does in respect to crew; for, although a numerical does not always imply a physical superiority, the *Didon's* was one of the finest crews out of France. Her men consisted of healthy, strong, and active fellows, who had been picked for Captain Jérôme Buonaparte's frigate, the *Pomone*, and had been in service since the commencement of the war; and they were commanded by officers remarkable for their professional skill and gallant demeanour. Captain Milius himself possessed these qualities in an eminent degree. His personal valour during the heat of the battle excited the admiration of his enemy; and the high sense of honour of which he subsequently, on an occasion quite unconnected with this action,¹ gave unequivocal proofs, established the greatness of his character.

A contest between two frigates, manned and appointed like the *Phoenix* and *Didon*, would naturally afford the display of much individual heroism. Our means of information are of course restricted to occurrences on board the former; and even there we cannot do more than recite one or two of the more prominent instances. The purser's station in action is in the cockpit; but Mr. John Collman, the acting purser of the *Phoenix*, scorned to remain in safety below, while the lives of his brother officers and comrades were exposed to danger on deck. With a brace of pistols in his belt and a broadsword in his hand, did this young man, in the hottest of the fire, take post on the quarter-deck; there, by his gesture and language, he animated the crew to do their duty as British seamen. "Give it her, my lads!" was an exhortation as well understood as it was obeyed, and the guns of the *Phoenix* dealt increased destruction upon the decks of the *Didon*. As the action proceeded, the loss by death or wounds of officers from the quarter-deck, and the temporary absence of the captain to assist in fixing the gun in his cabin, gave additional importance to the noble part which the acting purser had chosen. And what could have been the summit of Mr. Collman's expectations, in a professional way, for being thus prodigal of his person?—A purser's warrant!

There were two or three youngsters among the midshipmen who also distinguished themselves. One, named Edward Phillips, saved the life of Captain Baker. On that occasion, while the ships were foul, a man upon the *Didon's* bowsprit-end was taking a deliberate aim at him, when young Phillips, who, armed with a musket, stood close to his captain, unceremoniously

¹ See Parliamentary Proceedings on the Abolition of the Slave Trade.

thrust him on one side and fired. The discharge of the piece was instantly followed by the splash of the Frenchman's body in the water; and the ball from the musket of the latter, instead of passing through the captain's head, did but tear off the rim of his hat. Several of the sick seamen also left their cots, and assisted in filling and carrying powder for the use of their more efficient comrades. Instances of this kind would frequently occur, did every naval captain understand the difficult art, to maintain the rules of discipline and yet win and preserve the affections of his crew.

The name of no officer appearing in the letter of Captain Baker published in the London Gazette, the very recital of the above acts of good conduct on the part of his officers may raise a charge of unfairness against him, until it is known, that the services of every officer belonging to the *Phoenix* were properly set forth in the letter which Captain Baker transmitted to the admiralty. If, for reasons not very clear, it becomes requisite to suppress more than half an officer's letter, the mutilated portion laid before the public, and which in this instance is very short, should not be called "Copy of," but, "Extract from, a letter." Then, neither will the public have grounds for supposing that the writer wishes it to be inferred that his valour alone achieved the victory, nor the officers who served under him, and who contributed so mainly to the consummation of that victory, have a right to complain that their captain has neglected to mention them.

The action of the *Phoenix* and *Didon* was one in which, even after its decision, the victorious party had both a difficult and a perilous duty to perform. The prisoners greatly out-numbered the captors: the latter, therefore, had not only to separate and secure the former, but to watch over them with unremitting attention. They had also to refit the ships, particularly the prize, whose mainmast was in so tottering a state that the British were obliged to cut it away. The wreck cleared, the *Phoenix*, taking the *Didon* in tow, steered for a British port. On the 14th, at 8 P.M., Captain Baker spoke the *Dragon* 74, and in company with her, the next day at 4 P.M., fell in with M. Villeneuve's fleet. The *Phoenix*, with the *Didon* in tow, immediately bore up and made all sail to the southward. A division of the fleet chased the two crippled frigates, and had nearly arrived within gun-shot, when, at sunset, the French ships tacked and stood back to their main body. Having passed Lisbon, the British frigate and her prize were steering to enter Gibraltar,

when, in a thick fog, the ringing of bells and the occasional firing of guns were heard in every direction. Shortly afterwards Captain Baker became apprised, by the Euryalus frigate, whom he spoke, that the sounds proceeded from the Franco-Spanish fleet, then on its way to Cadiz. The Phœnix and Didon immediately changed their course to the westward, and soon got clear of all danger from the ships of M. Villeneuve.

But this was not the only danger from which Captain Baker and his officers and crew had the good fortune to escape. The French pilot of the Phœnix overheard a conversation among the prisoners, the subject of which was, a plan to get possession of the Phœnix, and by her means of the Didon. The discovery of this plot called for increased vigilance on the part of the British on board of both ships; and, scarcely had means been taken to overawe the prisoners in the hold of the Phœnix, than the French pilot seized and carried aft, as the ringleader of the mutiny, the late cockswain of Captain Milius, and who had been in a similar capacity under Captain Jérôme Buonaparte. Captain Milius behaved upon the occasion in the noblest manner. He inquired of the man if he had any complaints to allege. The fellow said he had not. "I know it," said Captain Milius, "for I have, every morning and night, a report that assures me of the good treatment of you all: were it otherwise, I myself would head you in the attempt to obtain redress. As it is, you are a disgrace to the name of Frenchman; and," turning to Captain Baker, "I beseech you, sir, put him in irons." Captain Baker expressing a disinclination to resort to so harsh a measure, Captain Milius urged him more forcibly to do as he requested, and Jérôme's cockswain was accordingly committed, for a short time, to the custody of the master-at-arms. After this firebrand had been removed, quietness, and even cheerfulness, reigned among the prisoners; and the two frigates, having by standing well to the westward got a fair wind, anchored on the 3rd of September in Plymouth Sound.

Having thus brought his frigate and her prize safe to a British port, Captain Baker, it is natural to suppose, looked forward to the speedy acquisition of those honours which, in all similar cases, had been conferred upon the captain of the victorious ship. We trust that, by this time, our impartiality is so well established, that any opinion we may submit respecting the merits of an action recorded in these pages, will be received as the result of, at the least, an unbiassed judgment. Having premised this, we venture to pronounce the capture of the Didon

by the *Phoenix*, considered in reference as well to the force, the skill, and the spirit, mutually opposed, as to the perseverance and good management of the conqueror in securing and bringing home his prize, to be one of the most brilliant and exemplary cases of the kind in the annals of the British navy.

Unfortunately for the captain of the *Phoenix*, Mr. Pitt resolved to grant no more ribands of the Bath to naval and military officers, meaning to reserve them for ministers abroad. Still more unfortunately for Captain Baker, that illustrious statesman, before he could accomplish his intention of instituting a new military order of merit, died. The early retirement of Lord Barham from office (February 9, 1806) must have been an additional misfortune to Captain Baker. Not less so, probably, was the successive appointment, within about five years, of five new first-lords of the admiralty: Lord Grey, Honourable Thomas Grenville, Lord Mulgrave, Right Honourable Charles Yorke, and Lord Melville. With each of whom it is customary, in reply to complaints such as the captain of the *Phoenix* might reasonably urge, to express regret that merit should have been overlooked by his predecessor, but to decline entering into any retrospective view of the circumstances which may have guided that predecessor's conduct. Thus it has happened, that, to this hour, Captain Baker has received no reward for his meritorious services in capturing the *Didon*. It is true that, in 10 years afterwards, when the new order was instituted, he was made a companion of the Bath; but, as every one of the three remaining captains of frigates in Sir Richard Strachan's action was honoured with a similar mark of approbation, there cannot be a doubt that Captain Baker would have received the same, even had he, if we may judge from an analogous case, run away from, instead of fought and captured, a superior French frigate.

The *Didon* was built in the year 1797 at St. Malo, and, just before she sailed for the West Indies in the spring of 1805, underwent a thorough repair. Her sailing qualities were so extraordinary, that, although jury-rigged, she beat the *Phoenix* on every point. The *Didon* was purchased for the use of the British navy, but, for some reason with which we are unacquainted, was suffered to lie in ordinary in Hamoaze until taken to pieces in the year 1811. We had almost forgotten to mention, that Mr. Samuel Brown was the first-lieutenant of the *Phoenix*. We wish it was in our power to add, that he became rewarded with the promotion customary upon less important occasions. He was not made a commander until August 1, 1811.

While the British 18-gun ship-sloop *Swift*, Captain John Wright, was cruising in the bay of Honduras, information reached him of a *garda-costa* which had taken several vessels trading to that settlement. For the purpose, if possible, of putting a stop to the depredations of this Spanish schooner, Captain Wright detached his second-lieutenant, Mr. James Smith, with a party of men, on board a prize-schooner in company, the *Marianne*.

On the 13th of August, having received intelligence, when cruising off the island of Bonacca, that the *garda-costa* was lying at an anchor under the batteries of Truxillo, Lieutenant Smith proposed to his people a plan to cut her out. This being cheerfully acquiesced in, the *Marianne*, under cover of the night, stood over for the harbour, and got well into the bay without being discovered. Lieutenant Smith then despatched two small boats with six men in each, one under the command of Mr. Walker, the *Swift*'s boatswain, and the other, of Mr. William Pitt Bowler, one of her midshipmen, with directions to ascertain if the *garda-costa* was really in the situation described. The *Marianne* at the same time stood in to cover, if necessary, her two boats.

Shortly afterwards the *Marianne* obtained a sight of the *garda-costa* at her moorings. Almost at the same moment Mr. Bowler's boat (Mr. Walker's, from pulling heavy, not being able to get up) gallantly boarded, and after some resistance carried the Spanish *garda-costa* *Caridad-Perfecta*, of 12 (pierced for 16) guns; but, the chief part of her crew being on shore, with only her captain and 14 men present when the attack commenced, and these jumped overboard at its conclusion and escaped to the shore. The noise of the struggle alarmed the forts, which immediately opened a very heavy fire. The *garda-costa*'s cables were, however, quickly cut, and sail made upon her. After a fire continued for some time between the *Swift* and *Marianne* and the Truxillo batteries, the prize was brought safely out without the loss of a man. To the additional credit of Mr. Bowler, he had been only two years at sea.

On the 9th of October the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Princess Charlotte*, Captain George Tobin, cruising near the island of Tobago, discovered at a great distance to windward a suspicious ship and brig. Seeing no chance of overtaking these vessels if he went in chase, Captain Tobin disguised his vessel as much as possible. This had the desired effect; and the French brig-covette *Naiade* of 16 long 12-pounders, four

2-pounder brass swivels, and 170 men, commanded by Lieutenant Joseph-Pierre-Marie Hamon, and ship-corvette, late British sloop, *Cyane*, of 26 guns (18 long 6-pounders¹ on the main deck, and two fours and six 12-pounder carronades on the quarter-deck and fore-castle, all English caliber), and 190 men commanded by Lieutenant Charles Léonard Menard, bore down to capture the supposed merchant-ship.

The two French vessels did not discover their mistake, until the *Cyane* at least was within gun-shot of the frigate. That ship made a very gallant defence, and did not surrender until, besides being greatly damaged, she had her first-lieutenant and two seamen killed, and an enseigne de vaisseau and eight seamen wounded, some of them severely. The French commodore, M. Hamon, by taking a more prudent, if not so honourable a course, and by superior sailing, effected his escape without any apparent injury. In a week afterwards, however, after a nine hours' chase to windward, and a partial firing of 15 minutes' duration, in which she had one man killed, the *Naiade* was captured, in latitude 14° 5' north, longitude 55° 48' west, by the 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Jason*, Captain William Champain.

On the 14th of November the French 38-gun frigates *Libre* and *Furieuse* sailed from Flushing, bound on a cruise, first off the coast of Ireland to capture British merchantmen, and then off the mole of St. Nicolas, island of St. Domingo, to destroy the vessels and harass the commerce of the black inhabitants. The two frigates were next to proceed to the city of Santo-Domingo, and, if there or elsewhere they could get a sufficient supply of provisions, were to extend their cruise to October, 1806.

This plan was defeated, at a very early stage of the cruise, by a gale of wind off the coast of Scotland, which caused the separation of the two frigates. One of them, the *Libre*, on the morning of the 24th of December, when off the port of Rochefort, fell in with, and was chased by, the British 44-gun frigate *Egyptienne*, acting commander (in the absence of Captain the Honourable Charles Elphinstone Fleeming, who was attending Sir Robert Calder's court-martial) Lieutenant Philip Cosby Handfield. At noon the 38-gun frigate *Loire*, Captain Frederick Lewis Maitland, joined in the chase, and at 3 P.M. brought the *Libre* to action. At 3 h. 10 m. the *Egyptienne* opened her fire; receiving from the French frigate, as did also the *Loire*, an

¹ The gazette-letter says "twenty;" which was the number she carried in the but the ship had ports for only eighteen, British service.

animated fire in return. In a very short time the *Egyptienne* ran the *Libre* on board, carrying away by the shock the latter ship's bowsprit and doing some injury to her own larboard fore-channel. Close quarters with such an antagonist as the *Egyptienne*, whose main-deck guns were 24-pounders, soon put an end to the contest; and at 3 h. 30 m. p.m., after a brave defence, the *Libre*, mounting 24 long 18-pounders on the main deck, and 10 long 8-pounders and six (brass, we believe) 36-pounder carronades on the quarter-deck and fore-castle—total 40 guns, with a crew of 280 men and boys, commanded by Captain Henri Descorches, hauled down her colours to the two frigates opposed to her.

The loss on board the *Egyptienne*, out of a crew of 330 men and boys, amounted to one man killed and nine wounded. The *Loire* does not appear to have sustained any loss; and her damages were also very trifling. The *Egyptienne*, on the contrary, had the head of her maintopmast shot away, her mainmast and bowsprit much wounded, and her rigging and sails injured, particularly her foretopsail, which was entirely destroyed. The *Libre*, according to the representation of her officers, had 20 men killed and wounded; and so badly wounded were the French frigate's three masts, that towards midnight, when the sea was high, they all fell over her side. In this state, with her hull a good deal damaged, the prize was taken in tow by the *Loire*, and arrived on the 4th of January at Plymouth.

The *Libre* measured 1009 tons, and was pierced to carry 26 guns upon the main deck; but, having been built since the year 1772, the prize was old and worn out, and therefore not purchased for the use of the British navy. The *Libre*'s late consort, the *Furieuse*, was more fortunate than herself, having succeeded in entering the port of Lorient.

On the 28th of November, at 5 p.m., the British 16-gun ship-sloop *Serpent*, Captain John Waller, cruising off the island of Bonacca in the bay of Honduras, discovered two suspicious sail in the north-east or windward-quarter. Considering it impracticable by chasing to close them before dark, and believing their destination to be the port of Truxillo, Captain Waller made no movement till dusk; when he bore up for the bay, and before 11 p.m. reached the entrance of it. On the 29th at 2 a.m. two fore-and-aft rigged vessels, doubtless the same, were seen rounding the east point forming Truxillo bay, but they soon hauled so close to the land as to be scarcely discernible. Con-

ceiving the best means of attacking them would be by the boats, Captain Waller despatched two of them under the command of his second-lieutenant, William Patfull, assisted by Charles Tracs, master's mate, with him in the launch, and Samuel Nisbett, midshipman, and Thomas Scriven, purser, in the cutter.

The two boats hastened towards the objects of attack, and, on approaching the sternmost vessel, they received from her a heavy discharge from great guns and small-arms. In spite of every opposition, however, Lieutenant Patfull and his party boarded, and without the slightest loss carried, the Catholic king's schooner garda-costa San-Christovel Pano, mounting one long traversing 18-pounder, two iron 4-pounders, and four brass 3-pounders, with abundance of small arms and a crew of 40 men; of whom her commander, Don Juan-Christovel Tierro, and 25 men escaped by jumping overboard and swimming to the shore. Leaving the cutter's crew in charge of the prize, Lieutenant Patfull, with the launch alone, went in pursuit of the other vessel, which proved to be a Spanish felucca-privateer, of one 4-pounder and 40 men; but, by lowering down her sails and sweeping round the opposite side of the bay, close to Luke's keys, this vessel, by daylight, was nearly under the fort of Truxillo, and consequently effected her escape.

Colonial Expeditions.—West Indies.

In our account of the proceedings of M. Villeneuve's fleet in the year 1804¹ has already appeared the plan of operations which Napoleon, on the 29th of September in that year, marked out for the squadron of five sail of the line and four frigates, under the command of Rear-admiral Missiessy, then lying in the road of the isle of Aix, watching an opportunity to escape the vigilance of the British blockading squadron, under Vice-admiral Collingwood in the Dreadnought 98. The French squadron had been ready for sea since May or June, 1804; and on the 2nd of August the Jemmappes and Suffren 74s, accompanied by the Armide and Gloire frigates, attempted to sail out; but, finding Vice-admiral Sir Robert Calder, who then commanded the blockading squadron, close off the port, the French ships returned to their anchorage in Aix road; where, moored in two lines, the squadron lay free from molestation, defended on one side by the batteries upon the isle of Aix, and on the other by a large floating battery, mounting 12 heavy mortars of

¹ See vol. iii., p. 242.

an extraordinary size, and 32 long 36 and 24 pounders, with a furnace for heating shot.

The expedition of M. Missiessy, it will be remembered, had for its principal object the capture of the island of Dominique, with power to the rear-admiral, if he deemed the thing practicable, to attempt Sainte-Lucie; and he was particularly directed to garrison, and endeavour to retain possession of, his conquests. On the 11th of January in the present year, owing to the temporary absence of Rear-admiral Sir Thomas Graves, who then commanded on the Rochefort station, Rear-admiral Missiessy was enabled to put to sea. On the following morning, the 12th, the British 12-gun schooner *Felix*, Lieutenant Richard Bourne, discovered the French squadron, and proceeded with the intelligence in search of Sir Thomas Graves, but whom Lieutenant Bourne was not able to join until the 16th; and even then, owing to a strong gale at south-west, the British squadron was compelled to put into Quiberon bay.

After being detained on the coast by a succession of similar gales, M. Missiessy, on the 25th, proceeded on his mission. His force consisted of the *Majestueux* three-decker, the four 74-gun ships *Jemmappes*, *Lion*, *Magnanime*, and *Suffren*, the three 40-gun frigates *Armide*, *Gloire*, *Infatigable*, and the two 16-gun brig-corvettes *Actéon* and *Lynx*, having on board 3500 troops, under the command of General Lagrange, besides a great quantity of military stores, including a considerable train of artillery.

The interruption, already complained of, in the correspondence of Napoleon with his minister of marine,¹ renders uncertain the nature of the modifications of the original plan. The probability is, that the additional instructions received by Rear-admiral Missiessy were, chiefly, that he was to disembark the military stores, in stated quantities, at Martinique and Guadeloupe; that he was to capture and possess Dominique, and, without any particular reference to Sainte-Lucie, was to depredate, as far as he was able, the weaker of the neighbouring British colonies; and that if, in 35 days from his arrival in the Antilles, Admiral Villeneuve, with the Toulon fleet, did not make his appearance, M. Missiessy was to commence his return home, calling on his way at the city of Santo-Domingo, and leaving with General Ferrand as many troops as he might have remaining on board.

On the 20th of February Rear-admiral Missiessy, with his squadron, entered the channel of Sainte-Lucie, there fell in with

¹ See vol. iii., p. 348.

and chased an English convoy, but succeeded in capturing one vessel only, the Prince of Asturias transport; and, on the same afternoon, cast anchor in the road of Fort-de-France, or Fort Royal, Martinique. During the evening the squadron landed 2500 muskets and 50,000 weight (French) of powder. The rear-admiral and general also disembarked, and, on a consultation with Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse, the governor-general of the island, came to the determination to make an immediate attack upon the British island of Dominique. The plan was this. The squadron was to appear before the island at daybreak on the 22nd, and to effect a disembarkation at three different points; for which purpose the troops were divided into three columns. The first column, consisting of 900 men, and commanded by General Lagrange in person, was to land between the south-east point of the island and the town of Roseau, possess itself of a battery situated on the point, and then march rapidly towards the fort which defends the town on its east side. The second column, composed of 500 men, under Adjutant Barbot, having disembarked at the foot of Morne-Daniel, distant a full mile and a half to the north-west of Roseau, was to turn a fort that commanded the town, and cut off the retreat of the garrison. The third column, composed of about 900 men, and commanded by General Claparède, was to land within two gun-shots of a mountain situated at the north-west extremity of the island, and carry that position at the point of the bayonet.

On the 21st, in the afternoon, the French squadron, preceded by an armed schooner as a look-out, set sail towards Dominique, and at midnight arrived abreast of the south-east point of the island. On the 22nd, at about 3 A.M., the fort of Scotshead, a post not far from this spot, discharged the alarm-gun; and shortly afterwards the signal was answered by fires in different parts of the island. The French admiral continued to stand on under easy sail, and, just as the day dawned, appeared before the town of Roseau. The ships of the squadron immediately hoisted English ensigns and pendants, and prepared for disembarking the troops. Meanwhile Brigadier-general George Prevost, the commander-in-chief or governor of Dominique, deceived by the colour of the ships, had sent the captain of the fort on board the *Majestueux*, to conduct the supposed British admiral and his squadron to a safe anchorage. This appears in General Lagrange, but not in General Prevost's letter. Shortly afterwards the boats pushed off with the troops, and the squadron changed its colours to French.

The column of General Lagrange, 900 strong, was the first that landed, effecting its disembarkation, under cover, at first of the *Actéon* and the schooner, and subsequently of the *Majestueux*, *Jemmappes*, and *Lion*, at a spot not far distant from that originally fixed upon. A gallant resistance was made by the British regulars and colonial militia, under the command of Major Nunn, of the 46th regiment, and, on his being severely wounded, of Captain O'Connell, of the first West India regiment: but, against an enemy so comparatively numerous, every effort was unavailing, and the important post of Cachecrow was carried. The second column, under Adjutant Barbot, 500 strong, landed near Morne-Daniel, and, after a slight skirmish with a body of militia "under Brigadier-general Prevost,"¹ assaulted and carried the redoubt; in which, according to the French accounts, 16 militia artillerymen were taken. The remainder of the colonial forces, with the brigadier-general at their head, retired to the heights of Woodbridge-estate; a defile of difficult approach.

While all this was going on, a spirited cannonade was maintained between the *Magnanime*, *Suffren*, and three frigates, joined afterwards by the remainder of the French squadron, on the one part, and the guns of Fort Young and Fort Melville on the other. The latter fort mounting five long 24-pounders, and the former five long 24 and three 18 pounders with a furnace for heating shot, several of which in their red-hot state were discharged at the shipping.

The calm, which usually prevails at this early hour of the day, prevented the covering vessels from lending a prompt aid to General Claparède and his column of 900 men. Consequently, the latter did not accomplish a landing until past noon, and then not on the spot originally intended. The general, however, succeeded at last in disembarking his men, and soon effected a junction with General Lagrange. The united columns then attacked, and at 4 P.M. entered, Fort Young: where they found about 300 militiamen, who laid down their arms. Meanwhile the town of Roseau had been set on fire, not by the shot of the ships that lay off, but by the wadding of one of the guns mounted upon Fort Young. The French soldiers, it is related, did their utmost to extinguish the flames; but the only part of the town saved was a few small houses occupied by free negroes.

Brigadier-general Prevost, as soon as he found the case was

¹ The official letter is not very clear on this point. A private letter from St. Kitts is rather more explicit. "General

Prevost, having observed from the government-house the ineffectual resistance," &c., &c.

desperate, retreated across the island, accompanied by Brigademajor Prevost and a quartermaster of militia, and arrived, in 24 hours afterwards, at the stronghold of Prince Rupert. This place of safety the general and his two friends, it appears, would scarcely have reached, so difficult is the country to traverse, had it not been for the assistance of the inhabitants and the exertions of the Caribs. No sooner did the British commander-in-chief of the island reach the fort, than he directed all the cattle to be driven in, and took measures for getting a supply of water from the river in the bay. He had previously given orders for all the regulars in the island to follow him; leaving the militia and the president of the council to make the best terms they could with the enemy, for what remained of the town of Roseau, the capital of the island.

The loss sustained by the British regulars, in resisting the invaders and defending the various posts, amounted to one sergeant, one drummer, and 19 rank and file killed, one field-officer, two captains, and 18 rank and file wounded, and one captain, one sergeant, and six rank and file taken by the enemy; total 21 killed, 21 wounded, and eight prisoners. There were also three sailors wounded, assisting at the batteries; and the loss on the part of the militia, although not known at the date of the official return, is declared to have been considerable. The French state the British loss at 200 in killed, wounded, and prisoners: they, of course, include the militia, and may not be far from the truth. Their own loss the French report at three officers and 32 soldiers killed, and five officers and 77 soldiers wounded; an amount which, without reckoning the loss, if any, on board the squadron, sufficiently proves that the few British opposed to them had made a good use of their powder and ball.

The British official account is so loosely worded, that it is impossible to get at the exact number of regulars engaged. They probably did not exceed 220 men; nor, taking the French account, does the whole force, regular and irregular, upon the island, appear to have been more than 650 or 700 men; whereas the French force that landed is acknowledged to have consisted of 2300 men, all veteran soldiers; exclusive of a reserve on board the squadron of about 1200 men, of an equally good quality. The squadron itself, without the troops, was of sufficient strength to have created considerable annoyance.

The governor of Dominica, who had reached his post of safety on the 23rd, was, on the 25th, summoned by General Lagrange

to surrender the fortress of Prince Rupert. On the same day Brigadier-general Prevost returned a reply, which, if he had not annexed a copy of it to his official letter, might be considered as a private communication, sent purposely to thank the French general for his humanity towards, and kind treatment of, his wife and children; of whom, by-the-by, no mention whatever is made in General Lagrange's letter. Although, by inference, a passage in General Prevost's letter may be taken to refer to the summons which had been sent to surrender Fort Rupert, there is no direct allusion to it. For instance:—"I have had the honour to receive your letter. My duty to my king and country is so superior to every other consideration, that I have only to thank you for the observations you have been pleased to make on the often inevitable consequences of war. Give me leave, individually, to express the greatest gratitude for your humanity and kind treatment of my wife and children, and at the same time to request a continuance thereof, not only to her and them, but towards every other object you may meet with."

General Lagrange, however, either did receive some letter putting a negative upon his demand, or so construed the one which has been published; for, although General Ernouf from Guadaloupe had just arrived at Roseau, and offered to add a corps of grenadiers to the force under General Lagrange to enable him the more easily to reduce the fort, the latter decided, in preference, to evacuate the island. After dilapidating the batteries, embarking some guns, and spiking others, destroying the carriages, the ammunition, and the warehouses containing provisions, taking away such prisoners as were regulars, disarming the militia and putting them on their parole, and not omitting to levy a contribution, at first of 6000*l.*, but at length of 5500*l.* sterling, upon the inhabitants, the general and his troops, on the 27th, at about 10 A.M., re-embarked on board the squadron. At noon the latter set sail for Guadaloupe; whither the Lynx had already convoyed the 22 English and colonial merchant-vessels (nine or ten only square-rigged), which it had been her business, while the engagement was pending, to carry off from the road of Roseau; but of which, or of the dismantlement of the batteries, not a word is there in the brigadier's letter to Sir William Myers.

Other good fortune than that of escaping to the fort of Prince Rupert without scratch or bruise attended Brigadier-general Prevost. He contrived to—what in homely but intelligible language is called—bamboozle the folks at home. The Annual

Register, making no distinction between doing a thing and ordering it to be done, declares that the governor, not Major Nunn, "opposed with the small force under his command, the landing of the French inch by inch."¹ "Throughout the whole of this transaction," proceeds the writer, "the highest praise is due to the conduct of the governor, and the British troops under his command." The conduct of the latter was, indeed, entitled to every praise. But praise was not all that he or that they received. The committee of the Patriotic Fund, unable to make the proper discrimination, presented the governor of Dominique with a 100*l.* sword and a piece of plate, and gave a 50*l.* sword to each of the two officers, Major Nunn and Captain O'Connell, as well as sums of money to the wounded privates. With respect to General Lagrange, our decided opinion is, that he did not do his duty in so soon evacuating the island of Dominique. He should at least have made an attempt upon Prince Rupert. So Napoleon thought, but, from some unexplained cause, included the admiral in the censure which he passed upon the general. However, as is too often the case in the minor concerns of life, what marred the fortune of one man made the fortune of the other; and General Prevost rose to fame upon the forbearance of General Lagrange to push his success to a point, which, in all probability, would have made the former his prisoner, instead of, in the language of undue panegyric, his conqueror.

On anchoring with his squadron at Basse-Terre, Guadaloupe, Rear-admiral Missiessy disembarked the proportion of troops and military stores allotted for the island, took in a supply of water, sold his prizes, divided the proceeds among his crews and the troops; and, on the evening of the 2nd of March, scarcely 60 hours from his entering the road, weighed and stood out. On the 5th, at daybreak, the squadron passed Nevis point, and appeared off the island of St. Kitts; the frigates and smaller vessels anchoring, about noon, in the road of Basse-Terre, the capital of the island. Shortly afterwards a column of 500 men, commanded by Adjutant Barbot, effected a landing without opposition, and, entering the town, demanded of the inhabitants the sum of 40,000*l.* sterling, threatening, in case of failure, to set it on fire. The militia having previously joined the few British regulars, forming a total of about 500 men, in the almost impregnable fortress of Brimstone-hill, a committee from the principal inhabitants succeeded in persuading the French general and admiral to be contented with 18,000*l.*

¹ Annual Register for 1805, p. 220

which sum, with great difficulty, was collected and paid over to them. Having destroyed the guns and stores at the two batteries of Basse-Terre, and disarmed a part of the militia, the French troops re-embarked; but, previously to its departure, the squadron committed a gross breach of faith in pillaging the road of Basse-Terre, from which the frigates took six merchantmen, all it contained. Four of these the French afterwards burnt. The remaining two, one laden with sugar, the other with coffee and cotton, they carried off as prizes.

After this predatory exploit, the French ships proceeded off the island of Nevis. There they levied a contribution of about 4000*l.* sterling, disarmed the batteries, and destroyed five merchant-vessels, all they could find. The island of Montserrat received a similar visit. Thus enriched, Rear-admiral Missiessy and General Lagrange, in a few days afterwards re-anchored in Fort Royal, Martinique. Here the admiral found the French brig *Palinure*, recently arrived from France with despatches, which announced the return of M. Villeneuve to Toulon in consequence of a storm, and ordered M. Missiessy to return forthwith to Europe. After disembarking at Martinique nearly the whole of the troops remaining on board the squadron, the French admiral set sail for France. Calling on his way off the city of Santo-Domingo, he found General Ferrand, with a handful of men, reduced to the greatest extremity by the persevering attacks of the negroes; against whom the general had sustained a siege of 24 days, and from whom he had little chance of escape, as the port was generally blockaded by one or more British frigates. General Lagrange promptly disembarked his remaining battalion; and a quantity of money and provisions was also supplied to General Ferrand. After this the squadron again set sail; and, although two or three British squadrons, under enterprising officers, had been despatched to look after him, being as little annoyed by hostile squadrons on his return as he had been on his way out, Rear-admiral Missiessy re-anchored, on the 20th of May, in the road of the Isle of Aix.

BRITISH AND FRENCH FLEETS.

IN the abstract which we have now to introduce,¹ is to be found the greatest number of British ships-of-war that ever was, or that perhaps ever will be ordered to be built within a single year. Considering what gigantic efforts, until the close of the year 1805, had been making by Buonaparte for the invasion of Great Britain, no surprise need be created, that efforts, corresponding in magnitude, should be made by the latter to frustrate the attempt. The extraordinary increase of 21 ships in the commissioned line-of-battle column, while the total of the sea-service ships of the same rank exhibits an increase of only four, proves that effectual means had been taken for a present, as well as for a future, augmentation of force.

A reference to No. 13 abstract shows that, at the commencement of the year 1805, there were 33 ships of the line in ordinary, either repairing or to be repaired for sea-service. The greater part of these ships were in want of what is termed a thorough repair; that is, a repair that would have cost nearly as much money, and have occupied nearly as much time, as a rebuild. To obviate this a measure was resorted to which, since the year 1797, had been recommended to the admiralty, by Mr. Gabriel Snodgrass, surveyor to the East India Company. It was that of strengthening some ships by diagonal braces, doubling or sheathing others with plank, and, where the ships were in a still worse state, both bracing and doubling them. By this method 22 sail of the line, five 18-pounder frigates, and seven of a smaller class, were brought forward into active service. Every one of these ships, except the Ganges, was at sea in the year 1805; several of the line-of-battle ships took an

¹ See Appendix, Annual Abstract, No. 14.

active part in the different engagements which occurred in that eventful year; and while none of the ships returned to port to be laid up in ordinary or repaired within two years, two remained out of nine, and several for six or seven years, after they had been thus expeditiously and economically converted from useless hulks to effective cruisers.¹

Among the newly-built vessels of the year 1805, is the first regular ship-of-war belonging to the British navy constructed of teak, the *Salsette*, and at the top of the column of ordered ships stands a first-rate, the *Nelson*, similar in size and force to the *Caledonia*, and whose tonnage is about double that of the 18 "cruisers" grouped together at the bottom of the same column. Nothing further occurring in Abstract No. 14 worthy of notice in this place, it will suffice to refer to the customary lists of prizes made, and losses sustained, during the year 1805.²

The number of commissioned officers and masters, belonging to the British navy at the commencement of the year 1806, was,

Admirals	55
Vice-admirals	50
Rear-admirals	56
" superannuated 22	
Captains	617
" superannuated 26	
Commanders, or sloop-captains	416
" superannuated 46	
Lieutenants	2437
Masters	541

And the number of seamen and marines voted for the service of the same year was 120,000.³

In our last year's account of the proceedings of the Brest fleet, we stated that, on the 13th of December, a strong division of it, consisting of 11 sail of the line, four frigates, and a ship-corvette, had escaped from the anchorage outside of the goulet; and that, in consequence of the severity of the weather, Admiral Cornwallis, the commander-in-chief of the Channel fleet, was not apprised of the circumstance.⁴

On the 14th these 11 line-of-battle ships, which were the *élite* of the Brest fleet, separated into two squadrons; one of which consisted of the

¹ A list of the ships, down to 18-pounder frigates inclusive, which were so doubled and braced, will be found in the Appendix. See No. 3.

² See Appendix, Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7.

³ *Ibid.*, No. 8.

⁴ See vol. iii., p. 314.

Gun-ship.

120	Impérial . . .	} Vice-admiral Corentin-Urbain Leissegues. Captain Julien-Gabriel Bigot.
80	Alexandre . . .	
74	{ Brave . . .	Commodore Louis-Marie Coudé. Captain Jean-Baptiste Henry. ,, Gaspard Laignel.
	{ Diomède . . .	
	{ Jupiter . . .	

Frigates, Cornète and Felicité; *ship-corvette* Diligente.

This squadron, provisioned for six months, and having on board about 1000 troops, was to proceed direct to Santo Domingo, and there disembark the troops as a reinforcement to General Ferrand. M. Leissegues was then to cruise two months before the island of Jamaica; and, if the British were too strong in that quarter, he was to proceed off the bank of Newfoundland; there "manger jusqu'à son dernier biscuit," and then steer straight for Rochefort or Lorient.

The other squadron was under the command of Rear-admiral Willaumez, and consisted of the

Gun-ship.

80	Foudroyant . . .	} Rear-admiral Jean-Bapt.-Phillibert Willaumez. Captain Antoine Henri.
74	{ Cassard . . .	
	{ Impétueux . . .	
	{ Patriote . . .	
	{ Eole . . .	
	{ Vétéran . . .	

Frigates, Valeureuse and Volontaire; also two brig-corvettes, or avisos.

This squadron, provisioned also for six months, was to proceed off St. Helena or the Cape of Good Hope, at the rear-admiral's option; then to steer for Martinique or Guadaloupe to get supplies. M. Willaumez was then to touch at Cayenne for information, cruise off Barbadoes for a few months, and, having done all the mischief possible to British commerce in that quarter, was to return, by the way of St. Helena, to Europe. This cruise, it was supposed, would occupy a period of about 14 months.

It was not until the 24th of December, 1805, that intelligence reached the admiralty, and that was by a cartel from Gibraltar, of the escape from Brest of a French squadron, stated to consist of seven, instead of 11, sail of the line and four frigates. Immediately two British squadrons were ordered to put to sea: one, of seven sail of the line, under Vice-admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, as follows:—

Gun-ship.

98	London	Captain Sir Harry Neale, Bart.
80	Foudroyant	{ Vice-adm. (b.) Sir John Borlase Warren, Bart. Captain John Chambers White.
74	{ Ramillies	,, Francis Pickmore.
	{ Hero	,, Hon. Alan Hyde Gardner.
	{ Namur	,, Lawrence William Halsted.
	{ Repulse	,, Hon. Arthur Kaye Legge.
	{ Courageux	,, James Bissett.

The other, of the following six sail, under Rear-admiral Sir Richard Strachan :—

Gun-ship.

98	St. George	Captain Thomas Bertie.
80	Cæsar	{ Rear-adm. (b.) Sir Richard John Strachan, Bart. Captain Charles Richardson.
74	{ Centaur	,, Sir Samuel Hood.
	{ Terrible	,, Lord Henry Paulet.
	{ Triumph	,, Henry Inman.
	{ Bellona	,, John Erskine Douglas.

About the middle or latter end of January, after having been detained several days by foul winds, these squadrons sailed; Sir John Warren's from St. Helen's, Sir Richard Strachan's from Cawsand bay. Sir John's instructions were to proceed to the island of Madeira, and there endeavour to gain intelligence of the route of the French squadron: if that intelligence did not substantially controvert the supposition of its having gone to the West Indies, the British admiral was then to hasten to Barbadoes; whence, if no tidings could be heard, he was, after leaving a portion of his force with Rear-admiral Cochrane, to run down to Jamaica. There he was to consult with Vice-admiral Dacres, and, if the latter should have nothing to communicate respecting the route of the French, he was to augment the force on the Jamaica station to four sail of the line, and, with the remaining ships of his squadron, return to Spithead. Sir Richard Strachan, with his six sail of the line, was to proceed straight to the island of St. Helena, in search also of the above French squadron. Not finding it there, he was to make the best of his way to the Cape of Good Hope, to reinforce the expedition which had been sent to effect the capture of that important settlement. Let us now return to the two French admirals.

On the 15th, in the afternoon, latitude $46^{\circ} 8'$ north, longitude $12^{\circ} 14'$ west, a British convoy of 23 sail, from Cork to the West Indies, under the protection of the 38-gun frigates *Arethusa*,

Captain Charles Brisbane, and *Boadicea*, Captain John Maitland, and 18-gun ship-sloop *Wasp*, Captain Buckland Stirling Bluett, fell in with both French squadrons to leeward; the nearest of which, being that of M. Leissegues, was steering to the westward, with a north-north-east wind, and the other, which was only visible from the mast-head, appeared to be steering to the southward. The squadron under M. Willaumez was, in fact, then in pursuit of a convoy from Gibraltar, in charge of the *Polyphemus* 64 and *Sirius* frigate, and the French succeeded in capturing one or two transports; with which the *Volontaire* was immediately detached to Teneriffe. Four of the French ships, of which the *Vétéran* was one, chased the *Sirius* for nearly two hours, and compelled her to part company.

Early on the morning of the 16th, when the character of the only squadron now seen by Captain Brisbane and his companions became clearly ascertained, 17 of the convoy, by signal from the *Arethusa*, steered south-west, and the remaining six sail, with the three men-of-war, tacked and stood to the north-west. The French squadron immediately did the same, and continued the chase throughout the day; but, towards evening, Rear-admiral Leissegues tacked, and again stood to the south-west. Since morning Captain Brisbane had detached the *Wasp* to Rochefort, Ferrol, Cadiz, and Gibraltar, to inform the admirals commanding upon those stations of the situation of the French when last seen; and at 2 P.M. the *Boadicea* had been sent to Admiral Cornwallis off Ushant with similar intelligence.

At midnight, with the six vessels of the convoy then in her company, the *Arethusa* made sail to the westward. With daylight on the 16th, again appeared M. Leissegues and his squadron, in full pursuit, but at a very great distance. In a few hours the French admiral gave over the chase, and left the *Arethusa* and her small charge to pursue their course unmolested. On the 23rd, at 4 h. 30 m. P.M., when about midway between Madeira and the Canary isles, the *Arethusa* fell in with the following squadron under Vice-admiral Sir John Thomas Duckworth:—

Gun-ship.		
80	<i>Canopus</i>	{ Rear-admiral (w.) Thomas Louis. Captain Francis William Austen.
74	{ <i>Superb</i>	{ Vice-admiral (w.) Sir J. T. Duckworth, K.G. Captain Richard Goodwin Keats.
	{ <i>Spencer</i>	{ Hon. Robert Stopford.
	{ <i>Donegal</i>	{ Pulteney Malcolm.
	{ <i>Powerful</i>	{ Robert Plampin.
64	<i>Agamemnon</i>	{ Sir Edward Berry.

Gun-frigate.

40 Acasta Captain Richard Dalling Dunn.

36 Amethyst ,, James William Spranger.

On the 15th of November Rear-admiral Louis, with five ships of this squadron by, the orders of Vice-admiral Lord Collingwood, the commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean fleet, was blockading the few French and Spanish ships which the battle of Trafalgar had left in the port of Cadiz, when Sir John Duckworth, in the *Superb*, joined from Plymouth and assumed the command. On the 26th, in the evening, the 18-gun ship-sloop *Lark*, Captain Frederick Langford, informed the *Agamemnon*, that on the 20th, off the *Salvages*, a cluster of rocks between Madeira and Teneriffe, a French squadron of five sail of the line, a *rasée*, three frigates, and two brig-corvettes, had dispersed a convoy of six sail, which she was conducting to Gorée.

Raising the blockade, Sir John, with his six ships of the line, made all sail towards Madeira, in quest of the above five French ships of the line, which were, as conjectured at the time, the Rochefort squadron under M. Allemand, with the captured *Calcutta* in company.¹ On the 5th Sir John made and communicated with Madeira, and on the 15th arrived off Teneriffe. The vice-admiral then stood on to the southward as far as the Cape de Verds, and was on his return to resume the blockade of Cadiz, when fallen in with, as already related, by the *Arethusa* and her convoy.

As the British squadron was now working back to the northward, the direction in which the French squadron was when seen by the *Arethusa*, no immediate alteration became necessary in the course of the former. On the 25th, at 6 h. 45 m. A.M., latitude 30° 52' north, longitude 20° 16' west, when standing close hauled on the starboard tack, with the wind about east half north, the British descried, in the south-east quarter, which was a little abaft the weather-beam, nine strange sail standing to the southward. At 7 A.M. the squadron tacked in the same direction; and every rag of canvas was presently upon Sir John's six sail of the line and two frigates, in chase of the still supposed Rochefort squadron, of five sail of the line and smaller vessels.

During the whole day and night of the 25th the chase continued, both squadrons still on the larboard tack with a moderate breeze from the eastward. On the 26th, at 8 A.M., it was evident that the *Superb*, *Spencer*, and *Agamemnon*, with the

¹ See p. 49.

Amethyst frigate, were gaining upon the sternmost French ship. It was also discovered, in the course of this forenoon, that instead of five, the enemy had six sail of the line. These, as may be conjectured, composed the squadron of Rear-admiral Willaumez, numbering, with the absence of the *Volontaire*, just nine sail, on its way to St. Helena. The chase continued with increased advantage to the British, until 1 p.m.; when the relative distances of the ships, according to the mean calculations of the two headmost British ships, were as follows: French sternmost ship from *Superb* about seven miles;¹ *Spencer* astern of *Superb* about four miles, and Amethyst frigate rather nearer; *Agamemnon* about five miles astern of *Spencer*, and hull down to *Superb*; *Acasta* frigate and *Powerful* 74 about 22 miles from *Spencer*, and out of sight from *Superb*; and *Canopus* and *Donegal* out of sight of both *Spencer* and *Superb*. According to the statement of a contemporary, the computed distance between the *Superb* and the sternmost ship of her squadron, which we take to have been the *Donegal*, was, by meridian observation, about 45 miles.²

At the time stated, 1 p.m., to the joy of M. Willaumez, and to the surprise, and of course the regret, of such of the British ships as could see it, Sir John directed to be hoisted a signal annulling the chase; and the *Superb*, with more awkwardness than she ever betrayed, before or since, shortened sail and hove to. This unfortunate signal was run up in latitude 28° 35' north, and longitude 19° 10' west, after a chase, reckoning until 1 h. 15 m. p.m., of 30 hours and a half, during which the leading ships had run about 149 miles in a south-south-east direction.

In July, 1801, without waiting for friends, the *Superb* dashed alone among the rearmost ships (two of them three-deckers) of an enemy's fleet;³ but Captain Keats was then the first, not the second, officer in command of her. The alleged motive for Sir John's discontinuing the chase was the divided state of the British ships; owing to which the *Superb* might have got herself surrounded and captured before any assistance could reach her. It appears, however, that the French squadron itself, during the latter part of the chase, was by no means concentrated; and that, had the *Superb* brought to action, as in the course of a few hours she might, the sternmost French ship, the *Spencer* and *Agamemnon* were sufficiently advanced to keep in

¹ *Superb's* log says, "nine or ten miles." *Spencer's*, "five or six ahead of *Superb*." We have taken the mean of the two.

² Brenton, vol. iii., p. 522.

³ See vol. iii., p. 113.

check any other French ships that might have shortened sail to cover their rear. As it is not likely that the French admiral would have abandoned his rearmost ship, a general action would in all probability have ensued; and, as the ships of the two squadrons were equal in number, and all of them two-deckers (there being but one French frigate, the second British frigate would have compensated for the Agamemnon's inferiority), the issue, in all reasonable calculation, would have been favourable to the British.

Having by standing for a short time to the north-north-west, collected his scattered ships, Sir John despatched the Amethyst to England with intelligence of the strength of the French squadron and of its supposed destination to the East Indies; and then, at about 6 h. 10 m. P.M., bore away west-south-west, to get a supply of water at the Leeward islands, the stock on board not being likely to last until the squadron could work back to its station. On the 2nd of January, 1806, the island of St. Antonio bearing north-west half-west distant 10 or 12 miles, Sir John detached the Powerful, first to victual herself among the Cape de Verds, and then to proceed on to the East Indies, to reinforce the squadron under Rear-admiral Sir Edward Pellew.

On the 12th of January, with his remaining five sail of the line and one frigate, Sir John anchored in Carlisle bay, Barbadoes, and immediately sent the Acasta to the island of St. Christopher, or St. Kitts, to expedite the preparations for watering the squadron. On the 14th the squadron weighed from Carlisle bay; and steering to the westward across Fort Royal bay, Martinique, the vice-admiral anchored, on the evening of the 19th, in Basse-Terre road, St. Christopher's. On the 21st the 74-gun ship Northumberland, Captain John Morrison, bearing the flag of Rear-admiral the Honourable Alexander Cochrane and the Atlas of the same force, Captain Samuel Pym, joined company, but without communicating a word of intelligence respecting any French squadron.

Sir John here commenced watering and refitting his ships for their homeward passage; when, on the 1st of February, the 16-gun ship-sloop Kingfisher, Captain Nathaniel Day Cochrane, joined, with intelligence, that a French squadron of three sail of the line had been seen steering towards the city of Santo-Domingo. Immediately the British squadron, now consisting of seven sail of the line, one frigate, and one sloop, weighed and made sail in quest of the enemy. On the 3rd the ships lay to off

the island of St. Thomas, and were joined by the 14-gun brig *Epervier*, Lieutenant James Higginson. The squadron then ran through the Corvel passage, and at noon on the 4th passed the island of Zacheo in the Mona passage. On the 5th, at 8 A.M., the east end of the island of St. Domingo bore north-west eight or nine leagues; and shortly afterwards the 12-pounder 36-gun frigate *Magicienne*, Captain Adam Mackenzie, with a Danish schooner which she had detained, joined company, bringing a joyful confirmation of the previous intelligence. This schooner had sailed from Santo-Domingo road, while the French squadron was lying there. The French officers, it seems, wished to have her burnt; but the admiral, to his subsequent regret, would not consent.

On the 6th of February, at daybreak, the British squadron, having been under easy sail all night, arrived in sight and nearly abreast of the road and city of Santo-Domingo. At 6 A.M. the *Acasta*, who, with the *Magicienne*, had been ordered ahead, signalled two frigates, one of which was the *Diligente*, under way; and at 6 h. 44 m., nine sail at anchor. Five of these composed the line-of-battle ships, and a sixth the remaining frigate, of the squadron of Rear-admiral Leissegues. The rest were merchantmen. The voyage hither of the former may be related in a few words. On the ninth day after chasing the *Arethusa* and her convoy, having been directed, inconsiderately at this season of the year, to pass to the north-west of the Azores in order to avoid British cruisers, the French squadron encountered a heavy gale of wind, in which the *Jupiter* lost her maintopmast, and the *Diomède* sprang a leak. On the next day, the 24th of December, a still more violent storm came on, in which the *Alexandre* and *Brave* parted company. Finding he could not, without additional risk to the squadron, obey his instructions, the rear-admiral, with his remaining three sail of the line, two frigates, and one corvette, bore up and passed to leeward of the Azores. On the 20th of January M. Leissegues anchored in the road of Santo-Domingo, and on the next day disembarked the troops that were on board his ships, along with a quantity of ammunition and other military stores. On the 29th the *Alexandre* and *Brave* joined the *Imperial*, and landed their troops. The ships then set about repairing their damages, and, by the 6th of February, had so far completed them, as to be nearly ready to get under way and proceed upon their voyage.

At 7 h. 30 m. A.M., observing the force that was approaching them, the French ships slipped their cables and made sail to the

westward, in the direction of Cape-Nisao, having a light breeze at about north-north-west. They soon formed in line of battle in the following order: Alexandre, Impérial, Diomède, Jupiter, and Brave, with the Félicité and Cornéte frigates, and Diligente corvette, in a second line in-shore of the line-of-battle ships. The course of the British was immediately shaped so as to cross the leading French ships; and Sir John telegraphed, that the principal object of attack would be the admiral and his two seconds. At 8 A.M. the British squadron, in two divisions, was in tolerably compact order. The starboard and weather line consisted of the Superb, Northumberland, Spencer, and Agamemnon; the larboard or lee one, of the Canopus (just a-beam of the Spencer), Donegal, and Atlas. The Acasta and Magicienne frigates, Kingfisher sloop, and Epervier brig, in the mean while, had taken their stations to windward of the line-of-battle ships.

Soon after 8 A.M. the inequality of sailing among the British ships began plainly to show itself. By 10 A.M., the Agamemnon had dropt considerably astern, and the Canopus, the leading ship of the lee line, was now no further advanced than the former. The three leading ships of the weather line were in close order, and gaining fast upon the French squadron; the ships of which, at about 9 h. 45 m. A.M., hoisted their colours, and, owing to the wind having shifted to north-east by east, were now steering with it about a point upon the starboard quarter. At 10 h. 10 m. A.M. the Superb, having shortened sail, opened a fire from her starboard guns upon the Alexandre; as, in three minutes afterwards, did the Northumberland upon the three-decker, the Impérial. In another five minutes the Spencer, who was close on the Northumberland's starboard quarter, joined in the cannonade, taking the Diomède as her more immediate opponent, but firing occasionally at the three-decker ahead of her; and all the engaged ships kept running nearly before the wind, at the rate of about eight knots an hour.

Either by accident or design, the Alexandre, after the exchange of three broadsides, suddenly hauled up on the larboard tack, and passed astern of the Superb and Northumberland in quick succession; leaving the Impérial in close action with the latter, and at a somewhat greater distance with the Superb, who, about this time, signalled her friends in the rear to engage more closely. At 10 h. 25 m. the Alexandre attempted to cut through the narrow interval between the Northumberland and Spencer; but the latter, after pouring in a raking fire, crossed

the French ship's bow, wore, and brought her to action on the larboard-tack. Owing to the smoke, this change of sides had been unperceived by the *Superb* and *Northumberland*; who, the one on the starboard-beam, the other on the starboard-bow, of the *Spencer*, gave her some occasional shots. In a very little time, however, the *Northumberland* gallantly pushed in between the *Superb* and *Impérial*, and received from the latter a tremendous broadside; some of the shots of which passed through both sides of the *Northumberland* and struck the *Superb*, for whom the broadside had been intended.

While the *Spencer* and *Alexandre* were closely engaged with their heads to the southward, the remaining ships of both squadrons continued their course to the westward. At about 10 h. 35 m. A.M. the *Canopus*, leading the lee division, crossed and fired into the bows of the *Alexandre*, whose masts, already tottering with the *Spencer*'s heavy fire, fell by the board. The *Donegal* and *Atlas*, in passing, fired also at the *Alexandre*, the latter's dismasted state being scarcely perceivable in the smoke. The *Canopus* standing on towards the three-decker and her second astern, and the *Donegal* and *Atlas* attaching themselves to the *Brave* and *Jupiter*, the action, except on the part of the *Agamemnon*, who still appeared unable to get up, became general. Finding that her antagonist, besides being wholly dismasted, was on fire, the *Spencer*, as soon as her disabled state would permit, filled, and at about 11 A.M. bore up towards the remaining combatants in the west.

After having, as above related, fired into the bows of the *Alexandre*, the *Donegal* passed on, and with her starboard guns engaged the *Brave*. Captain Malcolm then wore under the latter ship's stern, and engaged her closely with his larboard guns, until, being much cut up and disabled, and having sustained a heavy loss in officers and men (partly, no doubt, from the fire of some of the other British ships in passing), the *Brave* struck her colours; as, about 10 minutes before, had the dismasted *Alexandre*, after a defence equally creditable. Having silenced the *Brave*, the *Donegal* stood on; and after firing a few broadsides from her larboard guns into the *Jupiter*, who, as well as the *Brave*, had been partially engaged with the *Atlas* and one or two other British ships as they passed to the westward, ranged ahead, and ran her opponent on board, receiving the *Jupiter*'s bowsprit over her larboard quarter, and securing it there by a hawser from her own lower-deck port to the French ship's foremast. After this prompt measure, the *Jupiter*, with-

out much further resistance, surrendered; and the Donegal, having sent on board a lieutenant, two midshipmen, and 100 men, took her prize in tow. Shortly afterwards the Donegal directed the *Acasta*, by signal, to take possession of the *Brave*, then in the north-by-west quarter; and who had been previously hailed by the *Agamemnon*, as the latter stood on, in obedience to Sir John's signal, to assist in overpowering the three-decker and her second astern.

At about 11 A.M. the *Atlas*, who, after quitting the *Jupiter*, had followed the *Canopus*, in fulfilment of the admiral's orders, to aid him in subduing the French admiral and his two seconds, poured two broadsides into the *Impérial*, and then, bearing up under the latter's stern, raked her. At this instant the tiller of the *Atlas*, by the breaking of the braces, got jammed upon the transom; and at the same critical moment the ship received into her starboard quarter a heavy fire from the *Diomède*. Her whole attention being thus taken up, the *Atlas* failed to observe the *Canopus*, who was close ahead, time enough to shift her helm with effect, and which, in its crippled state, could make only one turn a-port. The consequence was, that the *Atlas* fell on board the *Canopus*, and, without doing any essential damage to the latter, carried away her own bowsprit. The *Atlas* quickly hove her after-sails aback, and, on clearing the *Canopus*, dropped alongside of the *Diomède*; whom she continued to engage with her starboard guns for about 12 minutes, when the *Spencer* came up and joined in the action. What now ensued will best appear after the fate of the French three-decker has been brought to a close.

With such a multitude of foes gathering round her, the latter ship, powerful as she was, had enough upon her hands. The chief antagonist of the *Impérial* had been the *Northumberland*, whose shattered state gave decided proofs of the heavy broadsides and well-directed fire to which her gallantry had exposed her. The fire of this ship, aided by that of the *Superb*, and subsequently of the *Canopus*, had also produced its effect upon the French three-decker; who, at 11 h. 30 m. A.M., with the loss of her main and mizen masts, hauled towards the land, then not more than a mile distant. Having had her masts badly wounded and rigging cut to pieces, the *Northumberland* could only send after the *Impérial* a few distant shot; and the *Superb*, deeming it unsafe, apparently, to be in less than 17 fathoms water, hauled off to the southward. The *Canopus*, however, continued to fire at the three-decker, until the latter, at 11 h. 40 m. A.M.,

struck the ground, and by the shock lost her only remaining stick, the foremast. The *Impérial* shortly afterwards fired a gun to leeward, and her people flocked to the upper part of the ship in the utmost apparent distress: whereupon the firing at her ceased, and the nearest British ships hastened to join the *Superb*. About this time the mainmast of the *Northumberland* came down by the board, and, falling forward on the booms, broke to pieces all the boats, and carried away three or four skid-beams, besides doing other material damage.

After having bore up from engaging the *Alexandre*, the *Spencer* had passed, and, not seeing any colours, had fired at, the *Brave*; had passed, next, the *Donegal* as she was boarding the *Jupiter*, and was approaching to aid the *Canopus* in her attack upon the *Impérial*, when, owing to the latter's proximity to the shore, the *Spencer* had no choice but to join the *Atlas* in engaging the *Diomède*. It was Captain Stopford's intention to pass under the latter's stern; but in this he was foiled by the position of the *Atlas*, who, it will be recollected, had dropped, and was engaging, upon the larboard beam of the *Diomède*. The *Spencer* then steered to pass ahead of the *Diomède*, and received her fire, without the power of returning it, until closing she crossed the French ship's bows. Meanwhile, the *Atlas*, in her still ungovernable state, having shifted her position, the stern of the *Spencer* now became exposed to the guns of the *Diomède*. The *Spencer* at length came to the wind on the larboard tack, and the *Atlas* hauled out of her way, but too late to prevent the *Diomède* from running on shore. The moment the French ship struck the ground, her three masts went by the board; but the *Diomède* still continued to fire occasionally at the *Atlas* and *Canopus*, until they quitted her to rejoin the admiral. Thus in less than two hours had the five ships composing this French squadron been either captured or driven on shore. The two frigates and the corvette, having got well to leeward during the action, hauled to the southward; and, as the *Acasta* and *Magicienne*, at the commencement of the battle, were not ordered to go in chase, and, at its close were busily employed in attending to the captured ships, all three of the former effected their escape.

For the actual force of the British ships, in guns and men, it may suffice, in this case, to refer to their respective establishments, as set forth in various parts of this work. For the guns mounted on the first and second decks, except in the case of the *Canopus*, which ship, from the weakness of her topsides, had

been fitted with 18 instead of 24 pounders, reference may be had to the alphabetical letters K, N or O, and P, in Annual Abstract No. 1. The quarter-deck and fore-castle guns of all seven ships were chiefly 32-pounder carronades, agreeably to the establishment of 1797,¹ and the six carronades on the poop, except those of the *Superb* which were 24s, were 18-pounders.

The force of the French ships may also be stated with tolerable accuracy. The *Impérial* is acknowledged to have been "le plus fort et le plus beau vaisseau qui eut jamais été construit dans aucun pays du monde,"² and to have mounted in this action 130 guns, 36, 24, and 18 pounders, namely 34 on each of her principal decks, besides 10 long 12-pounders and 12 iron 36-pounder carronades on her quarter-deck and fore-castle, and six brass ones of the same caliber on the poop; making her broadside weight of metal reach the enormous amount of 1852 lbs. English. The *Impérial* is described to have had thin sides, and to have been constructed, throughout, of very light scantling for so large a ship. She must have measured at least 3000 tons. Admiral Ekins, but upon what authority we are not informed, says it was 3300.³ That the tonnage of the *Impérial* could not have been much below that amount may be inferred from the fact, that the *Commerce-de-Marseille*, a ship mounting when captured but 118 guns, with only 12-pounders on the third deck, measured 2747 tons.

The long-gun force of the *Alexandre* may be seen in that of her class-mate, the *Formidable*, taken by Sir Richard Strachan;⁴ and a reference to the force of the *Scipion*, captured on the same occasion, may suffice for that of either of the three 74s. It is believed, however, that each of the four two-deckers carried eight iron 36-pounder carronades, in lieu of an equal number of her quarter-deck long guns. In the account of the enemy's force, as given in Sir John Duckworth's gazette-letter, the *Diomède* appears to have been of "84 guns." No writer on the subject, except ourselves, has been so sceptical as to doubt that authority; and accordingly each of our contemporaries, disregarding the statement in the first edition of this work, that the *Diomède* was a 74, have felt themselves, if not quite correct, quite safe (with many writers a paramount consideration), in averring that the ship was an 84.⁵ We knew the contrary, not

¹ See vol. ii., p. 119.

² *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvii., p. 263.

³ Ekins's *Naval Battles*, p. 294.

⁴ See p. 9.

⁵ Brenton, vol. iii., p. 524; who also makes the *Canopus* but a 74. Marshall, vol. i. p. 262, and vol. ii., p. 281, and Ekins, p. 293.

only from having seen the name of the *Diomède* as a 74 in several French accounts published previously to the action, but from the smallness of her sworn complement, which was actually 40 men fewer than that of either of the other French 74s, and from the positive assertion of a British officer of distinction, who took a very active part in the battle. Nor is the difference between a French 84 and a French 74 merely that of 10 guns. The caliber of all the guns, except those upon the lower deck, is larger, the scantling stouter, and the complement of men much greater.

The number of men composing the crew of any one of the French ships is not even hinted at in the official letter. The following are the respective numbers that were certified by the French officers, except in the case of the *Impérial*, which we shall revert to presently; and for which head-money was paid to the captors: *Impérial* (doubtful), 1500 men; *Alexandre*, 820; *Brave* and *Jupiter*, 660 each; and *Diomède* 620; total, 4260. With respect to the *Impérial*, the three deponents were common men. They swore that their ship mounted 136 guns, and went into action with a crew of 1500 men. It may have been so, certainly, but the probability is that these illiterate fellows (for not more than one of them, it appears, could write) meant, that their ship had 1500 men on board before she disembarked the troops. That the *Impérial* was rather under than over manned, may be inferred from the fact, that all the other ships were so. Let us say that her crew amounted to 1200 men; and that is allowing her 100 more than the establishment of a French 120-gun ship.¹

The loss sustained by the British ships was officially reported as follows:—Superb, three seamen and three marines killed, one lieutenant (Charles Patriarch) and the master (William Pickering) badly, and four midshipmen (Charles Wallington, Thomas Jackson, Joseph Bullen, and James Willcox), 41 seamen and nine marines slightly wounded: Northumberland, one midshipman (David Ridgeway), 18 seamen and one marine, and the admiral's cook killed, one lieutenant (George Francis Seymour), three midshipmen (William Millard, Charles William Selwyn, and Jeremiah Lawrence), one secretary's clerk, one boatswain's mate, the French pilot, 27 seamen, and 12 marines badly, and three midshipmen (Henry Stokes, Charles Comer, and Philip Peacock), one secretary's clerk, one quartermaster, two boatswain's mates, 20 seamen, and six marines slightly wounded.

¹ See vol. 1., p. 59

Canopus, eight officers (names not reported), seamen, and marines killed, 15 badly, and seven slightly wounded; Spencer, her boatswain (Martin Oates), 14 seamen, and three marines killed, and her captain, one lieutenant (James Harris, both slightly), one lieutenant of marines (James Cuthbertson, badly), one midshipman (William Neame, slightly), 40 seamen and six marines wounded; Donegal, one midshipman (Charles H. Kynaston), seven seamen, and four marines killed, the master (John Airey), three midshipmen (William Rudall, Henry Ogilvie, and Edward Acton), and 12 seamen and marines badly, and 17 slightly wounded; Atlas, seven seamen and one marine killed, the master (William Mowbray), boatswain (Stephen Spargo), and nine seamen wounded; Agamemnon, one seaman killed, and one boatswain's mate, four seamen, and eight marines wounded; making the aggregate loss of 74 killed and 264 wounded, and the total numerical loss of each ship as follows:—

	Killed.	Wounded.	First-lieutenants.
Superb	6	56	{ Richard Gill. Richard Couch, <i>sec.</i> Uncertain.
Northumberland	21	79	{ Richard Harward, <i>sec.</i> Uncertain.
Canopus	8	22	George Ravenshaw.
Spencer	18	50	William Sanders.
Donegal	12	33	Lord Jas. Townshend.
Atlas	8	11	Uncertain.
Agamemnon	1	13	

We may remark that, in respect to the relative proportions of killed and wounded, the returns of the *Superb* and *Atlas* form a surprising contrast. But the log of the *Superb* says: six killed and 30 wounded. The return of the *Northumberland*, on the other hand, corresponds exactly with the entry in her log.

No British ship, except the *Northumberland*, appears to have had any mast shot away. The *Donegal* lost her fore-yard, and the *Atlas*, by an accident as has been shown, her bowsprit. The masts and rigging of most of the other ships were much wounded and cut up, and some of their hulls not a little damaged by the shot of their opponents. One account indeed states, that the *Spencer* received 60 shot in her hull, on the side on which she engaged the *Alexandre*. The *Northumberland's* hull, no doubt, was in quite as shattered a state.

The loss sustained by the captured French ships, for the want of a little pains on the part of the writer of the British official account, cannot be stated otherwise than in a general way. According to Sir John Duckworth's letter, the *Alexandre* had

300 men in killed and wounded, the *Brave* 260, and the *Jupiter* 200. With respect to the *Impérial* and *Diomède*, all that appears is, that their killed and wounded were "not known, but were certainly many." The *Impérial*, according to the French accounts, had 500 men killed and wounded, including among the former two of the admiral's aide-de-camps, and among the badly wounded, the first and second captains and five other officers. The loss sustained by the *Diomède* has not been enumerated, but must have been, in proportion, equally severe. According to information derived from the masters of some American vessels at anchor in the road pending the engagement, that ship had 250 men killed and wounded. The loss on the part of the *Jupiter*, if not of the *Brave*, appears to have been rather over-rated in Sir John Duckworth's letter. Neither of these ships had any of their masts shot away, nor was the *Jupiter* materially damaged in her hull; but the captains of both the *Brave* and the *Jupiter* appear to have been either mortally or very severely wounded, neither having been present to sign the head-money certificates. The hull of the *Brave* was tolerably cut up, and the *Alexandre's* hull completely shattered from stem to stern; so that, what with her numerous shot-holes and her entirely dismasted state, this fine 80-gun ship could with difficulty be kept afloat.

The spot where the two French ships had run on shore was about midway between Point Nisao and Point Catalana. The ships lay broadside-on, the *Diomède* about 200 yards astern of the *Impérial*; and such was the rocky state of the coast, that the bottoms of both were stove in very soon after the vessels had struck. The French immediately proceeded to get first their wounded, and then the remainder of their crews on shore, it being the avowed intention of M. Leissegues, as soon as that was effected, to set the two ships on fire. On the 8th, when, as it appears by the French accounts, all, or nearly all, of the crew of the three-decker had been saved, and all of the *Diomède's*, except her captain and his surviving officers, and about 100 of the men, the British frigates advanced towards that part of the coast. The *Acasta* and consort, by means of their boats, brought away Captain Henry and his people, and afterwards set fire to and destroyed both French ships. In his third letter, Sir John states that Captain Dunn, to whom this service had been intrusted, "rescued all the prisoners (number not stated) from perishing through a tremendous sea." The fact is, that, although Captain Henry and about 150 of the surviving officers

and men of the *Diomède* were made prisoners, scarcely half a dozen persons, and none above a fore-castle man, were taken, who had belonged to the *Impérial*.

Considered as a naval combat, the action off the road of Santo-Domingo displays nothing very remarkable. It was simply that seven British two-decked ships, including one 64, after a running fight of two hours with one three, and four two, decked French ships, captured three of the latter, and drove on shore the remainder. It is as true that the *Impérial* was nearly a match for any two ships in the British, as that the *Agamemnon* was unable to cope with the weakest ship in the opposite line. But the French were totally unprepared, and, if some accounts dated from the city of Santo-Domingo are to be depended upon, had actually left on shore several of their officers and men, including their very admiral. The latter, however, according to his letter in the *Moniteur*, was on board his ship before the action became general. One of the private letters from the city of Santo-Domingo states that, when the British squadron made its appearance, the French sailors were calking the sides of their ships: a circumstance which explains the half-finished and dirty appearance of the three prizes, of the *Jupiter* and *Brave* especially, when they anchored in the harbour of Port Royal, Jamaica.

On the other hand, the British had been, for weeks, anticipating this or a similar rencounter; and, so far from being deficient in general officers, three of the ships displayed admirals' flags at their mast-heads. With the exception of the noble manner in which the *Northumberland* closed with the three-decker, and the spirited conduct of the *Spencer* and *Donegal*, the British ships neither did, nor had the opportunity of doing, anything to distinguish themselves. As to the French they certainly displayed less than their usual gallantry and judgment; but there is no saying that this falling off may not have arisen, in some degree, from the absence of Rear-admiral Leissegues at the commencement, and his apparently shy conduct at the close of the action. The *Alexandre* did all that a ship could do; and the *Brave*, if not the *Jupiter*, went far to emulate the former.

As soon as the two most disabled of his three prizes were refitted, Sir John proceeded with them to Jamaica; and Rear-admiral Cochrane, as soon as he had got a jury-mainmast rigged on the *Northumberland* and other matters done to her, made sail back to his station, accompanied by the *Agamemnon*, as the least disabled ship, in case the *Northumberland*, owing to her crippled state, should require any assistance.

The *Alexandre* was formerly the *Indivisible*, launched at Brest in the summer of 1799.¹ The two remaining prizes were from 10 to 12 years old. The *Alexandre* measured 2231 tons, the *Jupiter* 1899, and the *Brave* (which ship, having foundered on her way to England, was not measured) about the same. The first was too much injured by shot to be worth repairing for a sea-going ship; but the second, under the name of *Maida* (a *Jupiter* 50 being already in the service), became for a year or two a cruising ship, and was fitted, on her first and second decks, with Gover's 24-pounders, a medium gun of which we shall hereafter say more.

To judge by the solicitude which the vice-admiral, when a captain, expressed to be made a baronet, for his comparatively small services at the capture of *Minorca*,² we can readily conceive that Sir John, upon the present occasion, expected at the least to be created a peer. But Sir John received no addition to his honours. In about two months after the action, however, Rear-admiral Cochrane was invested with the order of the Bath, and Rear-admiral Louis was created a baronet. Captain Cochrane, who, to the credit of Sir John Duckworth, had been allowed to carry home the despatches, was made a post-captain. We believe the first-lieutenant of each flag-ship was also promoted to post-rank, and the second made a commander; and that a commander's rank was bestowed upon the first-lieutenant of each of the four remaining ships.

Considering the panic that usually prevails in the British West India islands, when a French fleet or squadron makes its appearance in that quarter of the globe, the inhabitants of Jamaica may well be excused for having received Sir John and his prizes with "rapturous acknowledgments." Nor was it strange that the patriotism of the mercantile interest (peculiarly sensitive when large risks are at sea) should prompt the body of London merchants, and the committee of underwriters at Lloyd's, to vote vases and swords and sums of money to those who, by cutting short the career of a French squadron, had probably saved from capture so much valuable property. But who could imagine that the British parliament, a court from its very nature so well calculated to take an unbiassed view of the subject, would have voted its thanks to the officers and men who, with seven sail of the line, had defeated five, thus virtually declaring, with the noble mover, Lord Grenville, that superiority of force does not, in the least, take from the bril-

¹ See vol. ii., p. 303.

² *Ibid.*, p. 222.

liancy of a victory, or from the merit of those by whom it was achieved?

It would seem by this, as if Sir John's own vivid description of his exploit had captivated the minister's understanding. The admiral very adroitly begins by stating, that his information on the subject led him to believe that the enemy's force in the West Indies consisted of "ten sail of the line, with as many frigates and corvettes." Now, all the information obtained on the subject came, it is admitted, from two Danish schooners; one that saw the French ships steering for the road of Santo-Domingo, and another that had actually lain at anchor with them. Is it possible, that the master of either of these vessels, of the last especially, could have been so blind or so stupid as to mistake five ships of the line for 10, and two frigates and one corvette for 10 sail of that class? In another part of his letter, Sir John says: "I cannot, though bound to pay every tribute to the noble and gallant efforts of the Honourable Rear-admiral Cochrane, &c., &c., be vain enough to suppose that, without the aiding hand of Providence, such a result could have been effected."

The same sentiment as that expressed by Lord Grenville in the House of Peers was delivered by Mr. Grey in the House of Commons. The latter went even further than his coadjutor in the upper house. The honourable mover adverted to the "promptitude with which he (Sir John) left his station off Cadiz, when he heard of the enemy's fleet being at sea." According to our view of the subject, it was no extraordinary promptitude for a British admiral, with six sail of the line, to go in quest of a French admiral with five; but if we are not mistaken, Vice-admiral Lord Collingwood, the commander-in-chief, greatly blamed Sir John Duckworth for quitting his station, and leaving the port of Cadiz unblockaded by a single ship. Surprised as we are at the verbal inaccuracy of a lord of the admiralty, in designating a squadron of five enemy's ships a "fleet," we are still more so that Mr. Grey should laud the "skill that Sir John displayed, in taking a position to intercept them at the time they owed their escape entirely to the superiority of their sailing." Can this refer to the Christmas-day chase? It certainly does. So that an act, for which, had he not fallen in with M. Leissegues, Sir John would probably have been brought to a court-martial, is held up as a pattern to imitate, and that by the first lord of the admiralty!

If Englishmen in general, who, blessed with a free press,

could know at least how many ships had been engaged on each side (for he must be a bold panegyrist, indeed, who would misstate that fact), felt that the victory of Sir John Duckworth off the city of Santo-Domingo had been greatly overrated, what must the French have thought, who had no other statement placed before them than an official letter, positively declaring, that the victory was obtained, and with great difficulty obtained, by nine British ships of the line and several frigates over four French ships of the line, two frigates, and a corvette? No sooner did Captain Raymond Cocault, commanding the *Diligente* corvette, reach a safe anchorage in Port Louis road, in the river that leads to Lorient, than he gave the minister of marine an account of the misfortunes of the squadron he had belonged to; misfortunes, indeed, considering the glory which had been won on the occasion, they could scarcely be called. After describing his first discovery of the British squadron off the road of Santo-Domingo, M. Cocault states, or rather, after what has appeared respecting the forgeries in the *Moniteur*, we may say, is made to state, thus: "At six o'clock I distinguished in this squadron nine ships of the line and several frigates." "A six heures, je distinguai dans cette escadre neuf vaisseaux de guerre et plusieurs frégates."¹ Now, it is customary to express "ship of the line" by "vaisseau" singly, but it is not uncommon for a line-of-battle ship to be called, as distinguished from a frigate or sloop, "a man-of-war;" and that this is the sense in which M. Cocault uses the term, "vaisseaux de guerre," is evident from his following it up with "plusieurs frégates."

M. Cocault goes on to state what signals he made, and how they were answered by his friends in the road, and adds: "At seven o'clock the four ships of the line and two frigates got under sail, with a very light wind; while the enemy's nine ships of the line and frigates were favoured by a shift of wind from north to east." "A sept heures, les quatre vaisseaux et les deux frégates étaient sous voile, mais avec un vent très-faible, tandis que les neuf vaisseaux de guerre et les frégates de l'ennemi étaient favorisés par la variété de la brise qui du nord avait passé à l'est."

But the most amusing part of M. Cocault's letter is his account of the result of the engagement: "Three of our ships," says he, "appeared to us to have grounded near the batteries;² three" (meaning those three) "were dismasted; the fourth was in the

¹ *Moniteur*, March 30, 1806. ² It does not appear that there were any near the spec-

possession of the enemy: two English ships were aground near our own, and were as bare as sheer-hulks; they had fired guns of distress, and the frigates appeared to be occupied in saving the crews. Two other English ships were in the offing, dismasted and in a very bad state, and the remainder of the enemy's squadron appeared to have suffered considerably.' "Trois de nos vaisseaux nous avaient paru échoués près des fortifications de la place; trois étaient dématés: le quatrième était au pouvoir de l'ennemi: deux vaisseaux anglais étaient échoués auprès de nôtres et rasés comme des pontons; ils avaient tiré le canon de détresse, et les frégates paraissaient occupées à sauver les équipages. Deux autres vaisseaux anglais étaient au large dématés en très-mauvais état, et le reste de l'escadre ennemie paraissait avoir beaucoup souffert." Yet, according to the official letter of the French admiral (but which was not suffered to appear in the *Moniteur*), M. Cocault had fled entirely out of sight when the action closed. Thus: "La *Félicité* et la *Diligente* n'étaient point en vue alors (à la fin de l'action), et j'ignore quelle route elles ont faite."¹ And, considering that the action lasted only two hours, Captain Cocault and his companion must have made sail at a very early stage of it.

No doubt M. Cocault felt highly indignant when he discovered the use that had been made of his name; but, had he remonstrated, he probably would not have attained the rank and honours which he now appears to enjoy. For instance, at the date of his letter, M. Cocault was a "capitaine de frégate" about two-thirds down the list, and simply a "legionnaire de la légion d'honneur." On the 12th of July, 1808, he was appointed "capitaine de vaisseau," and, on January 1, 1822, the date of the latest list in our possession, was within 11 of being an admiral, with an increase of orders to, "chevalier de l'ordre royal et militaire de St. Louis," and "officier de l'ordre royal de la légion d'honneur."

After the frequent occasions we have had to correct the misstatements of a contemporary, who boasted, and, we think, with reason, of "the great opportunities he had enjoyed for obtaining the most correct information,"² but who has since shown, in a very marked manner, the little profit that may be derived from the possession of such advantages, we shall abstain from taking any lengthened or serious notice of his account of the victory off Santo-Domingo roads. The squadron

¹ *Victoires et Conquêtes* tome xvi., p. 269.

² Brenton, *vcl.* iii., Preface.

which chased the Lark, that chased by Sir John Duckworth and abandoned in so extraordinary a manner, and that afterwards met and defeated by him, are all, as far as we can gather, considered to be the same.¹ He says that, closely supported by the Northumberland, Spencer, and "Sir Edward Berry," Sir John "boldly laid the Superb alongside the Impérial;" and that the main and "mizen" masts of the Northumberland were shot away as she lay alongside the same ship. After approving of Sir John's discontinuance of the chase of M. Willaumez, the writer may well laud the "brilliant victory" obtained over M. Leissegues. Perhaps some panegyric of this kind was necessary, in order that the engraved portrait, intended for the frontispiece to the account, might not be considered undeservedly placed there.

Having brought to its disastrous close the cruise of Rear-admiral Leissegues, we must now return to M. Willaumez, whom, it will be recollected, we left just as an unexpected turn of good fortune had released him from the, in all probability, fatal consequences of a meeting with an equal British force.² Left by Sir John Duckworth to pursue his course, the French admiral reached, without further molestation, the latitude of the Cape of Good Hope. Here he captured an English merchant-vessel, but not "une corvette anglaise,"³ for none was lost, and from the former learnt, to his regret, into whose hands the Cape had recently fallen. In this port he was to have refitted, preparatory to a cruise off the bank of Anguillas, where he had hoped to have intercepted the China fleet. Thus disappointed, M. Willaumez contented himself with cruising between the continents of Africa and South America, until the want of provisions, in the beginning of April, sent him to the port of St. Salvadore. After a stay here of 16 days, the French squadron weighed and set sail for Cayenne. There M. Willaumez separated his squadron into three divisions, and cruised between the last-named port and the ninth degree of south latitude. He, it appears, contemplated the destruction of the shipping in Carlisle bay, Barbadoes; but declares he was prevented by currents, contrary winds, and bad weather. Perhaps, had M. Willaumez made the attempt, he would have found more formidable obstacles than these.

On the 9th of June the Vétéran arrived at Fort Royal, Martinique; having narrowly escaped an encounter with the 74-gun ship Northumberland, Captain John Spear, bearing the flag of

¹ Brenton, vol. iii., pp. 520, 521, 529.

² See vol. iii., p. 378.

³ Victoires et Conquêtes, tome xvii., p. 300.

Rear-admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, who arrived a few hours afterwards from Barbadoes, in consequence of information that Prince Jérôme's ship had been seen off the north end of that island. On the 14th, early in the morning, the 74-gun ship *Elephant*, Captain George Dundas, without a foretopmast, joined the *Northumberland* in Fort-Royal bay; and, on the same afternoon, the *Canada* 74, Captain John Harvey. On the 15th at 3 A.M. the *Northumberland*, in a heavy squall, carried away her fore-yard and foretopmast, and, towed by the *Canada*, was obliged to bear away for Gros-islet bay, Sainte-Lucie, to refit. On the same afternoon the *Eole* and *Impétueux* arrived in Fort-Royal bay. On the 20th the *Foudroyant* and *Valeureuse* succeeded in reaching the same anchorage, although chased by Sir Alexander's squadron; and on the 24th the like good fortune attended the *Cassard* and *Patriote*. During the chase of the two latter ships, the *Northumberland*, a second time, carried away her fore-yard.

On the 1st of July Rear-admiral Willaumez quitted Martinique, and steered for the island of Montserrat, to windward of which he found himself on the following day. The squadron having here separated, two of the ships appeared before the harbour, and demanded and took three English merchant-vessels which were at anchor within it. Meanwhile information had been sent to the islands of Nevis and St. Christopher, time enough for a part of the homeward-bound convoy, amounting to 65 sail, collected off Sandy Point at the latter island, to put to sea, under the protection of the 28-gun frigate *Carysfort*, Captain Kenneth M'Kenzie, and *Dolphin* armed store-ship, Lieutenant William Hodge; who, with their charge, stood away to leeward, unseen by the enemy. Nine sail, however, from Nevis, and from Basse-Terre, St. Christopher's, which had missed the convoy, were obliged to take refuge under the batteries of Brimstone-hill, on the last-named island. These nine sail of merchantmen, about sunset on the 3rd, were attacked by the remaining four French sail of the line, on their return from Nevis, where they had captured three ships and a brig. Owing, however, to the heavy cannonade opened by the fort on Brimstone-hill, and by a battery near the beach, the French ships, one of them with some damage to her rigging, were compelled to retire without effecting their object. All this occupies a very small space in the French narrative of the proceedings of M. Willaumez's squadron. "*Elle se dirigea vers Mont-Serrat, et rançonna* (rather a strong word for all that was done) *cette colonie.*

L'amiral Willaumez visita encore plusieurs rades ennemies, où il fit des prises."

On the 4th, early in the morning, the two ships that had been at Montserrat joined the four which had been foiled at St. Christopher's, and the squadron stood towards the island of Tortola, in high glee at the prospect of capturing the greater part of the immense fleet of deeply-laden English ships there assembled, ready to proceed on their homeward-bound voyage. It so happened, however, that, at daybreak on the 6th, at a short distance to the south-east of the west point of the island of St. Thomas, and at about nine miles to windward of the French squadron, was cruising a British squadron, under Rear-admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, consisting of the three 74s named in the preceding page, the 64-gun ship *Agamemnon*, Captain Jonas Rose, and the frigates *Ethalion*, *Seine*, *Galatea*, and *Circe*, together with some sloops and schooners.

Since the 4th Sir Alexander had heard of the arrival of M. Willaumez off Montserrat, and, with a laudable zeal, was proceeding to endeavour to rescue the convoy from his grasp. Almost immediately on perceiving the British squadron, the French squadron, as if desirous to avoid a contest, bore up and ran through the Channel between St. Thomas and Passage island, followed, until 2 P.M., by Sir Alexander; who then steered for Drake's bay, Tortola, and anchored there on the morning of the 8th, in company with about 280 sail of West-Indiamen.

The French account of this meeting is as follows: "On the 6th of July, under the island of St. Thomas, he (Willaumez) fell in with the English squadron of Admiral Cochrane, composed of four sail of the line and of several frigates and large corvettes, forming a total of 12 or 13 three-masted vessels. This squadron was to windward. Willaumez shortened sail to wait for it, and cleared for action. The English admiral did not think proper to engage, and kept his wind. The position of the two squadrons prevented the French admiral from closing the enemy, who had Tortola and St. Thomas to shelter himself in, and after having in vain offered him battle, he (Willaumez) resumed his route."

Deeming it, as he himself admits, no longer safe to remain in the Antilles, and having taken on board his squadron at Martinique a sufficient quantity of provisions to last until October, M. Willaumez steered towards the latitude of the Great Bahama bank. It is clear from this, that, notwithstanding the bounce in the account just quoted, the instructions of M. Willaumez forbade

him to fight without very considerable odds in his favour; for, no other squadron than that of Rear-admiral Cochrane was then in the Antilles. The French admiral's object in proceeding to the Bahama bank, was to intercept the Jamaica homeward-bound fleet, of whose day of departure, number, and escort, he had received the fullest information. Arrived on his station, the French admiral looked anxiously for the convoy. Day after day passed, without the appearance of a fleet, or even of a sail, except now and then an American vessel, worth only the intelligence she brought. For M. Willaumez made no scruple to seize and detain every neutral vessel he fell in with, in order that his cruising ground might be kept a secret. "Ayant, lui, la précaution d'arrêter et de retenir tous les bâtimens neutres, pour qu'on ne pût savoir d'avis sur sa position."¹ This is worthy the attention of those citizens of the United States of America who have been wont to charge the English fleets and cruisers with being the sole offenders in thus harassing neutral commerce.

We formerly mentioned that Napoleon, out of regard to the naval profession, had made his younger brother Jérôme a member of it.² Royalty concentrating in itself all possible claims for promotion, the young prince was raised to the rank of lieutenant de vaisseau on the 14th of January, 1803, not quite a twelvemonth after his initiation into the service. On the 1st of November, 1804, Jérôme was made a capitaine de frégate, and appointed to the Pomone;³ in which frigate, accompanied by some other vessels, he cruised a short time in the Mediterranean. One would suppose that this promotion was sufficiently rapid to satisfy even a royal mind. Before, however, he had been a capitaine de frégate seven months, Jérôme wanted to *make himself* a capitaine de vaisseau. About this time his vagaries, and his total disregard of the rules of the service, notwithstanding all the allowances made to him as the brother of the emperor, created so much disgust in the French navy, that complaints were forwarded to Napoleon; who, in a letter of June 16, 1805, says to his minister of marine: "M. Jérôme Buonaparte cannot be a capitaine de vaisseau; it would be a fatal innovation to suffer him to give himself rank. In this point of view, his conduct betrays an unexampled levity, and his justification has no reason in it. Not only has Jérôme not the right to make an enseigne a lieutenant, but I annul the appointment: this con-

¹ Victoires et Conquêtes, tome xvii., p. 302.

² See vol. iii., p. 163.

³ Ibid., p. 378.

duct is altogether ridiculous. When he shall have fought and captured an English line-of-battle ship, he will not have the right of giving rank, but simply of recommending those who may have distinguished themselves.”¹

It may easily be conceived what a plague this, in court language, illustrious personage was to an enterprising officer like M. Willaumez. Doubtless the admiral had received from the emperor the most solemn charge to avoid every risk of placing his headstrong brother in the hands of his enemies. If so, there is less difficulty in accounting for the apparently shy conduct of Rear-admiral Willaumez in retreating, as well from Sir John Duckworth with an equal, as from Sir Alexander Cochrane with an inferior force. In short, the cruise of M. Willaumez, like the generality of those planned by the French emperor, had for its object an attack upon the defenceless commerce, rather than upon the armed ships and batteries of his enemy.

After the squadron had cruised for some days longer upon the Bahama bank, in the listless and unprofitable manner already mentioned, the impatience of the admiral's protégé could hold out no longer; and accordingly, on the night of the 31st of July, the *Vétéran* contrived to part company. With the aid of his first-lieutenant, and of the other able officers that were no doubt placed around him, Captain Jérôme bent his course towards Europe. On the 10th of August, in latitude 46° 31' north, longitude 35° 15' west, he was fortunate enough to fall in with a homeward-bound Quebec fleet of 16 sail, under the protection of the 22-gun ship *Champion*, Captain Robert Howe Bromley. After a gallant but unsuccessful attempt to draw the French 74 in chase of herself, the *Champion* saw six of her convoy captured and burnt. According to Jérôme's account, three others shared the same fate; but the “two frigates” effected their escape. By which designation was meant the *Champion*, and, we suppose, the Osborne transport, the pendant ship of the convoy.

On the 26th, at daybreak, having reached the latitude of Belleisle, on her way to Lorient, the *Vétéran* fell in with, and was chased by, a British squadron composed of the 80-gun ship *Gibraltar*, Captain Willoughby Thomas Lake, and the 18-pounder 36-gun frigates *Penelope* and *Tribune*, Captain William Robert Broughton, and Thomas Baker. The prince had reason to be alarmed; but by the local experience of the officers intrusted with the care of Jérôme and with the manage-

¹ For the original of this letter, see Appendix, No. 9.

ment of the ship, the *Vétéran* succeeded in reaching the little port of Concarneau, situated about three leagues to the north-north-east of the Glénan isles; and into which, on account of its rocky approach, narrow entrance, and small depth of water, no ship of the line had ever before attempted to take shelter.

For his dereliction of duty in quitting his commanding officer without leave, Prince Jérôme did not, as far as we can discover, receive any rebuke from his brother. On the contrary, Napoleon, pleased perhaps at the partial destruction of the Quebec convoy, received him in a very flattering manner: and the editor of the *Moniteur* was commanded to dress up Jérôme's "cruise" in the first style of court panegyric. No inducement, however, could prevail upon the young naval hero to trust himself again at sea in a fighting-ship; and he very soon afterwards, we believe, quitted the profession. M. Willaumez now demands our attention.

Daylight on the 1st of August discovered to the French admiral the absence of the *Vétéran*; and, fully sensible of the danger to which the fugitive prince would be exposed, M. Willaumez cruised in every direction to find him. Meanwhile the Jamaica fleet, consisting of 109 vessels, under convoy of a 64, two frigates, and a sloop or two, had sailed from the west end of that island on the 28th of July, to go by the gulf, instead of the windward passage, and was then rounding Cape Antonio. Having returned from his unsuccessful search, M. Willaumez continued to cruise for the Jamaica fleet, until, at the expiration of some days, a neutral assured him that his hopes were at an end.

This delay on the part of M. Willaumez, in all probability, would have led to a rencounter between him and Sir John Borslase Warren, had not the latter, on quitting Barbadoes, where he had arrived on the 12th of July, kept too much to the eastward. After having returned to Spithead from his first cruise off Madeira, Sir John had sailed, on the 4th of June, with the *Foudroyant* and four of his five 74s,¹ with an additional 74, the *Fame*, Captain Richard Henry Alexander Bennett, in lieu of the *Repulse*, of the same force. The vice-admiral took with him, on the same occasion, but one frigate, the *Amazon*. So that Sir John had under his command one 80, five 74s, and one frigate; and, before Jérôme parted, M. Willaumez had also one 80, five 74s, and one frigate. By a singular coincidence, too, both 80-gun ships bore the same name.

¹ See p. 89.

The French admiral now prepared to execute the remaining objects of his cruise. These were, to proceed to the coast of Newfoundland, there to capture the fishing-vessels and destroy the fisheries; then to take up a favourable station for intercepting the English trade from Labrador, Greenland, and Iceland, and to be ready, by the middle of October, to enter a port of France.¹ Scarcely had the French ships turned their heads to the northward, when M. Willaumez encountered a greater misfortune than any he had experienced since his departure from home. On the night of the 18th of August, in latitude 22° north, longitude 63° west, a gale or hurricane overtook the squadron, scattering the ships in every direction, and dismasting and damaging the whole of them.

When the gale subsided, the French admiral found himself entirely alone. Having contrived a substitute for her lost rudder, and erected jury-masts in lieu of those which had been carried away, the Foudroyant steered straight for Havana. On the 15th of September, at daylight, when within three leagues of his destined port, M. Willaumez fell in with the British 44-gun frigate Anson, Captain Charles Lydiard, then about six miles distant, running along-shore from the Matanzas, and standing directly for the Foudroyant. At 7 h. 30 m. A.M., the latter hoisted the French ensign and a rear-admiral's flag, Havana at this time bearing from the Anson west-south-west distant between three and four leagues. At 8 h. 15 m., then nearly calm, the French 80 shortened sail, and despatched a boat into the harbour. At 10 h. 15 m. A.M., a light air springing up from the south by east, each ship crowded all the sail she could set. At noon Point Moro bore from the Anson west by south four or five miles. At 1 P.M. the Foudroyant fired a gun to windward, and at 1 h. 10 m. the Anson shortened sail. In a minute or two afterwards the Foudroyant did the same, and hove to, as if awaiting the frigate's approach. At 1 h. 15 m. P.M., the Foudroyant opened her fire, and received in return the fire of the Anson; both ships standing on the starboard tack, the Anson to windward. The cannonade continued until about 1 h. 45 m. P.M.; when, finding she was not able to cope with her antagonist, the Anson tacked, ceased firing, and made sail, with the loss of two seamen killed, and seven seamen and one marine wounded, besides having the starboard leech of her foretopsail and the slings of the main yard shot away, and her standing and running rigging and sails much cut. The Anson had also received

¹ *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvii., p. 302.

several shot in the hull. What damage or loss the *Foudroyant* sustained has not been recorded: all we know is, that in a very short time after the action had ceased, she was at an anchor in Havana.

A French 80-gun ship, in weight of metal, number of men, and size, is, be it remembered, a full match for a British 98; and, although the *Foudroyant* was disabled in her masts, she was not (for, if she had been, the French themselves would quickly have made it known) in her guns. Hence a tolerable idea may be formed of what chance the *Anson* would have stood had she persevered in the contest. The French were so sensible of the disparity between the combatants, and of the little honour which had been gained by the larger vessel, that they not only described the British frigate as a "cut-down line-of-battle ship, carrying two whole batteries," but stated her to have been in company with other British men-of-war; and this, although it was well known at Havana that the *Anson* was cruising alone. "Dans les environs de ce port," says the French account, "le *Foudroyant* fut attaqué par une division anglaise, à la tête de laquelle se trouvait le vaisseau rasé l'*Anson*."¹ Now, the *Anson's* captain, with more propriety, might have stated, that he was "attacked by a Franco-Spanish division, at the head of which was the *Foudroyant*;" for the Spanish 74 *San-Lorenzo* and several gun-boats, just as the *Anson* had ceased firing, were seen coming out of Havana to assist the French ship. Resolved, for this gasconade, to pay the French in their own coin, Captain Brenton declares, that the *Anson*, "after a severe action, drove him (M. Willaumez) for protection under the guns of the *Moro* castle."²

Of the two British squadrons despatched in different directions in pursuit of the supposed single squadron which had put to sea from Brest, that under Sir John Warren has already had its proceedings in part detailed. The squadron of Sir Richard Strachan had returned to Plymouth equally unsuccessful. From certain information that M. Willaumez, after quitting St. Salvador in April, had steered to the north-west, Sir Richard was again ordered in pursuit. It had by this time been found that a 98-gun-ship was no acquisition to a flying squadron. The *St. George* was therefore to be left at home; as was also the *Centaur*, on account of Sir Samuel Hood's appointment to the command off Rochefort. In lieu of those two ships, three others were added, which made Sir Richard's squadron as follows:—

¹ *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvii., p. 303.

² Brenton, vol. iv., p. 59.

Gun ship.

80	Cæsar	{	Rear-adm. (b.) Sir Richard John Strachan, Bart. Captain Charles Richardson.
	{ Belleisle	,,	William Hargood.
	{ Terrible	,,	Lord Henry Paulet.
74	{ Bellona	,,	John Erskine Douglas.
	{ Audacious	,,	Thomas Le Marchant Gosselyn.
	{ Montagu	,,	Robert Waller Otway.
	{ Triumph	,,	Sir Thomas Masterman Hardy, Bart.

Gun-frigate.

36	{ Melampus	,,	Stephen Poyntz.
	{ Décade	,,	John Stuart.

On the 19th of May this squadron sailed from Plymouth, and on the 8th of August, after having cruised some time off Madeira and the Canary islands, Sir Richard anchored in Carlisle bay, Barbadoes. On the 13th that persevering officer again set sail in search of M. Willaumez; of whose cruising-ground he had received so good information, that the night of the 18th of August fell upon both squadrons nearly in the same latitude, and within a degree of the same longitude, the British experiencing the gale in latitude $21^{\circ} 25'$ north, longitude 62° west, the French, as has already been stated, in latitude 22° north, longitude 63° west. The accidental circumstance of a day's earlier departure from Barbadoes might have enabled Sir Richard to have crossed the path of M. Willaumez, as the latter was returning to his cruising-ground from the eastward, where he had been seeking Prince Jérôme, who had so unceremoniously quitted his protection.

On the 14th of September, at daybreak, Cape Henry in the United States of America bearing west-north-west distant 12 leagues, the British 74-gun ships Belleisle and Bellona, and frigate Melampus, being on the appointed rendezvous, in search of the Cæsar and the other ships of their squadron, which had been separated by the gale, discovered to leeward of them, and immediately chased, a strange sail under jury-masts, steering straight for the Chesapeake. This was the French 74-gun ship Impétueux, next to the Foudroyant, the most disabled ship of M. Willaumez's squadron. In the crippled state of his ship, M. Le Veyer had no alternative but to bear up towards the land. Accordingly, at 8 h. 15 m. A.M., the Impétueux hoisted French colours, and ran herself on shore. Soon afterwards the Melampus shortened sail, and, having hove to on the larboard tack, fired a broadside at the French ship, who thereupon hauled down her ensign and pendant. At 10 A.M. the British ships

anchored about a mile from the shore, in five fathoms water, and, with their boats, took possession of the *Impétueux*. At noon two suspicious sail in the offing induced Captain Hargood to get under way with the *Belleisle* and *Bellona*, leaving the *Melampus* to remove the French prisoners and set fire to the prize. By 8 P.M. that service was accomplished, and the frigate weighed and stood after her consorts.

The capture and destruction of the *Impétueux* was certainly a breach of neutrality; and the French consul at Norfolk so considered it, by refusing to acknowledge her late crew as prisoners of war. However, the affair happily passed off in the United States with very little notice.

About a fortnight previously to the destruction of the *Impétueux*, the *Patriote* and *Eole*, each on a different day, arrived in the Chesapeake in a very disabled state, particularly the former. These ships afterwards proceeded to Annapolis, where in a little while they were blockaded by some British ships-of-war from Halifax. Eventually, as will be seen, the *Patriote* reached France; but the *Eole*, we believe, was taken to pieces in America. The same fate attended the *Valeureuse* frigate, who, partially dismasted, had put into the Delaware, and had subsequently removed, for greater security, as high up the river as Philadelphia. The *Foudroyant*, after undergoing a refit at Havana, set sail on her return to France, and arrived in the road of Brest. The *Cassard* the only remaining ship of the French squadron, as soon as the gale had abated, bent her course towards Europe, and reached in safety the port of Rochefort.

A third British squadron had been despatched from the Channel, for the purpose of intercepting M. Willaumez on his return to France. This squadron was placed under the command of Rear-admiral Sir Thomas Louis, Bart., in the 80-gun ship *Canopus*, with orders to cruise about 50 leagues to the westward of Belle-Isle. The news of the dispersion of the French squadron, and of the disasters that had subsequently attended it, reached the rear-admiral in the early part of his cruise, and Sir Thomas and his squadron forthwith removed to the station off Cadiz. We must now pay a short visit to the port of Brest; the fleet cruising off which, since the 22nd of February, when Admiral Cornwallis struck his flag, had been under the chief command of the Earl St. Vincent.

Not only had the best of the ships and the bulk of the seamen been taken from the Brest fleet to form the two expeditions

that had sailed from the road in December, 1805, and of whose respective fates we have already given so full an account, but a serious deficit had been caused in the stock of stores and provisions at the port. Hence the seven or eight line-of-battle ships that still remained afloat were not in a condition to go to sea; nor, during the whole of this year, did one of them make even a show of sailing out. However, on the 5th of October, during the temporary absence of the British squadron stationed off the port, the French 74-gun ship *Régulus*, after nearly a twelve-month's successful cruise, the principal events of which we shall hereafter relate, got safe in.

Heavy as had been the loss to the French navy at the battle of Trafalgar, it was by no means in so desperate a state as some of the English periodical writers would have the public believe. Steel, in his monthly Navy-list for March in the present year, enumerates the number of line-of-battle ships then belonging to France at 19: while, with an air of triumph, he states the British line-force, including 50s, at 243 sail. This appears in a small Table, entitled "Naval Force of Europe;" and in which France, as a naval power, ranks below Sweden, Denmark, and even Turkey. So far from the statement being correct as relates to France and England, the one possessed, in a state for sea-service and building, more than 53 sail of the line, thus:—

Brest	afloat	10	building	3
Orient	"	0	"	2
Rochefort	"	6	"	2
In the Scheldt	"	0	"	10
Vigo	"	1		
Cadiz	"	5		
Toulon	"	3	"	2
Genoa	"	0	"	2
With Willaumez	"	6	"	21
„ L'Hermitte	"	1	Afloat	32
		<hr/>		<hr/>
		32	Total	53

Several of the ships here marked down as building were ready to be launched, and some were actually afloat. Among the ships of the line which Napoleon at the commencement of the war had ordered to be built, were two at Nantes, one at Bordeaux, one at Marseilles, one at Ostende, and one at Saint-Malo. These have been excluded from the statement, because it is doubtful whether or not they were proceeded upon. In the

course of two or three years, every one of the above 21 building ships was actually in commission; and it is believed that, before the close of the year 1806, several other line-of-battle ships, including two or three three-deckers of the class of the *Impérial*, were laid down in the different ports of the French empire.

Out of the above 53 ships, not one mounted, or was intended to mount, fewer than 74 guns; whereas England, if her 64-gun ships be excluded, possessed, in a state for service and building, but 102 sail of the line.¹ Nor, with the addition of the 64s, would the number exceed 123. The absurdity of including stationary harbour-ships, hulks, and 50-gun ships, when the total on the opposite side contains no vessels of that description, has already been exposed.² Even admitting that, in the year 1806, Russia or Spain had about the same number of line-of-battle ships as France, will any one say that, in point of maritime enterprise, physical strength, and means of annoyance, the latter did not rank far above them? Hence, so far from the British navy, in March 1806, being to the French navy, in ships of the line, as 12 to one, the difference, in reality, was but as two to one; and, so far from France being, at the time referred to, the seventh naval power in Europe, she was, as she long had been, the second.

The command of the British naval forces, on the extensive station of the Mediterranean, was still in the able hands in which we last year left it.³ Early in the month of February Vice-admiral Lord Collingwood, while cruising off Cadiz, received information that four of the five frigates which, with other ships of the late discomfited Franco-Spanish fleet, had sought refuge in the port after the battle of Trafalgar, were ready for sea, and intended to sail the first opportunity. By way of inducing the French frigates to do so, in the hope to intercept them soon after they quitted port, Lord Collingwood with his squadron retired to a station about 10 leagues distant from the harbour; where he lay out of sight, leaving the 38-gun frigate *Hydra*, Captain George Mundy, and 18-gun brig-sloop *Moselle*, Captain John Surman Carden, close off the port, with orders to keep a watchful eye upon any vessels sailing from it.

On the 23rd of February a strong easterly wind began to blow, and by the 26th had driven the British squadron as far to the westward as Cape Sta.-Maria. Informed of this by the signal

¹ See Appendix, Annual Abstract, No. 14.

² See vol. i., p. 62.

³ See p. 1.

posts along the coast, *M. La Marre-la-Meillerie*, on the same evening, put to sea with the *Hortense*, *Hermione*, *Rhin*, and *Thémis*, and brig-corvette *Furet*, the frigates with six months' provisions and a number of troops on board. At 9 h. 15 m. P.M. the *Hydra* and *Moselle*, then about three miles west of Cadiz lighthouse, standing in-shore, discovered and chased the French squadron, which, with a wind so strong and favourable, had already got outside of them. The British frigate and brig immediately bore up after the four French frigates and brig, Captain Mundy intending to steer a parallel course, to watch their manœuvres. At 11 P.M., observing that the French squadron continued a steady course, Captain Mundy detached the *Moselle* in search of the commander-in-chief, and, with the *Hydra* alone, gallantly continued the pursuit.

On the 27th, at 2 h. 30 m. A.M., in consequence of the French commodore having altered his course a point to the westward, the British captain found that he had considerably neared the squadron, particularly the brig, which was at some distance astern of the frigates. The object now was, to cut off this brig; and at length, after a two hours' further chase, the *Hydra* overtook her. The *Furet*, mounting 18 long 8-pounders, with a complement of 130 men, commanded by Lieutenant de vaisseau *Pierre-Antoine-Toussaint Demai*, and victualled for a five months' cruise, fired a broadside "pour l'honneur de pavillon," and hauled down her colours. Apparently unmoved by this circumstance, *M. La Marre-la-Meillerie* permitted the British frigate to carry off her prize, and with his four French frigates, continued his route to the westward.

In the course of the summer the whole of the five French two-deckers that had escaped from the battle of *Trafalgar*, appear to have got themselves repaired and in readiness to put to sea, under Vice-admiral *Rosily*. The Spaniards also succeeded in getting ready one three-decker and five or six two-deckers; making a total of 11 or 12 sail of the line in Cadiz alone. In *Carthagen*a lay ready for sea eight Spanish sail of the line, including two three-deckers. In *Toulon* there were three French two-deckers, and two or three frigates also ready; besides one or two sail of the line in ports of *Venice*, fitting. Whether it was that a want of concert existed among the allies, that *Napoleon* was too much occupied with his army to draw out a plan of operations, or that the scenes of the 21st of October, 1805, had made too deep an impression to be so soon obliterated, the year 1806, in respect to the movements of the

enemy's fleets within the limits of Lord Collingwood's command, was one of comparative repose.

Although the waters of the Mediterranean had been cleared of the fleets of the French emperor, his armies were still tyrannizing over the inhabitants of her shores, and the corrupt court of Naples was compelled again, as in the former war, to claim the protection of the British navy. Restricted as we are in our subject, a general view of the state of French power and influence in the Mediterranean states is all that will be required from us.

As the great battle of Marengo in the former war led to the peace of Luneville, so the still greater battle of Austerlitz in the present led to the peace of Presburg. But the terms granted to Austria were much less favourable in the latter than in the former case. There the acquisition of the Venetian states was considered to be no inadequate compensation for the loss of the Low Countries; but, by the treaty of Presburg, Austria renounced her share of those states, and consented that they should be annexed to the kingdom of Italy; taking, as her only possession on the shores of the Mediterranean, the comparatively insignificant port of Triest, at the head of the Adriatic. About the same time (December 26, 1806) that the treaty of Presburg was concluded with Austria, a treaty between Buonaparte and Prussia was signed at Vienna.

Peace with these two powers, and the withdrawal of the Russian army from Austria, left Napoleon to wreak his vengeance upon Ferdinand of Naples; who, in direct violation of the treaty of neutrality which he had concluded with the French emperor, on the 8th of October, 1805, had suffered an Anglo-Russian squadron to land a body of troops in the bay of Naples. This took place so shortly after the ratification of the treaty of Portici as on the 20th of November. The Russian troops were about 14,000 in number, and commanded by General Lasey. These were quartered in Naples and its environs. The British troops, amounting to about 10,000 men, were commanded by General Sir James Craig, and were cantoned at Castel-à-mare, Torre-del-Greco, and the vicinity. Nor was this all. The King of Naples began levying an army, and providing horses and waggons for its conveyance, and magazines of stores and ammunition for its use.

With his accustomed promptitude in carrying his measures into execution, Napoleon, on the 28th of December, the very day after the treaty of Presburg had been signed, issued from

his head-quarters at Vienna a proclamation, declaring that the Neapolitan dynasty had ceased to reign. The denouncement of this threat was the signal for the two allies of Naples to consult their own safety. The Russian troops re-embarked and retired to Corfu; and the English troops, being far too few for so extensive a line of defence as it would have been necessary to maintain, re-embarked also, and posted themselves at Messina, in Sicily.

Hearing of the advance of a French army, the King of Naples quitted his capital on the 23rd of January: and, embarking on board the British 74-gun ship *Excellent*, Captain Frank Sotheron, took refuge, a second time, at Palermo.¹ The queen and a part of the court accompanied or quickly followed the king in his retreat; but the Duke of Calabria, the king's eldest son and the heir apparent to the throne, remained as regent of the kingdom until the 7th of February, when he also quitted Naples and retired to his dukedom. The French army, in the mean time, with Joseph Buonaparte for its nominal head, but really under the command of General Massena, assisted by General Reignier and other officers of reputation, had reached the frontiers, and on the 9th took post at Ferentino. From this place Joseph Buonaparte issued a proclamation, vowing vengeance upon the court of Naples, but promising protection to the people. Shortly afterwards the French army advanced in three divisions. The right division, under General Reignier, marched to Gaeta, a strong port situated upon a rocky promontory, three sides of which are washed by the sea, and the fourth connected with the continent by a narrow and well-fortified isthmus. The governor of this fortress, the Prince of Hesse-Philipsthadt, was summoned to surrender on favourable terms, but refused. An immediate attack by the French gave them, with some loss, the possession of a redoubt; but, for the present, they gained no other advantage. The centre division, under General Massena, marched straight to Naples; and on the 12th and 15th of February Joseph Buonaparte entered successively, by capitulation with the garrisons, Capua and Naples. In short, before the end of March, the French had placed garrisons in Scylla and Tarento, and were in possession of the whole kingdom of Naples, except Gaeta, and Civitella del Tranto in the further Abruzzo.

On the 21st of April, while matters were in this state, Rear-admiral Sir William Sidney Smith, having been detached by

¹ See vol. ii., p. 214.

Lord Collingwood for the purpose, arrived in the *Pompée* 74 at Palermo, to take the command of the squadron assembled there for the defence of Sicily. That squadron then consisted, besides the *Pompée* and *Excellent*, of the two 64-gun ships *Athénien*, Captain John Giffard, and *Intrepid*, Captain the Honourable Philip Wodehouse, a Neapolitan frigate, one or two British frigates, and a few Neapolitan gun and mortar boats. The British army still occupied Messina, but, owing to the retirement of Sir James Craig from ill-health, was now under the command of Sir John Stuart.

The first step taken by Sir Sidney was to throw supplies into Gaeta, which he accomplished, under a heavy fire from the besiegers, landing, with a considerable quantity of ammunition, four of the *Excellent's* lower-deck guns. Shortly afterwards, considering that the best means of co-operating with the Prince of Hesse in defending the fort, which he had hitherto with so much gallantry maintained, would be to draw off a part of the attacking force for the defence of Naples, Sir Sidney proceeded thither with the *Pompée*, *Excellent*, *Athénien*, and *Intrepid*; leaving in command off Gaeta Captain Henry Richardson, with the 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Juno*, Neapolitan frigate *Minerva*, Captain Vieugna, and 12 Neapolitan gun-boats.

The French having erected a battery of four guns on the point of La Madonna della Catterra, the Prince of Hesse ordered 60 men from the garrison to be embarked in four fishing-boats; and on the night of the 12th Captain Richardson, with the armed boats of the two frigates, landed the troops undiscovered in a small bay in the rear of the enemy's works. The French abandoned the fort as the boats reached the shore; and the guns were spiked, the carriages destroyed, and the troops re-embarked, without any loss. On the 15th the garrison of Gaeta made another tolerably successful sortie, supported in the attack and retreat by two divisions of gun-boats, one of them under the command of Captain Richardson, and by the armed boats of the *Juno* under the direction of Lieutenant Thomas Wells, assisted by Lieutenant of marines Robert M. Mant. The only loss on the part of the allies was sustained by the *Juno's* boats, and consisted of four seamen killed and five wounded.

Upon Sir Sidney's arrival in the bay of Naples with his squadron, now, by the junction of the 74-gun ship *Eagle*, Captain Charles Rowley, augmented to five sail of the line, he found the city illuminated in honour of Joseph Buonaparte; who, since the 30th of March, had caused himself to be proclaimed, and

was now being crowned King of the Two Sicilies. Although the fire of his squadron would soon have interrupted the ceremony, Sir Sidney humanely and politically refrained from hostilities against the inhabitants, and directed his attention to a more legitimate object, the dislodgment of the French garrison from the island of Capri.

To the French commandant, Captain Chervet, a summons was sent on the 11th; and, upon the refusal of the latter to capitulate, the *Eagle* was detached to take up a position for the purpose of covering the troops intended to be landed. Captain Rowley placed his ship in the most judicious manner; and the *Eagle* did not open her fire until near enough to feel the effects of the enemy's musketry upon her quarter-deck, where a seaman was killed and her first-lieutenant, Mr. James Crawley, wounded. After a fire from both decks of the *Eagle*, and from two Neapolitan mortar-boats, continued from 9 till 10 A.M., the French were driven from the vineyards within their walls. Immediate advantage of this was taken by the disembarkation of the storming-party, consisting of seamen and marines, the latter under the command of Captain Richard Bunce, assisted by Captain John Stannus and Lieutenant George P. Carroll, and the former of Lieutenants John Arthur Morell, of the *Eagle*, and Edward Reding of the *Pompée*. Thus led, the British seamen and marines gallantly mounted the steps that led to the heights; and Captain Stannus, pressing forward, killed the French commandant. On this event being known, the garrison beat a parley, and were allowed to capitulate upon honourable terms. This success was fortunately obtained with no greater additional loss to the British than one marine killed and four seamen and six marines wounded; total, with the *Eagle's* loss on first anchoring, two killed and 10 wounded.

Having placed an English garrison in Capri, Sir Sidney steered along the coast to the southward, obstructing by land, and cutting off by sea, the enemy's communications, in order to retard his operations against Gaeta. The rear-admiral then returned to Palermo, and, falling into the views of Ferdinand, joined the latter in persuading General Stuart to invade Calabria. Reluctantly consenting, Sir John, on the 1st of July, landed about 4800 effective men, all infantry, without opposition, in a bay in the gulf of St. Eufemia. On the afternoon of the 3rd intelligence was brought to him, that General Reignier, with an immediate force of 4000 infantry and 300 cavalry, and an hourly expected force of 3000 more troops, was encamped on the sloping

side of a woody hill below the village of Maida, which was distant about 10 miles from the position of the British. Hoping to be able to attack the French general before his reinforcement arrived, Sir John Stuart, on the morning of the 4th, commenced his march. But General Reignier had been joined the evening before by the expected division, and now had under him at the least 7000 men. Desirous of bringing his cavalry into action, and, perhaps, underrating the military prowess of his enemy, General Reignier descended into the plain in front of his position. Here was fought the famous battle of Maida, in which the British bayonet, almost before a thrust had been made by it, won the day; and that with so trifling a loss to the British as one officer, three sergeants, and 41 rank and file killed, and eleven officers, eight sergeants, two drummers, and 261 rank and file wounded: whereas the loss of the French, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, was estimated at nearly 4000 men.

The consequence of this victory was the possession by the conquerors of all the forts along the coasts, and of all the depôts of arms and ammunition prepared for the attack of Sicily. By the end of July the whole of the British army was withdrawn from Calabria, except the garrison of Scylla, and a detachment of the 78th regiment under Lieutenant-colonel M'Leod, which had been detached in the 32-gun frigate *Amphion*, Captain William Hoste, to the coast near Catanzaro, in order to encourage and assist the insurgents in that quarter. By these two officers an attack was made, on the 30th of July, upon the important port of Cotrone; and, owing greatly to the judicious manner in which Captain Hoste placed the *Amphion* and some Neapolitan gun-boats that were under his command, was attributed the surrender of that fortress, with all its stores and magazines, and upwards of 600 French troops.

Shortly after this the French evacuated both Calabrias; but neither the victory of Maida, nor the subsequent successes of the British, could save the fortress of Gaeta. The gallant Prince of Hesse, having received a severe splinter wound, retired to Palermo for his recovery, leaving the command of the post to the lieutenant-governor, Colonel Hotz. Against that officer the French, having brought their artillery to act, eventually succeeded; and on the 12th of July the fortress of Gaeta surrendered by capitulation. The re-action that followed this success restored to the French, before the end of the year, nearly every important post in the two Calabrias, except Scylla; which was still in the possession of the British, and, united with

their occupation of Messina, on the opposite site of the Faro, gave them the entire command of the strait.

Among the places which Austria ceded to France by the treaty of Presburg was the province and noble harbour of Cattaro in Dalmatia, situated about 24 miles to the southward of Ragusa. By the terms of the treaty, the French were to take possession in six weeks after the ratification. The time expiring without the arrival of any officer from France, an agent of the court of Russia succeeded in persuading the inhabitants, who were chiefly Greeks, that, as France had neglected to take possession of the province within the time limited, Austria was released from the obligation of maintaining it. This reasoning, although it convinced the inhabitants, produced no effect upon the Austrian officer, who had 1500 men under his command. Just, however, as the Austrian commissary arrived, who was to deliver up the province to the French, a band of Montenegrins from the mountains entered the town, and a Russian ship of the line from Corfu anchored in the harbour. Intimidated by this, or, as is thought, bribed by the Russian agent, General Ghislieri consented to evacuate the place, which was immediately occupied by the natives, and by them transferred to the Russians.

Disappointed in gaining possession of Cattaro, the French seized upon Ragusa, under the pretence of securing it against the incursion of the Montenegrins, who had not even threatened to violate its territory; but the occupation of the place by the French produced the very evil which they had pretended to avert. At length, after several skirmishes, the barbarians were driven to the mountains, and the French, who had been greatly reinforced, remained, at the close of the year, in quiet possession of Ragusa; as did the Russians of Cattaro and the adjacent town of Castel-Nuovo.

Light Squadrons and Single Ships.

On the 2nd of January, early in the morning, while the British 54-gun ship Malabar, Captain Robert Hall, and 18-gun ship-sloop Wolf, Captain George Charles Mackenzie, were cruising off the south coast of the island of Cuba, two large schooner privateers were descried by the Wolf running into Azeraderos, a small harbour the entrance to which was protected by a double reef of rocks. On arriving off the port, Captain Hall sent the master of the Malabar, Mr. Thomas Fotheringham, to sound for anchorage; and, in a little while, the latter found a passage over the reef through which the Wolf might be conducted.

The *Wolf*, accordingly, under the able pilotage of Mr. Fotheringham, and assisted by the boats of the Malabar, stood into the harbour in six fathoms, and came to an anchor within a quarter of a mile of the two privateers, who had moored themselves in an advantageous position and confidently awaited the attack. The *Wolf* then opened her fire, and continued it for one hour and three quarters; when, perceiving that the privateersmen were abandoning their vessels, Captain Mackenzie despatched the boats to take possession.

This was quickly done; and the vessels were found to be, the *Régulateur*, mounting one long 18-pounder on a traversing carriage, and four long 6-pounders, all brass, with a complement of 80 men, and the *Napoleon*, mounting one long 9-pounder, two long 4-pounders, and two 12-pounder carronades, with a complement of 66 men. Of the crews four only were taken prisoners, all wounded, one of them mortally: the remainder had fled to the woods. The two schooners were towed without the reefs, when, from the number of shot-holes in her, the *Régulateur* sank, with two wounded Frenchmen and one of the Malabar's marines on board. The previous loss on the British side amounted to two seamen killed and four wounded.

On the 6th of January, in the evening, the British 12-pounder 36-gun frigate *Franchise*, Captain Charles Dashwood, having anchored abreast the town of Campeachy in a quarter less than four fathoms, so shallow was the water upon that coast, at the distance of five leagues off shore, despatched her launch, barge, and pinnace, containing 64 officers and men, under the command of Lieutenant John Fleming, first of the ship, assisted by Lieutenant Peter John Douglas, third of the ship, Lieutenant Mends of the marines, and Messrs. Cuthbert Daly, John Lamb, Charles William Chalmers, and William Hamilton, midshipmen, with orders to scour the bay, and bring off such of the enemy's vessels as they might fall in with. The second-lieutenant, Thomas John Peschell, was as anxious as any to be one of the party; but requiring his presence on board, Captain Dashwood could not indulge him.

Owing to the distance they had to row, the darkness of the night, and the uncertainty of their position, the boats did not arrive at the spot in which the vessels lay until 4 A.M. on the 7th. Unfortunately for the British, this was long after the moon had risen. Consequently their approach had been discovered, and ample time given to the Spaniards for preparation, even to the tricing-up of the boarding-nettings, and the project-

ing of sweeps from the sides of the vessels, to obstruct the boats in their approach.

Although the alarm had thus spread from one end of the bay to the other, and had even extended itself to the castle on shore, nothing could damp the ardour of the British. They pushed rapidly on, and presently saw approaching them two Spanish brigs-of-war, an armed schooner, and seven gun-boats; all of which had slipped their cables, and now opened a heavy fire upon the three boats; such a fire as would soon have annihilated them, had not Lieutenant Fleming, with as much judgment as intrepidity, dashed forward, and, with the launch, laid the nearest brig on board. Being quickly supported by Lieutenant Douglas in the barge, and Mr. Lamb in the pinnace, Lieutenant Fleming, after an obstinate conflict of 10 minutes' duration, carried the Spanish brig-corvette *Raposa*, mounting 12 carriage-guns (pierced for 16), with swivels and cohorns, and having on board 75 men, out of a complement of 90, her captain, Don Joaquin de la Cheva, with some other officers and a boat's crew, being absent on shore.

This exploit was achieved with a loss to the British of only seven men slightly wounded; whereas the *Raposa* had one officer and four men killed, and her acting commander and 25 men wounded, many of them mortally; several of the crew had also leaped overboard and were drowned. The remaining brig, represented to have mounted 20 guns, with a crew of 180 men, the schooner eight guns, and the seven gun-boats, two each, now opened a fire of cannon and musketry upon the *Raposa*; but the latter and the boats so smartly returned the fire, that the flotilla soon retired to their former position, and left Lieutenant Fleming in quiet possession of his prize.

It is always a pleasant part of our task, after recording a well-executed enterprise of the desperate character of that which we have just narrated, to be able to state, that the officer who, as is not invariably the case, was both the appointed and the real leader of the party, has received that promotion which is so justly his due. The preparatory step to this is the official testimony of the captain of the ship whose boats were detached on the service. Let us see what Captain Dashwood, in his letter to Vice-admiral Dacres, says upon the subject of this action: "To an officer of your discriminating judgment, I trust I shall stand excused if I take the liberty of recommending Lieutenant Fleming to your notice for his meritorious conduct on this occasion. He appears to me to be an officer of distinguished merit

and bravery; and I understood he was highly respected by his late captain, the good, the amiable, and my gallant predecessor, the Hon. John Murray." Can any thing be stronger? And yet Lieutenant Fleming was not promoted, but Lieutenant Douglas was. The latter, at the date of the enterprise, was third-lieutenant of the ship; the former first: the one was a lieutenant of about two years' standing, the other of nearly six. What was the consequence? Why, that Lieutenant Fleming was not made a commander until November, 1814, just three years to a month after Lieutenant Douglas had been made a post-captain. That Lieutenant Douglas was a brave officer, and a most deserving young man, no one can deny; but Lieutenant Fleming possessed the prior right of promotion, from his seniority of rank, from his responsibility as the commanding officer of the enterprise, and from his acknowledged skill and gallantry in bringing that enterprise to a successful issue.

On the 8th of March, in the evening, the British 44-gun frigate *Egyptienne*, Captain the Hon. Charles Paget, anchored off the port of Muros in Spain, and detached her boats, under the command of Captain Philip Cosby Handfield (still acting as first-lieutenant of the frigate, on account of not having received an official account of his promotion), assisted by Lieutenant Richard Israel Alleyn, and Lieutenant of marines Edward Hancock Garthwaite, to endeavour to cut out from the harbour a large frigate-built French privateer known to be lying there.

In this enterprise, the British fully succeeded, although the vessel, which was the *Alcide*, of Bordeaux, pierced for 34 guns, and carrying, when at sea, a complement of 240 men, was moored close to the beach, under the protection of two batteries, that kept up an incessant fire until the ship was towed clear of their range. The British had the additional good fortune to execute the service without a casualty. We wish Captain Paget had entered a little more into the details, and acquainted us how many, and what nature of, guns the *Alcide* mounted, and how many men were on board of her when thus, with such entire impunity, boarded, carried, and brought out of an enemy's harbour.

On the 13th of March, at 3 A.M., in latitude 26° 16' north, longitude 29° 25' west, as a British squadron, consisting of the 98-gun ship *London*, Captain Sir Harry Neale, 80-gun ship *Foudroyant*, Captain John Chambers White, bearing the flag of Vice-admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, and 38-gun frigate *Amazon*, Captain William Parker, was steering to the south-

east, with the wind at west-south-west, two sail at a short distance in the north-east were discovered by the London, then astern and to windward of her companions. The London immediately wore in chase, and made signals to the admiral with false fires and blue lights. In a short time Sir Harry got near enough to open his fire upon the strangers, then on the larboard tack, under all sail, and who were no other than our old friends the Marengo and Belle-Poule, returning to France from their long eastern cruise; and from whom, it will be recollected, we parted in the preceding August at the close of a third rather inglorious encounter with an enemy.¹

We must be permitted to digress a little, to bring M. Linois to the point at which we now find him. After quitting the Blenheim and convoy, the French admiral repaired to Simon's bay, where he arrived on the 13th of September, and found the Bato Dutch 64, but quite in a dismantled state, and without a crew. While waiting at this anchorage repairing his damages, he was joined by the Atalante; but which frigate soon afterwards perished on the coast. Quitting their anchorage on the 10th of November, the Marengo and Belle-Poule proceeded off Cape Negro; thence towards Cape Lopez; and, although he reconnoitred all the bays and anchorages along the African coast, M. Linois captured but one ship and one brig of trifling value. The two ships then steered for Prince's island, where they took in water, and afterwards cruised to leeward of Saint Helena. Here on the 29th of January, 1806, M. Linois fell in with an American, who informed him of the capture of the Cape by the English. Learning, also, that the Indian seas were filling with British men-of-war, in search of himself and companion, the French admiral decided to return home, and on the 17th of February crossed the equinoctial line for the twelfth time since his departure from Brest in March, 1803. In less than four weeks more he reached the spot which, as we will now proceed to show, proved the bane of his hopes.

At 5 h. 30 m. A.M. the London got alongside of the Marengo; and the two ships commenced the action, yard-arm and yard-arm. At 6 A.M. the Marengo, unable longer to withstand the London's heavy and well-directed fire, hauled off, and made sail ahead. At 6 h. 15 m. A.M. the Belle-Poule opened her fire upon the lee bow of the London, and received a fire in return, until out of gun-shot ahead. At 7 A.M. the Amazon came up; and

¹ See p. 52.

passing the London, overtook, and at 8 h. 30 m. A.M. began engaging, the Belle-Poule. All this while the London had been keeping up a running fight with the Marengo, and she continued it until 10 h. 25 m. A.M.; when, seeing the Foudroyant coming fast up, the Marengo struck her colours to the London; as, about the same time, did the Belle-Poule to the Amazon.

The London, out of her 740 men and boys, sustained a loss of one midshipman (William Rooke) and nine seamen and marines killed, and one lieutenant (William Faddy, dangerously), one midshipman (J. W. Watson), and 20 seamen and marines wounded. Her sails, rigging, and masts were also a good deal damaged by shot. The loss on board the Amazon amounted to her first-lieutenant (Richard Seymour), one lieutenant of marines (Edward Prior), one seaman, and one marine killed, and five seamen wounded.

The gun-force of the Marengo and Belle-Poule was precisely that of their respective classes, as particularized at Nos. 4 and 5 of the small Table at p. 59 of the first volume. The former, when she commenced the action, had a crew, as certified by the captain and his two senior lieutenants, of 740 men and boys; of whom the Marengo had two officers and 61 men killed, and eight officers and 74 men wounded, including among the latter the admiral and his son, severely, and Captain Vrignaud, with the loss of his right arm; total 63 killed, and 82 wounded. The Belle-Poule, out of a crew of 330, similarly certified, lost six men killed and 24 wounded. It may seem singular that these two ships should be so well manned at the end of a three years' cruise, especially when the Marengo, if not the frigate, had sent away two or three prizes. But it is believed that they each had on board a proportion of the crew of the *Atalante*, the loss of whose ship near the Cape of Good Hope has already been noticed.

Between a British 32-pounder 98, and a French 74-gun ship the relative broadside weight of metal is not so unequal as might be supposed to exist between a three and a two decked ship, the one, in long guns only, being 958, the other 907 lbs.; but the carronades of the London increased the preponderance in her favour. In point of complement, the two ships were equal; but in tonnage, the French ship had slightly the advantage, the Marengo measuring 1926, the London 1894 tons. The two frigates, if we overlook a superiority of 40 or 50 men in the French one, were well matched; and Captain Parker and his

officers no doubt regretted that the Amazon had not met the Belle-Poule single-handed.

The determined resistance of the French ships was creditable to them; and that on the part of the Marengo tended much to remove any ill impression, which Commodore Dance's, the Centurion's, or the Blenheim's affair might have cast upon Rear-admiral Linois. The only ship of the latter's late Indian squadron, left cruising at the date of his capture, was the *Sémillante*; and we shall soon have occasion to recur to the proceedings of that fortunate frigate.

On the 21st of March the British hired armed brig *Colpoys*, of 16 guns (14 carronades, 12-pounders, and two long fours), and 121 men and boys, commanded by Lieutenant Thomas Ussher, chased in to the port of Avillas, under the protection of a battery of six long 24-pounders, three Spanish luggers. Having a fine commanding breeze, the *Colpoys* stood in after them; when, just as she got within range of the battery, and before her carronades could be worked with effect, the wind died away.

Lieutenant Ussher immediately manned two boats, and stepping into one himself, dashed through a heavy fire of grape from the battery and of musketry from a party of soldiers that had been sent on board the vessels to defend them. His boat, containing, besides himself, only six men, soon out-pulled the other boat. Without waiting for the latter, Lieutenant Ussher gallantly boarded and carried the three luggers, the captains and crews, all but 13 men, leaping over on one side, as the lieutenant and his little party entered on the other.

The second boat then came up, and assisted in getting off the prizes; one, named *Santa Buena-Ventura*, of two guns, laden with flax and steel; the second, named *San-Antonio*, of the same force and lading; and the third, the *San-Real* in ballast. The latter was given up to the enemy, with 11 of the prisoners. Notwithstanding the heavy fire of the battery, this truly gallant exploit was effected with the loss of only two men wounded, one of them severely.

On the 19th of April, as the *Colpoys*, commanded by the same enterprising officer, was standing along-shore between the *Glénans* and *Isle Groix*, in company with the gun-brig *Attack*, Lieutenant Thomas Swaine, two *chasse-marées* were perceived at anchor at the entrance of the river *Douillan*; but which, on the approach of the two brigs, got under way and stood up the river.

Finding it necessary to silence a two-gun battery before the

boats could get to the *chasse-marées*, Lieutenant Ussher, with 12 men from each brig, landed, and, after a short skirmish, got possession of, and spiked, the two guns, which were long 12-pounders. Lieutenant Ussher afterwards brought the vessels down the river, and destroyed the signal-post of Douillan; accomplishing the whole of this daring and important service without the slightest loss, or any greater damage to the two brigs than that done to their standing and running rigging, while engaged with the battery previously to its destruction by the two boats' crews. For his gallantry upon this and several previous occasions, Lieutenant Ussher, on the 18th of the following October, was promoted to the rank of commander.

On the 24th of March, at 1 P.M., Cape Roxo, in the island of Porto-Rico, bearing north by west distant 16 leagues, the British 18-gun brig-sloop *Reindeer* (sixteen 32-pounder carronades and two long sixes), Captain John Fyffe, standing on the starboard tack, with the wind at south-south-east, discovered two men-of-war brigs speaking each other in the south-east quarter. The *Reindeer* immediately stood towards them, and at 1 h. 40 m. P.M. showed her colours, and made the strangers out to be enemy's cruisers. They were the French brig-corvettes *Phaëton*, Lieutenant Louis-Henri Freycinet-Saulce, and *Voltigeur*, Lieutenant Jacques Saint-Cricq, of 16 long 6-pounders, and 115 men each.

At 2 P.M. the *Voltigeur*, hoisting her colours, passed to leeward of, and fired her broadside at, the *Reindeer*; while the *Phaëton*, having also hoisted her colours, together with a commodore's pendant, kept her wind. For the latter the *Reindeer* immediately tacked; and, in crossing her on the opposite board, poured in a heavy fire, which was promptly returned by the *Phaëton*. The British brig continued tacking, and alternately exchanging broadsides with the two French brigs until dark; when, having the leech of her foresail and the clew of her foretopsail shot away, and the jib-canvas and most of the running rigging much cut, and the weather becoming thick and squally, the *Reindeer* was unable to go about for nearly a quarter of an hour. Meanwhile, having doubtless felt the effects of the latter's 32-pound shot, and being, as it afterwards appeared, on their way to the squadron of M. Leissegues, supposed to be still in Santo-Domingo roads, the *Phaëton* and *Voltigeur* had made sail. So that at 7 P.M., when the *Reindeer* tacked in pursuit, the two French brigs were no longer visible.

With the exception of a few shot-holes in her hull, the

Reindeer's damages were confined to her rigging and sails, and she escaped without any loss on the part of her crew. What damage or loss was sustained by her two opponents could not of course be ascertained; but it was afterwards understood, that the Phaëton had suffered from it, as well in men, as in masts, rigging, and hull.

On the 26th, in the forenoon, the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate Pique, Captain Charles Bayne Hodgson Ross, crossing over from St. Domingo to Curaçoa, fell in with and chased the two French brig-corvettes named in the last action; and which were then upon the starboard tack, with a fresh trade or south-east wind, standing in for the land. At 1 P.M., having got within long range, the Pique commenced firing at, and at 2 P.M. by her superior sailing closed with, the two brigs. When the firing had continued about 20 minutes, the sternmost brig, the Phaëton, having had her peak and gaff halliards shot away, and being otherwise crippled, fell on board the starboard beam of the frigate, who, to promote so desirable an object, had taken advantage of a favourable flaw of wind and put her helm down.

In an instant Lieutenants William Ward and Philip Henry Baker, Mr. John Thompson, the master, and Lieutenant William Henry Craig, of the marines, with about 25 petty officers, seamen, and marines, sprang on board the Phaëton; and the Pique, clearing herself, stood for the Voltigeur, whose commander, M. Saint-Cricq, although he had, as it appears, agreed to co-operate with the commodore in an attempt to board the frigate, when escape should be found impracticable, and had since been directed to close for the purpose of putting the manœuvre into execution, was crowding sail to get away.

No sooner had the boarding-party stepped upon the decks of the Phaëton, than a great proportion of her crew, headed by the officers, rushed from under the fore-and-half mainsail, where they had lain concealed, and, using the boom and the fallen sail both as a rest for their pieces and a shelter for their persons, opened, with comparative impunity, a most destructive fire upon the British; destructive, indeed, for it killed Mr. Thompson, the master, and eight seamen, and wounded Lieutenants Ward, Baker, and Craig, and 11 seamen and marines.

The Pique, the instant she was aware of what had happened, backed her sails, and sent a boat with a fresh supply of men. These, indignant at the sight of their slaughtered comrades, in a very few minutes compelled the French crew, although greatly

superior in numbers, to call for quarter. As, when the Phaëton fell on board the Pique, the brig's colours, with part of the main-sail, hung over the taffrail in the water, and her crew could neither be seen nor (a very unusual thing on board a French ship) heard, it was considered that she would surrender quietly. A resistance, therefore, so sudden and fierce did certainly bear the appearance of treachery.

Having again filled, the Pique crowded after the Voltigeur; who, profiting by all this delay, had advanced considerably ahead, with the intention of running on shore. Before, however, she could effect that object, the French brig was overtaken, and, without further opposition, captured.

During the cannonade the frigate had only one seaman wounded, and that by a grape-shot; making her total loss nine killed and 14 wounded. The death of Mr. Thompson was a great loss to the service. He had been a most active and enterprising officer, and had left in Jamaica a young and amiable wife to whom he had very recently been united. Lieutenants Ward and Baker were both wounded severely by musketry, the one having a ball through his thigh, the other through his right arm.

The loss on board the Phaëton, although admitted to be very severe, could not be exactly ascertained. Among her wounded was Lieutenant Freycinet, with the loss of his right arm. The loss on board the Voltigeur, who, from her position on the Pique's weather-bow, received very little of her fire, was wholly immaterial. Indeed the frigate, being very light, lay over so much with the strong breeze, that her fire upon either brig was comparatively ineffective. The Phaëton and Voltigeur were new vessels, of about 320 tons each, and were afterwards commissioned as British cruisers, under the names of Mignonne and Musette.

Nine days previous to the capture of these two French brigs, Lieutenant Ward, with the gig of the Pique, and Mr. John Eveleigh, midshipman, with the yawl, gallantly boarded, and after a very smart resistance, but fortunately without any loss, succeeded in capturing, off Ocoe bay, St. Domingo, the Spanish armed schooner Santa-Clara, of one long 9-pounder and 28 men, completely equipped for war.

On the 1st of November Captain Ross sent the barge and two other boats of the Pique, under the direction of Lieutenant Christopher Bell, assisted by lieutenant of marines Edward Bailie, to intercept a schooner coming round Cape Roxo, Porto

Rico. Owing, however, to a heavy squall from the shore, attended with rain, the boats lost sight of her in the night. Determined not to return to the ship empty-handed, these two enterprising officers pushed in for Carbaret bay, where lay a fine Spanish copper-bottomed brig pierced for 12 guns. This vessel they not only brought safe out, but they destroyed a three-gun battery on shore, spiking the cannon and breaking the carriages; and all without the loss of a man.

On the next day, the 2nd, Lieutenant Philip Henry Baker, in the Pique's launch, chased, and, after some smart skirmishing but no loss, drove on shore upon the reef of Cape Roxo, a French felucca-rigged privateer, of two carriage-guns, four swivels, and 26 men, where she was completely wrecked. On his return to the ship, Lieutenant Baker chased and captured another very fast-sailing French privateer, of one gun and 20 men.

On the 3rd of April a Spanish squadron, consisting of two ships of the line, a frigate, and a brig, having under their protection a few coasters, sailed out of Carthagena; and, while the three former chased to the southward, the British 12-pounder 36-gun frigate *Renommée*, Captain Sir Thomas Livingstone, and 18-gun ship-sloop *Nautilus*, Captain Edward Palmer, who had been stationed to watch the port, the brig, accompanied by the convoy, and favoured by a fresh north-easterly wind, steered along-shore to the westward.

Finding, as evening came on, that the *Renommée* had left the Spanish ships at a great distance astern, Sir Thomas despatched the *Nautilus* to Lord Collingwood off Cadiz with the intelligence of their escape, and after dark made sail for Cape de Gata, in the hope of cutting off the Spanish brig. On the 4th, at 2 A.M., the brig was discovered at anchor under Fort Callartes, and not more than 500 yards from it. Baffling winds delayed the *Renommée* in her approach for three-quarters of an hour; but, on getting up, the frigate's fire soon silenced the brig, and cut asunder the warp by which she was hauling herself on shore. Thus foiled in her purpose, at 3 h. 30 m. A.M., the Spanish brig-of-war *Vigilante*, mounting 12 long "12" (or rather, we think, 8) pounders on the main deck, and six "24" (or more probably 18) pounder carronades on the quarter-deck, total 18 guns, with a crew of 109 men, commanded by Lieutenant Don Joseph Julian, struck her colours and was brought safe off. Two Spanish gun-boats had co-operated with the brig for a short time, until silenced and driven, as was believed, upon the beach, and

the batteries had fired at the frigate during the whole time that she continued within range of their guns; but still the *Renommée* sustained little or no damage, and had only two men wounded. The loss on board the *Vigilante* was one killed and three wounded; and the brig's mainmast was so damaged that it fell soon after her surrender. The prize was a similar class of vessel to the *Port Mahon* and *Vincejo*, and, under the name of *Spider*, continued for many years to be a useful brig-cruiser in the British navy.

On the 3rd of May, late in the evening, Captain Livingstone, cruising to the north-east of Cape Palos, despatched the boats of the *Renommée* and *Nautilus*, under the command of Lieutenant Sir William Parker, assisted by Lieutenants Charles Adams and Alexander Nesbett, Lieutenant of marines Henry Meerton, Mr. Timothy Murray, boatswain of the *Renommée*, and Mr. Dawson, carpenter of the *Nautilus*, and several midshipmen, to cut out from the port of Vicja, the Catholic king's schooner *Giganta*, of two long 24-pounders in the bow, three long 4-pounder carriage-guns and four 2-pounder swivels, and 28 men, commanded by Captain Don Juan de Moire.

On the 4th, at 1 A.M., the service was executed in a very gallant manner, although the schooner, having suspected the attack, had her boarding-nettings triced up, was chain-moored within pistol-shot of the batteries, and defended by more than 100 musketeers stationed on the beach. Notwithstanding the formidable opposition they experienced, the British brought out their prize, a remarkably fine vessel, with no other loss than one midshipman (Charles Forbes) and three men badly, and three slightly wounded. Nor did the loss on the part of the *Giganta* amount to more than nine wounded, including one mortally.

On the night of the 21st of October the four cutters of the *Renommée*, under the direction of Lieutenant Sir William Parker, entered the port of Colon in the island of Majorca, and, in the face of a fire from the vessels in the harbour and from the tower of Falconara, gallantly boarded and carried a Spanish tartan, mounting four guns, and two settees, one of them mounting three guns, and both deeply laden with grain. The two settees were with great difficulty brought out of the port; but the tartan, having got on shore, was set fire to and destroyed. This bold enterprise was effected with the loss of only one British seaman wounded.

On the next night three of the frigate's cutters, under the command of the same officer, brought off, from under the guns

of the *Falconara*, one Spanish settee, mounting two guns. On this occasion the British were much annoyed by musketry from behind the bushes, which wounded one seaman. To put a stop to this, Sir William landed with a few marines and seamen, and having killed one Spaniard and driven off the remainder, re-joined the ship without any further loss.

On the 5th of April, as the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Pallas*, Captain Lord Cochrane, was lying at an anchor close to the Cordovan shoal, his lordship received such information as determined him to attempt cutting out two French brig-corvettes lying in the river Gironde leading to Bordeaux. Accordingly, on the same evening, a little after dark, the boats of the frigate, under the command of Lieutenant John Hansell, assisted by Mr. James Sutherland the master, and by midshipmen Edward Perkyns, John Charles Crawford, and William A. Thompson, proceeded on the service. The vessels lay 20 miles above the shoals and within two heavy batteries. The British, nevertheless, at 3 A.M. on the 6th, boarded, carried, and cut out, in spite of every resistance, the French brig-corvette *Tapageuse*, of 14 long 8-pounders and 95 men; which vessel, having the guard, was perfectly prepared. The strength of the flood-tide prevented the boats or the prize-brig from ascending the river after the remaining brig; and therefore at daybreak the *Tapageuse* made sail. The alarm was immediately given, and the other brig followed and attacked the *Tapageuse*, but after an hour's firing, was compelled to sheer off. All this was effected with the loss of only three seamen wounded, and some trifling damage to the rigging of the prize.

On the same morning, while the *Pallas* lay at an anchor awaiting the return of her boats, two armed ships and a brig, making many signals, were observed coming down towards the former. The British frigate was soon under way, and notwithstanding her reduced complement, chased and drove on shore the two French 20-gun ship-corvettes *Garonne* and *Gloire*, and the 16-gun brig-corvette *Malicieuse*. The masts of all three vessels shortly afterwards went by the board, and their hulls were involved in a sheet of spray.

On the 25th the *Pallas* was detached by Vice-admiral Thornborough, cruising with a small squadron off the *Tour des Baleines*, to reconnoitre the French squadron at anchor in the road of the Isle of Aix. The *Pallas* accordingly stood in, and counted five sail of the line (one a three-decker), five frigates, one ship-corvette, and three brig-corvettes. Shortly afterwards

the French 40-gun frigate *Minerve*, Captain Joseph Collet, accompanied by the three brig-corvettes, *Lynx*, *Sylphe*, and *Palinure*, got under way by signal from the admiral, and with the wind from the north-east stood out to drive away the *Pallas*; but the latter continued her station, and, as the French frigate and brigs approached, fired at them several broadsides. The *Minerve* and her three consorts, discovering about this time the 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Iris*, Captain George Argles, 16-gun ship-sloop *Hazard*, Captain Charles Dilkes, and a cutter, cruising off Chasseron, stretched in under cover of the batteries at the Isle of Aix. Observing this, as well as that the French captain had no intention to stand out beyond the reach of the forts, Lord Cochrane made sail towards the offing.

There being, as this indefatigable officer himself states, "nothing better in view," and finding that the French trade was kept in port, in a great measure, by the knowledge of the exact situation of the British cruisers constantly announced by the signal-posts upon the coast, Lord Cochrane resolved to attempt the destruction of some of them. Accordingly, detachments of the crew of the *Pallas* demolished, in succession, the two posts at Pointe de la Roche, the post at Caliola, and the two in Anse de Répos, on the coast of La Vandée; bringing away all the flags, and burning the houses built by the Government. One of the two posts in Anse de Répos was taken by Lieutenant Haswell and Mr. Hillier, the gunner, at the head of their division of men, from upwards of 100 French militia.

Lord Cochrane subsequently landed, and attacked a battery of three long 36-pounders, with a garrison of 50 men, situated on Pointe d'Eguillon, in the Pertuis Breton. In this attack he was greatly assisted by the flanking fire of the Frisk cutter, Lieutenant John Norton, and Contest gun-brig, Lieutenant John Gregory. The British then laid the fort in ruins, spiked the guns, burnt the carriages, blew up the barrack and magazine, and threw all the shells into the sea. The signal-post of Eguillon, together with the house, shared the fate of the gun-carriages; but a French convoy that had lain under the protection of the battery, succeeded in getting into a river beyond the reach of the enterprising chief and his men. In all these exploits, Lieutenant David Mapleton, and Mr. Sutherland, the master, and Mr. Robert Hillier, the gunner, are mentioned as having greatly distinguished themselves.

On the 12th of May the *Pallas*, accompanied by the 44-gun frigate *Indefatigable*, Captain John Tremayne Rodd, and 16-gun

ship-sloop *Kingfisher*, Captain George Francis Seymour, again stood in to reconnoitre the French squadron in the road of the Isle of Aix. The French admiral immediately ordered out two frigates, one of which was known to be the *Minerve*, attended by the three brigs. At 2 P.M. the two British frigates and sloop passed the lighthouse battery on the Isle of Aix, which fired several shot at them. Shortly afterwards a few distant broadsides were exchanged between one of the French frigates and the *Kingfisher*. At 3 P.M., being close under the batteries, the *Pallas*, *Indefatigable*, and *Kingfisher* tacked and stood out.

On the 14th, early in the morning, the *Pallas* worked in alone against a fresh breeze from the south by west: and at 10 h. 30 m. A.M., having arrived nearly within gun-shot of the battery on the Isle of Aix, shortened sail to her topsails to reconnoitre the French squadron in the road. In a little while the *Minerve*, accompanied by the three brig-corvettes already named, was seen upon the beam of the *Pallas* running down with studding-sails and royals set, to capture or drive off the intruder. Knowing how to profit by the heedless manner in which the French captain was making his approach, Lord Cochrane kept the main topsail of the *Pallas* shivering, and got all ready to assist M. Collet in taking in his flying kites.

At about 11 h. 15 m. A.M., the *Minerve* and her three consorts having arrived within point-blank shot, the *Pallas* opened her fire, and very soon shortened the frigate's sail for her, and brought down the maintopsail yard of one of the brigs. The *Pallas* now filled her maintopsail, hauled on board her tacks, and endeavoured to get to windward of her principal opponent; who, assisted by the batteries, opened a smart fire upon the British frigate.

The mutual cannonade continued, with such interruptions only as were occasioned by the frequent tacking of the *Pallas* to avoid the shoals, until 1 P.M.; when, having succeeded in gaining the wind of the *Minerve*, and in getting between her and the batteries, the *Pallas* poured into her, at tolerably close quarters, one or two heavy broadsides. The *Minerve* slackened her fire. Seeing this, the *Pallas* ceased hers, and, with the view of preventing her opponent's retreat, ran her on board. The French frigate's side thrust back into their ports the British frigate's guns; but that did not prevent the latter from discharging their contents, with destructive effect, into the hull of the former. The decks of the *Minerve* appeared to be deserted by all except Captain Collet and a few of his officers, and three pistol-shot

was the only return she made. Such, however, was the quantity of headway in the ships, and such the unequal collision between two bodies so disproportionate in size, that the Pallas had her foretopmast, jib-boom, fore and main topsail-yards, spritsail-yard, bumpkin, cat-head, chain-plates, fore-rigging, foresail, and even the bower anchor, by which Lord Cochrane had hoped to hook on, torn away. Yet even this accident, by which the two frigates so unexpectedly separated, would probably not have saved the Minerve, if M. Allemand, seeing that the latter's fore-yard was gone, and that her rigging was entirely disabled, had not sent two other frigates to her assistance. Upon this the Pallas, being nearly a wreck, bore up towards the offing with what little sail she could set, until, meeting the Kingfisher, the latter took her in tow.

The loss on board the Pallas, whose complement was 214 men and boys, amounted, notwithstanding the closeness of the action, to only one marine killed and one midshipman (William Andrews, very badly) and four seamen wounded; while the loss sustained by the Minerve, whose crew amounted to 330 men and boys, was, by the acknowledgment of her officers, seven men killed and 14 wounded. With respect to the damages of the French frigate, all that appears in the French official account is, that her fore-yard was cut in two, and a few other injuries done to her. Another account states, that the stopper of her anchor was broken in the concussion of the two ships, and that it was in consequence of its falling to the bottom and bringing the frigate up, that the latter was prevented from pursuing the Pallas. As iron cables were not then in use, we are to conclude from this, that there was no axe on board the French frigate to cut away a hempen one.

The Pallas, a frigate of 667 tons, built of fir in the year 1804, was armed on the main deck with the 26 long 12-pounders of her class, and upon her quarter-deck and forecastle with 12 carronades, 24-pounders, total 38 guns. The Minerve, a fine new frigate of 1101 tons, when afterwards captured by the British, was found to mount, besides her 28 long 18-pounders on the main deck, four long 8-pounders and 12 iron 36-pounder carronades on the quarter-deck and forecastle; total 44 guns.

The relative force of these two frigates, unequal as it here appears, does not offer quite so great a disparity as distinguished the case of the Speedy and Gamo;¹ but taking into the account the difference in the quality of those with whom the British had

¹ See vol. iii., p. 133.

to contend, and the hazardous position in which they fought the action, it does not fall far short of it. Lord Cochrane seems to have viewed his opponent through a diminishing medium: they were never, in appearance, too ample for his grasp, or too powerful to be subdued by his skill and intrepidity.

We have had occasion, more than once, to complain of the (for such it is) criminality of naval writers, in garbling official accounts, with the view of enhancing the exploits of their countrymen. It is a contemptible practice, and deserves exposure, as well for the cause of truth generally as in justice to the party whose statements have been misrepresented. M. Allemand, in his letter to the French minister of marine, and without which we should probably never have known who, as Lord Cochrane calls her, "our late opponent the black frigate" was, states, that he ordered the *Minerve* and the avisos, or brigs, attached to the advanced squadron, to weigh and attack the enemy's frigate; and that he subsequently sent two other frigates to chase away the latter. "Alors je fis appareiller la *Minerve*, Capitaine Collet, avec les avisos de l'avant-garde." "Je fis signal à deux frégates d'appareiller pour la poursuivre:" whereas, according to the account in a voluminous French work of acknowledged respectability, the *Minerve* alone was ordered out by M. Allemand, and alone, as we are left to infer, compelled the British frigate to seek her safety in flight. "Cet officier-général donna ordre à la frégate la *Minerve*, de mettre sous voiles pour aller repousser la frégate ennemie."¹

On the 17th of April, at 2 p.m., the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Sirius*, Captain William Prowse, while cruising six or seven leagues to the eastward of Civita-Vecchia, gained intelligence that a flotilla of French armed vessels was to have sailed thence that morning, bound to Naples. The *Sirius* immediately crowded sail in that direction, and at 4 h. 15 m. p.m. discovered the object of her pursuit, near the shore. The flotilla consisted of the ship-corvette *Bergère*, of 18 long 12-pounders, and one brass 36-pounder carronade, with 189 men, Commodore Charles-Jacques-César Chaunay-Duclos, brig-corvettes *Abeille*, of 18 long 8-pounders and two brass 36-pounder carronades, with 160 men, *Legère* and *Janus*, of 12 long 8-pounders each, bombard *Victoire*, of 12 long 18-pounders and two heavy mortars, cutter *Gauloise*, and gun-ketches *Jalouse*, *Gentille*, and *Provençale*, each of four long 4-pounders and one brass 36-pounder carronade; making altogether 97 guns.

¹ *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvii., p. 290.

Soon after sunset the *Sirius* closed with the flotilla, which, formed in compact order within two leagues of the mouth of the *Tiber*, and near a dangerous shoal, was lying to, with that confidence which its strength naturally inspired, to await the attack. At 7 p.m., being within pistol-shot, the *Sirius* opened both her broadsides, and continued closely engaged during two hours, at the end of which the *Bergère* hailed that she surrendered.

The determined resistance of this corvette, the dangers of the shore, and the crippled condition of the *Sirius*, owing to the facility with which the smoothness of the water had enabled the French to use their guns, prevented the frigate from pursuing the remainder of the flotilla; although several of the vessels appeared much disabled, and had been compelled, before the *Bergère* struck, to cease firing and make off.

The loss sustained by the *Sirius* amounted to one master's mate (William Adair), five seamen, and three marines killed, and one acting master (James Brett), one master's mate (John Robinson), one midshipman (Meyricke Lloyd), 12 seamen, and five marines wounded, nine of them dangerously. The loss on the part of the *Bergère*, which must have been severe, has been accidentally omitted in the official account.

Although the execution done to the *Sirius* shows the advantages under which these heavily armed small-craft act in smooth water, yet, had it been daylight, the probability is, that more than one would have become prize to the British frigate. The gallantry of Captain Prowse in the affair derives additional merit, from the handsome manner in which he notices the good behaviour of M. Chaunay-Duclos, the commodore of the flotilla.

On the 21st of April, at daybreak, latitude $30^{\circ} 45'$ south, and longitude $30^{\circ} 5'$ east, as the British 74-gun ship *Tremendous*, Captain John Osborn, and 50-gun ship *Hindostan*, Captain Alexander Fraser, with a light wind at east-north-east, were escorting a homeward-bound fleet of Indiamen, numbering 11 sail, the French 40-gun frigate *Canonnière* (late British frigate *Minerve*¹), Captain César-Joseph Bourayne, was discovered to leeward steering south-south-west. Ordering the *Hindostan* by signal to lead the fleet, the *Tremendous* made sail in chase of the frigate; who, having hauled her wind on the starboard tack, bore from the former at noon west by south, and the convoy south-east. Favoured by the lightness of the breeze, the *Canonnière* outsailed the 74, and would have weathered her, had not

¹ See vol. iii., p. 184.

M. Bourayne, by the appearance of land ahead and to windward, been obliged to bear up. This, with an increase of the breeze at about 2 P.M., enabled the Tremendous to gain so upon the frigate, that at 3 h. 30 m. P.M. the latter, hoisting her colours, opened a fire from her stern chasers, and received a return fire from the bow-guns of the 74.

At 4 P.M., finding herself closely pressed, the *Canonnière* gradually hauled up on the larboard tack; as did also the Tremendous, keeping upon her opponent's larboard-quarter, and firing her guns as they could be brought to bear. By occasionally luffing up, the frigate got her whole broadside to bear, and thereby considerably damaged the rigging and sails of the 74. The latter, notwithstanding, rather fore-reached upon the *Canonnière*, and was meditating to cross her bows and end the contest by a raking fire, when, at about 4 h. 45 m. P.M., a well-directed broadside from the frigate shot away the jib-stay and foretop-sail ties and slings of the 74, and brought her foretop-sail-yard down upon the cap.

In consequence of this accident the Tremendous dropped astern fast, and, having no immediate alternative, bore up and poured a raking fire into her opponent's stern and quarter, but at too great a distance to produce any effect. As soon as she had repaired her damaged rigging, the 74 again hauled up; but the frigate had now got to windward, and was making so good a use of the advantage, that the few shot afterwards fired by the Tremendous could not reach her. At the time that the latter hauled up, the *Charlton* Indiaman, Captain George Wood, being ahead of the fleet, hove to and fired her broadside, but at so great a distance, that the *Canonnière* did not deign a reply. Captain Osborn continued the pursuit until 7 h. 30 m. P.M.; when, the frigate having disappeared since sunset, the Tremendous hove to, in order to await the coming up of the *Hindustan* and convoy.

Except a few shots in her masts, the damages of the Tremendous did not exceed those already mentioned; and, owing to the high fire of her opponent, she had not a man hurt. The injuries done to the *Canonnière* were of a more serious description. A shot had penetrated 16 inches into her mainmast, and cut the heart of it; and her fore-yard and mizenmast were also badly wounded. One of her iron 36-pounder carronades (of which the frigate had 14, with six long eights, making her guns the same in number as when recaptured from the British, 48) and two of her anchors were broken by shot; she likewise re-

ceived about 21 in the hull. Her loss, out of a crew of 330 men and boys, amounted to seven men killed and 25 wounded, including among the latter two or three officers. It is related of two "enseignes," or midshipmen, named Prenet and Duplantos, that, after being severely wounded, they went below only to get the blood stanchied, and then returned to their quarters.

If anything can add to the credit of M. Bourayne, for the able management of his ship, and his persevering and successful defence of her against a force so superior, it is the modesty of the account which he transmitted to the minister of marine. No rodomontade; all is plainly, yet minutely told, and, in every material point, agrees with the entry in the British ship's log. Fortunately for the cause of truth and the character of a brave officer, the imperial supervisor of official correspondence either overlooked Captain Bourayne's letter, or, having no immediate purpose to answer by altering the statements it contained, suffered the *Moniteur* to insert the letter in its original form.

Captain Bourayne's account, however, was too insipid to be served up, in its simple state, to the French readers of the "*Victoires et Conquêtes*." The writer has accordingly seasoned it in a way which, he knew, would render it palatable. Not only is the *Tremendous* made to fly from the field of battle, but the crew of the *Canonnière* are eager to board her. "Il ne s'agissait plus alors, pour ces braves matelots, de soustraire leur frégate au vaisseau ennemi, ni même de la forcer à une retraite honteuse; ils aspiraient à la prendre, et les cris, à l'abordage! à l'abordage! se firent entendre à plusieurs reprises."¹

The action of the *Tremendous* and *Canonnière* affords a lesson to officers who find themselves suddenly assailed by a decidedly superior force. It teaches them that, by a judicious and protracted defence, their ship may escape, even when, in a manner, close under the guns of an opponent whose single broadside, well directed (the chief point wherein the *Tremendous* appears to have failed), must either sink or disable her.

The *Canonnière* had sailed from Cherbourg on the 14th of November 1805, as a reinforcement to Rear-admiral Linois, whom Captain Bourayne, agreeably to his orders, proceeded to join at the Isle of France. Not finding the admiral there, the frigate was seeking him off the Cape of Good Hope, when fallen in with by the *Tremendous* and her convoy. After repairing, as well as could be done at sea, the damage she had sustained in

¹ *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvii., p. 289.

this rencounter, the *Canonnière* steered for Simon's bay, and on the 30th anchored near Penguin island. Deceived by the Dutch colours at all the forts, and on board the merchant-ships at anchor with him, M. Bourayne sent on shore a boat under the command of a lieutenant. No sooner had the party disembarked, than the forts, changing their colours, opened a heavy fire of shot and shells upon the frigate. The *Canonnière* immediately cut her cable and stood out. Several shells broke over, but none did any important injury to her; and not a single shot struck her hull. The French lieutenant and his men were of course made prisoners.

On the 25th of April a British squadron, composed of the 50-gun ship *Leander*, Captain Henry Whitby, 18-pounder 40-gun frigate *Cambrian*, Captain John Nairne, and 18-gun ship-sloop *Driver*, Captain Slingsby Simpson, cruised off the port of New York, to search American vessels coming from foreign ports for enemy's property and for goods contraband of war, also to gain information respecting the routes of two or three French squadrons then known to be at sea. At about 2 P.M. on that day Captain Whitby went on board the *Cambrian* to dine with Captain Nairne, leaving the *Leander* in charge of her first-lieutenant, Mr. John Smith Cowan. At 3 P.M., when standing in upon the larboard tack, Sandy-Hook lighthouse bearing west-north-west, distant about five leagues, the squadron discovered several sail in the south-west by south, apparently about four leagues from the Jersey shore, steering towards the Hook.

Soon after 4 P.M. the *Cambrian*, at that time the leading ship of the three, and distant about three miles and a half from the land, fired at some of the nearest vessels, and, heaving to, sent her boats on board three or four of them. The *Leander* then passed astern of the former, and stood on, to endeavour to bring down several brigs, one or two schooners, and a ship that had brought to at the distance of two or three miles from the squadron, with their heads in shore and their foresails set. After firing two guns at two brigs, that lay close together, and were more advanced than their companions, the *Leander*, being within about three miles of the shore, tacked, and continued occasionally firing single guns ahead and astern of the brigs, until the latter wore and stood towards her. The brigs were then boarded by her boats, and suffered to proceed; as were all the other vessels boarded by the squadron on that afternoon, except the ship, which, being detected in an illicit trade from Havana, was detained and sent to Halifax, where the greater portion of her

cargo was legally condemned. Among the ships not boarded was one from the West Indies, laden with a full cargo of contraband, and commanded by the nephew of the celebrated Paul Jones.

No sooner had the two first-mentioned American brigs altered their course to approach the *Leander*, than a small sloop discovered herself at a short distance in shore of them. Little did the *Leander's* captain imagine what a powerful instrument of persecution against him this apparently insignificant object was to be made: insignificant, indeed, for who, beyond some half a dozen citizens of New York, had ever heard of the "American coasting-sloop *Richard*, Jesse Pierce, master?" It appears (for there is no positive evidence of the fact) that a shot from the *Leander* killed John Pierce, the brother of Jesse, as the former was standing at the helm. A splinter was said to have struck him under the jaw, and to have caused instant death. The man never moved after he fell, but his brother acknowledges that he neither saw John Pierce fall, nor the splinter strike him. The sloop was presently in New York, and alongside of one of the wharfs. An election was at this time going on in the city. The body of the man was carried on shore, and the scenes that followed were a disgrace to the citizens.

In mockery of all justice, a grand jury collected among the citizens found a bill for wilful murder against Captain Whitby. The impulse, once given, extended all over the United States. Even the President was induced to issue a proclamation, declaring the captain of the *Leander* to be a murderer, and calling upon the citizens to seize him, Captain Whitby, that he might be proceeded against according to law. By the same proclamation, the *Leander*, and the two ships in her company at the time the unfortunate occurrence happened, as well as all other vessels commanded by the same three captains, were prohibited from entering the harbours and waters of the United States. At a subsequent period Captain Whitby, at the instance of the British admiralty, was tried by a court-martial for the murder of John Pierce, and, there not being a particle of evidence to prove the charge, was acquitted.

On the 25th of May, in the afternoon, the British 18-gun ship-sloop *Renard* (sixteen 18-pounder carronades and two sixes), Captain Jeremiah Coghlan, being about 10 miles north-north-east of the island of Mona, standing to the northward, with a light wind at east-south-east, saw and chased a strange sail under the island of Zacheo, bearing south-east. The pursuit continued all night: and daylight on the 26th discovered the

stranger to be a brig, and apparently a cruiser. All this day and night passed in chase, each vessel still on the starboard tack, the Renard gaining. On the 27th, at 8 A.M., owing to the calm state of the weather, the Renard took to her sweeps, and continued plying them until 8 P.M., when a light breeze sprang up. That night passed, and at noon on the 28th the Renard, being in latitude $20^{\circ} 30'$ north, longitude 68° west, and having got almost near enough to the stranger to open her fire, was saved that trouble by the French brig-corvette Diligent, Lieutenant Vincent Thevenard, hauling down her colours; and this, notwithstanding the brig mounted 14 long 6-pounders and two brass 36-pounder carronades, and had on board a crew of 125 men. The Diligent had sailed from Pointe-à-Pitre seven days before, and was bound to Lorient.

What could have possessed M. Thevenard that he should have so disgraced the flag under which he served as to haul it down without making the slightest resistance? As the bearer of despatches from Guadaloupe to France, he was justified in speaking no one. That excused his flight, but not his surrender. The moment he saw that he could not escape, and that the ship approaching him was of about equal size to his own (the Renard was of 348, the Diligent of 317 tons), he should have fought her. Not a 10-gun schooner-privateer from the island he had quitted but would have done so. What had he to fear, with the weather-gage and a battery of seven French 6-pounders and one 36-pounder carronade, opposed to eight 18-pounder carronades and one 6-pounder? The only difference in force between the Renard and a common English gun-brig, or one of the large armed schooners, was in number, not in caliber of guns. On coming to close quarters, and beginning to feel the weight of his opponent's heavier shot, what was to hinder the French captain from boarding?

To call the conduct of M. Thevenard by any softer name than cowardice, would be acting more leniently towards a Frenchman than we are accustomed to act towards an Englishman. To the honour of both navies, cases of the kind are rare, very rare; and if M. Thevenard continued to belong to the French navy, as it appears he did, until the reduction that took place in the year 1817, it must have been because he misrepresented the circumstances under which he had been captured in 1806. What would Napoleon have done had he known that the commander of one of his brig-corvettes had struck to a vessel of equal force without firing a shot?

On the 17th of February, 1805, the Honourable East India Company's ship Warren Hastings, Captain Thomas Larkins, mounting 44 guns, with a complement of 196 men and boys, sailed from Portsmouth on a voyage to China. As extraordinary pains had been taken in the equipment of this ship, to enable her to defend herself against a French frigate should she chance to fall in with one, we will give a more particular account of her armament.

The Warren Hastings mounted 26 medium 18-pounders on her main or lower-deck, 14 carronades, 18-pounders, on her upper-deck, and four carronades, 12-pounders, on her poop. The medium gun was six feet long, and weighed about $26\frac{3}{4}$ cwt.; whereas the full-sized 18-pounder of the British navy is nine feet long, and weighs about $42\frac{1}{2}$ cwt. The former, when run out, did not reach above a foot beyond the ship's side, and, in traversing, *wooded*, or touched the side of the port, at an angle of less than three points from the beam. The 13-pounder carronade was five feet long, and weighed about $15\frac{1}{2}$ cwt.; the 12-pounder was three feet and a quarter long, and weighed about $8\frac{1}{2}$ cwt. A navy carronade of each caliber is in length and weight as follows: the 18-pounder, three feet four inches, and about $10\frac{1}{2}$ cwt.; the 12-pounder, two feet eight inches, and about $6\frac{1}{2}$ cwt. The carronades of the Warren Hastings were mounted upon a carriage resembling Gover's in every particular but the only essential one, the having of rollers adapted to a groove in the slide. The consequence of this silly evasion of an ingenious man's patent was, that the whole of the ship's quarter-deck and poop guns became utterly useless, after only a few rounds had been fired from them. The first discovery of any imperfection in the new carriage occurred at exercise; but a plentiful supply of black lead upon the upper surface of the slide lessened the friction, and, with the aid of an additional hand, enabled the gun to be run out. On account, however, of the rain, and the salt water in washing the deck, the application of black lead was obliged to be repeated every time of exercise.

The Warren Hastings arrived out without meeting any opponent to try her powers upon, and sailed again on her return, but not quite so strongly armed. Four of her main-deck ports had been calked up, to afford space for a store-room, and the four guns transferred to the hold; and, on account of a reduction in her crew, occasioned by her 40 Chinamen remaining at Canton and a British ship-of-war pressing 18 of her English seamen, four of the 18-pounder carronades were also removed

below. Consequently the ship now mounted but 36 guns, with a crew of only 138 men and boys.

On the 21st of June, at 7 h. 30 m. A.M., in latitude $26^{\circ} 13'$ south, longitude $56^{\circ} 45'$ east, the Warren Hastings, steering west by south under a press of sail, with a strong breeze from north-east by east, descried in the south-west quarter a strange ship standing to the south-east under treble-reefed topsails and courses. This was the French 40-gun frigate *Piémontaise*, Captain Jacques Epron. As this ship was armed somewhat differently from her class, we will here state her force:—Her main-deck guns were the customary 28 long 18-pounders; and on the quarter-deck and fore-castle she mounted 10 iron, and two brass, 36-pounder carronades, two long French 8-pounders, and four long English 9-pounders. These had belonged to the British frigate *Jason*, having been thrown overboard by her when she grounded off *Pointe de la Trenche* at the capture of the *Seine* in June, 1798.¹

Exclusive of her 46 carriage-guns the *Piémontaise* carried swivels and musketoons in her tops and along her gunwales. In other respects, also, this French frigate was equipped in an extraordinary manner. On each fore and main yard-arm was fixed a tripod, calculated to contain a shell weighing 5 cwt. In the event of the ships getting close alongside each other, the shell, having been previously placed on the tripod, was to have its fusee lighted by a man lying out on the yard with a match in his hand: it was then to be thrown from the tripod, and, falling upon the other ship's deck, would, from its weight, pass through to the deck below. Here its explosion would scatter destruction all around; and, in the midst of the confusion, the Frenchmen were to rush on board. These, again, were armed more like assassins than men-of-war's men; each having, besides the usual boarding weapons, a poniard struck through the button-holes of his jacket.

At 9 A.M., having brought the Warren Hastings to bear well on her weather-quarter, the *Piémontaise*, shaking the reefs out of her topsails, stood towards the former, who still continued upon her course. At 9 h. 30 m., although gaining fast on the Indiaman, the frigate set her topgallantsails and fore and main-topmast studding-sails, and at 10 A.M. showed an English blue ensign and pendant. Notwithstanding these friendly demonstrations, the Warren Hastings suspected the character of her pursuer, hoisted her colours, and made the private signal. Of this the *Piémontaise* took no notice, but continued rapidly to

¹ See vol. ii., p. 248.

approach. At 11 A.M. the Indiaman shortened sail, hauled up a point, and cleared for action. At noon the frigate took in her studding-sails, stay-sails, and a mainsail; and soon afterwards, having approached within a mile, hauled down the English and hoisted French colours.

At 10 h. 20 m., choosing a leeward station, on account, says Captain Epron, of the heel caused by the high wind, the Piémontaise opened her fire upon the larboard quarter of the Warren Hastings within musket-shot distance; and which fire the latter, as soon as she could bring her guns to bear, returned. The action, thus commenced, continued for about a quarter of an hour, when the frigate filled and passed ahead, having done no other damage to the Indiaman than disabling a part of her rigging. On getting about a mile and a half ahead of her antagonist, the Piémontaise tacked, and, passing close to leeward of the Warren Hastings, gave and received a smart fire. In this the Piémontaise, besides killing and wounding several of the Indiaman's crew, badly wounded her foremast, cut away the whole of her larboard fore-shrouds, foretopsail-tie, and principal running rigging and stays, also the ensign, but which was quickly rehoisted at the maintopgallantmast head.

Scarcely had the Warren Hastings stoppered her damaged shrouds, and reeved preventer braces, ere she was compelled to receive the third attack of the Piémontaise; who, having put about in her opponent's wake, recommenced the action, but with little additional effect, beyond irrecoverably crippling the Indiaman's foremast. Owing to this circumstance, and to the prevailing high wind and rough sea, the Warren Hastings was reduced to such sails only as she could carry on her main and mizen masts. Having a second time tacked ahead of her antagonist, the Piémontaise was advancing to make the fourth assault, when the Warren Hastings re-opened her fire. The cannonade then became mutual and spirited; but it was to the increased disadvantage of the Warren Hastings, who had already had her main as well as her foremast, shot through, her standing and running rigging much cut, and two quarter-deck guns disabled, and had sustained a loss of five men killed and about as many wounded.

In this crippled state, with only the maintopsail set, the Warren Hastings sustained the fifth attack of the Piémontaise; who, backing on the former's larboard-quarter, poured in a heavy and destructive fire, which knocked the driver-boom into splinters, and presently carried away the mizenmast nearly by the board. The mast falling forward, disabled every effective

gun on the upper-deck. In addition to all this, the lower-deck was on fire from the shot that had entered the counter; and, in consequence of the nail of the tiller-rope on the barrel of the wheel having drawn, the rudder was rendered temporarily useless. The surgeon, also, had the whole of his instruments destroyed by a shot which came into the place where he was amputating and dressing the wounded. This, in a merchant-vessel, is a more exposed spot than in a ship-of-war, the space analogous to the cockpit in the latter being usually filled with a portion of the cargo. Thus circumstanced, the Warren Hastings, at about 4 h. 50 m. P.M., hauled down her colours.

The loss sustained by the Warren Hastings amounted to her pursuer (John Edwick) and six men killed, and 13, including her chief, third, and sixth officers (James Cockwell, Edward Davies, and William Hope), and her surgeon's mate (James Greville), wounded. The loss on the part of the *Piémontaise*, as stated by Captain Epron himself, amounted, out of a complement, in crew and supernumeraries, of 385 men and boys, to seven men killed, and five badly wounded; nor, considering that the frigate's principal damages were confined to her rigging and sails, could the loss well have been greater.

Comparative Force of the Combatants.

		Warren Hastings.	Piémontaise.
Broadside-guns	{ No.	18	23
	{ lbs.	312	533
Crew	No.	138	385
Size	tons	1356	1093

An action between a merchant-vessel and a ship-of-war requires, in order fairly to show the relative force of the parties, some further explanation than a mere statement of figures can afford. The chief purpose of the one ship being to carry a cargo, her armament is made a secondary consideration; whereas, the sole object of the other is to fight: accordingly, no pains are spared to render the former, both in *matériel* and *personnel*, fully adequate to the duties of her station. This comparison of the man-of-war with the merchantman applies to common cases. But, by some mismanagement on the part of her equippers, the Warren Hastings could make very little use of her upper-deck and poop batteries, after the second or third round of shot, and, for want of hands, could man only eight out of the 11 guns on her lower-deck battery; while the *Piémontaise*, as has already been shown, was armed in a manner every way calculated for causing destruction to an adversary, and for

bringing the combat, even with a regular frigate like herself, to a favourable issue.

Under these circumstances, the defence made by the Warren Hastings, protracted as it was to four hours and a half, displayed a highly commendable zeal and perseverance on the part of Captain Larkins, his officers, and ship's company; but, with all their gallant efforts, the latter could never have succeeded in capturing, although, had the ship's guns been in an effective state, they might, in beating off, an antagonist so well armed, manned, and appointed as the Piémontaise.

Some scenes that now ensued would have better become an Algerine cruiser, or a Malay pirate, than a French national ship-of-war. The dismasted state of the Warren Hastings at her surrender, assisted by the force of the heavy sea then running, caused the ship to fall off; and the Piémontaise, lying close to leeward, under her three topsails, with the mizen one aback and the main one shivering, bore up, to avoid being run foul of. Having by this evolution filled her maintopsail, and being unattended to at the helm, the frigate again came to, and ran foul of the larboard bow of the prize. The two ships then dropped close alongside of each other, producing, in the disturbed state of the sea, a crash that rendered the situation of both extremely hazardous.

A party of Frenchmen, headed by the first-lieutenant, Charles Moreau, now rushed on the decks of the Warren Hastings, and, with uplifted daggers and horrid imprecations, threatened the lives of all on board. After one ruffian had dragged Captain Larkins about the ship, charging him with an attempt to run the frigate on board, in order to cripple her masts, and calling him by every opprobrious epithet, another, in the person of M. Moreau himself, stabbed the captain with a poniard in the right side. The instrument passed through the right lobe of the liver, and occasioned so great a flow of blood that Captain Larkins fainted. Even this did not save him from the savage fury of his persecutor, who ordered him, in his weak state, to jump on board the Piémontaise, and, but for the humanity of a M. Baubin, an acting-lieutenant of the frigate, would have driven him into the sea. The man afterwards admitted that he had stabbed Captain Larkins, but attempted to extenuate the base act, by charging the latter with having purposely run the ship on board the Piémontaise.¹ The simple fact that M.

¹ See a translation of Lieutenant Moreau's letter to the editor of the "Isle-of

France Gazette," in the Naval Chronicle, vol. xx., p. 193.

Moreau, as well as many of his followers, was highly intoxicated, may account for the oblivious state of his memory as to the origin of the accident.

With such an example set them by their chief officer, the prize-crew were comparatively merciful in not absolutely slaying their victims: they merely stabbed three of the officers, John Wood, second officer, John Barnes, surgeon, and John Ball, boatswain's mate. So that, including the captain and a midshipman, Mr. James Bayton, who was pierced in seven different places in his two arms by the monster Moreau, five persons were wounded in cold blood, after the honourable surrender of their ship. Pillage of every description of course followed these tyrannical proceedings; but, after a while, the furious passions of the captors subsided, and Captain Epron, and some of his officers, did their best to conciliate and render comfortable Captain Larkins and the survivors of his crew.

Taking her prize in tow, the *Piémontaise* steered for the Isle of France, where the two ships arrived on the 4th of July. As a proof of her extraordinarily fast sailing, the frigate, in a moderate breeze, carrying three single reefed topsails, foresail, and mizenstaysail, towed her prize, a deeply-laden ship, admeasuring nearly a fourth more tonnage than herself, and having very small jury-sails set, at the rate of seven and a half knots an hour.

On the 22nd of June, in the evening, Captain George Ralph Collier, of the 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Minerva*, lying becalmed in Finisterre bay, despatched two boats, under the command of Lieutenant William Howe Mulcaster, first of the frigate, assisted in the cutter by Lieutenant of marines Charles Menzies, and in the barge by Lieutenant Ogle Moore, to scour the neighbouring coast, and, in particular, to make an attempt upon some luggers of which information had been received.

The boats pushed off, and, on arriving where the luggers lay, found they must carry a fort. This, although it mounted eight brass guns, 24 and 12 pounders, was carried in a very neat and masterly manner by the bayonet and pike, before the guard had time either to raise the drawbridge, or to discharge a 12-pounder, which (a fishing-boat having apprised the garrison of the approach of the British) had been brought to face the gate. Four of the Spanish guard laid down their arms and were made prisoners: the remainder escaped.

As the day began to dawn and the men were much fatigued by their long row to the shore and their subsequent march over a

heavy sand, Lieutenant Mulcaster and his party were obliged to restrict themselves to spiking the guns and throwing some of them into the sea. They then took quiet possession of five luggers laden with wine, bound to Ferrol and Corunna; and although exposed, for nearly two hours, to a fire from a two-gun battery to the southward of the town, the British brought out their prizes without injury to a single man on either side.

On the 9th of July, while the *Minerva* was lying in the road of Oporto, Captain Collier despatched her barge, under the command of Lieutenant Mulcaster, to cruise a few leagues to the northward, in the hope to intercept some of the Spanish privateers and row-boats, lurking in the creeks and rivers of Portugal, to be ready to commit depredations upon the Lisbon trade as soon as it appeared off the coast. On the 11th, after a fatiguing row of nearly 40 miles, the barge fell in with the Spanish lugger-privateer *Buena-Dicha*, of one long 8-pounder, besides blunderbusses and musketry, and manned with 26 of the *Guarda desperadoes*. The barge advanced under a discharge of grape-shot from the lugger's prow-gun; but nothing could withstand the impetuosity of Lieutenant Mulcaster and his men. They quickly boarded and carried the privateer; killing one of her crew, and wounding badly her captain, two other officers, and two seamen, without sustaining, on their own part, the slightest casualty.

On the 2nd of October, while the *Minerva* was at anchor off Oro island, near the entrance of Porto-Novo, Captain Collier himself, attended by Lieutenant Menzies with him in the cutter, and followed by the barge in charge of Lieutenant Peter Paumier James and midshipman William Holt, with a select party of marines, proceeded to reconnoitre the bay of Rocks, in the hope of falling in with one or more of the six Spanish gun-boats known to be at Carril. After a pull of seven hours, the cutter was hailed by a gun-boat, lying at an anchor within pistol-shot of the shore, attended by a small gun-launch with a brass 4-pounder. The gun-boat was immediately boarded on the quarter, and carried, as well as her attendant, without the loss of a man. She was the Spanish gun-boat No. 2, mounting one long 24-pounder in the bow, and two short brass fours, with a complement of 30 men, commanded by Lieutenant Don Jesso Lopez.

On the 25th of June the British 18-gun brig-sloop *Port Mahon*, Captain Samuel Chambers, chased a Spanish armed brig into the

intricate harbour of Banas in the island of Cuba. At 9 P.M. the boats of the sloop under the command of Lieutenant John Marshall, assisted by Lieutenant Luke Henry Wray, and Mr. John Robson, gunner, were despatched to endeavour to cut the vessel out.

On the 26th, at 1 A.M., the Spanish letter-of-marque brig San-Josef, armed with one long 18-pounder on a pivot amidships, four 12-pounder carronades and two long 4-pounders on her sides, with swivels, pikes, and muskets, and 30 men, was gallantly boarded and carried by Lieutenant Marshall and his party: and this, although the vessel was protected by the fire from, and moored by a line to, a tower mounting two heavy guns. The next difficulty was to get the prize out of the harbour. This also was accomplished, although the brig grounded within pistol-shot of the battery, and was struck by several shot from it; and, notwithstanding that the boats had been damaged by shot, and several of the oars broken, while rowing to make the attack, the whole service was executed without the loss of a man.

On the 9th of July, at 3 h. 15 m. P.M., the British 74-gun ship Powerful, Captain Robert Plampin, being about seven miles to the northward of the Little Basses, island of Ceylon, standing north-west by west, with a light air from the south-west, discovered a strange ship upon her weather-beam, steering free with studding-sails set, and shortly afterwards, broad on the latter's weather-quarter, and in full pursuit of her, a second ship, soon recognised as the 16-gun ship-sloop Rattlesnake, Captain John Bastard. The stranger, which was the celebrated French frigate-privateer Bellone, Captain Jacques Perroud, not being able to haul up without coming to action with the Rattlesnake, and observing that the Powerful lay nearly becalmed while she herself was running before a strong wind, resolved to continue her course and endeavour to cross between the 74 and the shore. In this, however, the Bellone was foiled; for at about 5 P.M. the Powerful got within gun-shot, and, hoisting her colours, opened a fire, which the former instantly returned. A running fight was maintained until 6 h. 45 m. P.M.; when, finding there was no possibility of escape, the Bellone hauled down her colours and hove to.

Extraordinary as it may appear, the Powerful had two seamen killed and 11 wounded by the fire of the Bellone; and, what is still more extraordinary in an hour and a half's running fight between two ships so disproportionate in point of force, the

Bellone herself had only one man killed and six or seven wounded.

This is the second instance that has occurred in these seas, within less than four months, of a marked deficiency in gunnery on the part of a British 74. If the Tremendous did more execution than the Powerful, it was because the former was enabled occasionally to bring her broadside, or a great part of it, to bear upon her antagonist;¹ while the Powerful appears to have been confined to a head-and-stern cannonade. Still the Powerful had two long 32s, two long 18s, and two long 12s, to oppose to four long French 8s; and surely she might have made a better use of them.

Had the well-directed fire of the Bellone done more injury to the 74's masts, rigging, and sails, and less to her crew, the former would probably have escaped; for what could the Rattlesnake, with her 16 long 6-pounders and 120 men, have effected against the Bellone, with her 34 guns, composed of long 8-pounders and 36-pounder carronades, with a crew at this time on board of 194 men? The Bellone was afterwards purchased for the use of the British navy, and under the name of *Blanche*, became classed as a 28-gun frigate.

On the 14th of July the following British squadron of six sail of the line and one frigate, under Commodore Sir Samuel Hood in the *Centaur*, cruised off Rochefort, to watch the motions of a French squadron of five sail of the line and several frigates, at anchor in the road of the Isle of Aix:—

Gun-ship.

98	Prince of Wales . . .	Captain William Bedford.
	Centaur . . .	Commodore Sir Samuel Hood.
74	Conqueror . . .	Captain Israel Pellew.
	Monarch . . .	Richard Lee.
	Revenge . . .	Sir John Gore.
64	Polyphemus . . .	Robert Redmill.

Gun-frigate.

32	Iris	John Tower.
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The receipt of intelligence that a French convoy of 50 sail, laden with stores for Brest, lay in Verdon road, at the entrance of the river Gironde, waiting an opportunity to put to sea, under the escort of two brig-corvettes, determined the British commodore to attempt cutting them out. Accordingly a boat from each line-of-battle ship was despatched to the *Iris* frigate; who immediately proceeded with them to the 44-gun frigate *Inde-*

¹ See p. 143.

fatigable, Captain John Tremayne Rodd, then cruising off the Gironde, to prevent the convoy's escape. To the six boats from the line-of-battle ships, commanded as follows: Centaur, Lieutenant Edward Reynolds Sibly, the commanding officer of the whole; Conqueror, Lieutenant George Fitzmaurice; Prince of Wales, Lieutenant John Francis; Revenge, Lieutenant Charles Manners; Polyphemus, unknown; and Monarch, Lieutenant Dalhousie Tait, were now added three from the Indefatigable commanded by Lieutenants Thomas Parker, Thomas Arscott, and Ralph Shepperdson, and three from the Iris, the commanding officers of which do not appear to have been named in the official letter.

On the evening of the 15th, the time appearing favourable, the 12 boats pushed off from the Indefatigable, and proceeded towards the mouth of the Gironde. Shortly afterwards the wind shifted to the westward, and blew strong. But the persevering ardour of the British overcame all obstacles, and at the dead of the night the boats entered Verdon road. Lieutenant Sibly and his party instantly attacked the French 16-gun brig-corvette *César*, having on board 86 men, under the command of Lieutenant Louis-François-Hector Fourré, all perfectly prepared. While in the act of cutting away the brig's boarding-netting, Lieutenant Sibly was badly wounded by pike and sabre, in the side, arm, and face. The British, however, soon boarded the *César*; and, after a few minutes' severe conflict, in which M. Fourré fought most heroically until he fell covered with wounds, they carried the French brig.

Owing to the extreme darkness of the night, and the strength of the wind and tide, the other French brig, which was the *Teazer* (late British) of 14 guns, moored higher up the river, escaped by slipping her cables, and running before the wind still further up the Gironde. The convoy managed to do the same. Meanwhile the prize, having cut her cables, was standing out, exposed, for some time, to a heavy fire from the *Teazer* and the batteries on both sides of the river. Notwithstanding this opposition the *César*, under the able direction of Lieutenant Parker of the Indefatigable, worked out, and joined the two frigates at anchor off the mouth of the Gironde.

The loss on this occasion was tolerably severe. The British had one lieutenant (Charles Manners), one master's mate (Thomas Helpman), two boatswain's mates, and five seamen killed, four lieutenants (Sibly, Tait, both badly, Parker, and Shepperdson), one master's mate (Thomas Mullins), and 34 sea-

men and marines wounded, and one midshipman (Thomas Blackstone) and 19 seamen and marines prisoners; total, nine killed and 39 wounded. The 20 prisoners, with the deceased lieutenant, had belonged to the *Revenge's* boat; which was struck by a large shot, and would have sunk but for the proximity of the shore. The survivors, on landing, were of course made prisoners. The *César* is represented to have lost, exclusive of her brave commander, 13 of her crew killed or wounded. With a proper appreciation of Lieutenant Sibly's gallantry and wounds, the rank of commander was conferred upon him soon after his return to port.

On the 28th of March, early in the morning, a French squadron composed of the two 40-gun frigates *Revanche*, *Commodore Amand Leduc*, and *Guerrière*, Captain Paul-Mathieu Hubert, 36-gun frigate *Syrène*, Captain Alexandre Lambert, and 16-gun brig corvette *Néarque*, sailed from Lorient, on a cruise off the coast of Iceland, Greenland, and Spitzbergen, for the purpose of destroying British and Russian whale-ships; a service intrusted to M. Leduc, because, having himself been a Dunkerque whaler, he was considered to be well acquainted, both with the navigation of the Arctic sea and with the haunts of those who usually resorted thither.

Scarcely had the French commodore got well to sea, ere a fine chance was afforded him of returning to port with a valuable prize. At about 1 P.M. the British 38-gun frigate *Niobe*, Captain John Wentworth Loring, cruising between the *Glénans* and the isle of *Groix*, discovered, and, hoping to cut off one of them, chased M. Leduc's three frigates and brig. The latter, however, far from evincing any intention to molest the *Niobe*, continued their course to the southward, under all sail. The British frigate gained in the pursuit. At 9 P.M. the *Néarque*, who was at some distance astern of her companions, seeing her danger, fired a gun, let off several rockets, and hoisted five lights, one over the other, in the hope to induce the commodore to put about and save her. But the voyage to Greenland presented, in the eyes of M. Leduc, fewer dangers, perhaps, than an action between one English and three French frigates. At 10 P.M. the *Niobe* got alongside the *Néarque*, and, after firing a volley of small arms into her, which fortunately injured no one, carried her off as a prize. The French brig mounted 16 guns, with a crew of 97 men, and was victualled for five months.

The winter being unusually long, M. Leduc, as a proof that he need not have been in such haste to run from the *Niobe*,

found himself stopped by the ice: he, in consequence, bent his course to a temperate latitude, and, after cruising some weeks off the Azores and Cape Clear, stood again to the northward. On the 21st of May the squadron made the south-east point of Iceland, and, standing on to the northward, met with the ice on the 30th, in latitude 72° . From the 2nd to the 8th of June the frigates tried in vain to penetrate the ice in the direction of Spitzbergen. On the 12th they came in sight of the island, but, with all their endeavours, could not get beyond $76^{\circ} 10'$. About this time the *Guerrière* parted company in a fog.

It was on the 9th of July that the admiralty received intelligence of the havoc which these three French frigates had been committing upon the fisheries. Immediately the 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Phœbe*, Captain James Oswald, and 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Thames*, Captain Brydges Watkinson Taylor, lying in Leith roads, were directed to proceed off the Shetland isles; and the 38-gun frigate *Blanche*, Captain Thomas Lavie, then at anchor in the Downs, was ordered, by telegraph, to hasten to Yarmouth roads. When here, Captain Lavie received orders to follow and take under his command the *Phœbe* and *Thames*, and with them endeavour to discover and capture M. Leduc and his squadron.

On the 10th, in the afternoon, the *Blanche* sailed from Yarmouth roads, and, on the 13th, was at the rendezvous; but the *Phœbe* and *Thames*, having ascertained that one of the frigates had parted from her two consorts, had since proceeded in search of the latter. After remaining three days off the Shetland isles, the *Blanche* received intelligence, that the *Guerrière* had been seen alone off the Faro isles, where she had captured and burnt several English ships. The *Blanche* immediately made sail towards the spot, and on the 18th, at 10 h. 30 m. A.M., saw from her mast-head, in the east-north-east quarter, the object of her search, standing upon a wind in a direction towards herself. The *Guerrière* had intended to go into Drontheim in Norway, to land her prisoners and to procure a supply of water; but, when off the port, a pilot-boat communicated some intelligence that induced her to put about and steer for the island of North-Faro, of which she was within a few hours' sail when fallen in with by the *Blanche*. The mounted force of the two frigates may here be introduced. The quarter-deck and forecastle guns of the *Blanche* were 16 carronades, 32-pounders, fitted upon the non-recoil principle, and two long 12-pounders; making her total of guns 46. The *Guerrière*, in addition to the maindeck

force of her class, mounted two brass 36-pounder carronades in the bridle-ports, and two others, and eight iron ones of the same caliber, with 10 long 8-pounders, on her quarter-deck and fore-castle; total 50 guns.

At noon the *Blanche* bore up under all sail, with a light breeze from the south-west; but the *Guerrière*, as if mistaking the *Blanche* for one of her consorts, continued to stand on until 3 P.M., when she also bore up, spreading all her canvas. The superior sailing of the *Blanche* enabled her to gain rapidly in the chase, and at about 45 minutes past midnight, the British frigate opened her fire, pouring into her antagonist two whole broadsides before the latter returned a shot. A warm action now commenced, one ship pointing her guns chiefly at the hull, the other at the rigging. Still the *Blanche* maintained her position in the chase, and at 1 h. 30 m. A.M. on the 19th compelled the *Guerrière*, whose mizentopmast had previously fallen, to haul down her colours.

The loss on board the *Blanche*, whose damages were of the most trifling description, amounted, out of her 265 men and boys (being 16 men short), to only one lieutenant (Robert Bastin) and three marines wounded; while that sustained by the *Guerrière*, whose lower masts were all badly wounded, and hull shattered above and below water, amounted, out of the 317 men and boys which the scurvy had left out of a complement on quitting port of 350, to 20 officers, seamen, and marines killed, and 30 wounded, 10 of them dangerously.

Comparative Force of the Combatants.

		Blanche.	Guerrière.
Broadside-guns	{ No.	23	24 ¹
	{ lbs.	520	516
Crew	No.	265	317
Size	tons	1036	1092

According to this statement, the *Blanche* and *Guerrière* were tolerably well matched. But it was only in appearance; for a great proportion of the latter's crew were ill in their cots, and the remainder, to judge by the impunity with which the British frigate escaped, seemed to have been very indifferent marksmen. During this running fight of 45 minutes' duration not one round shot struck the hull of the *Blanche*. The three marines were wounded by a single discharge of grape, while standing on the fore part of the gangway near the fore-castle; and the second-lieutenant, Mr. Bastin, was wounded through

¹ Carronade in the bow-port not included.

both thighs with a musket-ball at his quarters on the main deck. The chief object of the French frigate appears to have been to cripple her antagonist, in order that she herself might escape. Failing in this, the *Guerrière* protracted the defence until she could no longer withstand the vigorous and well-directed fire of the *Blanche*. We must suppose, in justice to M. Hubert, who at this very time was a member of the legion of honour, that his men were really in a deplorable state, or he would not, from the first, have fled from a frigate, not superior in size, as he might see, nor in force, as he might conjecture, to the one he commanded.

The *Blanche*, with her prize, arrived on the 26th in Yarmouth roads; and the *Guerrière*, on being transferred to the British navy, became a valuable acquisition to the class of large 38s. Shortly after his return, Captain Lavie received the honour of knighthood, and Mr. Henry Thomas Davies, the first-lieutenant of the *Blanche*, the promotion which was due to him.

With his two remaining frigates, M. Leduc continued to harass the fisheries, unseen, though diligently sought, by the *Phœbe* and her consort. On the 13th of July the two French frigates put into Patris Feorden, a port in Iceland, and, on their departure a few days afterwards, were chased, it appears, by two English frigates (whose names we cannot learn), but escaped by concealing themselves within the small island of Rodesand. M. Leduc then cruised off Cape Farewell, for ships coming out of Davis's Straits, and afterwards proceeded to the northern extremity of Ireland. Here he remained till chased off on the 28th of August. He then made sail for Cape Clear, and, after cruising there till the 17th of September, steered for a French port. On the 22nd M. Leduc re-anchored in Lorient; having taken and sunk, during his six months' cruise, one Russian and 28 English merchantmen, chiefly whalers, and having lost, by capture, one 40-gun frigate and one 16-gun brig, almost half his original squadron.

On the 25th of July, in the evening, as the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Greyhound*, Captain Edward Elphinstone, and 18-gun brig-sloop *Harrier* (16 carronades, 32-pounders, and two sixes), Captain Edward Thomas Troubridge, were cruising in the Java sea, four sail of ships were descried, passing through the Straits of Salayer. Chase was immediately given; and at 9 P.M. the strangers hove to, at about seven miles distant from the shore that lies between the small Dutch ports of Borthean and Balacomba. One of the ships was easily made out to be a frigate,

and another a corvette; but a third had so much the appearance of a line-of-battle ship, that the two British commanders thought it prudent to wait until daylight before they bore down to examine the strange squadron. The Greyhound and Harrier accordingly lay to during the night, at the distance of about two miles to windward of the strange squadron.

The break of day discovered that the ship, which had led to the cautionary measures of the preceding evening, was a large two-decked armed merchant-vessel, similar in size and appearance to an English Indiaman. Shortly afterwards the squadron, which consisted of the Dutch 36-gun frigate Pallas, Captain N. S. Aalbers, the Dutch Company's ships Vittoria (the two-decker above mentioned), Captain Klaas Kenkin, and Batavia, Captain William De Val, both officers in the Dutch Company's service, and the 14-gun ship-corvette William, Captain Feteris, drew out in the order named, and formed a line of battle on the larboard tack, under their topsails.

At a few minutes past 5 A.M. the Greyhound bore up under French colours, as if to speak the Pallas, who was then at some distance ahead of her second astern, the Vittoria; and, when within hail, all further disguise being unnecessary, the British frigate shifted her colours, and commenced a cannonade. This was at 5 h. 30 m.; and the fire was returned with a smartness and spirit which evinced that the Dutch were fully prepared for the contest. The Harrier, who had kept close astern of the Greyhound, seeing the latter engaged, bore round up; and, passing between the Pallas and Vittoria, opened a fire of musketry at the latter, and discharged her larboard guns into the starboard quarter of the former. The Vittoria and her second astern, the Batavia, then bore up in succession, to return the Harrier's fire.

In the mean time the Greyhound, resolving to lose no time in taking advantage of the confusion thus caused by the Harrier's promptitude, wore close round her opponent's bows, raking her severely in passing. On reaching the starboard-bow of the Pallas, the Greyhound, then on the starboard tack, threw her sails aback, and maintained a position which, while it comparatively secured herself, was of destructive effect to her antagonist. The cannonade of the latter, with an equal opponent upon her bow and one by no means to be despised upon her quarter, gradually slackened, and at the end of 40 minutes ceased. On being hailed by the Greyhound, the Pallas replied that she had struck, and was soon in possession of the former.

The Harrier now hauled towards the Vittoria, and, after firing several broadsides at her, compelled this formidable looking ship, at 6 h. 30 m. A.M., to haul down her colours. Sending an officer to take possession, Captain Troubridge hauled towards the Batavia. The Greyhound had by this time made sail for the latter. Being wholly unable to cope with the new antagonist that was now advancing to the assistance of the Harrier, the Batavia, at 6 h. 40 m., followed the example of the Vittoria. Meanwhile the William, who, from her position in the rear, had taken no part in the action, was making off towards the shore. The Harrier immediately proceeded in chase; but, the state of her sails and rigging leaving her little chance of overtaking the fugitive, Captain Elphinstone threw out the signal to join. The Harrier did so, and the William effected her escape.

Out of her complement of 212 men and boys, the Greyhound had one seaman killed and eight wounded; and the Harrier, out of her 110 men and boys on board, had only three wounded. The Pallas mounted 40 guns, 12 and 6-pounders, with 24-pounder brass carronades, and had a complement of 250 men, including about 50 Malays. Of these the Dutch frigate lost eight killed, her captain (mortally), second and fifth lieutenants, three pilots, one midshipman, and 25 seamen wounded, four of them and one of the pilots mortally. The Vittoria and Batavia, represented in Captain Elphinstone's letter merely as "armed for the purpose of war," had, the one two men killed, the other the same, besides a lieutenant and six men wounded, the lieutenant and one of the latter mortally.

With such incomplete materials for comparing the force of the parties, it is difficult to do justice to the merits of the case. The affair was undoubtedly conducted with great skill and bravery on the part of the British, and they reaped no inconsiderable advantage from the prizes they made; two of which, the Vittoria, of 800, and the Batavia, of 500 tons, were richly laden with the produce of the Moluccas.

In the month of February, as already has been stated, four of the French frigates, which after the battle of Trafalgar had got into Cadiz, succeeded in putting to sea, under the command of Commodore La Marre-la-Meillerie, and were as follows:—

Gun-frigate.

	{ HortenseCommodore Louis.-C.-Aug. La Marre-la-Meillerie.
40	{ RhinCaptain Michel-Jean-André Chesneau.
	{ Hermione . . .	„ „ Jean-Michel Mahe.
36	{ Thémis . . .	„ „ Nicolas Jugan.

These frigates, after the disgraceful loss of the brig that was in their company,¹ proceeded to Sénégal, and thence to Cayenne; at which latter port they arrived on the 27th of March. Quitting Cayenne on the 7th of April, they steered for the West Indies, cruised to windward of Barbadoes 15 days; then proceeded to Porto-Rico, and after revictualling there, set sail on the 18th of May on their return to France. On the 27th of July, at 6 P.M., when in about latitude 47° north, longitude 7° west, steering south-east by east, which was a direct course for Rochefort, the *Hortense* and her three companions were discovered by the 74-gun ship *Mars*, Captain Robert Dudley Oliver, the look-out ship of a British squadron of five sail of the line, under the command of Commodore Richard Goodwin Keats, in the *Superb*.

The *Mars*, making the necessary signals, which the *Africa* 64 repeated to the commodore, then far astern, wore, and, with the squadron, crowded sail in chase. The French frigates immediately set all the additional sail they could, and continued their course to the south-east. Soon after dark the *Mars* lost sight, as well of them as of all the ships of her own squadron, except the *Africa*, who was seen on her lee-quarter till 11 P.M., when she also disappeared. The *Mars* now shaped her course so as to prevent the enemy from getting to leeward; and, as a proof with what judgment she was steered, daylight on the 28th discovered the four frigates on the same bearing as on the preceding evening, but, except one, at a greater distance. Upon that one, which was the *Rhin*, the *Mars* evidently gained.

Observing this, and that the British 74 was entirely alone, the French commodore, with what appeared a proper spirit, put about, and, on joining the *Rhin*, formed his four frigates in line of battle on the larboard tack. Finding, however, that the *Mars* was not in the least intimidated by the approach of four heavy French frigates, but was hastening on to engage them, M. La Marre-la-Meillerie failed in his resolution, and at 3 P.M. made off with three of his frigates, leaving the fourth to her fate. Having already run a distance of 150 miles, and the day being far spent, the *Mars* continued in pursuit of the nearest frigate, when, at 6 P.M., in the midst of a heavy squall of wind and rain, and just as the *Mars*, having gained a position on the frigate's lee-quarter, had fired a shot and was preparing to open her broadside, the *Rhin* hauled down her colours.

Soon after the *Mars* had taken possession of the *Rhin*, the squall cleared up, and the *Hortense*, *Hermione*, and *Thémis* were

¹ See p. 120.

seen standing to the south-east; but the approach of night, the proximity of the French coast, and the stormy state of the weather, owing to which not more than a third of the prisoners could be removed, rendered any further pursuit impracticable. Captain Oliver, thereupon, accompanied by his prize, steered in the direction of his squadron; and which, so far had he outrun it in 24 hours' chase, the Mars did not rejoin it until the forenoon of the 31st. Great credit was due to Captain Oliver for having persevered in the chase so long after he had got out of reach of support from any ship of his squadron; and, had the four frigates been commanded by a Bergeret, a Bourayne, or one of many other French captains whom we could name, an opportunity would doubtless have been afforded to the officers and crew of the Mars, to show what could be effected, under such circumstances, by a well-appointed, well-manned British 74.

The Hortense and Hermione succeeded in reaching Bordeaux, and the Thémis appears to have entered Rochefort. What account of this transaction M. La Marre-la-Meillerie gave to the French minister of marine has not transpired. We may conjecture, however, that the force which put the French commodore to flight was described, not as "un seul vaisseau anglais," but, as "une escadre de plusieurs vaisseaux anglais." Who will say, that four French frigates, three, if not all of them, carrying long 18-pounders and 36-pounder carronades, with, between them, upwards of 1300 men, were not an overmatch for a single British 74? What, then, but a misrepresentation of the facts could have saved this French commodore from being cashiered? And yet according to the "Etat Général de la Marine," for January, 1822, M. La Marre-la-Meillerie is a peer of France and a chevalier of the order of St. Louis.

Had a British officer in the command of four, or even of two, such frigates, run away from a French 74-gun ship, particularly when a comrade was likely to be cut off, our duty would have compelled us to expose him. But even a single British frigate, of the large class, would have felt half-reluctant to fly from one French 74; and, if overtaken and attacked, would not have surrendered until she had made a few shot-holes in her opponent's hull, and had herself become in a considerable degree disabled.

On the 14th of August, at daybreak, the Isle of Wight bearing north eight leagues, the British fire-brig Phosphorus, commanded by Lieutenant William James Hughes, perceived approaching her a large French lugger, pierced for 16, and

apparently mounting 12 guns. At 5 h. 10 m. A.M., the Phosphorus hailed the lugger, and was ordered in reply to strike, or that the latter would sink her. At 5 h. 20 m. the lugger laid the Phosphorus alongside, and, with three cheers, attempted to carry her by boarding; but, notwithstanding about 70 or 80 men advanced to the assault, they were repulsed by the 24 officers, men, and boys, belonging to the British vessel. After lying alongside 45 minutes, and engaging altogether an hour and 10 minutes, the lugger made sail, and sheered off. As soon as the state of her sails and rigging would permit her to wear, the Phosphorus stood after her opponent; but, losing ground in the chase, and having had her commander (middle finger off and severely wounded in the left hand), acting master (Thomas Esther), and six seamen wounded, one mortally, and the remainder severely, with no surgeon or even assistant on board to attend to them, the brig bore up and made sail for the Downs.

Although brig-rigged, the Phosphorus measured only 115 tons, and mounted but four 12-pounder carronades: one of which, soon after the action commenced, had its breeching and gooseneck broken. To have beaten off a vessel so decidedly superior in every respect was a matter of just triumph on the part of the officers and crew of the Phosphorus; and, for his very conspicuous gallantry upon the occasion, Lieutenant Hughes was promoted to the rank of commander. He also, we believe, received a handsome sword from the Patriotic Fund.

On the 22nd of August, in the evening, the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Alexandria*, Captain the Honourable Edward King, lying at an anchor off the port of Rio de la Plata on the Spanish main, despatched her boats to cut from under the forts in that harbour a Spanish polacre brig and garda-costa, which had for some time past materially injured the Jamaica trade. The boats were, the barge under Lieutenant Joseph Lewis, first of the frigate, the launch under Lieutenant Edmund Nagle, one of the cutters under master's mate Alfred Smith, and the jolly-boat. Unfortunately, owing to the prevailing darkness, the boats rowed all night without being able to discover the place in which the vessels lay, and in the morning returned on board their ship.

Seeing a frigate at anchor off their port, the Spaniards expected an attack and prepared to meet it. The 10-gun schooner *Gracieuse*, acting Lieutenant William Smith, joining company, Captain King, on the evening of the 23rd, again despatched

Lieutenant Lewis and the boats, which were now taken in tow by the *Gracieuse*.

After the schooner had cast them off, the boats pulled for the harbour, then about six miles distant; and, in the face of a heavy but ill-directed fire of grape-shot from three batteries, and of musketry from the shore and from the brig and *garda-costa* at anchor, Lieutenant Lewis and his party boarded and carried both vessels without the slightest loss, their crews abandoning them as the British approached. The Spaniards, in the course of their preparations, had hauled the brig and schooner aground, stripped them of their sails and running-rigging, and lashed them to the shore. Hence no exertions on the part of the British, although continued for ten hours and a half, could remove them. As the men were now falling fast under the incessant fire to which they had so long been exposed, Lieutenant Lewis quickly destroyed the two vessels and retreated to the offing. This he at length accomplished, but with so serious a loss as one master's mate (Alfred Smith) and five seamen and marines killed, and himself (slightly), Lieutenant Nagle, the gunner, one midshipman (Samuel Marshall), and eight seamen and marines wounded.

On the 18th of August Lieutenant Andrew M'Culloch, with the barge of the British 18-pounder 32-gun frigate *Galatea*, Captain George Sayer, cruising off the Spanish main, pursued some miles up a river near Puerto-Caballo a Spanish schooner privateer, of three long 6 and 4 pounders, with swivels and musketoons on stocks; and which, after an able resistance, in which her commander and one man fell, was carried. Finding it impracticable to bring away the schooner without danger of his retreat being cut off, Lieutenant M'Culloch removed the prisoners into his boat and blew her up. This gallant little enterprise was executed with so small a loss on the British side as one man slightly wounded.

On the 21st Lieutenant Harry Walker in the barge, without any loss whatever, drove on shore and completely destroyed, in the vicinity of the last exploit, another fine privateer-schooner, armed with swivels and small arms.

On the 9th of October, cruising off Barcelona, Captain Sayer despatched three boats under the direction of Lieutenant Richard Gittins, first of the frigate, assisted by master's mate John Green and James Scanlan the boatswain, to cut out some vessels at anchor in the above port. As the boats approached the harbour, a heavy fire of round and grape was simultaneously opened upon

them from three batteries, accompanied by musketry from them and the beach, to which the three schooners to be carried were moored head and stern. In spite of these obstacles, the British succeeded in boarding and bringing out the vessels; and, although exposed for an hour and a half to the fire above noticed, of the good direction of which the injury done to the *matériel* of the boats and prizes afforded proof, did not have a man hurt.

On the 12th of November, in the morning, the *Galatea*, cruising off the island of Guadaloupe, gave chase to a suspicious schooner in the north-west. After a few hours' chase, and when she was getting near to the schooner, the *Galatea* became becalmed. Captain Sayer now despatched in pursuit of the vessel the boats of the frigate, under the orders of Lieutenants Gittins and Walker. Just as the boats had got near enough to return the schooner's fire with their musketry, and were on the point of boarding her, the French colours came down. The prize proved to be the *Réunion*, a fine copper-bottomed schooner of 10 guns, from La Guayra bound to Martinique; and not a man in the boats received the slightest injury.

On the 23rd of August, in the morning, the British 38-gun frigate *Arethusa*, Captain Charles Brisbane, and 44-gun frigate *Anson*, Captain Charles Lydiard, cruising off Havana, discovered to leeward of them, and within two miles of the *Mona-castle*, the Spanish 34-gun frigate *Pomona*, from Vera Cruz, with specie and merchandise, using her utmost efforts, against a scant wind and a strong north-east current, to enter the harbour. Finding herself closely pushed by the frigates and driven to leeward of her port by the current, the *Pomona* bore up, and anchored in three and a half fathoms water, within pistol-shot of a castle, mounting 11 long 36-pounders;¹ and situated about two leagues to the eastward of the *Moro*. Here she was presently reinforced by 10 gun-boats² from Havana, each mounting a long 24-pounder, with 60 or 70 men; and which immediately formed in line ahead of the frigate.

Observing, as they bore up in chase, that the *Pomona* had anchored, each of the two British frigates passed a cable through the stern-port, to be ready to do the same in a position for cannonading with effect. At 10 A.M., the *Anson* and *Arethusa* came to anchor, the first abreast of the line of Spanish gun-boats, the other on her consort's starboard-quarter, in only one

¹ The official account says 16; but the number in the text is from an Havana account, in this instance more likely to be correct.

² The official account says 12. One Havana account says 10, another seven.

foot water more than she drew, and close alongside of the Pomona. A warm action now commenced between the two British frigates on the one part, and, on the other, the Spanish frigate, the 10 gun-boats, and the battery on shore. In 35 minutes the Pomona struck her colours, and was taken possession of; and all the gun-boats had previously been blown up, sunk, or driven on shore. The castle continued the cannonade a short time longer, firing red-hot shot occasionally, until the explosion of a part of the battery put an entire stop to the action.

The fire of the gun-boats had been so ill directed, that the Anson had not a man hurt. The Arethusa, however, did not escape so fortunately, having had two seamen killed, the captain (but who did not quit the deck), one lieutenant (Henry Higman), one lieutenant of marines (John Fennel), 27 seamen, and two marines wounded. The hot shot from the castle had also set the frigate on fire; but the exertions of her officers and men soon extinguished the flames. The Pomona mounted 38 long guns and carronades (long twelves on the main deck), with a complement of 347 men; of whom it appears, her captain and 20 men were killed, two lieutenants and 30 men wounded.

The money, belonging to the King of Spain, had been landed at the castle by the governor of Havana and the Spanish admiral; both of whom had come out purposely to anchor the Pomona in a place of safety, and had only quitted her 10 minutes before the action commenced. There was, however, a considerable quantity of plate and merchandise still on board, which fell to the share of the captors. The Pomona, under the name of Cuba, was afterwards added to the British navy, and the first-lieutenants of the Arethusa and Anson, John Parish and Thomas Ball Sullivan, deserved the reward of promotion for their gallantry in this action, which they shortly afterwards obtained for the capture of Curaçoa.

On the 29th of August, in the evening, the British 20-gun ship Bacchante, Captain James Richard Dacres, cruising off Santa Martha on the Spanish main, sent her boats, under the command of Lieutenant George Norton, assisted by John Howard the gunner, master's mates Henry Overend and Joseph Birch, lieutenant of marines John M. Pilcher, William Leriche the purser, and Robert Burnett the carpenter, to attempt the capture or destruction of some Spanish vessels at anchor in the harbour. On the 30th, at 1 A.M., the boats arrived at the entrance of the harbour, and immediately dashed for the vessels, under a tremendous fire from them, the batteries, and the beach, where

several field-pieces had been stationed. Notwithstanding this heavy fire, Lieutenant Norton and his party, without incurring any loss, succeeded in bringing out one armed brig and two armed feluccas.

Having received information that several privateers were in the habit of resorting to the small ports of Batabano and Trinidad in the island of Cuba, Vice-admiral Dacres, the commander-in-chief at Jamaica, detached Captain George Le Geyt, with the 18-gun ship-sloop *Stork*, the 14-gun schooner-sloop *Supérieure*, Captain Edward Rushworth, and schooners *Flying Fish*, of 12 guns, Lieutenant James Glassford Gooding, and *Pike*, of four guns, Lieutenant John Ottley, to endeavour to capture or destroy the marauders.

With this purpose in view, the four British vessels, on the 25th of August, set sail from Port Royal, and on the 30th at daylight made the Isle of Pines. At noon, when abreast of the south-west point, a schooner was discovered at an anchor high up the bight. Captain Le Geyt immediately sent a lieutenant and eight men to assist the 19 or 20 composing the crew of the *Pike*, and directed Lieutenant Ottley to make sail in chase. As soon as the *Pike* hauled her wind for that purpose, the schooner, which was a Spanish *garda-costa* of 10 guns and 45 men, got under way. In a short time the *Pike* arrived within gun-shot; and, after the exchange of two broadsides her opponent made sail. Pursuing her closely, however, the *Pike* compelled the *garda-costa* to haul down her colours, and returned with her to the *Stork*, then with the remaining two schooners riding at anchor.

It now appearing that, owing to the shallowness of the water, the *Stork* could not proceed any further towards Batabano, which was 30 leagues distant, Captain Le Geyt sent an officer and a party of men to the *Supérieure*, and directed Captain Rushworth, after lightening as much as possible his own vessel and the *Flying Fish*, to take the three schooners and endeavour to execute the service. The *Supérieure*, *Flying Fish*, and *Pike* accordingly made sail; but, owing to the intricacy of the navigation, they did not arrive off Point Gonda, 22 miles from Batabano, until the 2nd of September. Here they anchored, and at midnight weighed and stood over to the harbour, intending to be abreast of it before daydawn, but were prevented by baffling winds from reaching it until broad daylight.

Taking with him 18 men belonging to the *Stork*, 35 from the *Supérieure*, and 10 from the *Flying Fish*, Captain Rushworth then landed about two miles to windward of the battery at

Batabano. Leaving the men of the Flying Fish in charge of the boats, Captain Rushworth proceeded with the remaining 53 to attack the battery; but the marshy irregular ground so impeded the progress of the British, that the enemy was enabled to send a party of soldiers to waylay them in the thick bushes. The advanced division of Captain Rushworth's party, however, charged and completely routed the Spanish soldiers, leaving two dead and one wounded of their number. By this time a general alarm had spread, and the militia and the men from the shipping had joined the stationary regulars in front. Finding his retreat thus cut off, Captain Rushworth pushed forward to gain the fort. This he and his men carried in the short space of three minutes, the Spaniards retreating after firing two guns and a volley of small-arms. The battery thus gallantly taken mounted six long 18-pounders on travelling-carriages. These the British immediately spiked, and then proceeded to take possession of the vessels in the harbour, which consisted of one felucca pierced for 14 guns, but having only one long 18-pounder mounted, a schooner pierced for 12 guns, a French privateer of four guns, and three Spanish privateers of one gun each. Besides these armed vessels, there were six carrying cargoes. Entire possession was taken of all the above vessels, and the British got back to their schooners with so slight a loss as one man badly wounded. The names of the officers who accompanied Captain Rushworth in this very gallant and successful enterprise, he thus alludes to: "I also feel it my duty to state the great assistance I received from Lieutenants Russell and Murray, and Sub-lieutenants Blake and Brown." Unfortunately we cannot, in this instance, give the names with greater precision.

On the 9th of September at noon, as the British 22-gun ship *Constance*, Captain Alexander Saunderson Burrowes, and gun-brigs *Strenuous*, Lieutenant John Nugent, and *Sharpshooter*, Lieutenant John Goldie, were beating to the westward from their anchorage off St. Malo, they discovered a French frigate-built ship endeavouring to pass between them and Cape Fréhel. The latter was the flûte or store-ship *Salamandre*, of 26 guns (22 long 8-pounders and four 24-pounder carronades), and a crew of at least 80 men, commanded by Lieutenant de vaisseau Victor-Amédée Salomon, from St. Malo, bound to Brest, with a cargo of ship-timber. Finding herself closely pursued, with no chance of escape by dint of sailing, the *Salamandre* ran on shore among some rocks, and close under a battery. The *Strenuous* had so advanced in the pursuit as to be in danger of sharing

the same fate; and it was only by great exertions that the brig got clear. The British squadron anchored for the night. On the following morning the wind greatly increased; and, the French ship, the battery on the hill, and the troops on shore, appearing too formidable to be attacked by boats under such unfavourable circumstances, Captain Burrowes, who, indeed, believed the Salamandre to be irretrievably lost, weighed and steered for the island of Jersey.

As soon as the coast was clear and the tide served, the Salamandre, with the assistance afforded her from the shore, got off, and, being too much damaged to proceed on her voyage, returned to St. Malo. Here, after repairing her damages, the Salamandre remained, watching an opportunity to escape, until the morning of the 12th of October; when, the wind being fair and no enemy to be seen in the offing, she put to sea. It so happened, that at 6 A.M. the Constance and Strenuous, accompanied now, instead of the Sharpshooter, by the 16-gun brig-sloop Sheldrake, Captain John Thicknesse, and the hired armed cutter Britannia, had weighed from off the island of Chausey, with a light breeze at south-east, purposely to reconnoitre the port of St. Malo. At about 8 A.M. the Salamandre was discovered off Cape Fréhel, and was immediately chased, the British vessels having to employ their sweeps on account of the lightness of the breeze. At about noon the Salamandre succeeded in getting into the bay of Erqui, close in with the rocks. She there carried out bow and quarter springs, and made every preparation for an obstinate defence, having the aid of a two-gun battery on an adjacent hill, and of one or two field-pieces, and a few troops stationed on the beach.

The Sheldrake, out-sailing the Strenuous, led into the bay on the starboard tack, and the Constance, whose greater draught of water would have obliged her to be cautious in her advance, even could she, with so little wind, have headed her consorts, followed the Strenuous. At about 1 h. 45 m. P.M. the Sheldrake opened her fire on the Salamandre; as did the Strenuous and Constance, in succession, as they advanced. At a few minutes past 2 P.M., when the Constance, by sweeping, had arrived within pistol-shot on the enemy's beam, the signal was made to anchor; and, as soon as all three British vessels had done so, a spirited cannonade was maintained between them, the Salamandre, and the shore. At about the height of the action Captain Burrowes was killed by a grape-shot, and at 3 P.M. the Salamandre, having hauled down her colours, was taken pos-

session of by the master of the *Constance*. Soon afterwards the wind, which blew right on the shore, began to freshen; and at 5 P.M. the *Constance*, having had her cables cut by the fire of the battery, took the ground. In this helpless state the *Constance* remained exposed to a heavy fire of round-shot, grape, and musketry.

The surviving officers and crew of the *Constance* had now no alternative but to endeavour to save themselves. Accordingly, at 5 h. 30 m. P.M., all that were able quitted the ship in the boats, leaving the wounded to the care of the enemy. These amounted to her first-lieutenant (George Spencer Richards, slightly), her boatswain (Daniel M'Cawley, badly), and 14 seamen and marines, including four of the latter wounded mortally; the killed, to eight besides the captain. The *Sheldrake* had one seaman killed and two wounded, and the *Strenuous*, who had her foretopmast shot away, one midshipman (Robert Bond) and four seamen and marines wounded; making the total of the British loss 10 killed and 23 wounded, exclusive of 38 officers and men that were made prisoners in an unsuccessful attempt to save the *Constance*, on her again floating at the rising of the tide.

The *Salamandre*, mounting, as already stated, 26 guns with a crew, as admitted, of 80 men,¹ lost her captain, M. Salomon, and it was supposed about 29 men killed. Of her loss in wounded, all that can be stated is that nine, of whom two afterwards died, were received on board the *Sheldrake*. The *Salamandre* went on shore almost immediately after she had surrendered; and the British not being able to get her off, set fire to and destroyed her.

Between the above account, and that given by Captain Thickenesse in his letter to the admiralty, there are some, as respects the part performed by the *Constance*, not unimportant variations. The official letter states, that the surrender of the *Salamandre* occurred at 4 P.M., and that the first-lieutenant of the *Sheldrake* took possession of the prize. As it nowhere appears, in that letter, at what time the *Constance* struck the ground, the inference may be that she did so pending the action with the French ship; whereas, according to the testimony of an officer of the *Constance*, the latter did not touch the ground until two hours after the *Salamandre* had hauled down her colours and the master been sent to take possession. It was the shot from the French battery that, by cutting her cables, drove the *Constance* on shore. According to the official letter, the force of the Sala-

¹ The British official account says 150 men.

mandre was "26 long 12 and 18 pounds;" but we still believe our account to be correct. The *Constance* is also represented as "a perfect wreck;" whereas the French, on the third day, as we understand, got the *Constance* into St. Malo and afterwards repaired her for sea.

In the month of September Commodore Sir Samuel Hood cruised off Rochefort with the following squadron:—

Gun-ship.	
98	Windsor Castle . . . Captain Charles Boyles.
74	{ Centaur Commodore Sir Samuel Hood
	{ Achille Captain Richard King.
	{ Monarch ,, Richard Lee.
	{ Revenge ,, Sir John Gore.
	{ Mars ,, William Lukin.
Gun-brig-sloop.	
16	Atalante ,, Joseph Ore Masefield.

On the 25th, at 1 A.M., as the above squadron, with the wind at north by east, was stretching in upon the larboard tack for Chasseron lighthouse, then distant six or seven leagues, seven sail were discovered to leeward. At this time the *Revenge* was to windward of the *Centaur*, the *Monarch*, who had first made the signal for an enemy, to leeward and a mile and a half ahead of her, and the *Mars* on her starboard bow. The remaining ships of the British squadron were considerably in the rear. In expectation that the strangers, or a part of them, were line-of-battle ships, a signal was made to form the line; but the almost immediate discovery that they were frigates, caused the signal for a general chase to be substituted. The strangers were a French squadron which had escaped the preceding evening from Rochefort, bound to the West Indies, and consisted of the

Gun-frigate.	
40	{ Gloire Commodore Eléon.-Jean-Nicolas Soleil.
	{ Infatigable Captain Joseph-Maurice Girardias.
	{ Minerve ,, Joseph Collet.
	{ Armide ,, Jean-Jacques-Jude Langlois.
36	Themis ,, Nicolas Jugan.

Brig-corvettes, Lynx and Sylphe.

Nearly as soon as seen, the French squadron bore up, and steered south-south-west under all sail. The British ships bore away also; whereby the *Revenge*, who lay well to windward, was thrown very far astern. At 4 A.M., when the French squadron was about eight miles ahead of the *Centaur*, the *Monarch* had arrived nearly within gun-shot of the rearmost frigate, the *Armide*. At 5 A.M. the *Monarch* began firing her bow-chasers

at the latter; who returned her fire with her stern-guns, the frigates having previously hoisted French colours, and the commodore his broad pendant. At 6 A.M. the *Infatigable*, which was the weathermost frigate, hauled to the northward, and was pursued by the *Mars*; while the leewardmost frigate, the *Thémis*, accompanied by the two brigs, bore up to the southward, and no unengaged ship being near enough to pursue them, effected their escape.

The three remaining French frigates, the *Gloire*, *Armide*, and *Minerve*, now kept in close order for mutual support. At about 10 A.M. the *Monarch* opened her starboard guns upon the two rearmost frigates, and a very heavy cannonade ensued between her and them: so much to the disadvantage of the *Monarch*, chiefly because the heavy swell prevented her, during a great part of the time, from opening her lower-deck ports, that, in about 20 minutes, she was much disabled, and scarcely manageable. At 11 A.M., the *Centaur* got up, and commenced a heavy fire from her larboard guns upon the *Gloire* and *Armide*; while the *Monarch* continued engaging the *Minerve*. All three frigates kept up a smart and harassing fire in return. At 11 h. 45 m. A.M. the *Armide* struck to the *Centaur*; and soon after noon, the *Minerve* struck to the *Monarch*. By this time the *Mars* had also overtaken and captured the *Infatigable*. Thus left to herself, in the midst of foes so numerous and powerful, the *Gloire*, as a last resource, hauled up, and made sail to the westward. The *Centaur*, carrying all the canvas she was enabled to set, pursued her. At 2 h. 30 m. P.M. the *Mars*, who had joined in the chase, and who, from the entire state of her rigging and sails, was at this time the most effective ship, opened her fire upon the *Gloire*, and at 3 P.M. compelled the latter to haul down her colours.

So determined a resistance on the part of the French frigates, of the three, at least, that kept together, was not without its effect. The *Centaur* had eight of her fore, and five of her main shrouds shot away; also the main spring-stay, slings of the main yard, the chief part of the topmast and topgallant rigging and bob-stays, together with her jib-boom. Her bowsprit, foremast, fore-yard, mainmast, and main-yard, were each shot through in several places; and her running-rigging and sails cut to pieces. As a proof that the Frenchmen had chiefly this object in view, the *Centaur's* loss amounted to only one seaman and two marines killed, her captain and three seamen wounded. Sir Samuel's wound was a very serious one. While leaning with his right

hand on the railing of the quarter-deck, giving orders, a musket-ball entered and passed through between the wrist and the elbow, lodging below the shoulder. The shattered condition of the arm rendered amputation necessary.

The damages of the *Monarch* were of a similar description to those of the *Centaur*, except that the former had her main top-gallantmast shot away, and was more hit in the hull. The *Monarch's* loss amounted to one midshipman (William Buddin) and three seamen killed, one lieutenant (John Anderson), her boatswain (Peter Duffy), one midshipman (John Geary), 15 seamen, and seven marines wounded; total, on board the two ships, nine killed and 29 wounded. The *Mars*, the only ship besides these, that took, or could take, any part in the engagement, sustained a slight injury in her sails and rigging, but, although hulled eight or ten times, escaped without any loss.

The *Gloire* mounted 46 guns, and each of the other French frigates 44; long 18s on the main deck, and long eights, with iron 36-pounder carronades, on the quarter-deck and forecastle. They each had on board, including troops, about 650 men, and were full of stores, arms, ammunition, and provisions. No doubt it was owing to their being so deeply laden, that these frigates were not able, in the first instance, to escape from the line-of-battle ships.

Sir Samuel, in his official letter, promises to make a return, as soon as possible, of the loss sustained by the captured frigates; merely stating, that the result of their "obstinate resistance was attended with much slaughter." No doubt the *Gloire*, *Armide*, and *Minerve* severally suffered a very heavy loss, and were proportionably cut up in rigging, masts, and hull. Such gallant conduct on the part of the French ships merited a circumstantial account of the state, in point of damage and loss, in which they were at their surrender; and, admitting that the promised return was transmitted to the admiralty, it ought to have been published in the *Gazette*, if only as an act of justice towards a brave enemy.

These captured frigates were of very large dimensions. The *Minerve* measured 1101, the *Armide* 1104, the *Gloire* 1153, and the *Infatigable* 1157 tons. They were all added to the British navy; the first under the name of *Alceste*, the last, of *Immortalité*, and the other two under their French names.

On the 31st of October, 1805, a French squadron, composed of the new 74-gun ship *Régulus*, 40-gun frigates *Présidente* and *Cybèle*, and brig-corvette *Surveillant*, under the orders of com-

modore Jean-Marthe-Adrien L'Hermitte, sailed out of the port of Lorient, on a predatory cruise, first along the western coast of Africa, and subsequently in the Antilles. It had been Napoleon's intention to have embarked on board this squadron, to which another frigate or two were to have been added, 1000 men, for the purpose of taking one of the British African settlements, thereby to have drawn off a division of the Channel fleet. The command, both afloat and on shore, was to have been given to the emperor's brother Jérôme; but the latter was to have been attended by two intelligent officers, one belonging to each service, to prevent him from committing blunders.

On his first cruising-ground M. L'Hermitte took and destroyed several British slave-ships and merchant-vessels, and was fortunate enough, on the 6th of January, to capture the British 18-gun ship-sloop *Favourite*, Captain John Davie. The French commodore manned the latter as a cruiser, and, it is believed, sent home the *Surveillant*. According to a loose statement in the French newspapers, this brig afterwards attacked a large English letter-of-marque ship, and was sunk by her.

After committing sad depredations on the African coast, the squadron proceeded to the Brazils to refit. M. L'Hermitte again put to sea, and cruised a short time in the West Indies; when, on the 20th of August, being in latitude $22^{\circ} 26'$ north, and longitude 55° west, on his return to Europe, he was overtaken, and his ships dispersed by, the hurricane which proved so destructive in all parts of the Atlantic. The frigate *Cybèle*, having lost her topmasts, steered for the United States, and on the 1st of September anchored in Hampton roads; but the *Régulus* and *Présidente*, being so fortunate as to retain their masts, were enabled to steer for France.

On the 27th of September, at 3 h. 30 m. A.M., having separated from her companion, and got as near home as latitude $47^{\circ} 17'$ north, longitude $6^{\circ} 52'$ west, the *Présidente* fell in with a British squadron of six sail of the line, under Rear-admiral Sir Thomas Louis, in the *Canopus*. Chase was immediately given by the squadron; and the 18-gun brig-sloop *Despatch* (sixteen 32-pounder carronades and two long sixes), Captain Edward Hawkins, soon became the leading vessel in the pursuit. By 4 P.M. the *Despatch* had got within three miles of the *Présidente*, and was gaining fast upon her. At 5 h. 30 m. P.M. the brig shortened sail, and at 6 h. 45 m. commenced firing her bow-guns at the frigate; who returned the fire with her stern-chasers. A running fight between the *Despatch* and *Présidente*

was thus maintained until about 7 h. 45 m. P.M.; when the latter bore up and stood towards the British squadron, the nearest ship of which, the 38-gun frigate *Blanche*, Captain Sir Thomas Lavie, was about three miles astern of the brig. The *Canopus* shortly afterwards fired a distant shot at the French frigate, who thereupon hauled down her colours, and was taken possession of by the brig. So says the log of the *Despatch*; also that the *Présidente* had previously struck to her. The letter of Rear-admiral Louis contains no particulars; although it would have been but fair to have given the brig the credit which was due to her, that of having, when no ship was at hand to assist her, so boldly engaged a heavy French frigate.

The *Despatch* had her rigging much cut by the fire of the *Présidente*, and received one shot in her larboard bow between wind and water, but fortunately had not a man hurt. The French frigate mounted 44 guns, long 18 and 8 pounders, with 36-pounder carronades, and had a crew of 330 men. She did not, as far as appears, sustain any damage or loss from the fire of her tiny antagonist. The *Présidente* measured 1148 tons, was a remarkably fine frigate, and became a great acquisition to the British navy. The *Seringapatam*, and several of the large class of 18-pounder frigates still building, are from the draught of this French frigate, which, in the year 1815, was named *Piémontaise*.

The two remaining ships of M. L'Hermitte's squadron subsequently arrived safe in France; the *Régulus*, on the 5th of October, at Brest, and the *Cybèle*, in the course of the following year, at Rochefort or Lorient.

On the 18th of October, in the morning, as the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Caroline*, Captain Peter Rainier, was taking possession of the Dutch 14-gun brig *Zeerop*, Captain Groot, at anchor between Middleby and Amsterdam islands, off the coast of Java, the Dutch 36-gun frigate *Phoenix* was seen to slip from Onroost, and run for Batavia road; where also was lying, as communicated by the officers of the *Zeerop*, the Dutch 36-gun frigate *Maria-Riggersbergen*, Captain Jager. The *Caroline* instantly proceeded in the chase, and soon discovered the *Maria-Riggersbergen*, in company with the 14-gun ship-corvette *William* and brig *Zee-Ploeg*, and the Dutch Company's armed ship *Patriot* of 18 guns. Not at all dismayed by a force apparently so formidable, Captain Rainier, placing springs on both his cables, ran straight for the *Maria*; who, on the arrival of the *Caroline* within gun-shot, opened her fire. No return,

however, was made, until the *Caroline* had got as close as the wind would permit her, which was within half pistol-shot. The latter then opened her fire, and in half an hour compelled the *Maria*, although partially assisted by the three vessels already named and some gun-boats, to strike her colours. Thirty other gun-boats lay in-shore, but did not attempt to come out.

The *Caroline* mounted altogether 42 guns, with a complement, deducting 57 men that were absent, of 204 men and boys. Of these she had three seamen, and four Dutch prisoners who were in the hold, killed, a lieutenant of marines (Zachary Williams, mortally), 16 seamen, and one marine wounded. Not a spar was shot away, and very little damage done either to masts, rigging, or hull. The *Maria-Riggersbergen* was a frigate similar in size and force to the *Pallas*,¹ and therefore mounted 12, and not "18 pounders," as stated by mistake in the official account. The Dutch frigate had commenced the action with 270 men and boys; of whom she lost, as represented by her officers, 50 in killed and wounded. Her foretopsail-yard was shot in two, and her rigging, masts, and hull, more or less injured by the *Caroline*'s heavy broadsides.

It is reasonable to suppose that, had the *Maria-Riggersbergen*'s consorts, admitting them to have been in a situation to do so, co-operated more effectually, the *Caroline* would have found greater difficulty in capturing the Dutch frigate. This by no means detracts from the merit of Captain Rainier, his officers, and men, who deserve every credit for having ventured to attack a force of such apparent superiority, as well as for bringing the combat, by the vigorous means they employed, to so speedy a termination.

The *Maria-Riggersbergen* was purchased into the service by Rear-admiral Sir Edward Pellew, the British commander-in-chief on the East India station, and named the *Java*, but, in a very few months afterwards, became the grave of her officers and crew.

On the 27th of November Rear-admiral Pellew arrived off the road of Batavia with the following squadron:—

Gun-ship.

74	{	Culloden	{ Rear-admiral (r.) Sir Edward Pellew, Bart.
		Powerful	{ Captain Christopher Cole.
64	{	Russel	{ Robert Plampin.
		Bellequeux	{ Thomas Gordon Caulfield.
			{ George Byng.

Frigates, Sir Francis Drake and *Terpsichore*, brig *Seaflower*.

¹ See p. 164.

Directing the two frigates and brig to enter the road between the island of Onroost and Java, Sir Edward, with the line-of-battle ships, on account of the shoalness of the water, took a circuitous route. As soon as they observed the approach of the British squadron, the Dutch frigate Phoenix, the two armed brig-corvettes *Aventurier* and *Zee-Ploeg*, two armed ships and two armed brigs belonging to the Dutch India Company, and several merchant-vessels ran themselves on shore. The *William* corvette would have done the same, but had hauled down her colours to the *Terpsichore* as the latter passed Onroost.

The shoal water preventing the British ships from anchoring near enough to fire with effect upon the batteries or ships lying on shore, the rear-admiral detached, for the purpose of destroying the latter, the boats of the squadron under the orders of Captain Fleetwood Pellew, assisted by Lieutenant William Fitzwilliam Owen, of the *Seaflower*, and Lieutenant Thomas Groule, first of the *Culloden*. The *Sir Francis Drake* and *Terpsichore*, meanwhile, had stationed themselves in the best manner to support the boats in their advance. On seeing the boats approach, the crew of the *Phoenix* scuttled and abandoned their ship; and all the British could do on boarding her was to turn her guns upon the remaining vessels. These at length, together with the *Phoenix* herself, were set on fire and destroyed; and the boats got back to their ships with so slight a loss, notwithstanding the heavy fire opened upon them by the batteries, as one marine killed, and one marine and three seamen wounded.

The *William* corvette was found to be in so unseaworthy a state, that she also was destroyed. The two Dutch 68-gun ships *Pluto* and *Revolutie*, which Sir Edward had expected to find in Batavia road, had previously retired, for greater safety, to the fortified harbour of Gressie at the eastern extremity of the island.

On the 23rd of October, in the evening, as the British 12-gun schooner *Pitt* (ten 18-pounder carronades and two sixes), Lieutenant Michael Fitton, was lying at an anchor in the mole of Cape St. Nicolas, island of St. Domingo, the man looking out at the mast-head reported two sail in the offing, over the neck of land to the northward, one apparently in chase of the other. The *Pitt* instantly got under way, and, it being a stark calm, swept herself out of the mole. In the course of the night she was occasionally assisted by a light land wind, and on the 24th, at daybreak, descried three schooners, the largest evidently a

privateer of force. Towards the latter the Pitt now steered; and the stranger, as if confident in her strength, hove to. At 7 A.M. a distant firing commenced between the two schooners; but, in less than half an hour, the Pitt's opponent, which was no other than the celebrated French privateer *Superbe*, of 14 guns (12 long 6 and two long 8 pounders), Captain Dominique Diron, bore up, under easy sail, after her two prizes, whom she was conducting to the port of Baracoa in Cuba. The chase continued throughout the day and night, the greater part of the time in calm weather, during which the crew of the Pitt plied their sweeps with unremitting vigour.

On the morning of the 25th, a breeze springing up favourable to the Pitt, the latter was enabled, in the course of the day, again to get within gun-shot of the *Superbe*; who, having seen her two prizes safe into Baracoa, lay to off the port, as if determined to give battle to the British schooner, *M. Dominique* being well aware that, in case of discomfiture, he could run into Baracoa, where already lay four or five freebooters like himself. Aware, in some degree, of the Frenchman's intention, the Pitt contrived to get between the *Superbe* and her port, and at 4 P.M. recommenced the action. After a tolerably close cannonade of 30 or 35 minutes, the privateer again made sail; and the Pitt, who, in passing near Baracoa at sunset, had observed five privateers lying there, so manœuvred as to keep her opponent in the offing. In this way the two schooners passed the third night, the British crew having again to labour occasionally at the sweeps, with the additional duty of repairing their damaged rigging, and of remounting and securing several of the carronades, which, having been improperly fitted, had upset in the afternoon's engagement.

Early on the morning of the 26th the *Superbe* rounded Cape Maize; and, having to make Ochoa bay, where he knew there was a detachment of Spanish troops, *M. Dominique* was obliged to haul across the Pitt. In so doing the *Superbe* brought her starboard broadside to bear upon the Pitt's larboard bow, and, as soon as she had succeeded in crossing her, ran herself on shore among the rocks. The *Superbe*, with her colours still flying, then commenced landing her crew; and the Pitt continued the cannonade to induce the privateer to surrender. Finding that the Frenchmen were quitting the *Superbe* in great numbers, the Pitt sent her boats, manned and armed, and took possession.

When just abreast of Ochoa bay, the Pitt had observed to lee-

ward the three topgallantsails of a ship; and which, by the time the schooner had got a hawser on board her prize to attempt to heave her off, made herself known, by signal, as the British 16-gun ship-sloop Drake, Captain Robert Nicolas. Having been a merchant-vessel purchased into the service, the Drake made very slow progress in working to windward. The sloop at length joined company, and Captain Nicolas sent his boats to assist in getting the prize afloat; which, after considerable exertion, was accomplished.

Out of her complement of 54 men and boys, the Pitt had two men badly and six slightly wounded. On board the Superbe, whose alleged complement was 94 men, four were found dead in her hold, and three mortally wounded. The remainder, including M. Dominique himself, had escaped to the shore. The whole loss in killed sustained by the privateer was understood to have been 14, with a proportionate number of wounded; most of whom, by the aid of their companions, landed along with them.

Thus, after a 67 hours' arduous chase, including several intervals of close and spirited action, had a stop been put to the career of one of the most formidable French privateers, coupling her force with the notorious character of her commander, that, for a long time, had infested the commerce of the West Indies. Dominique was not only a daring and experienced privateersman, but he was a perfect freebooter. He detained American as well as English vessels (the two schooners which he had sent into Baracoa were Americans); and, where he wanted a cause to capture, was never without one to pillage. Few neutrals that crossed his path, but left him with a serious defalcation in their sails, rigging, or stores. Among the papers found on board the Superbe, was a list of captures, English, Spanish, and American, made by Dominique, to the amount of 147,000*l.* sterling.

It was therefore some merit to have captured a privateer, so capable of doing further mischief as the Superbe. It was a still greater merit to have performed the act by a vessel decidedly inferior in force; in men nearly double, in guns at least equal. If anything can be said in addition, it is that the chase was persevered in during three nights, and until the afternoon of the third day, and that it was maintained, for the greater part of the time, by sweeping; a service fatiguing to the men and harassing to the officers, the latter being obliged to be perpetually animating the former, lest they should relax in their exertions: it was also a mode of progression in which the

privateer, from the increased number of her crew, possessed an immense advantage.

Unfortunately for Lieutenant Fitton, having been on deck during the whole three nights, he was too wearied to undertake the task of writing the official letter, although kindly requested to do so by Captain Nicolas. The following extract from the letter of Rear-admiral Dacres to the secretary of the admiralty, enclosing the one received from Captain Nicolas, will show what, even from the latter's report, the former thought of the action between the Pitt and Superbe. "The zéal and perseverance manifested on this occasion, during so long a chase (being upwards of 50 hours at their sweeps with only two-thirds the number of men the privateer had), the very gallant conduct of, and superior professional abilities displayed by Mr. Fitton will, I trust, recommend him to the protection of their lordships."

M. Dominique afterwards equipped a brig, which he named "la Revanche de la Superbe," and actually sent, by a Spanish licensed trader, an invitation to Lieutenant Fitton, to meet him at an appointed place; but the latter, by the time the message reached him, had been superseded in the command of the Pitt by the *élève* of an admiral, not to be promoted to the rank of commander, but to be turned adrift as an unemployed lieutenant.

On the 20th of November, the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate Success, Captain John Ayscough, standing in for the land to the eastward of Cumberland harbour, island of Cuba, observed a small felucca running into Hidden Port, and immediately despatched in pursuit of her the yawl and barge, under the command of Lieutenant William Duke, assisted by Lieutenant Charles Spence, acting Lieutenant Dowell O'Reilly, and master's mate William Rand Hughes.

On the approach of the boats it was discovered that the crew of the felucca, about 50 in number, had landed with their small arms and their only long gun, and, having lashed their vessel to the trees, had taken post upon a neighbouring hill. From this eminence, the Spaniards fired with grape and musketry, in the most determined manner, upon the boats as they advanced, and at the first volley killed Lieutenant Duke. After a vain attempt for an hour and 20 minutes, to dislodge the privateersmen from the hill, Lieutenant Spence, with the additional loss of seven wounded, including Lieutenant O'Reilly, found himself unable to do more than take possession of the abandoned felucca, which proved to be the French privateer Vengeur from Santo-Domingo.

On the same night, while the 12-pounder 32-gun frigate Orpheus, Captain Thomas Briggs, was cruising in Campeachy bay, her barge, commanded by Lieutenant George Ballard Vine, very gallantly boarded and carried, without loss, the Spanish schooner Dolores, mounting one long 9 and two 4-pounder carriage-guns and four swivels, with 34 men; and which vessel had just been sent out from Campeachy for the express purpose of attacking the frigate's boats.

On the 13th of December, at 8 A.M., Cape San Martin, coast of Spain, bearing south-south-west six leagues, the British 16-gun brig-sloop Halcyon (fourteen 24-pounder carronades and two long sixes,) Captain Henry Whitmarsh Pearse, perceived three sail standing towards her from the land. Being on contrary tacks, the two parties closed fast; and, when about four miles apart, the Halcyon discovered the strangers to be an armed ship, brig, and xebec. At this time, also, five settees were seen from the tops, coming from the same quarter. The object now was, to engage before thereinforcement arrived; and the Halcyon, accordingly, hastened to close with the three vessels already so confidently approaching her. At 10 h. 30 m. A.M., being within musket-shot, the armed ship, brig, and xebec hoisted Spanish colours, and commenced the action. As soon as she got abreast of the second vessel, the Halcyon tacked, and thus brought her three opponents to closer action; which lasted until noon, when their fire slackened. At half an hour after noon, it being nearly a calm, the brig and xebec, assisted by their sweeps and boats, hauled off to the southward. The ship, which was nearest to the Halcyon, endeavoured to do the same to the northward; but the latter swept after her, and in the course of an hour got close alongside, when the Spanish corvette Neptuno, of 14 long 12-pounders and 72 men, struck her colours.

Of her 94 men and boys, the Halcyon was short 16, but had on board four very active passengers. Having fired chiefly at the rigging of the Halcyon, the Neptuno destroyed that effectually, but did not injure a man on board of her. What loss the Neptuno sustained is not stated in the official account; but it was probably severe. The brig was the *Virgine-de-Solidad*, of 14 long 12 and 8 pounders, and 78 men, and the xebec, the *Vives*, of 12 long 8 and 6 pounders, and 65 men, both national vessels. The two latter escaping, their loss in the action, if any, could not be ascertained.

The five settees were about three miles off when the Neptuno was deserted by her two consorts. On observing the circum-

stance, the former returned towards the shore, and entered the port of Denia. This action between the Halcyon and the above three armed vessels, was one of considerable gallantry on the part of Captain Pearse, and must have inspired the Spaniards, if further confirmation were wanted, with a very high opinion of the prowess of British seamen.

Colonial Expeditions.—Cape of Good Hope.

In the autumn of 1805 a small British squadron, composed of three 64-gun ships, one 50-gun ship, and four frigates and sloops, under the orders of Commodore Sir Home Popham, having in charge a fleet of transports and Indiamen, containing about 5000 troops, commanded by Major-general Sir David Baird, sailed from England, or rather, the ships-of-war having assembled there from different points, from the island of Madeira, for the real but concealed purpose of reducing the Cape of Good Hope. That squadron consisted of the

Gun-ship.			
64	Diadem	{	Commodore Sir Home Popham.
	Raisable		Captain Hugh Downman.
	Belliqueux	,,	Josias Rowley.
50	Diomedé	,,	George Byng.
		,,	Joseph Edmonds.
Gun-frigate.			
38	Leda	,,	Robert Honyman.
32	Narcissus	,,	Ross Donnelly.
<i>Brig-sloop</i> Espoir, and <i>gun-brig</i> Encounter.			

Having touched at St. Salvador for refreshments, the expedition sailed again on the 26th of November, and on the 4th of January, in the evening, reached the preconcerted anchorage, to the westward of Robben island. It was now too late to do more than take a superficial view of Blaw-berg bay, where it was proposed to land the main body of the army, and, by means of the Leda frigate and a part of the transports, make a demonstration off Green island; which latter service was ably executed by Captain Honyman.

On the 5th, at 3 A.M., the troops were put in the boats and assembled alongside the brig-sloop Espoir, Captain William King; but the surf ran so high that a landing was deemed impracticable, and the troops returned to their ships. Sir Home Popham, accompanied by Sir David Baird, then embarked in the Espoir, and closely examined the whole coast from Craig's tower to Lospard's bay, but could not discover any part where

a boat could land without extreme danger. The probability that some of the French squadrons, known to be at sea, would arrive with reinforcements, rendered it highly important that the disembarkation should be effected as speedily as possible. It was therefore resolved, notwithstanding the difficulty which the troops would experience in advancing, to land them at Saldanha bay. With this object in view, the transports containing the 38th regiment, the cavalry ships, and a proportion of artillery, under the orders of Brigadier-general Beresford, preceded by the *Espoir* and escorted by the *Diomedé*, sailed for that destination.

Just as the *Diomedé* had weighed the westerly wind began to abate ; and on the morning of the 6th, it appearing that the surf during the night had considerably subsided, measures were taken to land the remainder of the troops at the spot originally fixed upon. The *Diadem*, *Leda*, and *Encounter* then stationed themselves in a situation to render the most effectual assistance, and the boats of the *Raisonné* and *Belliqueux*, containing two regiments and some field-pieces, rendezvoused alongside the two first-named ships. At that moment the gun-brig *Protector*, Lieutenant Sir George Morat Keith, Bart., joined the squadron, and was placed by Captain Rowley, an officer of great local experience, to the northward, so as to cross the fire of the *Encounter*, and more effectually cover the landing of the troops. Captain Downman, at the same time, stood in with a light transport brig, drawing only six feet, to run her on shore as a breakwater.

Owing to these excellent arrangements, and the absence of any obstruction on the part of the enemy, the greater part of the troops effected their landing in the course of the afternoon ; but unfortunately not without a serious casualty, 35 men of the 93rd regiment being lost owing to the upsetting of a boat, occasioned by the eagerness of the troops to get on shore, whereby the line of beach became extended further than was prudent. The surf increasing considerably as the day shut in, the remainder of the troops were not landed until the morning of the 7th.

The commodore, with the *Leda*, *Encounter*, and *Protector*, and a division of transports containing the battering-train, then proceeded to the head of Blaw-berg bay, and, by firing over the bank towards the Salt Pans, drove the enemy from an eligible position in that neighbourhood. On the morning of the 8th the British army, about 4000 strong, and formed into two brigades, with two howitzers and six light field-pieces, moved off towards

the road that leads to Cape Town, and, having ascended the summit of the Blaw-berg or Blue mountain, and dislodged a party of the enemy's light troops there stationed, discovered the Dutch main body, supposed to consist of about 5000 men, chiefly cavalry, with 23 pieces of cannon, under the command of Lieutenant-general Janssens. These, after giving and returning a few rounds of cannon and musketry, retired from before the British bayonet; suffering a loss in killed and wounded, as represented, of 700 men, while the loss on the part of the British amounted to no more than 15 killed, 189 wounded, and eight missing.

On the 9th General Baird reached Salt river, where he proposed encamping to await the arrival of his battering-train; but a flag of truce arriving from the commanding officer of the town with offers to capitulate, the British troops, as agreed upon, took possession of Fort Knoeke. On the following morning, the 10th, articles of capitulation were signed, in due form, by Lieutenant-colonel Van Prophalow on the part of the Dutch, and by the general and commodore on the part of the British; and on the 12th the latter took possession of Cape Town and its dependencies, on the several batteries of which were mounted 113 pieces of brass, and 343 pieces of iron ordnance. General Janssens, who after the battle of the 8th had retired to Hottentot Holland's Kloof, a pass leading to the district of Zwelendam, was at length induced to surrender upon terms, by which the conquest of the colony was completed, and its internal tranquillity secured; the British agreeing that the Dutch general and his army should not be considered as prisoners of war, and should be conveyed to Holland at the former's expense.

As is customary in combined operations of the army and navy, a detachment of seamen and marines, under the appropriate designation of marine battalion, served on shore. The hardy seamen rendered themselves particularly useful in forwarding the supplies, and would have been still more so had the battering-train accompanied the troops. The whole force thus employed was commanded by Captain Byng; who had under him Captain George Nicholas Hardinge, a passenger on board the *Bellicieux*, on his way to join his ship, the new teak-built 36-gun frigate *Salsette*, and Lieutenants "Pigot, Graham, Sutherland, Mingay, and Pearce."¹ Among those who rendered themselves extremely

¹ When to the omission of the Christian names, is added that of the ship to which

the officer belongs, it is next to impossible to supply the deficiency.

useful in the operations going on, were the following captains of the Honourable Company's ships: William Edmeades, of the *William Pitt*, John Cameron, of the *Duchess of Gordon*, Henry Christopher, of the *Sir William Pulteney*, and James Moring, of the *Comet*.

On the 4th of March the French 40-gun frigate *Volontaire*, Captain Bretel, whom we have already mentioned as one of the squadron of Rear-admiral Willaumez, on its way to the Cape,¹ deceived by the Dutch colours on the forts and shipping, entered Table bay, and was captured by the British squadron, to the great joy of the 217 men of the Queen's and 54th regiments, whom the frigate had on board as prisoners. The *Volontaire*, a fine frigate of 1084 tons, was immediately added to the British navy by the same name.

Having, between the 9th and 13th of April, been informed by, among others, the master of an American merchant-vessel, that the inhabitants of Monte Video and Buenos Ayres were "so ridden by their government" that they would offer no resistance to a British army, Commodore Sir Home Popham took upon himself, with the concurrence of Major-general Sir David Baird, to plan an expedition against those places. On that or the following day Sir Home, with the *Diadem*, *Raisnable*, *Diomede*, *Narcissus*, and *Encounter*, vessels of war, and five sail of transports, having on board the 71st regiment, a small detachment of artillery, and a few dismounted dragoons, under the command of Major-general Beresford, set sail from Table bay. On the 20th the squadron bore away for St. Helena, and, upon arriving there, received on board a detachment of troops and artillery amounting to 286 officers and men; making the whole force of regulars embarked about 1200, including officers of every description. On the 2nd of May the expedition quitted St. Helena, and on the 27th, being anxious to obtain the earliest local information, Sir Home sailed for Rio de la Plata, in the *Narcissus*, leaving the squadron and transports in charge of Captain Rowley of the *Raisnable*. On the 8th of June the *Narcissus* anchored near the island of Flores, and on the 13th was joined by the *Raisnable* and squadron.

It being deemed preferable, after a consultation between the two chiefs, to make the first attempt upon Buenos Ayres, the marine battalion, consisting, including officers, of 340 marines and 100 seamen, under the command of Captain William King, of the *Diadem* (who had succeeded Captain Downman, sent

¹ See p. 90.

home with despatches announcing the surrender of the Cape), was placed on board the *Narcissus* and *Encounter*. On the 16th these vessels, with the transports and troops, moved up the river; while the *Diadem* blockaded the port of Monte Video, and the *Raisnable* and *Diomedé*, by way of demonstration, cruised near Maldonado and other assailable points in that vicinity. Owing to adverse winds and currents, the foggy state of the weather, and the intricacy of the navigation, it was not until the afternoon of the 25th that the *Narcissus* and transports anchored off Point Quelmey à Pouichin, about 12 miles from Buenos Ayres, and not more than 90 from the spot they had quitted nine days before. No opposition being offered, the British troops, numbering, with the marine battalion, about 1630 men, in the course of the evening and night of the 25th, effected a landing without the slightest casualty.

On the morning of the 26th a body of Spaniards, estimated at 2000 men, were discovered posted on the brow of a hill about two miles from the beach. These were attacked, and after a slight skirmish, driven from their position by the British, with a loss to the latter of only one killed, 12 wounded, and one missing. The British then hastened on to prevent the destruction of the bridge over the Rio Chuelo, a river about eight miles from the scene of action and three from Buenos Ayres. The troops arrived too late; but on the following day, the 27th, succeeded in passing the river by boats and rafts, prepared chiefly by the seamen, under the direction of Captain King. Major-general Beresford then summoned Buenos Ayres to surrender on a capitulation, and, while the articles were preparing, took quiet possession of that city, the viceroy and his troops having previously fled to Cordova. On the 2nd of July the capitulation was signed, and that upon terms highly favourable to the inhabitants. The quantity of specie captured in the place, and which was afterwards embarked on board the *Narcissus* frigate to be conveyed to England, amounted to 1,086,208 dollars.

The marine battalion, whose services were highly and justly extolled by the major-general, having re-embarked on board the squadron, the troops alone remained in the town of Buenos Ayres. For a while all seemed quiet; but at length the Spaniards, recovering from their panic, saw by what a handful of men they had been dispossessed of their town and its treasures. On the 31st of July Sir Home became apprised, by a despatch from the major-general, that an insurrection was forming in the city. On the 4th of August M. Liniers, a French

colonel in the Spanish service, crossed the Rio de la Plata in a fog, unobserved by the British cruisers, and landed at Conchas, above Buenos Ayres, bringing with him about 1000 men from Monte Video and Sacramento. On the 10th the insurrection burst forth; and on the 12th Major-general Beresford and his troops, after an action in which they lost 48 officers and men killed, 107 wounded, and 10 missing, were compelled to surrender; but owing to the firmness of the major-general, on terms highly favourable to the prisoners, in number about 1300. The loss on the part of the Spaniards, who are represented to have assembled in the city nearly 10,000 men, was stated at 700 in killed and wounded.

Commodore Sir Home Popham, with the squadron, remained at anchor at the entrance of the river, blockading the port, until, by the arrival of reinforcements on the 5th and 12th of October, he was enabled to recommence offensive operations. Sir Home's first attempt was upon Monte Video; but, finding the water too shallow to admit the ships to approach near enough to batter the walls with effect, the commodore, on the 28th, retired, with the intention of possessing himself of the harbour of Maldonado, formed by the island of Gorette, a strong place, defended by a battery of twenty 24-pounders. On the 29th the frigates of the squadron anchored in the harbour, and disembarked, without opposition, a detachment of troops (including sailors and marines about 1000 strong), under Brigadier-general Backhouse. Having, after a slight skirmish, obtained possession of the village of Maldonado, the commodore, on the 30th, summoned Gorette to surrender, which it immediately did; and thus matters remained in the Rio de la Plata at the close of the year 1806.

In the failure of the expedition to Buenos Ayres, not the slightest imputation attaches to the soldiers or seamen engaged in it: they had done full as much as could be expected from so small a number of men. The error lay in trusting to information, which, besides its glaring improbability, was derived from such a source as the master of an American vessel. Stories about disaffected inhabitants, and their readiness to receive foreign aid, ought always to be listened to with suspicion. They are generally traps to catch the credulous, and, when baited with mines of gold and silver, seldom fail in accomplishing their object. This was not the only score upon which Sir Home Popham was in fault. The lords of the admiralty tried him for quitting his station without orders; and a court-martial,

which sat on board the *Gladiator* at Portsmouth, from the 6th to the 11th of March, 1807, pronounced upon him the following sentence: "The court has agreed that the charges have been proved against the said Captain Sir Home Popham. That the withdrawing, without orders so to do, the whole of any naval force from the place where it is directed to be employed, and the employing it in distant operations against the enemy, more especially if the success of such operations should be likely to prevent its speedy return, may be attended with the most serious inconvenience to the public service, as the success of any plan formed by his majesty's ministers for operations against the enemy, in which such naval force might be included, may by such removal be entirely prevented. And the court has further agreed, that the conduct of the said Captain Sir Home Popham, in the withdrawing the whole of the naval force under his command from the Cape of Good Hope, and the proceeding with it to Rio de la Plata, is highly censurable; but, in consideration of circumstances, doth adjudge him to be only severely reprimanded, and he is hereby severely reprimanded accordingly."

BRITISH AND FRENCH FLEETS.

THE increase of large-sized three-deckers in the navies of other powers calling for a proportionate increase in the first rates of the navy of Great Britain, two more ships of the size of the *Caledonia*, and a third, larger than any other except the *Hibernia*, appear among the ordered ships of the abstract for this year.¹ The paucity of vessels of the smaller classes in the same column occasions the average tonnage of the 52 vessels, summed up at the foot of it, to be more than double that of the 122 vessels, standing as the total in the corresponding column of the preceding year's abstract. As, among regular ships-of-war, the armament usually increases with the size, the British navy probably acquired more real strength by the lesser, than by the larger number of vessels thus added to it.²

No one can doubt that it would greatly simplify the ordnance-establishment of a navy, if all the guns were of the same length, weight, and caliber. Similarly-sized carriages, utensils, and shot would suffice for all; and the only difference, in point of armament, between any two vessels would be in the number of guns which they respectively mounted. As, however, the law of mechanics will not, where two or more batteries are required to be placed one above another in a ship, usually admit of an equalization in the length and weight of the guns, we must be satisfied to obtain it in the caliber.

The Spanish and British navies present a few exceptions to this rule. The 80-gun ship *Phoenix*, taken from the Spaniards

¹ See Appendix, Annual Abstract, No. 15.

lists attached to this abstract, see Appendix, Nos. 10, 11, and 12.

² For the different prize and casualty

in 1780, mounted long 24s, of the same length and weight, upon both her first and second decks, and was similarly armed as the Gibraltar in the British service. Subsequently (March 18, 1797), the Gibraltar's 18 long 9-pounders on the quarter-deck and fore-castle were displaced for the same number of 24-pounder carronades, making the whole of her 80 guns except two, of one caliber. The San-Ildefonso, as formerly shown,¹ also mounted long 24s on her first and second decks. But the most important exception is, that the *Téméraire* and her two sister ships, *Dreadnought* and *Neptune*, mounted long 18s upon their second and third decks.² By the time, however, that these three 98s had been 10 years in the service, it was found necessary to change their third-deck 18s for 12s.

An equalization of caliber in three species of guns has been obtained by the invention of a ship gun, meeting, at length and weight, about midway between the carronade and the long gun of the same caliber. Thus:—

	Long 24-pdr.		Medium 24-pdr.		24-pdr. carr.	
	feet	in.	feet	in.	feet	in.
Length	9	6	6	6	3	8
Weight with carriage	cwt.	qrs.	cwt.	qrs.	cwt.	qrs.
	58	3	39	0	19	0

Of this medium ship-gun, three varieties exist, the *Gover*, the *Congreve*, and the *Blomefield*, named after their respective inventors. The muzzle of the *Congreve* resembles that of the carronade; and the other two guns, in appearance, differ very slightly from each other. *M. Dupin* claims the priority of invention on behalf of his countrymen *Texier de Norbec*, *Admiral Thévenard*, and *M. Bourdé*.³

In December, 1806, several English two-decked line-of-battle ships were armed throughout with guns of one caliber, 24-pounders long, 24-pounders of *Gover*, and 24-pounder carronades; whereby the ships, being old and weak, had much less weight to carry, with only a slight diminution in their broadside force. The greater part, if not the whole, of the ships had their poops cut off; and some of the 74s were rigged with 64-gun ships' masts and yards. The difference in the two modes of arming the 74s will best appear by a short Table:—

¹ See vol. iii., p. 74.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Voyage dans la Grande Bretagne, Force Navale, tome ii., p. 101.*

	No.	-	Pdrs.			
Old armament	F. D.	28	long	32	Weight of guns and carriages. — 181 cwt.	
	S. D.	28	,,	18		
	Qd. & F.	6	,,	12		
		,,	12	carrs.	32	Broadside- force. — 928 lbs.
New armament	F. D.	28	long	24	157 ,,	
	S. D.	28	Gov.	24		
	Qd. & F.	4	,,	24		
		,,	14	carrs.		24

Had there been a medium 32-pounder, as well as a medium 24 and 18, any new or effective two-decker, above a 64, might, we should suppose, have carried all her guns of the former caliber: in which case the momentum of her armament would be greatly augmented, while its absolute weight would remain nearly the same. For instance, taking it for granted that a medium 32-pounder would not weigh more than 40 cwt., or two hundred weight less than the common or nine feet 18-pounder, the weight of seventy-four 32-pounders of the three descriptions, with their carriages, would not exceed that of the old armament as stated above; and yet the broadside-force would be increased from 928 to 1184 lbs., a very material consideration.

An equalization of caliber to this extent would, however, as a general establishment, be almost impracticable in a navy like that of England, on account of the great number of guns which it would be necessary to recast. A newly-formed navy like that of the United States would have no such difficulty to encounter. The Americans, indeed, with their accustomed ingenuity, have recently invented a medium 32-pounder gun, and, by its means, have armed their largest ships with a treble battery of that powerful caliber.

The number of commissioned officers and masters belonging to the British navy at the commencement of the year 1807, was,

Admirals	52
Vice-admirals	57
Rear-admirals	50
„	superannuated 25	
Post-captains	693
„	superannuated 26	
Commanders, or sloop-captains	502
„	superannuated 50	
Lieutenants	2728
Masters	429

And the number of seamen and marines voted for the service of

the same year was, 120,000 for the first, and 130,000 for the remaining twelve lunar months of it.¹

Napoleon, it will be recollected, in his plan of operations against England, framed in September, 1804, intended that the Brest fleet, of 23 sail of the line and smaller vessels, should disembark from 30,000 to 40,000 men in the north of Ireland, or even in Scotland, in order to operate as a diversion while the main body of the grand army was traversing the Channel.² Some distinguished French officers, it seems, were of opinion, that Ireland solely should have been the object of the expedition, judging that, with the aid of the disaffected inhabitants of that unhappy country, a third of the army assembled for the conquest of England would suffice; that the troops in their diminished number could be transported by a fleet of men-of-war, instead of having to wait for so many contingencies to concur, ere a flotilla of 2000 gun-boats could reach in safety the opposite coast; and that the loss of Ireland would inflict a deep wound on the pride of England, would weaken her resources, and greatly reduce her in the scale of national importance.

It is believed that his imperial majesty, in proportion as he grew discouraged with the immobility of his flotilla, felt the force of all this reasoning; and that, when on the last of August, 1805, he suddenly drew off his legions from the neighbourhood of Boulogne, to be in time for an autumnal campaign against the two continental powers (Austria and Russia) who had coalesced with Great Britain against him, he entertained the hope of being able, at some future and not far distant day, either as a preparatory step towards, or as a substitute for, the invasion of England, to make a French province of the land of Hibernia.

Even had the battle of Trafalgar not been fought, Napoleon would hardly have marched his soldiers from the midst of their brilliant successes in Germany back to their cantonments on the coast, again perhaps to waste their time in a long course of listless inactivity. Much less would he have done so, now that the ships of that mighty fleet, which he had hoped to assemble in the Channel to convoy his army to its destination, were all captured, destroyed, wrecked, or blockaded. He therefore, having made peace with Austria at Presburg, and since gone to war with Prussia, continued achieving victory after victory over the Prussians and Russians, until he brought them also to his terms by the double treaty of Tilsit.

A seaport town of Western Prussia having, in the course of

¹ See Appendix, No. 13.

² See vol. iii., p. 215.

the war waged against those powers, become the scene of active operations, a British naval force was naturally to be found co-operating with the garrison in their endeavour to repel the invaders. The fortified city of Dantzic is seated on the western branch of the Vistula, near its entrance into the Baltic; and on the 14th of March, in the present year, was invested by a powerful French army under Marshal Lefebvre.

On the 12th of April the 16-gun ship-sloops Sally (hired), Captain Edward Chetham, Falcon, Captain George Sanders, and Charles (hired), Captain Robert Clephane, arrived off the harbour of Dantzic. As General Kalkreuth, the governor of the fortress, suspected that the besiegers would be supplied with provisions by sea, Captain Chetham detached the Charles to cruise between Rose hind, or head, and Dantzic bay, to intercept any vessels having that object in view; and on the 16th he anchored with the Sally in the Fair Way, a basin formed between the two mouths of the Vistula. Here the ship was so moored, as to flank the isthmus by which alone the French could attack the works.

On the 17th, finding that, owing to the French having encamped on the Nehrung, or Holme, forming the western bank of the Vistula, the communication between the Fair Way and the garrison was completely cut off, Captain Chetham resolved upon making an attempt to re-open it. For this purpose he lightened his ship by sending all her heavy stores on board her consort, the Falcon; and on the same day, by the great exertions of her officers and crew, as well as of Captain Sanders and a portion of his officers and men, the Sally pushed through the shoal water of the sluice or mouth of the Vistula.

At 6 h. 30 m. p.m. the Sally, whose armament, we believe, consisted of 24-pounder carronades, commenced a close action with the French troops at the Great Hollands on the Nehrung, in number about 2000, assisted by three pieces of cannon, and by a small battery at Legan on the right or south-eastern bank of the river, and partially sheltered by the ruins of several houses which the garrison had found it necessary to destroy. The action continued within pistol-shot until 9 p.m.; when, having several of the gun-breechings on her larboard or engaged side shot and carried away, and being without any wind to enable her to maintain her position, the Sally attempted to bring her starboard broadside to bear. In this Captain Chetham was foiled by the strength of the current. The Sally then hauled down the stream, and resumed her position in Fair Water.

The loss on board the British ship, by this gallant though

vain effort to relieve the Prussian garrison, was tolerably severe, her first-lieutenant (James Edward Eastman) and "nearly half" her crew being wounded by the incessant fire of musketry poured upon them. The mizenmast of the Sally was also shot through, her rigging and sails much cut, and upwards of 1000 musket-shot lodged in her hull. The loss on the part of the French, according to information received a day or two afterwards, amounted to upwards of 400 in killed and wounded.

On the 24th, the French, having completed their works, began bombarding the city, and on the 29th attempted to carry it by storm, but were repulsed. On the 16th of May the British 18-gun ship-sloop *Dauntless*, Captain Christopher Strachey, made a gallant but unsuccessful attempt to supply the garrison with 600 barrels of gunpowder. Having a favourable wind, the *Dauntless* ran up the river with studding-sails set, firing on the enemy as she passed: but the wind, either from shifting or from an unexpected bend of the river, became unfavourable, and the ship broke round off. The Channel being too narrow for the *Dauntless* to work in, and the fire of the enemy under such circumstances too heavy to be resisted, Captain Strachey ran his ship upon the Holme within half musket-shot of the French batteries, and surrendered. On the 21st a capitulation was proposed: and on the 27th the garrison of Dantzic, reduced from 16,000 to 9000 men, marched out of the fortress with the honours of war. On the 14th of June the battle of Friedland was fought; on the 25th an armistice was agreed upon between France and Russia at Tilsit; and on the 7th and 9th of July, at the same place, treaties were concluded between France, Russia, and Prussia.

That the French emperor had not, in the mean time, wholly neglected strengthening his marine, a glance at his naval means at the conclusion of that treaty will show. In the ports of Brest, Lorient, Rochefort, Ferrol, Vigo, Cadiz, Carthagena, and Toulon, were upwards of 45 French and Spanish sail of the line ready for sea, or nearly so, exclusive of three French sail of the line in the West Indies and America. Buonaparte flattered himself that he should soon have also at his disposal nine Portuguese sail of the line in the Tagus, and five Russian in the Mediterranean. These 62 sail, even while lying in port, would occupy the attention of an equal number of British ships; and every division that escaped to sea would, in all probability, be pursued by at least two squadrons of equal force. Moreover it was requisite to have an adequate British force in the colonies,

east and west, to be ready to act, in case an enemy's fleet should suddenly make its appearance. Hence, a great portion of the British navy was fully employed in the southern, eastern, and western seas: we have still to show what force might be opposed to the remainder in the northern sea.

In the port of Flushing, and at Anvers, or Antwerp, as more usually called, were three Dutch and eight new French sail of the line, ready for sea, or fitting with the utmost expedition. All these were 74s, built from Dutch models; two, the *Charlemagne* and *Commerce-de-Lyon*, were launched on the 8th of April, 1807; two others, the *Anversois*, and *Illustre*, on the 7th of June; and the remaining four, the *Audacieux*, *Duguesclin*, *César*, and *Thésée*, in the latter end of that month and beginning of July. Two other 74s, the *Albanais* and *Dalmate*, were on the stocks, getting ready with the utmost expedition. In the Texel were also three Dutch sail of the line, making a total of 14.

But these ships were not all. The French emperor, who, besides his grand army in the neighbourhood of Tilsit, had one of 70,000 men on the confines of Swedish Pomerania, and meditated sending another to occupy the Danish monarch's newly-acquired territory of Holstein, flattered himself with obtaining, either by fair means or by foul, the 11 sail of the line belonging to Sweden, and the 16 belonging to Denmark. There is also good ground for believing, that one of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit placed at the conqueror's temporary disposal the 19 or 20 fine new ships, which the Emperor of Russia had ready for sea, or nearly so, in the ports of Revel and Cronstadt.

Here would have been a confederate French, Dutch, Swedish, Danish, and Russian fleet of 60 sail of the line in the North and Baltic seas. Admitting the plan to have been realized to only half the extent in the alleged contemplation of Napoleon, 30 sail of the line and a proportionate number of transports could have conveyed a powerful army to Ireland; and the French emperor not only possessed a powerful army ready to act, but had reason to expect that he should soon have leisure personally to direct its energies towards the fulfilment of an oft-repeated threat, the humiliation of the most constant, the most formidable, and the most dreaded of his enemies.

In this state of things England naturally kept a watchful eye upon naval affairs in the north. A reliance upon the firmness and continued friendship of the King of Sweden induced her to send some troops, chiefly Germans, to his assistance; but, by the time the first division of these had landed, in Rugen and

Stralsund, the aspect of affairs in this quarter had materially changed, and the Swedish monarch was compelled at length to retire, with the remnant of his army, to the last-named fortress.

It was during the long and friendly discussion between the emperors on the Niemen, preparatory to the peace of Tilsit, that England became apprised of the confederacy that was forming against her in the north; and it was then, or soon after, that she learnt that the weakness of Denmark was a second time to operate as her excuse for favouring the views of France, by shutting up the Sound against British commerce and navigation, and lending the Copenhagen fleet to assist in the attempt to subjugate a power whose friendship it was at all times the interest of both Denmark and Russia to cultivate.

On the 19th of July, and not before, Great Britain came to the determination to demand of Denmark the temporary possession of her fleet, and, in case of refusal, to deliver it up on a solemn pledge to restore it entire at the conclusion of a general peace, to take it by force of arms. Owing to the lateness of the season, and the necessity of fulfilling the object of the expedition before the winter months put a stop to operations in the Baltic, the utmost despatch was required. As a proof that it was used, on the 26th of July Admiral James Gambier, with the principal division of the fleet, consisting of the following 17 ships of the line, exclusive of 21 frigates, sloops, bomb-vessels, and gun-brigs, set sail from Yarmouth roads:—

Gun-ship.			{ Admiral (b.) James Gambier.
98	Prince of Wales		{ Captain Sir Home Popham.
			{ ,, Adam Mackenzie.
	{ Pompée		{ Vice-admiral (b.) Hon. H. Edwin Stanhope.
	{ Centaur		{ Captain Richard Dacres.
	{ Ganges		{ Commodore Sir Samuel Hood.
			{ Captain William Henry Webley.
			{ Commodore Richard Goodwin Keats.
			{ Captain Peter Halkett.
	Spencer	,,	Hon. Robert Stopford.
	74 Vanguard	,,	Alexander Fraser.
	Maida	,,	Samuel Hood Linzee.
	Brunswick	,,	Thomas Graves.
	Resolution	,,	George Burlton.
	Hercule	,,	Hon. John Colville.
	Orion	,,	Sir Archibald Collingwood Dickson.
	Alfred	,,	John Bligh.
	Goliath	,,	Peter Puget.
	Captain	,,	Isaac Wolley.
	64 Ruby	,,	John Draper.
	Dictator	,,	Donald Campbell.
	Nassau	,,	Robert Campbell.

On the 1st of August, in the evening, when off the Wingo-beacon, at the entrance of Gottenberg, Commodore Keats, with the Ganges, Vanguard, Orion, and Nassau, also the 38-gun frigate Sibylle, Captain Clotworthy Upton, 36-gun frigates Franchise, Captain Charles Dashwood, and Nymphé, Captain Conway Shipley, and 10 brigs, parted company by signal, and steered for the passage of the Great Belt, in order to cut off any supplies of Danish troops that might attempt to cross from Holstein to Zealand. On the 3rd, in the forenoon, having previously ascertained that no opposition would be offered to the passage of the fleet into the Sound, the British admiral interchanged salutes with the castle of Cronberg, and shortly afterwards anchored in the road of Elsineur, where was lying the Danish 32-gun frigate Frederickscoarn. On the 5th, in the morning, the 74-gun ship Superb, Captain Daniel M'Leod, joined the expedition, and on the morning of the 6th weighed and made sail after the Vanguard and squadron, to receive the broad pendant of her old commander.

On the 7th the Inflexible and Leyden 64s, Captains Joshua Rowley Watson and William Cumberland, with a large convoy of transports arrived; also Rear-admiral William Essington, with the 74-gun ships Minotaur, Captain Charles John Moore Mansfield, and Valiant, Captain James Young. On the 8th and 9th the Mars and Defence, 74s, Captains William Lukin and Charles Ekins, joined, the first with a convoy of transports. On the 12th, in the morning, the 32-gun frigate Africaine, Captain Richard Raggett, arrived from Put bay in the island of Rugen, having on board Lieutenant-general Lord Cathcart, the commander-in-chief of the land-forces to be employed. Lord Cathcart had sailed from England in the same frigate on the 5th of July, and had anchored on the 16th in Put bay. His lordship and suite there disembarked, and proceeded to the neighbouring fortress of Stralsund.

By the time the transports from Rugen had joined, and a few others, under the 64-gun ship Agamemnon, Captain Jonas Rose, from England, the expedition consisted of 25 sail of the line, and upwards of 40 frigates, sloops, bomb-vessels, and gun-brigs; making a total of about 65 vessels of war, exclusive of 377 transports, measuring 78,420 tons, and conveying about 27,000 troops, more than half of them Germans in British pay.

It appears that Mr. Jackson, the British plenipotentiary to the court of Denmark, had his first interview with the crown prince at Kiel in Holstein. To the former's demand on the sub-

ject of the Danish fleet, the latter returned such a reply as might be expected,¹ and, despatching an estafette to Copenhagen, with orders to put the city in the best possible state of defence, proceeded thither himself. On the 10th, in the evening, the courier reached Copenhagen, and early on the following morning the work of preparation began. At noon the prince arrived, and by his presence gave an additional impetus to the exertions of his subjects. On the 12th his Danish majesty quitted Copenhagen for Colding in Jutland, leaving the defence of the city to the care of Major-general Peiman. The regular force at this time in the city and suburbs of Copenhagen, of which the population, in the preceding March, was estimated at upwards of 100,000 souls, has been variously stated at from 3000 to 10,000 men; but the account that appears to be the most worthy of credit makes the number, including an organized militia force of 2000 men, 5510. These were exclusive of sailors, and of 3600 armed citizens; so that the whole force, regular and irregular, amounted probably to 12,000 men. The main Danish army, of more than double that amount, was encamped in Holstein.

The sea-defence of the port consisted of the Trekronen pile-battery, situated at the distance of 2000 yards, in a north-east by north direction from the entrance of the harbour (which runs like a canal through the centre of the town), and mounting 68 guns besides mortars, a pile-battery in advance of the citadel, mounting 36 guns and nine mortars, the citadel itself mounting 20 guns and three or four mortars, and the holm or arsenal battery, mounting 50 guns and 12 mortars; total 174 guns and 25 mortars, the guns long 36 and 24 pounders (Danish), and the mortars the largest in use.

There were also around the Trekronen and in front of the harbour, the blockship Mars, of 64 guns, and the prame St. Thomas, of 22, also three 20-gun prames (24-pounders), two floating batteries, and from 25 to 30 gun-boats, each of the latter mounting two heavy long-guns. The fleet in the arsenal consisted of 16 sail of the line and 21 frigates and sloops afloat, but not in a serviceable state, besides three 74-gun ships on the stocks, one nearly finished. Two sail of the line, the Prindts-Christian-Frederic 74, Captain Jessen, and Princessen-Louisa-Augusta 64, Captain Sneedorf, lay in ports of Norway; the one at Christiansand, the other at Fredickswaern.

¹ No official account was published of the result of this interview, and, of the private accounts, scarcely two agree.

On the night of the 12th the Frederickscoarn frigate, at anchor, as already mentioned, in Elsineur road, foreseeing the turn that affairs would take, prudently slipped her cable and steered for Norway. This measure, and the knowledge of the active preparations making by the Danes, determined Admiral Gambier to detach a force in pursuit of the frigate. Accordingly, on the 13th, at 2 h. 30 m. P.M., Captain Ekins, with, besides his ship the Defence, the 22-gun ship Comus, Captain Edmund Heywood, weighed and made sail into the Cattegat, for the purpose, although no declaration of war had passed between England and Denmark, of capturing and detaining the Frederickscoarn.

Shortly after the departure of these ships on this unpleasant mission, Captain Ekins hailed Captain Heywood, and directed him, as the Comus, in the prevailing light wind, sailed better than the Defence, to proceed ahead and execute the service alone. The Comus, whose real so far exceeded her rated force, that she mounted 22 long 9-pounders on the main deck, and two of the same caliber, with eight 24-pounder carronades, on the quarter-deck and forecastle, immediately made all sail, followed by the Defence, who gradually dropped astern in the chase. On the 14th, at 6 h. 30 m. A.M., the Comus descried, bearing north, which was nearly ahead, the object of her orders, steering the same course as herself. Calms and partial airs retarded the progress of all three ships; and at noon the Frederickscoarn bore from the Comus north five miles, and the Defence south by east seven miles. At 4 P.M., the Danish frigate had increased her distance a mile. At 6 P.M., a light easterly breeze sprang up; and at 8 P.M., the Comus had advanced considerably in the chase, while the Defence was full 13 miles astern.

At a few minutes before midnight the Comus got alongside of the Frederiskscoarn, whose 32 guns were Danish 12 and 6 pounders, with 6 12-pounder carronades in addition. Captain Heywood desired the Danish captain to bring to, and allow his frigate to be detained. Considering that the Frederickscoarn was not merely a national ship of war, but a vessel, in guns, men, and size, superior to the Comus, no other reply could be expected than a peremptory refusal. On this the British ship fired a musket athwart the stern of the Dane, and instantly received a shot from one of the latter's stern-chasers. All ceremony being now at an end, the Comus bore up, and, as soon as she had placed herself astern of the Frederickscoarn in a raking position, commenced the action within pistol-shot. The fire of the Comus was immediately returned, and the cannonade con-

tinued for about 45 minutes; when the *Frederickscoarn*, from the disabled state of her rigging and sails, fell on board her opponent. A portion of the crew of the *Comus*, led on by Lieutenants George Edward Watts and Hood Knight, quickly rushed on the decks of the Danish frigate, and carried her without further resistance.

Besides escaping nearly untouched in hull, and with very slight damage in rigging or sails, the *Comus*, out of her 145 men and boys, had but one man wounded. The *Frederickscoarn*, on the other hand, suffered considerably in rigging, masts, yards, and hull, and, out of her complement of 226 men and boys, had 12 killed and 20 wounded.

Under almost any other circumstances than those which had led to this battle, the gallantry displayed by the officers and crew of the *Comus* would have been duly appreciated. As it was, very limited praise fell to the share of the British; while the Danes were less blamed for the want of prowess they had evinced, than compassionated for the heavy loss in blood, if not in fame, to which an attack so illegal and unexpected had unfortunately subjected them.

On the 14th the state of the weather prevented the British fleet from moving to a position for disembarking the troops: but, early on the 15th, the men-of-war and transports weighed, and by 5 p.m., worked up to the bay of Wedbeck, a village about midway between Elsinour and Copenhagen. Here the admiral and the bulk of the fleet anchored; while Rear-admiral Essington, with a small squadron, proceeded to an anchorage higher up the Sound, in order to make a diversion. On the morning of the 16th a part of the troops landed at Wedbeck, without opposition. The fleet then weighed and made sail towards Copenhagen, the two commanders in chief having previously addressed to the Danes, in the German language, a proclamation, explanatory of the object of the expedition, and couched in terms as conciliatory as the peremptory nature of the demand would admit. On the same day the Danish king, at Gluckstadt, and his general, at Copenhagen, issued a proclamation, or edict, directing all English vessels and property to be seized and detained.

On the 17th the Danish gun-boats, stationed off the entrance of Copenhagen harbour, taking advantage of a calm, seized and set fire to an English timber-laden merchant bark, in company with some transports coming from Stralsund: they also attacked, with round and grape, the pickets at the left of the British

army, and, after receiving a fire from several British bomb-vessels and gun-brigs, that were towed as near to them as the depth of water would admit, retired into the harbour. On the same evening Admiral Gambier, with 16 sail of the line, besides frigates, anchored in Copenhagen road, about four miles to the north-east of the Trekronen or crown battery; and, in consequence of the attack made upon the English merchantmen in the morning, issued an order to his cruisers to detain all Danish ships.

Between the 18th and 21st some additional skirmishes took place between the Danish and English gun-vessels, but with little or no effect on either side. On the last-named day, the circumvallation of Zealand by the British ships being complete, Admiral Gambier formally declared the island to be in a state of close blockade. On this day, also, the last division of troops, Lord Rosslyn's corps from Stralsund, disembarked in the north part of Keoge bay. To defend the left of the army from the annoyance of the Danish gun-boats, a battery of thirteen 24-pounders had been erected at a spot named Svane-Mølle.

On the 22nd three Danish prames, mounting 20 guns each, and from 28 to 30 gun-vessels, placed themselves in readiness to interrupt the army in the construction of some mortar-batteries in advance of the Swan-mill battery. To prevent this, the British advanced squadron, consisting, with the three sloops, five bomb-vessels, and seven gun-brigs, hereunder named, of three armed transports, and 10 launches fitted as mortar-boats, under the command of Captain Puget, of the Goliath, took a station within the crown battery.

Gun-sloop.

18	{	Hebe (hired)	Captain Edward Ellicott.
		Cruiser	Pringle Stoddart.
Ebs.	{	Mutine	Hew Stuart.
		Thunderer	George Cocks.
		Vesuvius	Richard Arthur.
		Etna	William Godfrey.
	{	Zebra	William Bowles.

Gun-brigs, Kite, Fearless, Indignant, Urgent, Pincher, Tigress, Desperate, and Safeguard.

On the 23rd, at 10 A.M., these vessels were furiously attacked by the Danish prames and gun-boats; assisted by the crown-battery, floating-batteries, block-ship Mars, and prame St. Thomas. The British returned the fire with spirit until 2 P.M.; when, finding that their carronades, at the distance which the vessels had been obliged to take, were no match for the heavy

long guns of the Danes, they drew off, with the loss of one lieutenant (John Woodford, of the Cruiser) and three seamen killed, and one lieutenant (John Williams, of the Fearless), seven seamen, and five marines wounded: also with some damage to the vessels, particularly the gun-brigs, which, drawing the least water, were the most advanced. The Danish gun-vessels now turned their fire on the mill-battery, but were soon compelled to retire, with one prame and several gun-boats damaged, and with a loss of nine men killed and 12 wounded.

On the 24th the Danish gun-boats remained quiet; but on the 25th a division of them appeared in the channel between Omache, or Amag, and Zealand, and cannonaded the right of the British line, stationed in the suburbs, and composed of the Guards. On the 26th the gun-boats at the harbour's mouth resumed their attack upon the left, but the mill-battery at length drove them in, after causing one, the Stube-Kiøbing, to blow up; whereby, out of her complement of 59 men, she had 30 killed and 12 badly wounded. Several of the other gun-boats sustained both damage and loss. On the 27th the army succeeded in opening a battery of four 24-pounders upon the division of Danish gun-boats, which, during the two preceding days, in conjunction with a battery of 12-pounders and heavy mortars erected at a timber-yard near that extremity of the city, had greatly annoyed the Guards; all which gun-boats, in a little while, were driven away, with one gun-boat much damaged, and upwards of 30 officers and men killed and wounded, afloat and on shore.

During the 28th, 29th, and 30th, no skirmishing took place between the adverse flotillas; but on the 31st the Danish prames, gun-boats, crown-battery, and floating-batteries, again attacked the British batteries at the mill and the advanced squadron: which latter, since the repair of the gun-brigs, had resumed its position off the entrance of the harbour. In this affair the Charles armed transport was blown up by a shell from the Tre kronen; whereby her master (James Moyase), seven of her seamen and two of the Valiant's were killed, and one lieutenant (Henry Nathaniel Rowe), a master's mate (Philip Tomlinson, mortally), and 12 seamen of the Valiant, and seven of the Charles, wounded; total, 10 killed, and 21 wounded. No other British vessel engaged appears to have sustained any loss. The Danes acknowledged a loss of only one man killed and four wounded.

On the 1st of September, in order to frustrate any attempt to

send reinforcements from Stralsund, now in the possession of the French, to Zealand, the former port was declared to be in a state of close blockade, and Commodore Keats was directed to detach a sufficient force to maintain it. On the same day, the army having nearly finished the numerous gun and mortar batteries (48 mortars and howitzers and twenty 24-pounders were mounted) around the city, the two British commanders-in-chief summoned Major-general Peiman to surrender the Danish fleet; pledging the faith of their government, that the same should be held merely as a deposit, and be restored at a general peace, and that all other captured Danish property should be restored immediately. To this summons the Danish general returned a direct negative, but requested time to send to the king on the subject.

Admiral Gambier and Lord Cathcart refused to consent to this; and on the 2nd, at 7 h. 30 m. P.M.,¹ all the British batteries opened, and the town was set on fire by the first general flight of shells. The bomb-vessels also threw some shells; and the fire was returned by the Danes, who, for several days previous, had fired from the walls and outposts, both with cannon and musketry, upon the British advanced posts. The bombardment continued until 8 A.M. of the 3rd. In the evening it recommenced, and was continued throughout the night, but with much less vigour than during the preceding night, in the hope that the Danes would surrender without the necessity of further severity. This was not the case, and at 7 P.M. on the 4th the bombardment recommenced in all its fury. In a short time the wood at the timber-yard, which was nearly a quarter of a mile in length, and of great value, was set on fire by red-hot shot. The steeple of the Fruekirke, or metropolitan church, was also set on fire, and, falling, spread the flames in every direction. By this time the fire-engines, which had been so serviceable on the first night, were all destroyed, and many of the firemen killed or wounded. This dreadful work continued until the evening of the 5th; when, the conflagration having arrived at a height to threaten the speedy destruction of the whole city, Major-general Peiman sent out a flag of truce, requesting an armistice of 24 hours to afford time to treat for a capitulation. The armistice was declined, as tending to unnecessary delay, and the works on shore were continued; but the firing was countermanded, and an

¹ A singular discrepancy here occurs in the official accounts. Admiral Gambier, in his letter, states that the bombardment commenced "in the morning of that day"

(see London Gazette for 1807, p. 1231); Lord Cathcart, and the Danes themselves at half-past seven in the evening.

officer was sent by Lord Cathcart to explain, that no capitulation could be listened to unless accompanied by the surrender of the Danish fleet.

Major-general Peiman having consented that the surrender of the fleet should be the basis of the negotiation, Major-general Sir Arthur Wellesley, Sir Home Popham, captain of the fleet, and Lieutenant-colonel George Murray, deputy quartermaster-general of the British forces, were appointed to settle the remaining terms of the capitulation. On the 6th, in the evening, the articles were drawn up, and on the 7th, in the morning, signed and ratified by the respective parties. By the terms of the capitulation, the British were to be put in possession of the citadel, and of the ships-of-war and their stores; and, as soon as these were removed from the dockyard, or within six weeks from the date of the capitulation, were to deliver up the citadel, and quit the island of Zealand; all hostilities were, in the mean time, to cease, and all property and prisoners taken on either side, to be restored.

Between the landing of the British troops and the commencement of the bombardment, one or two sorties and several skirmishes had taken place, in which the army had sustained a loss of four officers, one sergeant, and 37 rank and file killed, six officers, one sergeant, and 138 rank and file wounded, and one sergeant and 23 rank and file missing; making, with the loss incurred by the British afloat, a total of 56 killed, 179 wounded, and 25 missing.

The loss on the part of the Danes, on board the gun-vessels, and in the different skirmishes outside the city, appears, by their own accounts, to have been about 250 in killed and wounded, exclusively of a great number of prisoners. Their loss within the city, in being stated in the gross at about 2000 men, women, and children, was probably, and it is to be hoped it was, greatly exaggerated. Much blame was attached, and apparently with justice, to Major-general Peiman, for not having, when the opportunity was afforded him, sent the women, children, and helpless men out of the city. Humanity would then have had less to deplore on this melancholy occasion. The number of houses wholly destroyed was officially stated at 305, exclusive of one church; but scarcely a house, it appears, had wholly escaped from the effects of the bombardment; and a second church, that in the citadel, was considerably injured.

The Danish ships in the arsenal, which was an enclosed part of the harbour, had only their lower masts in, but their stores

were so admirably arranged in the warehouses, and such was the alacrity of the British seamen in fitting the ships out, that, in nine days, 14 sail of the line were towed from the harbour to the road; and this, although several of the ships had to undergo considerable repairs, and the scuttle-holes made in their hulls by the Danes, in order to sink them (a measure in their tardiness omitted), had to be closed. According to the Danish papers, the crown prince, while at Kiel, sent Lieutenant Von-Steffen to General Peiman, with orders, in case of being compelled to surrender the city, to burn the fleet; but, having been taken on his way by some patrols belonging to the British army, the lieutenant destroyed his despatches, and arrived at Copenhagen without them.

In the space of six weeks, the three remaining ships of the line, with the frigates and sloops, were removed to the road, and the arsenal and its store-houses cleared of masts, spars, timber, and other naval materials. Of the three 74s on the stocks, two were taken to pieces, and the most useful of their timbers brought off, and the third, being nearly planked up, was sawed in various parts and suffered to fall over. The Mars (blockship) and Dittsmarschen 64s, being old and rotten, were destroyed; as, for the same reason, were the Triton of 28, and the St. Thomas of 22 guns. This left in the possession of the British, three 80-gun ships,¹ fourteen 74s, one 64, two 40, six 36, and two 32 gun frigates, the names of which will appear in the list of Danish captures at the end of the volume. The remaining vessels were the two 20-gun ships Fylla and Little Belt, the two 16-gun ship-sloops Elven and Eyderen, the seven 16-gun brig-sloops, Allart, Delphinin, Glommen, Gluckstadt, Mercurius, Ned-Elvin, and Sarpen, the two 14-gun brigs Brevdrageren and Flewende-Fisk, and the 12-gun schooner Ornen. There were also 25 gun-boats.

On the 20th of October, by which time all the ships and small craft were out of Copenhagen harbour, the last division of the British army re-embarked, with the utmost quietness and without a casualty; and on the 21st, in the morning, the British fleet, with the prizes and transports, sailed from Copenhagen road, in three divisions, the first under Admiral Gambier in the Prince of Wales, the second under Rear-admiral Essington in the

¹ In the list at the foot of Admiral Gambier's letter, the Christian VII. is stated to be of "96 guns;" but, in reality, she was pierced for no more than 84 guns,

namely, 30 on the first deck, 32 on the second, and 22 on the quarter-deck and fore-castle.

Minotaur, and the third under Rear-admiral Sir Samuel Hood¹ in the Centaur.

In going down the Sound, the prize 80-gun ship *Neptunos* grounded on a sandbank, about six miles from Copenhagen, and near to the island of Huen. Notwithstanding every exertion, the ship could not be got off, and was ultimately destroyed. According to a previous understanding, the castle of Cronberg abstained from hostilities, and allowed the fleet, which, indeed, kept as much as possible on the Swedish side of the channel, to pass in safety. On entering the Cattegat the weather became boisterous, and led to the destruction of all the Danish gun-boats but three. After this, the fleet proceeded without further accident, and, at the close of the month, reached in safety Yarmouth and the Downs.

Many, who could not be persuaded either of the legality or the expediency of the attack upon Copenhagen, most readily admitted, that the conductors of the enterprise had performed their task with ability, promptitude, and, in this special case an important requisite, with moderation. Still the affair was not one from which much glory could be reaped. The attacking force, in each branch of it, was greatly superior; and the army alone, with a slight exception (the advanced squadron and the Danish batteries and gun-boats), had any contest to maintain: nor did that contest consist of a general action, but simply of a few partial skirmishes. The bombardment could scarcely be called an engagement, as all the loss, and that was most severe, fell upon the besieged; not a man, as it appears, having been hurt on the side of the British, during the three nights and one day that the bombardment lasted.

Nevertheless, the successful result of the Copenhagen expedition gained, for the army and navy employed in it, the same honorary rewards usually bestowed upon the achievers of the most brilliant victory, the thanks of the British parliament; but not with the unanimity common on such occasions. Admiral Gambier was raised to the peerage, Lieutenant-general Lord Cathcart promoted from a Scotch to an English peer, Vice-admiral Stanhope, Lieutenant-general Burrard, and Major-general Bloomfield made baronets, and Captain George Ralph Collier of the *Surveillante* frigate, the bearer of the despatches, a knight.

Although it is true that the fleet in Copenhagen road had

¹ This distinguished officer had hoisted his flag on the 13th, as had also, on the same day, Rear-admiral Keats.

little else to do than to look on, the squadron under Commodore Keats in the Great Belt had an arduous duty to perform, and that it was well performed may be inferred from the fact, that the island of Zealand is 230 miles in circuit, the channel between it and Holstein, where the main Danish army was encamped, extremely narrow, and its navigation, especially to line-of-battle ships, some of which touched the ground several times, extremely difficult; and yet, during the five or six weeks that the squadron lay in the Belt, no reinforcement was enabled to get across. None, at least, of any consequence; but some of the Danish papers stated, that three regiments, consisting of the 1st and 3rd Jutland infantry, and of Horzen's dragoons, had landed in Zealand during the siege.

With respect to the merits of the expedition to Copenhagen, morally and politically considered, the British public was for a long time divided in opinion. At length, as affairs in the northern part of the continent began to develop themselves, the necessity of the measure became generally admitted, and both houses of parliament voted their approbation of the conduct of ministers on the occasion.¹

It is not a little singular, too, that the very man, whose designs it was the object of that measure to defeat, has since declared, that the expedition showed great energy on the part of the British government. Napoleon has not, because perhaps the question was not put to him, stated, in a direct manner, that he intended to make use of the Danish fleet; but he is reported to have said: "The Danes being able to join me with 16 sail of the line was of little consequence, &c."² as if he really had contemplated some assistance of the kind. In fact, Buonaparte's confidential agent of that time, the celebrated Fouché, has since acknowledged, that one of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit gave him the use of the Danish fleet.³ Not more, however, than three or four of the ships could have been of use to the French emperor, during the little that remained of the season, as effective sail of the line, although the whole fleet might as transports. It is true that (and this was a circumstance which doubtless did not escape the proverbial acuteness of Napoleon) all the ships would have passed for what they nominally were, and would have required a corresponding force to be sent against them; nor must it be forgotten, that the Danish

¹ House of Lords, March 3, Contents 123, Non-contents 57. House of Commons, March 21, Ayes 216, Noes 61.

² See O'Meara's *Napoleon in Exile*, vol. 1., p. 251.

³ See *Memoirs of Fouché*, vol. i., p. 311.

seamen, whom, the French emperor blames the British for having left behind,¹ were brave, skilful, and, it is believed, tolerably numerous.

Although, as formally announced by Admiral Gambier to the officers and men of his fleet, the result of the siege of Copenhagen "added the navy of Denmark to that of the United Kingdom," the latter gained a very slight accession of strength; for, of the 15 line-of-battle ships that reached an English port, four only were found to be worth the cost of repair as cruisers. These were the

80	Christian VII.	measuring	2131	tons, and built in	1803.
74	{ Dannemark,	,,	1836	,,	1794.
	{ Norge,	,,	1960	,,	1800.
	{ Princess Carolina	,,	1637	,,	1805.

The model of the Christian VII. was so much admired, that a ship in every respect the same was immediately ordered to be built. That ship was the Cambridge, of 2139 tons, launched in 1815.

The most valuable part of the Copenhagen seizure were the masts, yards, timber, sails, cordage, and other naval stores. The value of these may be partly appreciated when it is known that, exclusive of the stores that were shipped on board the British and late Danish men-of-war, 92 transports, measuring upwards of 20,000 tons, brought away full cargoes. The guns, of course, on account of the difference in their caliber, were of no value, except perhaps as metal for re-casting. According to a Danish newspaper of the year 1806, the ordnance belonging to the 20 sail of the line afloat, and to the frigates, sloops, and gun-vessels, amounted to 2041 long guns, 202 carronades, and 222 mortars. But it is believed that many of the ships did not bring away the whole of their guns. The benefit to England was not what she had acquired, but what Denmark had lost; and it is doubtful whether, all circumstances considered, the destruction of the Danish ships at their moorings would not have been quite as profitable to the former as their capture and conveyance home.

The attack upon the Danish city and fleet naturally produced, especially when a formidable French army was near and a Russian ally in prospect, a declaration of war on the part of the crown prince; and on the 4th of November the King of England ordered reprisals to be granted against the ships, goods, and subjects of Denmark. The winter was not, however, the

¹ See O'Meara's *Napoleon in Exile*, vol ii., p. 29.

period for active operations ; and the Vanguard 74, with a few frigates and smaller vessels, was all the British force left cruising in the Belt.

On the 30th of August the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate Quebec, Captain the Right Hon. Lord Falkland, arrived off the Danish island of Heligoland, situated at the mouth of the Elbe, and forming a natural barrier to the shoals of that river, the Weser, the Emms, and the Eyder. Lord Falkland immediately summoned the governor to surrender this small, but in a commercial point of view important, island to the arms of Great Britain. The Danish officer refused ; and the Quebec was preparing to use force to compel him, when, at 2 h. 30 m. p.m. on the 4th of September, Vice-admiral Thomas Macnamara Russel, with the 74-gun ship Majestic, Captain George Hart, arrived and anchored close off the town. At 6 p.m., while making arrangements to storm the place with the marines and seamen of the two ships, the vice-admiral received a flag of truce with an offer to capitulate. On the next day, the 5th, the treaty was signed, and the island, which was much wanted as a safe asylum for the English cruisers in these dangerous waters, became a possession of Great Britain.

British and Turkish Fleets.

The unbounded influence which, in the autumn of 1806, France had acquired in the councils of the divan, threatening a rupture between Turkey and Russia, England as the ally of the latter, endeavoured to restore the amicable relations of the two countries ; but her ambassador, Mr. Arbuthnot, found himself completely foiled by the intrigues of the French ambassador, General Sebastiani. This artful emissary had arrived at Constantinople on the 10th of August, and in a few days succeeded in persuading the Porte to recal the reigning hospadars from Moldavia and Wallachia. On the 16th of September Sebastiani demanded, that the canal of Constantinople should be shut against Russian ships, which by a former treaty were allowed to pass it ; threatening war in case of refusal, and pointing to the powerful French army then in Dalmatia.

On the 22nd of October the British admiralty directed Vice-admiral Lord Collingwood, who still cruised off Cadiz, but, in the peaceable demeanour of the Franco-Spanish squadron, found little to occupy his attention, forthwith to detach three sail of the line, to reconnoitre the situation of the forts of the Darda-

nells and fortifications adjacent, as a measure of prudence, in case circumstances should call for an attack upon them by a British force. Owing to the quick passage of the vessel bearing the despatches, Lord Collingwood was enabled, on the 2nd of November, to send Rear-admiral Sir Thomas Louis upon the delicate and important service in view. And yet, on the 15th of February, 1808, in the House of Commons, the Hon. Thomas Grenville, the first lord of the admiralty who had given the orders, but who was then out of office, stated, that Sir Thomas Louis had not been detached until the 5th of December, and seemed to complain, as in that case well he might, that six weeks from the date of the orders had been allowed to expire before any step was taken to put them into execution. This shows how requisite it is to attend to dates.

On the 8th Sir Thomas, with the 80-gun ship *Canopus*, bearing his flag, Captain Thomas George Shortland, 74-gun ship *Thunderer*, Captain John Talbot, 64-gun ship *Standard*, Captain Thomas Harvey, one frigate and one sloop, anchored in Valetta harbour, island of Malta; and, having taken in water and provisions, the squadron sailed again on the 15th. On the 21st the rear-admiral anchored off the island of Tenedos, situated about 14 miles to the southward of the entrance to the Dardanells, for the purpose of obtaining pilots, and a change of wind to the southward. While these two indispensable articles are being waited for, we will endeavour to give a brief description of the passage which the squadron was preparing to enter. The channel is full 12 leagues long, and, between the Capes Greco and Janizary at its entrance, about three miles wide. About a mile up the strait are a pair of forts, called the outer castles of Europe and Asia. Here the channel is about two miles wide. About three leagues higher is a promontory, that contracts the passage to little more than three-quarters of a mile. On each side of this narrow, the proper Dardanells, stands a castle, mounted with heavy cannon. These are called the inner castles of Europe and Asia, or the castles of Sestos and Abydos. Above these castles the passage widens, and then forms another constriction, which is hardly so wide as the former, and is also defended by forts. The passage again widens, and, after slightly approximating at Galipoli, opens into the sea of Marmora. At nearly the opposite extremity of this small sea, and at about 100 miles from the entrance to it, stands the city of Constantinople.

On the 27th, at 3 A.M., pilots being on board and the wind

fair, the squadron weighed and stood towards the strait. At 9 A.M. the Thunderer and Standard anchored in Azire bay, about two miles below the castle of Abydos; and the Canopus, with a light west-south-west wind, proceeded alone. At 10 A.M. the rear-admiral interchanged salutes with the fort of Mydore, and, at 4 P.M. on the 28th, with Seraglio point; off which, at 5 P.M., the Canopus anchored, in company with the 40-gun frigate Endymion, Captain the Honourable Thomas Bladen Capel, who had carried out Mr. Arbuthnot, and was waiting the result of his negotiation.

It would appear that, intimidated by the preparations of the Russian ambassador, Italinski, to leave the capital, the Turks had, since the 15th of October, reversed the decrees which Sebastiani had extorted from their fears, and acceded to all Italinki's demands, when, on the 23rd of November, the Russian General Michelson, at the head of a powerful army, entered Moldavia, and took possession of Chotzim, Bender, and Jassi. The news of this invasion turned the tide of affairs; and Italinski, on the 25th of December, went on board Sir Thomas Louis's ship.

On the 28th, early in the morning, the rear-admiral weighed and steered for the Dardanells, leaving the Endymion to attend upon Mr. Arbuthnot. On the 2nd of January, 1807, the Canopus joined the Thunderer and Standard in Azire bay; where were also lying the 38-gun frigate Active, Captain Richard Hussey Moubray, and 18-gun ship-sloop Nautilus, Captain Edward Palmer. On the 4th the Russian ambassador removed on board the Active, and the latter sailed with him to Malta. On the 31st, at 10 A.M., the squadron was joined by the Endymion, having on board the British ambassador and suite, and the whole of the British merchants late residents of Constantinople; with whom the frigate, having cut her cables, had sailed on the 29th, at 11 P.M.

It appears that the cause of all this alarm was some private information, that the Turkish government meant to seize the Endymion, also the ambassador, his suite, and all the British residents, with the view of detaining them as hostages, and of "putting them to death by torture," in case a British force should commence hostilities. The merchants placed such reliance upon the intelligence, that they did not wait to carry off any part of their property. Sir Thomas Louis immediately weighed with his passengers, and, dropping down, re-anchored the same evening off the entrance of the strait. On the follow-

ing morning, the 1st of February, the squadron again weighed and anchored soon afterwards off the island of Tenedos.

In anticipation of a rupture of the negotiations with the Sublime Porte, the British admiralty, on the 22nd of November, 1806, had directed Vice-admiral Lord Collingwood to detach a force to the Dardanells, to be ready, in case of necessity, to act offensively against the Turks; and, proceeds the order, "as the service pointed out will require much ability and firmness in the officer who is to command it, you are to intrust the execution thereof to Vice-admiral Sir John Thomas Duckworth."¹ Owing to these orders having been put on board a squadron, which was detained by contrary winds, it was not until the 12th of January that they reached Lord Collingwood off Cadiz. On the 15th, in the evening, Sir John parted company from the fleet, in the 100-gun ship *Royal George*, Captain Richard Dalling Dunn, with instructions to the following purport:—

After having assembled the ships he had been directed to take with him, the vice-admiral was to proceed as expeditiously as possible to the Straits of Constantinople, and there take up such a position as would enable him to bombard the town, in case of a refusal to deliver up the Turkish fleet (the paper-force of which was 12 sail of the line and nine frigates), together with a supply of naval stores from the arsenal sufficient for its equipment. This was all plain sailing; but some contingencies were tacked to the vice-admiral's instructions, which rendered them complicated and obscure. For instance, he was to consult Mr. Arbuthnot on the "measures proper to be pursued;" and it was only when the British ambassador was of opinion that hostilities should commence that the British admiral was to make the peremptory demand of the surrender of the Turkish fleet. "At this crisis," says Lord Collingwood, "should any negotiation on the subject be proposed by the Turkish government, as such proposition will probably be to gain time for preparing their resistance or securing their ships, I would recommend that no negotiation should continue more than half an hour; and, in the event of an absolute refusal, you are either to cannonade the town, or attack the fleet wherever it may be, holding it in mind, that the getting the possession, and next to that the destruction, of the Turkish fleet, is the object of the first consideration." Lord Collingwood added, that the force appointed for the service was greater than had originally been intended, on a belief that the Russian squadron would not be in

¹ Parliamentary papers ordered March 23, 1808.

a situation to co-operate ; but that his lordship had, by letter, requested Vice-admiral Seniavin, then cruising in the Archipelago, with a Russian squadron of eight or 10 sail of the line, to detach four of his ships to serve under Sir John Duckworth in the expedition.

On the 17th the Royal George arrived at Gibraltar, and on the 18th sailed again, accompanied by the 98-gun ship Windsor Castle, Captain Charles Boyles, and Repulse 74, Captain the Honourable Arthur Kaye Legge, all three ships, as ordered by Lord Collingwood, having completed their provisions to four months. On the 30th the squadron anchored in Valetta harbour, island of Malta ; and on the 1st of February Sir John despatched the Active, which had arrived the preceding day with the Russian ambassador, to Sir Thomas Louis, to apprise him of the intended junction, and of the plan that was to follow. On the same day the 74-gun ship Ajax, Captain the Honourable Henry Blackwood, and on the 2nd of February the Pompée, of the same force, Captain Richard Dacres, bearing the flag of Rear-admiral Sir William Sidney Smith, arrived from the coast of Sicily. On the 4th, in the afternoon, Sir John, thus reinforced, sailed for the Archipelago, and on the 10th anchored off the island of Tenedos, in company with the Canopus and her companions ; making the squadron under the vice-admiral amount to eight sail of the line, two frigates (the Active having rejoined on the 6th), and two bomb-vessels, the Lucifer and Meteor, Captains Robert Elliot and James Collins.

Sir John had now the satisfaction to learn, that the strait of the Dardanells was not quite so formidable a passage as had been represented ; that the batteries were, some of them dilapidated, and others but partially mounted and poorly manned ; and that the bulk of the Turkish fleet lay moored in the port of Constantinople, in an unequipped but preparing state, except one 64-gun ship, four frigates, and several smaller vessels, at anchor just below Point Pesquies, which is nearly half-way up the channel to the Marmora.

Every moment's delay augmenting the danger, Sir John, on the 11th, at 11 A.M., weighed with the squadron, and stood towards the mouth of the Dardanells ; but at 1 P.M., the wind, which was from the south-east, not being fair for passing up the channel, the ships came to an anchor off Cape Janizary. Whether Vice-admiral Duckworth had received any other information than that afforded him by Sir Thomas Louis, or that a few days' reflection had enabled him to discover, in the latter's

communication, some cause of alarm which he had at first overlooked, certain it is, that on or about the 14th of February, Sir John began stuffing a cushion for his fall. In a letter to Lord Collingwood of that date, he says: "Having explained our intentions thus far, I think it a duty I owe to his majesty, and my own honour, to observe to your lordship, that our minister having left Constantinople 16 days since, and the Turks employed French engineers to erect batteries to flank every turn in our passage through the Dardanells, I conceive the service pointed out in my instructions as completely altered; and, viewed in whatever light it may be, has become the most arduous and doubtful that ever has been undertaken, for, as I am instructed by your lordship to communicate and consult with his majesty's ambassador, and to be guided in my proceedings by such communication, it is on that principle that the resolution has been adopted, for the honour and character of the nation appear pledged, and in our hands they never can be tarnished. Of the hazard which attends such an enterprise I am fully aware. We are to enter a sea environed with enemies, without a possible resource but in ourselves; and when we are to return there cannot remain a doubt but that the passage will be rendered as formidable as the efforts of the Turkish empire, directed and assisted by their allies the French, can make it. I entreat your lordship, however, to believe, that, as I am aware of the difficulties we have to encounter, so I am resolved that nothing on my part (shall) be left undone that can ensure the means of surmounting them."¹

On the evening of the same day on which this preparative letter bears date, a melancholy accident befel the Ajax, one of the ships of Sir John Duckworth's squadron. At 9 P.M., just as Captain Blackwood had retired to rest, the officer of the watch ran into the cabin and acquainted him that there was a great alarm of fire in the after part of the ship. Signals of distress were immediately made and enforced by guns. The fire had broken out in the after cockpit, and in the course of 10 minutes, notwithstanding every attempt to stifle it, the smoke became so dense, that, although the moon shone bright, the officers and men on the upper deck could only distinguish each other by speaking or feeling: all attempts, therefore, to hoist out the boats, except the jollyboat, were ineffectual. The flames then burst up the main hatchway, thereby dividing the fore from the after part of the ship; and with the greatest difficulty, the cap-

¹ Parliamentary papers ordered March 23, 1808.

tain, and about 381 of the officers, seamen, and marines of the ship, effected their escape, chiefly by jumping overboard from the bowsprit, or dropping into the few boats that were enabled to approach in time to be useful. Captain Blackwood leaped from the spritsail yard, and, after being about half an hour in the water, was picked up much exhausted, by one of the boats of the *Canopus*.

The *Ajax* burnt during the whole night, and, the wind blowing from the north-east, drifted on the island of *Tenedos*; where, at 5 A.M. on the following day, the 15th, the ship blew up with an awful explosion. Her net complement of men and boys was about 633; therefore, admitting all to have been on board at the commencement of the disaster, 250 souls must have perished. Among the sufferers were two merchants of Constantinople, and two women: a third saved herself by following her husband with a child in his arms down a rope from the jib-boom end.

A court-martial sat on Captain Blackwood and his surviving officers and crew for the loss of their ship, and pronounced upon them a sentence of honourable acquittal. Nothing of a decisive nature appears to have transpired relative to the origin of the accident, but rumour attributed it to a light falling among some hay which had been incautiously stowed away in the after-cockpit or bread-room. Mr. Parke, the chemist, seems, however, to think it highly probable, that the fire which destroyed the *Ajax* was occasioned by the spontaneous combustion of some coals having a quantity of martial pyrites mixed with them.¹

At length the wind shifted to south-south-west, and on the 19th, at 7 A.M., the squadron weighed, and steered for the entrance of the Dardanelles. Sir Sidney Smith of the *Pompée* had previously been directed to take under his orders the *Thunderer*, *Standard*, and *Active*, and, in case any opposition should be offered by the Turkish squadron, to destroy it. The British ships then formed themselves in line of battle in the following order: *Canopus*, *Repulse*, *Royal George*, *Windsor Castle*, *Standard*, having in tow the *Meteor*, *Pompée*, *Thunderer*, having in tow the *Lucifer*, *Endymion*, *Active*. At 8 A.M., the *Canopus* arrived abreast of the outer castles, both of which opened a fire upon her, and, in succession, upon the ships in her wake; but, at the suggestion of Mr. Arbuthnot, none of the British ships returned the fire, except the two bomb-vessels, who threw a few shells. This appears to have been rather an inconsistent pro-

¹ See Parke's *Chemical Catechism*, p. 265, note.

ceeding; but the bombs were actually signalled by the commander-in-chief to open their fire. What effect that fire produced we cannot positively say: but we believe it amounted to no more than the squadron suffered in passing these castles, and that was too slight to be noticed. At 9 h. 30 m. A.M. the leading ship of the British squadron arrived abreast of the inner pair of castles, which also opened a fire, within point-blank shot. This fire was returned by the ships of the squadron in succession as they passed, and doubtless with some effect.

The damage sustained by the British ships in passing the Dardanells, for that object had now been attained, was comparatively trifling. Not a mast or yard had been shot away, and the only spars injured were the spritsail-yard of the Royal George, gaff of the Canopus, and maintopsail-yard of the Standard. Nor was the loss of men by any means so great as might have been expected. The Canopus had three seamen killed, one petty-officer, eight seamen, and three marines wounded; the Repulse, one petty-officer and two seamen wounded; the Royal George, two seamen and one marine killed, two petty-officers, 22 seamen, and five marines wounded; total, three killed and 29 wounded: rather out of the usual proportion. The Windsor Castle had seven seamen wounded: the remaining ships, namely, the Standard, Meteor (who had the misfortune to burst her 13-inch mortar), Pompée, Thunderer, Lucifer, Endymion, and Active, no one hurt; total, six killed and 51 wounded.

A little above the castle of Abydos, and stretching on towards Point Pesquies, or Nagara Burun, on the Asiatic side, lay the Turkish squadron, of which we have before spoken, consisting of one 64-gun ship, with a rear-admiral's flag, one 40-gun frigate, with the flag of the captain pasha, two frigates of 36, and one of 32 guns, four corvettes, one of 22, one of 18, and two of 10 guns, two armed brigs, and two gun-boats. One of the brigs, on observing the approach of the British, cut her cables, and made sail for Constantinople with the intelligence; and yet no ship, as it appears, was detached in pursuit of her. With more gallantry than discretion, the Turkish ships fired at the British van, as soon as it arrived abreast of them. Having returned this fire, the Canopus, Repulse, Royal George, and Windsor Castle, stood on to an anchorage about three miles above the point; while Sir Sidney, with the Pompée, Thunderer, Standard, and frigates, ran in and anchored within musket-shot of the Turkish squadron, as well as of a redoubt on the point, mounting 31 heavy guns.

At about 10 A.M., the firing commenced, and in half an hour

the Turkish 64 ran on shore on the Asiatic side of the stream. In a few minutes afterwards the pacha's frigate, and all the other vessels, except one frigate, one corvette, and one gun-boat, did the same. The two latter were captured. The frigate cut her cables to escape from the heavy fire of the *Pompée* and *Thunderer*, and was making for the European side; when the *Active*, by signal, weighed and stood after her, but was unable to prevent the Turks from running their ship on shore. Captain Moubray then sent his boats, under the command of Lieutenant George Wickens Willes and Walter Croker, who took out the crew of the frigate, and afterwards destroyed her.

As the redoubt on the point maintained its fire, and the Turkish ships that had run on shore near it kept up their colours, while a part of the crews remained armed on the beach, and a considerable body of Asiatic troops, both horse and foot, appeared on the hills, the British were under the necessity of continuing the cannonade. A few shells from the *Pompée* dispersed the Asiatics, and Lieutenant Mark Oates, of that ship's marines, landed and brought off their green standard. Meanwhile the boats of the *Thunderer* and *Standard*, under the command of Lieutenants John Carter, John Waller, and Thomas Colby, boarded and destroyed the three Turkish frigates on shore on the Asiatic side; and Lieutenant Edward Nicolls of the *Standard's* marines, to whom the duty of burning the 40-gun frigate had been assigned, struck and carried off the flag of the captain pasha. Profiting by the consternation of the Turks from the explosions on all sides of them, Lieutenant Nicolls, accompanied by Lieutenant of marines William Finmore and Lieutenant Lestock Francis Boileau, entered the redoubt, the Turks retreating as the party approached. He then set fire to the gabions, and spiked the guns; eight of which were brass, and carried immensely large marble balls. The expected explosion of the line-of-battle ship, which the *Repulse*, by signal from the commander-in-chief, was assisting the *Pompée's* boats to destroy, obliged the British to retire from the shore before they had quite completed the demolition of the redoubt. The boats detached upon this service were commanded by Lieutenant William Fairbrother Carroll, having under him Lieutenant Walter Croker, Lieutenants of marines David Holt and William Lawrie, master's mate David Sinclair, and midshipmen Thomas Smith, George Parkyns, Edmund Lyons, and Norfolk King.

The loss sustained by the British in their engagement with the Turkish squadron and the redoubt amounted to three sea-

men and one marine killed, and one officer,¹ nine seamen, and four marines wounded, belonging to the Thunderer, five seamen wounded belonging to the Pompée, one officer and five seamen wounded belonging to the Standard, and one marine wounded, to the Endymion; total, four killed and 26 wounded: making, with the previous loss, 10 killed and 77 wounded, the amount in the official return.

At 5 P.M., having destroyed the Turkish squadron, and left the Active, in conjunction with the prize-corvette, gun-boat, and a division of the Pompée's boats to effect the total destruction of the battery, Sir Sidney with the remainder of his division got under way; and, Sir John having also weighed, the whole squadron pursued its course up the channel, with a strong breeze from the south by west, which was as fair as it could blow. At 8 P.M., the ships passed Galipoli, and, entering the sea of Marmora, stood for Constantinople. The British admiral carried little sail during the night; and on the following day, the 20th, the wind lessened considerably. The delay caused by this double misfortune made it nearly 10 P.M. before the squadron came to anchor; and then, not off the town of Constantinople, but off the Prince's islands, about eight miles from it.

On the 21st, at daybreak, the wind blew moderately from the south-east; and every one in the squadron, except the admiral and the ambassador, expected probably that the ships would weigh, and, in the letter as well as spirit of Sir John's instructions, proceed off the town, to be ready to bombard it the instant Mr. Arbuthnot should give the word. In fact it would appear that, as the ambassador, his suite, and the British residents of Constantinople were completely out of the hands of the Turks, and as hostilities had actually commenced between the latter and the British, the whole of the contingencies referred to in Sir John's instructions were got rid of, and that therefore the admiral was now at liberty to act upon his own responsibility. Sir John, however, thought otherwise, and preferred consulting the ambassador, whose pacific disposition he must by this time have known. The British squadron, consequently, remained at anchor; and the Endymion was the only vessel that moved, or that made an attempt to move, towards Constantinople.

The frigate, with the ambassador's despatches, anchored at about 11 h. 30 m. A.M., within four miles of the town, that being

¹ In consequence of the manner in which the general return of loss is drawn up at the foot of Sir John Duckworth's public

letter, we are unable to specify what officer was wounded in any of the separate services performed during this expedition.

as near as, according to Sir John's letter, the lightness of the wind and the strength of the current would permit her to approach. In these despatches Mr. Arbuthnot declares, "that the British fleet will avail itself of the first favourable wind to proceed towards Constantinople;" tells the Turks, that "the arrival of the fleet ought to convince them that, when orders have been given to British officers, no difficulties, no dangers, can retard their execution a single moment;" and promises that, "in case a favourable answer arrives on the day following at sunset, all hostile demonstration shall cease."

On the 21st, at daybreak, "Sir John Thomas Duckworth, vice-admiral of the white and knight of the bath,"¹ as he very properly styles himself, fires his first epistolary broadside at the Turkish fleet. He informs the Sublime Porte that, "having it in his power to destroy the capital and all the Turkish vessels, the plan of operations which his duty prescribes to him is, in consequence, very clearly marked out." Was ever anything so happily expressed? The vice-admiral then demands, as the only alternative, to be put in possession of the Turkish ships and of stores sufficient for their equipment, and gives the Turkish government half an hour after the translation of his note to the reis effendi, to determine upon the proposal.

As a proof of the conciliatory spirit of the Turks, and of how much was to be expected from them by negotiation, they refused to permit the flag of truce to land. On the same evening Mr. Arbuthnot addressed a note to the reis effendi, and declared, that "the answer to the admiral's note must be delivered in half an hour." Whether or not the officer who carried this note was permitted to land is uncertain. Midnight of the 21st produced another threatening note from the admiral, beginning thus: "As it has been discovered by our glasses, that the time granted the Sublime Porte to take its decision is employed in warping the ships of war into places more susceptible of defence, and in constructing batteries along the coast, it is the duty of the vice-admiral to lose no time."²

Daybreak on the 22nd arrived, and with it appeared at the admiral's mast-head the gladdening signal of "Prepare to weigh." The breeze, which continued to blow from the south-

¹ This honour was conferred upon him on the 6th of June, 1801, on his return from taking quiet possession of the Danish West-India islands, and probably as a compensation for his loss of prize-money to the almost immediate restoration of the captured colonies.

² These extracts are from the copies of the correspondence in the London journals, as translated from the *Moniteur*. This, which may account for the occasional obscurity of the language, is the only way in which they have been made public.

east, freshened in the forenoon; but the preparative flag still stuck fast to No. 66. Towards 4 p.m. the wind began to slacken, and at 5 p.m. subsided to nearly a calm. The ships remained at their anchors; and the opportunity of showing that the threats, of which the admiral and the ambassador had been so lavish, were not empty boastings, was lost. The effect of mortified pride was very serious upon the ambassador; for he was taken sick that very afternoon, and became so very ill on the day following, that the admiral, whose frame was formed of tougher materials, had the whole burden of diplomacy upon himself.

Sir John's first letter in the character of ambassador bears date on the 23rd, and is written in a very lofty and choleric tone. The vice-admiral begins by practising what, in moderate language, may be called a ruse. He says: "When the Active joins me, or even when my squadron shall be joined by *all* our naval force, even that shall not occasion any alteration in the terms I have proposed. I must tell you frankly, I will not consent to lose any more time. I owe it to my sovereign and to my own honour not to suffer myself to be duped, and those who are capable of thinking so meanly of others, justly become themselves the object of suspicion. You are putting your ships of war in motion; you take every method of increasing the means of defence; but if the Sublime Porte really wishes to save its capital from the dreadful calamities which are ready to burst upon it, the thought of which is shocking to our feelings of humanity, you will be sent here very early to-morrow morning with full powers to conclude with me the work of peace, which Mr. Arbuthnot would by this time have set out to conclude on shore, if he had not been prevented by a very serious indisposition. I now declare to you, for the last time, that no consideration whatever shall induce me to remain at a distance from your capital a single moment beyond the period I have now assigned; and you are sufficiently acquainted with the English character, not to be ignorant that, in a case of unavoidable necessity, we are less disposed to threaten than to execute. But understand me well. Our object is peace and amity: this depends on you."

Can it be wondered that the Turkish minister, having the shrewd Sebastiani at his elbow, should laugh at all this verbiage, and treat with contempt both the writer and the government of which he was the organ? First, the fleet of the Turks is demanded; now, merely that the latter will remain at peace;

or, in other words, that they will allow Sir John to repass the Dardanells without further molestation. Well, the Turks agree to treat; and Sir John, on February 24, says: "Considering the very great importance of the affair, not only as it regards the Sublime Porte and Great Britain, but the whole world, I have come to the resolution of personally conducting it." The admiral then proposes that a Turkish minister shall be sent on board either the *Endymion* or the *Royal George*; or he is willing himself to go on shore on any of the Prince's islands. The Turks name *Kadikioi* on the Asiatic side. Sir John Duckworth now discovers that "there is no precedent of an admiral, or commander-in-chief, quitting his squadron." He also declares, that the place is "too far distant." Whatever may have been the vice-admiral's motives for declining to trust himself among the Turks, they were such, apparently, as no arguments could overcome. Sir John therefore wished to depute rear-admiral *Louis* to be his representative on shore.

Whether the latter felt, that he who wore the honours should also share the dangers of the ambassadorship, or that he considered the negotiation, like the rest of this celebrated war of words, to be all vapour, Sir Thomas *Louis* preferred remaining on board his ship. The only persons, therefore, whose lives were placed in jeopardy, were a young midshipman named *Harwell*, and four lads belonging to the *Endymion*; who, on their way to the island of *Prota* in the frigate's jollyboat, to buy provisions of the Greek inhabitants, had been boarded by a party of Turks from the main and carried to Constantinople. A demand to have these lads restored formed the third stage of this protracted correspondence; and a flat refusal to deliver them up completed the climax of insolence and barbarity on one side, and of humiliation and disgrace on the other.

On the 27th, in the morning, it was discovered that the Turks had landed on the island of *Prota*, one of the Prince's islands, and the nearest to the anchorage of the British squadron; and that they were erecting a battery to annoy the latter. The marines of the squadron, under Captain *R. Kent* belonging to the *Canopus*, were prepared for disembarking; and the *Repulse* and *Lucifer*, having been ordered to cover the boats, proceeded towards the island. The two ships, on their approach, began to scour the beach, with their grape, when, instantly, a number of Turks quitted the island in their boats; and one boat, containing 11 men, supposed to comprise the remainder of all those who had landed, was captured. In the afternoon the discovery was

made, that some Turks were still on the island of Prota. The marines of the *Canopus* immediately pushed off for the island, landed, and, pursuing the Turks to a monastery with loop-holes for musketry, got worsted, with the loss of their brave commander and of several of their party. The signal having been made for assistance, the marines and armed boats' crews of the *Royal George*, *Windsor Castle*, and *Standard*, hastened to the rescue of their comrades on shore. A smart skirmish ensued; and, in the height of it, an officer arrived from the admiral, with orders for the detachments to return on board. The different boats' crews reached their respective ships soon after dark, with the loss of two officers, and five petty officers, seamen, and marines killed, and two officers, and 17 petty officers, seamen, and marines wounded; total, seven killed and 19 wounded.

Here was an enterprise that, had it succeeded, would have almost atoned for the imbecility and irresolution which had characterized every preceding act of the expedition. On the island of Prota, when attacked by the British, were two very important personages, General Sebastiani and the chief aga of the Janizaries. Had these men been brought on board the squadron, Sir John might at least have obtained, as the price of their ransom, leave to quit, what he so feelingly calls, "a sea environed with enemies," without harm to himself or his ships. A clever negotiator, indeed, might have effected a surprising change in the political views and intentions of the Sublime Porte.

It was not merely that the force, originally detached against the Turks upon the island of Prota, was inadequate to the purpose; it was, that the small reinforcement afterwards sent had received directions "to bring off the *Canopus's* people, but to avoid being drawn into danger." These were Sir John Duckworth's positive orders; and even his permission to Rear-admiral Louis, to send the first party, consisting of the marines of the *Canopus*, was not conceded without the neutralizing accompaniment, "that no risk whatever must be run, but if it could be effected without hazarding the people, it might." Who expects that military operations are to be conducted without risk? If the detachments were "not to pursue their object should it be attended with any hazard," Sir John might as well have sent a party of old women to drive away the Turks. Such milk-and-water wishy-washy measures will never succeed. And yet, not the slightest imputation attaches to the officers or men who landed on Prota: all acted as British seamen and marines

will ever act when left to themselves; but, in the midst of their glorious career, comes the chilling order for them to re-embark and return to their ships.

The calm weather of the 25th and 26th had been succeeded on the 27th by a westerly wind, which blew during the whole of the 28th; but the Turks had learned by experience that the British admiral had no real intention to molest their town or their fleet. The latter they had been suffered partially to equip, and the former to protect by batteries at every assailable point. That the French engineers and Turkish workmen had not been idly employed at a distance from the capital, we shall presently have occasion to show. By daybreak on the 1st of March the wind had shifted to the north-east: which was as fair as it could blow for quitting the territories of a people so ignorant and foolhardy, that no rhetoric could persuade, no threats intimidate them. Up went, at the Royal George's mast-head, the signal to weigh: and the preparative flag, if hoisted along with it, was so quickly hauled down, that at 8 h. 25 m. A.M. the whole of the British ships were under sail, standing in line of battle.

Although the Turks had been 10 days equipping their fleet, they had not, it appears, been able to get ready for sea more than five sail of the line and four frigates. These were at anchor in the road. By way of a flourish, or, as Sir John says, to give the Turkish "fleet" an opportunity to come out and attack him, he stood on and off Constantinople during the day, and at night bore up for the Dardanells. On the 2nd, at 5 p.m., daylight being preferred for passing the castles, the squadron came to an anchor about six miles above Point Pesquies, and was there joined by the Active frigate and her prize, the late Turkish corvette; which latter, by the admiral's orders, was given up to the prisoners.

On the 3rd, at 7 h. 30 m. A.M., the squadron again weighed, and at 8 h. 15 m. A.M. bore up under topsails, with the wind fresh at north-east. The ships then proceeded down the channel in the same order in which they had sailed up,¹ except that the Active was ahead of the Endymion, and that, instead of the Standard, the Endymion had the Meteor in tow. On approaching the castle of Abydos, hoping probably to propitiate the Turks, Sir John fired a salute of 13 guns. This produced an immediate return of shot and shells, both from the two castles and from the battery on Point Pesquies; which latter, since the passage up, had been repaired and remounted. The other bat-

¹ See p. 219.

teries on both sides, successively as the ships arrived abreast of them, opened their fire and received a fire in return. The mutual cannonade was kept up until nearly 11 h. 40 m. A.M.; and at a little before noon the British squadron anchored off Cape Janizary, out of the reach of further molestation.

The improved state of the defences of the Dardanells, since the passage up of the British, would naturally display its effects upon the latter in their passage down. We will take the ships in the order in which they descended the strait. The *Canopus* had her wheel carried away, and her hull much damaged, by the stone shot, but escaped with the loss of only three seamen wounded. On board the *Repulse*, a stone shot, from the castle on the Asiatic side, came through between the poop and quarter-deck, and killed two quarter-masters, five seamen, and three marines, and wounded one lieutenant of marines, two corporals, and four privates, also two quarter-masters and a boatswain's mate; total, 10 killed and 10 wounded, the only loss which the *Repulse* on this occasion sustained. The same shot badly wounded the mizenmast, broke and carried away the wheel, and did other serious damage. The *Royal George* had several lower shrouds cut away, and her masts slightly wounded: a large stone shot also stuck fast in her cutwater. Her loss amounted to two seamen and one marine killed, two officers, one petty-officer, 22 seamen, and two marines wounded; total, three killed and 27 wounded.¹ A stone shot of 800 pounds weight struck the mainmast of the *Windsor Castle*, and cut it more than three-quarters through: her loss amounted to three seamen killed, one petty officer and 12 seamen wounded. On board the *Standard*, a stone shot from the castle of Sestos, weighing 770 pounds, and measuring six feet eight inches in circumference and two feet two inches in diameter, entered the lower deck, killed four seamen, and, having set fire to the salt-boxes which were on deck for immediate use, caused an explosion that badly wounded one lieutenant, three petty officers, 37 seamen, and six marines. The alarm of fire that followed the explosion caused four seamen to leap overboard, all of whom were drowned; making the *Standard's* total loss by this single shot (and which was all she sustained) amount to eight killed and drowned, and 47 wounded. The *Pompée* had the good fortune to escape without being struck by a shot, in hull, masts, rigging, or sails. The *Thunderer*, on the other hand, was a good deal damaged, and had two seamen killed, one lieutenant,

See p. 220.

one shipman, 10 seamen, and two marines wounded. The *Lucifer* had no one hurt. The *Active* received a granite shot weighing 800 pounds, and measuring six feet six inches in circumference, which passed through her side two feet above the water, and lodged on the orlop deck, close to the magazine-scuttle, without injuring a man. The aperture made by it was so wide, that Captain Moubray, on looking over the side to ascertain what damage it had done, saw two of his crew thrusting their heads through at the same moment. Had there been a necessity for hauling to the wind on the opposite tack, she must have gone down.¹ Her loss altogether amounted only to her boatswain, four seamen, and three marines wounded. The *Endymion* had three seamen killed, and one lieutenant and eight seamen wounded. The *Meteor* had the misfortune, about a quarter of an hour before she got abreast of the castle of Abydos, to part the hawser by which the *Endymion* had been towing her. The *Endymion* did not wait to take the *Meteor* again in tow, but hastened past the batteries. These opened a tremendous fire upon the bomb, and all on board the squadron, knowing that the *Meteor's* magazine was above water, expected every instant to see her blown into the air. The stone shot flew about her in all directions, and some struck her hull. At length after (as in the passage up she had done her 13-inch) bursting her 10-inch mortar, the *Meteor* got past the batteries, with the loss of one lieutenant of the marine artillery and seven seamen wounded. We may notice, in passing, that the *Lucifer's* magazine was also above water, both bombs having originally been merchant-vessels. The regular bombs, or those built as such, have their magazines below water, which is the proper place. It was certainly a very hazardous experiment, to take these bomb-vessels where they would be exposed to so close and heavy a fire as in the passage of the Dardanells.

The total of the British loss in repassing the Dardanells amounted to 29 killed and 138 wounded; and the total loss incurred in the expedition, to 46 killed, including the four drowned, and 235 wounded. The following appear to have been the officers who suffered on the occasion. Killed: Captain of marines R. Kent, of the *Canopus*, and Lieutenant George Lawrence Belli, of the *Royal George*. Wounded: Lieutenants John Forbes and Nisbet Josiah Willoughby, and midshipmen George Holbrook, John Furneaux, — Dalrymple, John Alexander, John Wood Rouse, and Charles Cotesworth, of the *Royal*

¹ Marshall's *Naval Biography*, vol. i., p. 809.

George; master's mate John Nichols, and midshipman George Wray, of the *Canopus*; master's mate William Jones of the *Windsor Castle*; Lieutenant of marines Thomas Marshall, and master's mate Joseph Magui of the *Repulse*; Lieutenants John Waller and Thomas Colby, and midshipman — Moore, of the *Thunderer*; Lieutenant Daniel Harrington, Lieutenant of marines William Finmore, master's mates John Haines and William Smith, midshipman Charles Jay, and boatswains William Shorbridge of the *Standard*, and Mark Palmer of the *Active*; Lieutenant John Langdon of the *Endymion*, and Lieutenant of marine artillery George E. Ballechild, of the *Meteor*.

When the British admiral, as already related, dropped anchor off Cape Janizary, he was joined by the Russian admiral with eight sail of the line. What followed we will give in the words of one who, naturally feeling a bias towards Sir John Duckworth,¹ never wilfully misses an opportunity of bepraising him. "Siniavin requested Sir John to return with him, and renew the attack or the negotiations; but this was declined, and it was observed, perhaps with too much national vanity, that where a British squadron had failed, no other was likely to succeed."²

So much for the far-famed expedition to the Dardanells. Had the board of admiralty of that day been better acquainted with the character of Sir John Thomas Duckworth, they would have sought elsewhere for an officer of "ability and firmness" to carry their orders into execution. There was one, indeed, not five days' sail from the mouth of the Dardanells, whose ability and firmness had never been doubted, and whose local experience, and well-known influence with the Porte, eminently fitted him to be the conductor of such an enterprise. As soon as the Turks had decided to be hostile by firing at his ships, Rear-admiral Sir Sidney Smith would have considered himself as released from all further dependence upon the ambassador, and would have thought only of what was due to the honour of the British flag. On meeting the Turkish ships, off Point Besquies, he would have left two or three of his line-of-battle ships, and his frigates, to dispose of them, and, with the remainder of his squadron, would have dashed on to Constantinople. There, in defiance of currents and eddies, castles and granite balls, he would have laid his squadron close to the town, with his heaviest ship ready, at a moment's notice, to batter down the walls of the seraglio, if the terms which he had been instructed to demand were not strictly complied with. No one can doubt what would have

¹ See p. 107.

² Brenton, vol. iv., p. 150.

been the result of a measure so prompt, so intimidating, and so practicable.

That there should have been no investigation of the causes that led to so palpable a defeat as the one we have just done relating, may appear extraordinary. An inquiry was undoubtedly in contemplation, but two or three circumstances conspired to prevent it from being prosecuted. On the 16th of May, 1808, Colonel Wood moved, in parliament, for the log of the Royal George, with the view of grounding a charge against Sir John Thomas Duckworth; but the House of Commons refused to grant the motion, on the principle, that the inquiry fell more properly under the cognizance of a court-martial. In four days afterwards the House was called upon to pass a vote of censure upon the planners of the expedition, the members of the late administration. This motion also was lost; although Mr. Canning, then foreign secretary, declared, "it was obvious that the expedition might have done more than it did," and Mr. Windham, late secretary-at-war, insisted, that "the failure of the enterprise could not be attributed to any misconduct on the part of the late government."

This was a broad hint; but Sir John Thomas Duckworth had already shown (see p. 222), that a side-wind could make no impression upon him: he, therefore, did not demand an inquiry into his conduct, nor did any one else. The fact is, the public was so astounded at the idea of marble shot of 800 pounds weight, so convinced of the almost insurmountable difficulties of passing the Dardanelles, and so satisfied with the admiral for having destroyed the Turkish "fleet," as most of the papers described the 64 and three or four frigates,¹ that Sir John rather gained than lost credit for the discomfiture he had experienced.

It certainly was, to say the least of it, very injudicious to subject the acts of the admiral to the consent of the ambassador. The cabinet should have decided upon the measure, and the admiral alone have been charged with its execution. Although a tissue of contingencies and nicely-drawn distinctions may be unravelled in an instant by the professed diplomatist, a string of *ifs* and *buts* cannot fail to puzzle the understanding, and to mislead the judgment, of the unsophisticated sailor. He never succeeds so well, admitting his heart to be in the right place, as when he can see his way all clear before him to the very muzzles of the enemy's cannon.

¹ In Ralfe's "Naval Chronology," vol. ii., p. 29, we are favoured with a view of the "Destruction of the Turkish fleet."

The attack by the British on the capital of Turkey was immediately followed by the departure of an expedition against Alexandria in Egypt. On the 6th of March the British 74-gun ship *Tigre*, Captain Benjamin Hallowell, accompanied by the 38-gun frigate *Apollo*, Captain Edward Fellowes, 16-gun brig-sloop *Wizard*, Captain Edmund Palmer, and 33 sail of transports, having on board about 5000 troops under Major-general Fraser, sailed from Messina in Sicily. On the 7th, in the night, during thick and blowing weather, the *Apollo* and 19 sail of transports parted company; and on the 15th the *Tigre*, with the remaining 14, reached the Arab's tower. On the 16th the *Tigre* alone stood in towards Alexandria, to ascertain from Major Missit, the British resident, and Mr. Briggs, the vice-consul, who were expected to be on board the *Wizard*, which had been previously detached to receive them, the strength and disposition of the garrison and inhabitants. A favourable report being returned, the transports were called in from the offing; and, in the course of the evening, all the ships anchored off the entrance of the old or western harbour.

A summons was immediately sent, demanding possession of the town and fortresses. The morning, the 17th, brought a reply from the governor, that he would defend the place to the last extremity. On the same evening, therefore, between 600 and 700 troops, along with five field-pieces, and 56 seamen under Lieutenant James Boxer, were disembarked, without opposition, near the ravine that runs from lake Mareotis to the sea; but, owing to the heavy surf which got up in the night, the remainder, consisting of about 300 men, were not landed until the following day. On the evening of this day, the 18th, the troops moved forward, and attacked and carried the enemy's advanced works, with the slight loss of seven killed and 10 wounded. On the 19th, the *Apollo* and the missing transports appeared in the offing. On joining the *Tigre*, the *Apollo* proceeded, with all the transports, to Aboukir bay; where, on the following day, the 20th, the remainder of the troops were landed without opposition, the castle of Aboukir having previously been secured. The appearance of such a reinforcement induced the Turkish governor to offer terms of capitulation, similar to those which the British had proposed. On the same afternoon these terms were accepted; and at 2 A.M. on the 21st, possession was taken of the heights of Caffarille and Cretin, and immediately afterwards of the city of Alexandria itself, the garrison of which amounted only to 467 troops and sailors.

In the old or western harbour of Alexandria were found two Turkish frigates and one corvette. One frigate mounted 28 long 18-pounders (French caliber) on the main deck, and six long 8-pounders and six 18-pounder carronades on the quarter-deck and fore-castle ; total 40 guns, all brass. The other frigate mounted 26 long brass 12, and eight long brass 6 pounders, total 34 guns ; and the corvette 14 long 6, and two long 18-pounders, also of brass.

On the 22nd Vice-admiral Duckworth, with a part of his squadron, arrived on the coast. The arrival of this reinforcement induced Major-general Fraser to attack Rosetta and Rhamanieh, chiefly to get a supply of provisions for the garrison. The troops advanced and took possession, without resistance, of the heights of Abourmandour which command the town of Rosetta. In attempting, however, to possess themselves of that town, the troops were completely defeated, and returned to Alexandria with the loss of 400 officers and men killed and wounded, including among the former, the major-general himself. Famine now threatened the city of Alexandria, and Vice-admiral Sir John Duckworth, leaving the command of the squadron to Rear-admiral Sir Thomas Louis (who died soon afterwards on board the *Canopus*), quitted the coast, for England : where, on the 26th of May, the *Royal George* safely arrived.

The further operations of the British in Egypt, being wholly of a military nature, need not be here detailed. It may suffice to state, that the troops, being overpowered by numbers, suffered reverses ; and after losing upwards of 1000 of their number in killed, wounded, and prisoners, were compelled, in the middle of September, to evacuate Egypt, and re-embark on board their ships. This the British were permitted to do by a convention with the governor of Egypt ; who, immediately on their departure, entered the city of Alexandria at the head of a powerful army, and rehoisted on its lofty towers, the standard of Mahomet.

While on the subject of Turkish affairs, we must give some account of the naval war carried on between Russia and the Porte. Vice-admiral Seniavin, who made so bold a proposal to Sir John Thomas Duckworth, had been educated in the British navy, and, if we are rightly informed, subsequently gave a proof of his attachment by retiring from service while hostilities existed between Russia and England. The squadron now under his orders, and of which Rear-admiral Greig was the second in command, consisted of the

Gun-ship.		Gun-ship.	
80	Rafael.	66	{ Ratvizan.
	{ Twerday (flag).		{ St. Petro.
	Motchnoy.	60	Skoroy.
74	{ St. Cafael.	Frig.	
	St. Helene.	26	{ Kilduyn.
	Yarrowflaul.		{ Venus.
	Moscow.		

With this fleet, having taken possession of the islands of Lemnos and Tenedos, and placed a garrison in the latter, the Russian admiral blockaded the Dardanells. Another Russian squadron cruised off the mouth of the Bosphorus, and effectually cut off all communication between Constantinople and the Black Sea.

Emboldened by their success over a formidable squadron of the far-famed British, the Turks hastened to equip their fleet to act against the Russians in the Archipelago. With this stimulus to their exertions, the Turks managed, by the middle of May, to equip a squadron of eight sail of the line, six frigates, some ship and brig corvettes, and about 50 gun-vessels. On the 19th this fleet passed the Dardanells, and, finding that the Russian admiral had gone to the island of Imbro, steered for Tenedos. Here the Turks endeavoured to land a body of troops, but were repulsed, and stood over to the coast of Natolia. On the 22nd the two fleets got a sight of each other; and that of the Turks immediately crowded sail to escape through the Dardanells. After a running fight of two hours, the Turkish admiral succeeded in sheltering himself under the guns of the castles that guard the straits, but not without, it appears, losing three of his ships by stranding upon Cape Janizary.

Owing to this disaster, it was not until the 22nd of June that the Turks were again able to make their appearance outside the Dardanells. On that day 10 sail of the line, including one three-decker, with six frigates and five smaller vessels, anchored off the island of Imbro. They shortly afterwards steered for Tenedos, and, disembarking a strong body of Turks, retook the island. On the 1st of July the Russian fleet descried the Turkish fleet off the island of Lemnos. An engagement ensued, which lasted all day, and terminated in the alleged loss to the Turks of three ships of the line and three frigates. The latter and two of the former were driven on shore. The other was captured, and proved to be the ship of the captain bey, mounting 80 brass guns, and manned with 774 men; of whom, exclusive of the loss on board the other ships, 230 were killed

and 160 wounded: a sufficient proof of the obstinate manner in which the Turks had defended themselves. That they were by no means so skilful as they were brave, is evident from the small loss sustained by the Russians; which amounted, on board of all their ships, to only 135 killed and 409 wounded. It was a circumstance as singular as it was fortunate, that, on board the captured Turkish ship, were found young Harwell and his four fellow-prisoners. A short time afterwards, falling in with the Kent 74, Captain Edward Oliver Osborn, the Russian admiral sent them on board that ship.

Having completely defeated the Turks, and compelled them a second time to retire to the Dardanells, Vice-admiral Seniavin took measures to recover possession of Tenedos. On the 9th he appeared off this island with his fleet, and summoned the Turkish general to surrender upon a capitulation. This the latter did; and on the 10th the Turkish garrison, numbering 4600 men, was transported to the coast of Asia. The treaty of Tilsit, of which we have already given some account, having effected a total change in the politics of Alexander, Vice-admiral Seniavin, on the 24th of August, concluded an armistice with the Porte. He then, after detaching Rear-admiral Greig, with the Moscow, St. Petro, and some smaller vessels, to take possession of the island of Corfu, ceded to Russia by France under the treaty above named, hastened, with the remaining nine sail of the line and one frigate, to get out of the Mediterranean and into the Baltic before the expected rupture between Russia and England should render that a difficult undertaking.

British and Portuguese Fleets.

At the very time that the columns of the *Moniteur* were filled with invectives against England, for violating the neutrality of Denmark, the French emperor was marching an army to the frontiers of Portugal; and that not because the latter had relaxed her neutrality in favour of Great Britain, but because she had hitherto refused wholly to abrogate it in favour of France. Napoleon had the modesty to demand, that Portugal should shut her ports against the commerce of England, and should detain the subjects of the latter and sequester their property: thus compelling the prince regent virtually to declare war against the ancient ally of his house, merely to indulge the rancour of the French emperor, and assist him with a fleet of ships in his meditated plan of adding Ireland to the number of

his conquests. Awed, at length, by the near approach of General Junot and an army of 40,000 men, and swayed probably by the arguments of the powerful French faction that existed in the heart of his capital, the prince regent, on the 20th of October, declared by proclamation, that he had judged it proper "to accede to the cause of the continent," and shut his ports against the men-of-war and merchantmen of Great Britain.

Intelligence of this proceeding reached England early in November; and the following nine sail of the line, which had been previously got ready, quitted Portsmouth and Plymouth, under the command of Rear-admiral Sir Sidney Smith, bound straight to the Tagus:—

Gun-ship.

26	Hibernia	{ Rear-admiral (b.) Sir William Sidney Smith.
		{ Captain Charles Marsh Schomberg.
98	London	,, Thomas Western
80	Foudroyant	,, Norborne Thompson.
	{ Elizabeth	,, Honourable Henry Curzon.
	{ Conqueror	,, Israel Pellew.
74	{ Marlborough	,, Graham Moore.
	{ Monarch	,, Richard Lee.
	{ Plantagenet	,, William Bradley.
	{ Bedford	,, James Walker.

In the autumn of the preceding year a threat of Napoleon's that he would conquer Portugal, had induced the British government to send Earl St. Vincent and a squadron to Lisbon, with the offer of money and troops to assist in repelling the invaders; or, should that, in the state of the country, be deemed impracticable, and the prince regent prefer a removal to his South-American dominions, the admiral was to protect him and his family thither. But the sudden hostility of Russia and Prussia compelled the French emperor to direct the whole of his energies against them: and Portugal, for the present, was allowed to retain her independence. Napoleon's successful career in the north having again left him at leisure, he once more bent his view upon Portugal, and with more earnestness than ever.

A case for British interference had thus again occurred, and it remained to be seen, whether the prince regent, in aid of the "continental cause," meant to make a further trial of the forbearance of England; or, in fulfilment of former assurances, would consent to retire, with his family, fleet, and army, into a safe asylum in the Brazils. Suffering his fears, however, again to get the better of his discretion, the prince regent, on the 8th of November, signed an order for the detention of the few British

subjects, and of the inconsiderable portion of British property, that yet remained in Lisbon. Immediately on the publication of this order, the British ambassador, Lord Strangford, demanded his passports, presented a final remonstrance against the recent conduct of the Portuguese court, and on the 17th joined Sir Sidney's squadron, which had just arrived off the coast.

A rigid blockade was forthwith declared, and enforced, by the British admiral against the Tagus. After this measure had been tried for a few days, Lord Strangford, on the 27th, went to Lisbon in the ship-sloop *Confiance*, Captain James Lucas Yeo, bearing a flag of truce, to propose to the Portuguese government, as the only condition upon which the blockade would be raised, the alternative, of either surrendering the fleet to England, or of employing it in the removal of the prince regent and his family to the Brazils. Convinced by the reasoning of Lord Strangford, assured, in the fullest degree, of British protection, and not uninfluenced, probably, by a suspicion of Buonaparte's real views respecting the house of Braganza, of which the *Moniteur* had just given a hint, by threatening that the dynasty of Braganza should no longer exist, the prince regent, on the same day, proclaimed his intention to retreat, with the queen his mother, and all the royal family, to his dominions in America, there to establish himself in the city of Rio de Janeiro until a general peace; and he appointed a regency to govern the kingdom in his absence.

It fortunately happened that the bulk of the Portuguese fleet, whether prepared for this or for some other purpose, was in readiness to put to sea. Accordingly, on the 29th, in the morning, Vice-admiral don Manuel d'Acunha Sottomayor, with the 84-gun ship *Principe-Reale*, 74s *Conde-Henrique*, *Medusa*, *Principe-de-Brazil*, and *Rainha-de-Portugal*, 64s *Alfonso-d'Albuquerque*, *Don-Joan-de-Castro*, and *Martino-de-Freitas*; frigates *Minerva*, of 44, *Golfinho*, of 36, and *Urania* and another, with whose name we are unacquainted, 32 guns; three 20-gun brig corvettes, and one 12-gun schooner, having on board the whole of the royal family of Braganza, along with many of the prince's faithful counsellors and adherents, and accompanied by about 20 large armed merchant-ships, filled with cargoes and passengers, set sail from Lisbon. In the course of a few hours this fleet, conveying altogether about 18,000 Portuguese inhabitants, arranged itself under the protection of that of the British; and the friendly junction of the two fleets was immediately announced by a reciprocal salute of 21 guns.

The above eight sail of the line, four frigates, and four smaller vessels, comprised the whole of the Portuguese navy, except one 74, the *Vasco-de-Gamo*, under repair and nearly ready, and another 74, and 64, and five frigates and corvettes, that were unserviceable. As a proof that the efficient ships of that navy, with the royal family and loyal inhabitants on board, had not been too precipitate in their retreat, on the 30th, which was the very day after their departure, General Junot, with the advanced division of the French army, entered Lisbon. Having accompanied the Portuguese fleet to latitude $37^{\circ} 47'$ north, and longitude $14^{\circ} 17'$ west, and waited till the ships had reassembled, after a severe gale of wind, Sir Sidney, on the 6th of December, detached Captain Moore, with the *Marlborough*, *London*, and *Bedford* to attend the fleet to the Brazils, and, with the remainder of his squadron, parted company. One of the Portuguese ships of the line, being deemed unfit to proceed on the voyage, bore up for England. The remainder, escorted by Captain Moore, pursued their voyage, and on the 19th of January landed the prince regent at Bahia. Captain Moore, with the British and Portuguese men-of-war, then proceeded to Rio de Janeiro.

The object of Sir Sidney in parting company was to watch the motions of the nine Russian sail of the line under Vice-admiral Seniavin; who, finding it dangerous to proceed further to the northward, had anchored in the Tagus. This step on the part of England was rendered necessary by the menacing tone which Russia had recently assumed. On the supposition that this Russian squadron was still in the Mediterranean, Sir Sidney had been ordered to detach the *Foudroyant*, *Conqueror*, and *Plantaganet*, as a reinforcement to Rear-admiral Purvis off Cadiz; but he now, of course, kept those ships with him, and with his five sail of the line cruised off the mouth of the Tagus.

After Sir Sidney had been a week performing this duty, Commodore Peter Halkett joined from England, with, besides his own ship, the *Ganges*, the 74s *Defence* and *Alfred*, Captain Charles Ekins and John Bligh, and the 64s *Ruby* and *Agamemnon*, Captains John Draper and Jonas Rose. These ships had sailed from Portsmouth on the 6th, just four days after the Emperor of Russia's hostile declaration against England had been received by the British government. Of this declaration, and of that which speedily followed it, we shall reserve any remarks we may have to make, until the next year's operations in the Baltic come under our notice. It may suffice to state here, that the Russian squadron, under Vice-admiral Seniavin,

remained safe blocked up in the Tagus on the last day of the present year.

Light Squadrons and Single Ships.

On the 6th of January the British 38-gun frigate *Impérieuse*, Captain Lord Cochrane, while passing the basin of Arcasson to the southward of the Gironde, on her way to join the squadron of Commodore Keats off Chasseron lighthouse, detached her boats, under the orders of Lieutenant David Mapleton, assisted by midshipmen the Honourable William John Napier and Mr. Houston Stewart, and assistant-surgeon George Gilbert to bring out of the basin whatever vessels might be found there. As a preliminary step, Lieutenant Mapleton attacked and carried Fort Roquette, which was intended for the defence of the entrance to the inlet. A large quantity of military stores was there destroyed, four long 36-pounders, two field-pieces and a 13-inch mortar spiked, the platoons and carriages burnt, and the fort laid in ruins; and, as a proof that this enterprise was as judiciously as it was gallantly conducted, not a man of the party was hurt. In his letter on this subject Lord Cochrane mentions the capture or destruction of several French merchant-vessels, but it does not appear that any were found in the basin of Arcasson.

On the 21st of January, at daybreak, the British 18-pounder 32-gun frigate *Galatea*, Captain George Sayer, cruising off the coast of Caraccas on the Spanish main, discovered from the mast-head a sail in the south-east, steering for La Guayra; but which sail soon altered her course for Barcelona. At noon, the frigate then nearly becalmed, the stranger was made out to be an enemy's man-of-war brig, and was, in fact, the French brig-corvette *Lynx*, mounting fourteen 24-pounder carronades and two long eights, with a complement of 161 men and boys, commanded by Lieutenant de vaisseau Jean-Mathieu Fargenel, from Guadaloupe, bound to the Caraccas with despatches. At this time, having the advantage of a light land wind, and assisted by her sweeps, the *Lynx* was fast leaving the *Galatea*; so much so, that at 2 P.M. the brig's topgallantsails, as viewed from the frigate, were scarcely above the horizon. Still, shut in as the brig was between the frigate and the coast, Captain Sayer conceived that he might obtain possession of her by the assistance of his boats.

Accordingly, at a very few minutes past 2 P.M., six boats, containing five officers, 50 seamen, and 20 marines, 75 in all,

and placed under the command of first Lieutenant William Coombe (left leg of wood), pushed off from the ship in the following order, each boat taking the one next to her in tow : short gig, commanding officer's name unknown ; long gig, master's mate John Green ; green cutter, third Lieutenant Robert Gibson ; pinnace, second Lieutenant Henry Walker ; barge, Lieutenant Coombe ; and launch, master's mate Barry Sarsfield. The brig, at this time, was to the eastward of Cape Codera, which bore from the frigate south-east distant about four leagues. At 3 P.M. finding that the boats gained very little on the brig, Lieutenant Coombe directed them to separate and make the best of their way, with the exception, that no boat, without orders, was to row ahead of the barge. At 6 P.M. the *Lynx* bore east-south-east distant about four leagues. Mr. Green in the long gig now advanced ahead to reconnoitre, with orders by all means to keep sight of the brig, and, in the event of its growing dark, to hoist a light.

At 8 h. 30 m. P.M. Lieutenant Coombe's boat, having got within musket-shot of the chase, lay to on her oars, that the men might arm, and in order to give the sternmost boats time to come up. The long gig now joined, with a confirmation of the warlike character of the enemy, and that she was under all sail, with sweeps out. In 10 minutes more the sternmost boats, except the short gig, got up, and began also to arm and prepare for the attack : which was to be made in two lines ; the lee line, consisting of the barge, pinnace, and long gig, was to board on the starboard quarter, and the weather line, consisting of the green cutter and launch, on the larboard quarter ; and the boats of both lines to steer close in between the sweeps and the brig's sides.

In this order, the five boats (the short gig left behind) undauntingly advanced. At 8 h. 50 m. Lieutenant Coombe, being within pistol-shot of the *Lynx*, then with a light land wind going about two knots an hour, hailed her twice, but received no answer. The British instantly gave three cheers, and in another five minutes were close alongside the French brig. The latter, having trained her guns aft in readiness, repulsed the assailants with a heavy fire of cannon and musketry, wounding, among others, Lieutenant Coombe, by a musket-bullet which passed through the muscular part of his left or legless thigh. A second attempt was made to board, with no better success than the first. The boats now dropped and poured through the brig's stern and quarter-ports a destructive fire of musketoons

and small arms, which cleared the deck of many officers and men who had crowded aft to repel the boarders.

Having succeeded thus far, the boats again dashed alongside. After an arduous struggle, in which Lieutenant Walker fell dead of his third wound, the British gained the brig's deck. The latter now became the scene of a most desperate and bloody conflict, which, in about five minutes, terminated in favour of the boarders; but not until they had strewed the deck with dead and wounded Frenchmen, and driven the remainder, some upon the bowsprit and jib-boom, and others up the shrouds and down the hatchway. Thus, in about 15 minutes from the first attempt to board, were the Galatea's boats in possession of the French brig-corvette, in chase of which they had been seven hours pulling, part of the time under a burning sun. Just as the action was over the short gig joined.

The loss sustained by the British in achieving this truly gallant exploit was very severe. The killed consisted of Lieutenant Walker, five seamen, and three marines; the severely wounded of Lieutenant Coombe, master's-mate Sarsfield, one petty-officer, five seamen, and three marines; and the slightly wounded, of master's mate Green, one petty-officer, eight seamen and one marine: total, nine killed and 22 wounded; including four out of the five officers who had commanded the boats, and comprising nearly half the number of British present in the action. The short gig, it will be observed, was absent, with at least five men, and one to keep each remaining boat would leave 65 for boarding the brig.

The loss among the Frenchmen was also severe. The Lynx, out of a complement, as acknowledged by themselves, of 161 men and boys, had her third-lieutenant (late captain of the Buonaparte privateer, and since restored to his former rank in the French navy), 13 petty-officers, seamen, and soldiers killed, her captain, first-lieutenant (both badly), four other officers, and 14 petty-officers, seamen, and soldiers wounded, the greater part of them badly; total, 14 killed and 20 wounded.

Having secured the private signals and the magazine, Lieutenant Coombe gave orders to get the wounded off the deck, the dead hove overboard, and the studding-sails hauled down. The sweeps were then brought in-board, and the boats veered astern. By this time a light breeze had sprung up from the south-west, of which immediate advantage was taken, and the brig stood to the northward, in expectation of falling in with the frigate. The prize then hoisted two lights vertical at the mast-head, and fired

several blue-lights, to indicate her situation. Such, however, had been the distance of the Galatea at the period of the attack, that the latter did not make her appearance until 2 A.M., on the 22nd. Signals of recognition having been exchanged between the two vessels, Lieutenant Gibson, at 3 A.M., was despatched to Captain Sayer with information of the successful result of the enterprise; and at 5 A.M., the Lynx and Galatea were within a few fathoms of each other.

When all the circumstances of this boat-attack are taken into consideration, no one will dispute that, although in a few instances it may have been equalled, it has never been surpassed. The distance which the boats had to pull, the shutting in of day, and the loss of sight of their ship, the great force of the enemy, his determined resistance, and the heavy loss which it inflicted on the assailants, required a considerable share of courage to sustain, and of skill and valour to overcome. The prize, too, was not an armed merchant-vessel or privateer, but a national brig of war, fully manned, mounted, and equipped, and, no slight advantage, under sail and going two knots through the water when the British attacked her. Nor did the difficulties end with the contest. There were less than 50 British to overawe and keep in subjection, during an anxious period of nearly six hours, more than 120 Frenchmen. The Lynx, being a fine vessel of 337 tons, and only two years old, was purchased for the use of the British navy. A Lynx, however, being already in the service, the name of the prize was changed to the *Heureux*; and her first commander was he who had the best right to her, the gallant William Coombe.

On the 27th of January, at daylight, Soramme river on the coast of Guayana bearing south by east distant 26 miles, the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate Jason, Captain Thomas Cochran, descried and chased a ship and brig, evidently cruisers, about six miles upon her weather-beam. At 10 h. 15 m. A.M. the Jason brought the ship to action, and presently compelled her to haul down her colours. The prize proved to be the late British sloop of war *Favourite*, mounting 16 long 6-pounders and two 12-pounder carronades on the main deck, and eleven 12-pounder carronades on the quarter-deck and fore-castle; total, 29 guns, all English caliber, with a complement of 150 men, commanded by Lieutenant de vaisseau Gabriel-Etienne-Louis Le Marant-Kerdaniel. The brig in her company, when first chased, was a corvette of 14 brass 8-pounders and 120 men.

On the 26th of January, late in the evening, the 18-gun ship-

sloop Lark, Captain Robert Nicholas, cruising off the Spanish main, chased, and early on the 27th captured, two Spanish garda-costa schooners; one the Postillon, of one long 12-pounder, two 6-pounders, and 76 men, the other the Carmen, of one 12-pounder, four 6-pounders, and 72 men, each commanded by a lieutenant of the Spanish navy.

On the 1st of February, having the prizes in company, with 10 men in each, the Lark discovered a convoy of market-boats, protected by two gun-boats and an armed schooner. The market-boats ran on shore; but the gun-boats and schooner sought refuge in a creek of Zispata bay, protected by a four-gun battery. The Lark followed these vessels into the bay, and soon silenced the fort. Not being able, owing to the shallowness of the water, to enter the creek, the Lark anchored off the mouth of it; and, taking with him the whole of the sloop's remaining officers and crew, amounting to about 100 men and boys, Captain Nicholas proceeded up the creek in his boat. The Spaniards, relying upon their numbers, rowed out to meet the British, and, until the latter closed, kept up a resolute fire. They then fled. Captain Nicholas seized this opportunity of boarding with his single boat the sternmost gun-vessel, carrying one long 24 and two 6 pounders. The vessel ran on shore, but was carried after a desperate resistance; by which, out of 16 men in the captain's boat, three were dangerously, and himself severely, wounded.

All further success was now at an end; for, in following the other gun-boat and the armed schooner up the creek, the pilot missed the channel, and ran the two garda-costa prizes on shore. As there was no prospect of getting the vessels afloat, the action was continued in that situation until 5 P.M. Mr. Richard Pound the purser, and two men, being now added to the list of wounded, Captain Nicholas gave up the attempt, and directed Lieutenant John Bull to destroy the two schooners, and cover the retreat of the boats; a service which he effectually executed.

On the 14th of February the British 20-gun ship Bacchante Captain James Richard Dacres, and 18-pounder 32-gun frigate Mediator, Captain William Furlong Wise, cruising off Cape Raphael, island of St. Domingo, captured the French national schooner Dauphin, of one long 12 and (when chased but since thrown overboard) two 4 pounders, with a crew of 71 men. It was now decided to make an attack upon the adjacent fort of Samana, a notorious nest for privateers. For this purpose the prize was to be sent in under French colours, and the Mediator,

an Indiaman purchased into the service, and so far well adapted for deception, disguised as a neutral.

In this way the schooner, the frigate, and the 20-gun ship stood through the intricate channel into the harbour; and, so well was the stratagem conducted, and so skilfully were the *Mediator* and *Bacchante* piloted by their respective masters, that these vessels anchored within half a mile of the fort of Samana before they were discovered. The fort, which was manned chiefly by privateersmen, then commenced firing, and the *Mediator*, whose situation was the nearest, and *Bacchante*, fired in return. After the mutual cannonade had continued four hours, Captain Wise, assisted by Lieutenants Henry Loraine Baker, John Norton, and — Shaw, proceeded with the boats of the two ships, and gallantly stormed, and without any further loss carried, the fort.

In the harbour were found an American ship and an English schooner, prizes to the privateers belonging to the port; also two French schooners, fitting for sea as cruisers. Considering the heavy fire maintained by the fort, and its commanding situation, the British loss was not so great as might have been expected. It amounted to one master's mate (Thomas H. M'Kenzie) and two seamen of the *Bacchante* wounded, and two seamen killed, and 13 seamen and one marine wounded on board the *Mediator*; total, two killed and 16 wounded.

On the 1st of March, while the British 50-gun ship *Glatton*, Captain Thomas Seccombe, and 14-gun brig *Hirondelle*, Lieutenant George A. E. Skinner, were at anchor off the island of Tenedos in the Archipelago, information was received that one of the annual Turkish ships from Alexandria to Constantinople, was at anchor in the port of Sigri. Captain Seccombe immediately despatched the boats of the *Glatton*, under the orders of Lieutenant Edward Watson, assisted by lieutenant of marines Charles A. Trusson and George Augustus Edward Sandwith, and covered by the *Hirondelle*, to cut out the vessel. In this service the boats fully succeeded, but with the loss of Lieutenant Watson and four men killed, and nine wounded. The ship had formerly been a French corvette of 18 guns, 10 of which she at this time mounted.

On the 15th of March the British 22-gun ship *Comus*, Captain Conway Shipley, cruising off the island of Grand Canaria, sent her boats, under the orders of Lieutenants George Edward Watts and Hood Knight, assisted by Lieutenant of marines George Campbell, to cut out some vessels in the harbour of

Puerta de Haz. In this the party completely succeeded, without incurring any greater loss than one person (Lieutenant Campbell) wounded, although the vessels, which consisted of six merchant-brigs, were moored near to, and defended by the cross fire of, three batteries.

On the 8th of May Captain Shipley again sent his boats, three in number, into Grand Canaria, commanded as before by Lieutenants Watts and Hood, to whom master's mate Jeaffreson Miles was this time added. The object of attack was a large armed felucca, lying under the protection of a strong fort and two batteries. Notwithstanding the fire from these, as well as of musketry from between 30 and 40 soldiers sent to assist in her defence, Lieutenant Watts, in his single boat, most gallantly boarded the felucca, and nearly cleared her decks before the two remaining boats from bad pulling were enabled to get up. On their arrival the vessel was quickly carried.

The cables of the vessel, which proved to be a Spanish packet from Cadiz to Buenos Ayres, were now cut; and, as the enemy had used the precaution to carry her sails and rudder on shore, the boats began taking her in tow. Just at that moment a hawser, fast under water astern, was manned in the fort, and, before it could be cut, the vessel was dragged nearly under the muzzles of the guns. An exceedingly heavy fire then commenced, and was continued from all the batteries until the vessel got out of sight. This very gallant enterprise was performed with the comparatively trifling loss of one man killed and five wounded, including Lieutenant Watts himself severely in several places, but not dangerously. Of the Spanish troops, 21 were made prisoners, including 18 wounded: the remainder, except a few who swam on shore, were killed. For his gallantry on this occasion, Lieutenant Watts was soon afterwards promoted to the rank of commander.

Between England and the United States of America, a spirit of animosity, caused chiefly by the impressment of British seamen, or of seamen asserted to be such, from on board of American merchant-vessels, had long unhappily subsisted. It is, we believe, an acknowledged maxim of public law, as well that no nation, but the one he belongs to, can release a subject from his natural allegiance, as that, provided the jurisdiction of another independent state be not infringed, every nation has a right to enforce the services of her subjects, wherever they may be found. Nor has any neutral nation such a jurisdiction over her merchant-vessels upon the high seas, as to exclude a bel-

ligerent nation from the right of searching them for contraband of war, or for the property or persons of her enemies. And, if in the exercise of that right the belligerent should discover on board of the neutral vessel a subject who has withdrawn himself from his lawful allegiance, the neutral can have no fair ground for refusing to deliver him up; more especially, if that subject is proved to be a deserter from the sea or land service of the former.

When, by the maritime ascendancy of England, France could no longer trade for herself, America proffered her services, as a neutral, to trade for her; and American merchants and their agents, in the gains that flowed in, soon found a compensation for all the perjury and fraud necessary to cheat the former out of her belligerent rights. The high commercial importance of the United States, thus acquired, coupled with a similarity in language, and to a superficial observer, a resemblance in person, between the natives of America and of Great Britain, has occasioned the former to be the principal, if not the only, sufferers by the exercise of the right of search. Chiefly indebted for their growth and prosperity to emigration from Europe, the United States hold out every allurements to foreigners; particularly to British seamen, whom, by a process peculiar to themselves, they can naturalize, as quickly as a dollar can exchange masters, and a blank form, ready signed and sworn to, be filled up. It is the knowledge of this fact that makes British naval officers, when searching for deserters from their service, so harsh in their scrutiny, and so sceptical of American oaths and asseverations.

The crew of a vessel, armed or unarmed, sailing under the flag of the United States, usually consists of one or more of the following classes: 1. Native American citizens; 2. American citizens, wherever born, who were such at the definitive treaty of peace in 1783; 3. Foreigners in general, who may or may not have become citizens of America subsequently to the treaty in question; 4. Deserters from the British army or navy, whether natives of Britain or of any other country.

To the first class Great Britain cannot have the shadow of a right; and, from such of the second as were British born, she barred herself by the treaty acknowledging the independence of the revolted colonies. Of the third class, the only portion which England can have any pretension to seize, are the subjects of the power or powers with whom she may be at war, and her own native subjects. With respect to the former, the very

act of entering on board a neutral implies that the foreigner has thrown off his belligerent character ; he is a non-combatant of the most unequivocal description, and, as such, entitled to exemption from seizure. A passenger, especially if a military man, may be an exception.

With respect to her own subjects serving on board neutral vessels, Great Britain claims a right to take them, because she considers that they owe to her an allegiance previous and paramount to that exacted of them by the neutral. There can hardly be a doubt, as it appears to us, that a belligerent may take her native seafaring subjects from a neutral merchant-vessel. We shall not, however, stop to discuss a subject that branches into so many ramifications, but proceed to the fourth class, deserters from the British army or navy. If such deserter owes a natural allegiance to the nation on board of whose vessel he is serving, he is in his proper place, and no other nation has a right to molest him. If he owes no natural allegiance to either, the right of present possession may be allowed to step in, and decide the claim on behalf of the neutral. If, on the contrary, the nation that claims him as a deserter, can claim him also as a native subject, surely that nation, a belligerent too, has a right to withdraw him from the service of the neutral. Having submitted these few remarks, we shall proceed to relate one or two occurrences to which they will be found closely to apply.

In consequence of the two French 74-gun ships *Patriote* and *Eole* lying at anchor in one of the rivers of the Chesapeake,¹ it became necessary that a small British force should be stationed off the coast, to watch their motions. At the commencement of the present year that force consisted of the two 74-gun ships *Bellona* and *Triumph*, Captains John Erskine Douglas and Sir Thomas Masterman Hardy, Bart. ; with a few smaller vessels. At this time the British store-ship (a reduced 44) *Chichester*, Captain Edward Stopford, lay alongside the navy-wharf at Gosport, Virginia ; where she had been hove down to be repaired, in consequence of having got on shore in the vicinity of Hampton roads.

Early in the month of February Captain Saunders, the commandant of Fort Nelson, with one sergeant, one corporal, and four privates, all under arms, proceeded to the lodgings of Captain Stopford near the wharf, and demanded to have three men, represented to have deserted from the fort, and to be then

¹ See p. 117.

on board the *Chichester*, restored to him. Captain Stopford went with the party to the *Chichester*; and, after a long search, the deserters were found, and delivered to the American commandant, who immediately marched them to the fort. "Captain Stopford," says a sergeant of marines belonging to the *Bellona*, examined at the court-martial which will hereafter be noticed, "directed Mr. Brookes, one of the midshipmen of the ship, to be confined, for telling Captain Saunders that he thought it was not right to give up their deserters, when they would not give up ours."

As the three men, thus taken out of a British ship-of-war, were all natives of Great Britain, one born at Londonderry, another at Manchester, and a third in some part of the United Kingdom, we must suppose that they were delivered up because the *Chichester*, circumstanced as she was, had no means of opposing force to force. It was therefore the prevalence of power over right; and that, be it recollected on the part of the most vehement of all sticklers for right, the United States of America. Nay, at the very time of this occurrence, five marines and soldiers, all British-born subjects, had deserted from the *Chichester*; and three or four of them, with the British uniform on their backs, had since enlisted in the American land service, and been repeatedly seen by their late comrades, wearing the American military uniform. It was to these five deserters from the *Chichester*, that the young midshipman so spiritedly alluded. To the repeated demands made by Captain Douglas for the restoration of these men, the only answer obtained was, that, if any deserters had entered the American service, they had been sent with a detachment into the country; which was likely enough.

But the *Chichester* was not the only British ship in the Chesapeake, whose men deserted to the United States and were refused to be delivered up. The *Bellona*, *Belleisle*, and *Triumph* 74s, *Melampus* frigate, and the 16-gun ship-sloop *Halifax*, Captain Lord James Townshend, had each a similar complaint to make. The case of the last-named ship deserves particular mention. On the 7th of March, at 6 p.m., as the *Halifax* was lying in Hampton roads, the jollyboat, with midshipman Robert Turner and five men, was sent to weigh a kedge-anchor, which had been dropped for swinging the ship. Profiting by the thickness of the weather, the men took the boat from the midshipman and pulled with her towards the shore. Mr. Turner hailed the ship repeatedly until silenced by William Hill, a

native of Philadelphia, who threatened to murder him if he did not desist. The boat soon afterwards reached Sewel's Point, and the five men jumped out of her, leaving the midshipman to get back to the Halifax in the best manner he could. One of the men has already been named. The remainder were, Richard Hubert, born in Liverpool; Henry Saunders, born in Greenock; George North, born in Kinsale; and Jenkin Ratford, born in London.

At this time the United States 36-gun frigate Chesapeake, Captain Charles Gordon, bearing the broad pendant of Commodore James Barron, was at an anchor in Hampton roads, fitting to proceed to the Mediterranean; and a rendezvous for seamen, under the command of Lieutenant Arthur Sinclair, was open for her at the town of Norfolk. To this rendezvous, on the 9th, the five British deserters made their way, and all enlisted themselves to serve on board of the Chesapeake. On the day previous the British consul at Norfolk, Colonel John Hamilton, had been officially informed of the desertion of these men. So that Lieutenant Sinclair must have been acquainted with the circumstance; and, as a proof that he suspected a demand would be made for their restoration, this conscientious officer asked each of the men if he had not "a second name." Either he, or some one else, soon furnished, we have no doubt, the whole of the men with second names. At all events it was afterwards clearly proved, that Jenkin Ratford had been entered in the Chesapeake's books by the name of Wilson.

Lieutenant James Masters of the Halifax, who had been sent to give information to the British consul, saw the five deserters parading the streets of Norfolk with the recruiting party of the Chesapeake. On the 10th Captain Lord James Townshend went himself to the Chesapeake's rendezvous at Norfolk, and, presenting a list of names, asked Lieutenant Sinclair, if those five men, or any of them, had entered for his frigate. The lieutenant replied, as well he might, that none had entered "by those names," and referred the British captain to the magistrates. The magistrates were applied to, and so was the mayor, and so was Captain Decatur, but all in vain. Lord James afterwards met Ratford and Saunders in the street. The latter would have returned, but Ratford dissuaded him, and abused his late captain in the grossest manner. Lord James went again to Lieutenant Sinclair, and stated that, if the latter would allow him to go into the rendezvous, he, Lord James, would point out the deserters; but the American lieutenant refused to permit him.

A representation of all these circumstances was forthwith made to Vice-admiral the Honourable George Cranfield Berkeley, the British commander-in-chief on the North-American station, then residing at Halifax, Nova Scotia; and in the early part of June the 50-gun ship *Leopard*, Captain Salusbury Pryce Humphreys, the vice-admiral's flag-ship, sailed from Halifax for the Chesapeake, with an order, dated on the 1st of the month, and addressed to the different captains and commanders under the vice-admiral's command, directing, that, in case of meeting the American frigate *Chesapeake* at sea, and without the limits of the United States, they were to show to her captain that order, and to require to search his ship for deserters from the "*Belleisle*, *Bellona*, *Triumph*, *Chichester*, *Halifax*, and *Zenobia cutter*," and were to proceed and search for the same; and that, if a similar demand should be made by the American, he was to be permitted to search for any deserters from the United States service, "according to the customs and usage of civilized nations on terms of peace and amity with each other."

On the 21st, at 8 A.M., the *Leopard* arrived off Cape Henry, and, running up Lynnhaven bay, anchored about noon in company with the *Bellona* and *Melampus*. On the 22nd, at 4 A.M., the *Leopard* weighed and made sail, and at 6 A.M., re-anchored about three miles to the northward of Cape Henry lighthouse, in company with the *Triumph*. At 7 h. 15 m. A.M. the United States frigate *Chesapeake* weighed and put to sea from Hampton roads, with a moderate breeze at west-south-west and at 9 A.M. passed the *Bellona* and *Melampus* in Lynnhaven bay: whereupon the *Bellona* made a signal to the *Leopard*, to weigh and reconnoitre in the south-east by east. At 9 h. 15 m. A.M. the latter did weigh and make sail in the direction prescribed, and at the same time observed the *Chesapeake* about three miles astern. At 1 P.M., the wind shifted to south-east, and obliged both ships to beat out. At 3 P.M., having arrived off Cape Henry, at the distance of between four and five leagues from the land, the *Leopard* bore down to speak the *Chesapeake*, then about two miles distant.

The wind being light, it was not until 3 h. 27 m. P.M. that the *Leopard* arrived within hail of the *Chesapeake*, Cape Henry, by the latter's account, then bearing north-west by north distant three leagues.¹ Captain Humphreys, hailing, said he had despatches from the British commander-in-chief. The answer to this was: "Send them on board; I shall heave to." This the

¹ Commodore Barron's Letter.

Chesapeake accordingly did. At 3 h. 32 m. P.M. the Leopard also hove to; and in a few minutes Lieutenant John Meade went on board the Chesapeake, bearing, in addition to Vice-admiral Berkeley's order already recited, a letter from Captain Humphreys to Commodore Barron, adverting to the order enclosed, and expressing a hope that every circumstance might be amicably adjusted. At 4 h. 15 m. P.M., the boat not making her appearance, the Leopard recalled her by signal, and in six minutes Lieutenant Meade returned with Commodore Barron's reply, the commencing words of which are: "I know of no such men as you describe. The officers, that were on the recruiting service for this ship, were particularly instructed from the government, through me, not to enter any deserters from his Britannic majesty's ships; nor do I know of any being here." The commodore then states, that his instructions are, not to permit the crew of his ship to be mustered by any but her own officers, that he wishes to preserve harmony, and that he hopes his answer will prove satisfactory.

The Leopard now edged down nearer to the Chesapeake; and Captain Humphreys, again hailing, said: "Commodore Barron, you must be aware of the necessity I am under of complying with the orders of my commander-in-chief." After the hail had been twice repeated, the only reply returned was: "I do not understand what you say." Yet these words were distinctly heard by the hailing ship, and she was to windward. Resolved no longer to be trifled with, and observing on board the American frigate indications of intended resistance, the Leopard discharged a shot across the Chesapeake's fore-foot. In a minute's time a second shot was fired; and in two minutes more, or at 4 h. 30 m. P.M., nothing but evasive answers being returned to the hails of Captain Humphreys, the Leopard poured in her broadside. Commodore Barron then hailed. Upon this orders were given to cease firing; but, as the purport of the hail was only to intimate that he would send a boat on board the Leopard, and as the Chesapeake was now clearly seen making preparations to return the fire, the thing was considered to be an artifice to gain time, and the Leopard renewed her fire. The Chesapeake returned a few straggling shot, not one of which struck her opponent; and, at 4 h. 45 m. P.M., just as the Leopard had fired her third broadside, the American frigate hauled down her colours. As a proof that we have not underrated the Chesapeake's resistance, Commodore Barron, in his official letter, says: "Our resistance was but feeble." The log of the Chesa-

peake also says: "Having one gun ready, fired and hauled down her colours." And, in further confirmation, the *Leopard's* log states, that her fire was returned by only a few guns. Almost immediately after the surrender of the American frigate, her fifth-lieutenant, Mr. Sidney Smith, came on board the *Leopard*, with a verbal message from Commodore Barron, signifying that he considered the *Chesapeake* to be the *Leopard's* prize.

At 5 P.M. Lieutenants Gordon Thomas Falcon, George Martin Guise, and John Meade, with several petty-officers and men, went on board the *Chesapeake*, to fulfil the object of Vice-admiral Berkeley's orders. The books of the *Chesapeake* were produced, and the crew mustered. One only of the five men that had deserted from the *Halifax* was found, Jenkin Ratford. He was dragged out of the coal-hole, and, on being brought to the quarter-deck, declared that he was an American, his name Wilson, and that he had never belonged to the *Halifax*. Unfortunately for him, the *Leopard's* purser, Mr. Abraham Preston, who had discharged Ratford into the *Halifax*, was present, and fully identified him. Three deserters from the *Melampus* frigate were also seized: William Ware, and Daniel Martin (a black man), the one born in Maryland, the other in Massachusetts, United States, and both pressed by the *Melampus* from an American brig in the bay of Biscay; also John Strachan, stated to have been born in Maryland, but of which there was some doubt. He had been pressed by the *Melampus* out of an English Guineaman, off Cape Finisterre, but had entered almost immediately afterwards.

Although about 12 other British subjects were mustered on board the *Chesapeake*, all known to be deserters from British ships-of-war, the above four men were all that were taken out of her. With these, at 7 h. 30 m. P.M., the *Leopard's* boat returned to the ship; bringing also Lieutenant William Henry Allen of the *Chesapeake*, with a letter from Commodore Barron, again offering to deliver up the frigate as a prize. To this Captain Humphreys replied, that, having fulfilled his instructions, he had nothing more to desire, but must proceed to rejoin his squadron. He then tendered assistance, and deplored the extremity to which he had been compelled to resort. At 8 P.M. the *Leopard* made sail towards Lynnhaven bay; and shortly afterwards the *Chesapeake* did the same towards Hampton roads.

Unfortunately this encounter, although bloodless to the

Leopard, was not so to the Chesapeake; the latter having had three seamen killed, the commodore, one midshipman (James Broom), and eight seamen and marines slightly, and eight severely, wounded. It was afterwards reported, that two of the four remaining deserters from the Halifax were among the three men killed; but, as all the deserters, except perhaps Hill, he being a native American, appear to have been accommodated by their new masters with "second names," there is no getting at the fact from the returns, in which the names of the killed are, John Lawrence, James Arnold, and John Sheckley.

According to the items in the numerous "surveys" held upon the occasion, the three broadsides of the Leopard lodged 22 round shot in the Chesapeake's hull, irreparably injured her fore and main masts, badly wounded her mizenmast, cut away 13 lower shrouds and stays, shattered the foresail, mainsail, maintopsail, and foretopmast staysail, injured and rendered unfit for service a spare foretopmast, and another spare spar, and damaged two boats. In addition, as appears by her log-minutes, the Chesapeake had three feet and a half water in the hold. Three more such broadsides would have sunk her. And yet a writer in the "Naval Monument," an American publication, jeers the British for having done so little injury to the Chesapeake.

Although more than 60 years have elapsed since the British 50-gun ship has been excluded from the line of battle, Commodore Barron found it convenient to make "a line-of-battle ship" of the Leopard. Her real force will show how little she was entitled to that appellation. The Leopard's armament, upon the first and second decks, was precisely the same as mounted by other ships of her class; namely, 22 long 24, and the same number of long 12-pounders. Upon her quarter-deck and fore-castle, she mounted six carronades, 24-pounders, and two long 9-pounders, total 52 guns, besides an 18-pounder launch carronade. The Leopard had her full complement on board, consisting of 318 men and 25 boys; she had also on board, as passengers, 10 artillery-men, and three midshipmen, belonging to some of the ships on the coast.

The Chesapeake measured 1135 tons, and at this time mounted 28 long 18-pounders upon the main deck, 14 carronades, 32-pounders, leaving a vacant port on each side, upon the quarter-deck, and two carronades, 32-pounders, and two long 12-pounders, leaving three vacant ports on each side, upon the fore-castle; total 46 guns. This was the ship's peace establish-

ment. The books of the Chesapeake bore the names of 440: but, among these, were 25 runnings and discharges. Consequently her actual complement consisted of 415; and, included in that number, were 10 boys or lads. There were also several passengers on board, going to the Mediterranean. That the Chesapeake had at least five lieutenants, appears by the signature of her "5th lieutenant" to several of the official documents relating to the action.

From this statement of the force of the two ships, it is clear that, had it not been for the unprepared state of the Chesapeake, the superiority of force on the part of the Leopard would only have been nominal. The American frigate threw a greater weight of shot in broadside, carried full 50 more men, and was nearly 100 tons larger, than the British "line-of-battle ship."

Notwithstanding that, in his note to Captain Humphreys, Commodore Barron disclaimed all knowledge of any deserters being on board the Chesapeake, Jenkin Ratford himself declared, at his trial, that both the commodore and Captain Gordon mustered the crew soon after the deserters from the Halifax had arrived on board. And even, in his official letter, the commodore admits, that three of the four men had been claimed as deserters, thus:—"They (the Leopard's officers) called on the purser, who delivered his book, when the men were examined, and the three men demanded at Washington, and one man more, were taken away."

It was these "three men demanded at Washington" that, on two accounts, weakened the claim of the British. In the first place, the *Melampus* is not one of the ships named in the published copy of Vice-admiral Berkeley's order. Consequently the Leopard's captain, in taking away men who had deserted from the *Melampus*, exceeded what appear to have been his written instructions. And yet it is not improbable, that Captain Humphreys had received orders (perhaps verbal ones) to demand and take the *Melampus's* deserters, because Vice-admiral Berkeley officially declares to the former, that, throughout the whole of the transaction with the Chesapeake, he conducted himself most properly. In the next place, those very three men were all, as has already appeared, natives of the United States. Consequently, whether they had or had not deserted from the British, they were, if the position we have advanced is a tenable one, justly detained by the Americans.

This is the ground taken by the American president; and accordingly, in his proclamation of date July 2, interdicting all

British ships-of-war from entering the ports of the United States, Mr. Jefferson says: "This enormity was not only without provocation or justifiable cause, but was committed with the avowed purpose of taking by force, from a ship-of-war of the United States, a part of her crew; and, that no circumstance might be wanting to mark its character, it had been previously ascertained that the seamen demanded were natives of the United States." The assertion here made about the want of provocation, or of justifiable cause, is in the usual strain of American invective, where the British are the accused. Not so if the French offend; for, as a Boston newspaper informs us, when in the summer of the same year 1807, the United States sloop-of-war *Hornet* lay in the port of Lorient, a French officer and a party of men went on board, and seized and carried off five Frenchmen, naturalized citizens of the United States, and who had been several years in the American naval service; but not a murmur was heard on the subject.

The statement respecting the birthplace of "the seamen demanded" is, and was probably meant to be, equivocal. If it refers to the "three men demanded at Washington," the assertion may be true; but, if to the whole of the deserters demanded of Commodore Barron, it is not so. The officers of the *Leopard*, we must own, would have given a fairer colour to the transaction; they would, indeed, have deprived the American president of the power of dwelling, with any effect, upon its "enormity," had they left the *Melampus's* three men where they found them, and taken an equal number, or the whole if they pleased, of the 12 British subjects, also composing a part of the crew of the *Chesapeake*, and, to strengthen the former's claim upon them, also deserters from British ships-of-war.

All four of the recovered seamen, namely, the one belonging to the *Halifax* and the three to the *Melampus*, were tried at Halifax, Nova Scotia, on the 26th of August, 1807. Jenkin Ratford was found guilty of mutiny, desertion, and contempt, and hanged at the fore yard-arm of the *Halifax*, the ship from which he had deserted. The three remaining prisoners were also found guilty of desertion, and sentenced to receive each 500 lashes; but the men were afterwards pardoned.

The account of the attack upon the *Chesapeake* reached London on the 26th of July; and on the 2nd of August, before any demand for redress had been made by the American minister in London, the British government caused to be conveyed to the latter, a disavowal of the right to search ships in

the national service of any state for deserters, and a promise of suitable reparation for the unauthorized act of the British officer. On the 6th Mr. Munroe transmitted to his government the note of Mr. Secretary Canning; and on the same or the following day arrived American newspapers, with Mr. Jefferson's interdictory proclamation. Encouraged by the proclamation, the citizens of the United States, especially along the shores of Chesapeake bay, treated everything that was British with the greatest indignity: they destroyed 200 water casks belonging to the *Melampus*, and committed numerous outrages of a similar description. This showed that the offer of redress had been prematurely made; particularly when coupled with Mr. Munroe's instructions, received soon afterwards, and submitted to the British government.

Notwithstanding the violent conduct of the United States, as made known by their newspapers, and by the introduction, in the American minister's note, of subjects foreign to the immediate cause of complaint, the British government, by a public instrument, dated on the 16th of October, and entitled, "A proclamation for recalling and prohibiting seamen from serving foreign princes and states," declared, that the claim to the seizure of deserters from the national ships of other powers could not again be brought forward by British naval officers. In addition to all this, Vice-admiral Berkeley, the officer who had issued the order to search the Chesapeake, was recalled from his command; and at a subsequent day, two (one having died) of the three deserters from the *Melampus*, being, as before stated, natives of the United States of America, were sent back to their country.

On the 19th of April, the British gun-brig *Richmond*, Lieutenant Samuel Scudamore Heming, working up towards Cape Mandigo, on the coast of Portugal, discovered a lugger with Spanish colours flying, at anchor in a little bay about six leagues to the northward of Peruche. Lieutenant Heming immediately began preparations for destroying her, and, in the evening as soon as it was dark, detached the gig and jolly-boat, with Sub-lieutenant George Bush and boatswain's mate Ebenezer Lyons. The two boats pulled boldly into the bay, and in the face of a heavy fire, which wounded three of the men, boarded and carried the lugger privateer *Galliard*, of four 4-pounders and 36 men; all of whom, except 12, jumped overboard and escaped to the shore.

Deeming it unfair to make use of the labours or good fortune,

of a contemporary without an acknowledgment, and being desirous to set an example to those who have already given proofs, that they require some stronger stimulus than a mere consciousness of doing wrong to deter them from the meanness of plagiarism, we shall again transcribe from the pages of Captain Edward Brenton's work an account of the proceedings of his brother's ship.

“The Spartan frigate of 38 guns, commanded by Captain (now Sir J.) Brenton, met with a severe loss on the 14th of May, off Nice; she had been all day chasing a polacre ship, and at sunset both were becalmed at the distance of about five miles from each other: the vessel appeared to be an unarmed merchant-ship. The boats of the Spartan with the two senior lieutenants, Weir and Williams, and 70 of the best men, pulled alongside in two divisions, and attempted to board her on the bow and quarter with the usual determination and valour of British seamen; but the vessel was defended by a numerous and equally gallant crew, with boarding-nettings and every other means of resistance. The first discharge from their great guns and musketry laid 63 of our brave fellows low, the first and second lieutenants and 26 men being killed or mortally wounded; seven men only remained unhurt. The few remaining hands conducted the boats back to the ship. The narrow escape of one of the men was very remarkable. James Bodie, the cockswain of the barge, was missing. The deceased men were all laid out on the main deck; the wife of Bodie, a beautiful young woman, flew with a lantern from one to the other in search of her husband, but in vain: all the survivors declared that he had undoubtedly perished; they saw him wounded, and fall between the ship and the boat. The poor woman became delirious, got into the barge on the booms, and taking the place lately occupied by Bodie, could with difficulty be moved from it. A few days, with the soothing kindness of the officers and crew, produced a calm, but settled grief. At Malta a subscription of 80 guineas was made for her, and she was sent to her parents in Ireland. Some weeks elapsed when the Spartan spoke a neutral vessel from Nice, and learnt that a polacre had arrived there, after a severe action with the boats of a frigate; that she had beaten them off, and that when they had left her, a wounded Englishman was discovered holding by the rudder chain; he was instantly taken on board, and after being cured of his wounds, sent off to Verdun. Captain Brenton concluding that this could be no other than his cockswain, wrote to his

friends at that depôt, and the fact turned out to be as he had supposed. Mrs. Bodie was made acquainted with the miraculous escape of her husband, who remained a prisoner four years. He was at length restored to his family, and now enjoys a berth on board the Royal Charlotte yacht with his old captain; his wife is with him, and both are highly and deservedly respected.

“Before she had recovered from this misfortune, the Spartan had a narrow escape from capture: proceeding from Palermo towards Toulon, she fell in with a French 74-gun ship, two frigates, and a brig. Captain Brenton determined to watch their motions during the night, and the enemy gave chase to him; at daylight they had got within three miles, but a light breeze springing up, the Spartan ran along the east side of Cabrera, pursued by the ship of the line; the frigates and the corvette went round the west side in hopes of cutting her off, the Spartan lying nearly becalmed, while they were coming up at the rate of seven miles an hour: the headmost frigate being within range, tried single shot, which striking the object, she gave her whole broadside. Captain Brenton would not allow a shot to be returned. In a few minutes the French frigate was involved in a dense cloud of her own smoke, and lay becalmed, while the Spartan, having received very little damage from their shot, kept the breeze, and left her unskilful pursuers to themselves. We notice this fact as a warning to young officers when similarly situated, to confine their whole attention to trimming their sails; for not only does the firing destroy a breeze of wind, but even in fresh gales the motion of the guns, and the men, are unfavourable to the velocity of the ship.”¹

This account, in our opinion, contains a far from unimportant omission, the names of the French ships. That omission we have been enabled to supply. The 74 was the *Annibal*, late British *Hannibal*, captured at Algeiras,² one frigate, the *Pomone*, the other the *Incorruptible*, and the corvette the *Victorieuse*. The captain of one of the frigates is represented to have been afterwards broken by a court-martial at Toulon for his conduct on this occasion; although, we confess, we cannot see upon what ground. The above extract certainly shows none; and we have not been able to find, in any French publication, a word on the subject.

On the 5th of June, at 7 h. 30 m. A.M., the British 38-gun frigate *Pomone*, Captain Robert Barrie, cruising off the *Pertius*

¹ Brenton, vol. iv., p. 159

² See vol. iii., p. 103.

Breton, discovered and chased in the north-east three armed brigs. On approaching near, a convoy was discovered under their escort. At about 9 A.M. the Pomone got within random-shot of one of the brigs, when the wind entirely failed. Having also to tack from the Barges d'Olonne, which she did not do until within 400 yards of them, the Pomone lost all chance of cutting off either of the armed brigs. Some of the frigate's shot reaching the convoy, two, supposed to be naval transports, ran on shore, and a third vessel, a brig, was deserted by her crew. Captain Barrie immediately despatched Lieutenant John Jones, in the six-oared cutter, to take possession, as well of this brig as of any others that were not close to the shore. This service Lieutenant Jones performed with great judgment and gallantry, and fortunately without loss, although the grape from the shore and from the gun-brig passed through and through his boat.

One of the gun-brigs now making a show of sweeping out, Captain Barrie sent Lieutenant James Wallace Gabriel, with three boats, to meet her. As, however, the brig retreated under the protection of the batteries and of the numerous musketry which lined the beach, Lieutenant Gabriel was recalled, and directed to proceed towards St. Gilles; where several vessels, part of the convoy belonging to the three gun-brigs, were observed to be nearly becalmed. With these vessels the lieutenant afterwards came up, and captured 14 of them, without the least resistance, the crews of the vessels, which consisted of brigs, sloops, and chasse-marées, taking to their boats as the British approached.

On the 6th of June the British 14-gun brig Port-d'Espagne, Lieutenant James Pattison Stewart, cruising in the gulf of Paria, detached Lieutenant Hall and 25 men in a prize schooner disguised as a neutral, to attack a Spanish privateer, which, otherwise, there was no chance of overtaking. After exchanging musketry and receiving the fire from her guns, Lieutenant Hall, in a very cool and brave manner, laid the privateer on board, and quickly carried her, although the Mercedes, as was her name, mounted two carriage-guns and two swivels, and had a crew of 30 men. Out of these, three men were killed, one drowned, and three wounded. On the British side two men only were wounded.

On the 30th of April the British 38-gun frigate Uranie, Captain Christopher Laroche, arrived off the port of Cherbourg, to watch the motions of a French 40-gun frigate and brig-corvette,

which had recently come from the arsenal into the road, preparatory to an escape to sea. The frigate was, we believe, the *Département-de-la-Manche*, or, as for brevity she was called, the *Manche*, launched on the 27th of the preceding December, a fine frigate, afterwards captured by the British, and found to measure nearly 1100 tons. The brig was either the *Cigne* or the *Papillon*, of 16 guns. It is but fair to state, that although rating as a 38-gun frigate, the *Uranie*, on account of a recent reduction in her armament, was inferior to any ship of her class. Being an old French ship (the same that captured the *Thames* in 1793¹), the *Uranie* had been found too weak to carry long 18-pounders, and a battery of long 12-pounders had been substituted. Her quarter-deck and fore-castle armament was, we believe, the same as that of her class, 16 carronades, 32-pounders, and two long nines; making her total number of guns 46. Her complement, also, appears to have been the same, 281 men and boys; but the *Uranie* was at this time between 30 and 40 men short.

On the 5th of May, at 2 h. 30 m. p.m., when the *Uranie* lay at an anchor between Cape La Hague and Cherbourg, the French brig came out of the road and stood to the northward, as if to reconnoitre the frigate; but, just as the latter was preparing to slip and go in chase, the brig put back. On the 15th, at 4 h. 30 m. p.m., when the *Uranie*, in company with the 12-gun brig *Rebuff*, Lieutenant John Whiston, was standing towards Cherbourg with the wind at west-north-west, the weather, which had been thick and hazy, suddenly cleared up, and discovered the French frigate and brig, with five launches, standing out. The *Uranie* cleared for action. At 4 h. 45 m. the French vessels stood in shore, and in another quarter of an hour stood out again. The *Uranie* thereupon wore, and hove to on the larboard tack, Cape La Hague west six or eight miles. A thick fog then came on, and concealed the *Manche* and her consort from view. They, in the mean time, had put back to the road.

On the 16th, in the forenoon, the *Uranie* and *Rebuff* again stood in towards Cherbourg; and, on arriving close off the road, the *Uranie* hoisted her colours and fired a gun. On the 6th of June the brig came out through the east passage, and, at 3 p.m., after receiving from the *Uranie* a distant broadside, stood back through the western passage, or that at the opposite extremity of the dike. On the 7th, at 1 h. 35 m. p.m., Cape La Hague south-south-west six or seven leagues, the *Uranie*, then, it ap-

¹ See vol. I., p. 118.

pears, alone, discovered the *Manche* and her consort to the eastward. The *Uranie* having the wind from the westward, bore up under all sail in chase of the French frigate and brig, then standing in; but which, at 3 h. 30 m. P.M., put about and stood for the *Uranie*, as if intending to engage. The *Uranie* shortened sail. At 4 P.M. the two French vessels bore up and made all sail for Cherbourg, followed leisurely by the *Uranie* until 5 P.M., when, having arrived nearly off the mouth of the harbour, the latter hove to.

On the 16th the 12-gun brig *Defender*, Lieutenant George Plowman, joined company. On the 18th, at 10 h. 30 m., just as the *Defender* had been detached to the northward, the *Manche* and her attendant were seen coming out of Cherbourg. The *Defender* was immediately recalled; and the two British vessels, about noon, with the wind at north-west by west, bore up in chase under topsails, topgallantsails, and foresail. At 15 minutes past noon the French frigate and brig tacked towards the British frigate and brig; whereupon the *Uranie* hauled up her foresail. At 1 h. 45 m. P.M. the French vessels tacked in shore, or from the latter. The *Uranie* then set her foresail. At this time the *Manche* had hauled up her courses, with the apparent intention of waiting for the British frigate to close; but the former soon afterwards, still keeping her courses up, edged away towards Cherbourg. The *Uranie* and *Defender* then fired their bow guns, but without effect. It was now perceived that the *Manche*, under topsails and topgallantsails, considerably out-sailed the *Uranie* with her foresail set. Upon this, at 3 h. 20 m. P.M., the two British vessels hauled off, and hove to on the larboard tack, with their heads to the northward.

On the 22nd at noon, Cherbourg south by east three or four leagues, and the wind moderate from the west-north-west, the *Uranie* and *Defender*, then under topsails and topgallantsails, on the starboard or in-shore tack, discovered the *Manche* and brig-corvette coming out of the road, through, we believe, the eastern passage, and standing towards them on the larboard tack. At 40 minutes past noon the *Uranie* tacked to the northward, apparently to speak the *Defender*. At 0 h. 45 m. P.M. the two French vessels tacked in-shore, and in five minutes afterwards Captain Laroche spoke Lieutenant Plowman, and directed him to keep upon the *Uranie*'s weather-quarter. The *Uranie* then tacked in-shore, and at 1 h. 15 m. P.M. the French frigate and brig tacked towards the former. The *Uranie* then set her foresail. At 1 h. 45 m. P.M. the *Manche* and her con-

sort tacked in-shore, and at 2 P.M. bore up. The *Uranie* and *Defender* then bore up in chase. At 2 h. 15 m. P.M. the British frigate set her mainsail, and at 2 h. 40 m. her royals, and was gaining fast on the French vessels, they having little wind in-shore. At 3 h. 20 m. the *Uranie*, followed by the *Defender*, hauled off on the larboard tack, and, having fired her starboard broadside at the enemy without any visible effect, shortened sail and hove to.

It appears that, early in the month of July, the ship's company addressed a letter to the board of admiralty, complaining that their captain had not done his utmost to bring the enemy's frigate to action. As soon as a knowledge of this fact reached the officers, they, as was natural, became alarmed for the character of the ship and themselves, and applied for a court-martial upon Captain Laroche. The court sat at Portsmouth, from the 20th to the 24th of July inclusive. The charges were confined to what took place on the 15th of May and 22nd of June.

As well as we can gather from the brief and imperfect abstract of the proceedings of the trial given in the public prints,¹ the conduct of the *Uranie* on the last-named day was the principal cause of complaint. It is stated that the *Uranie* wore or stood from the enemy for some time, and was an hour before she was ready for action, and that there was great confusion on board; that, had Captain Laroche done his utmost, he might have cut off the corvette, and must have brought the frigate to action if she did not abandon the corvette; and that he passed the enemy's frigate within gun-shot, giving a broadside, and wore, and must have been in close action in a few minutes, if he had chased the frigate and carried all sail.

In his defence Captain Laroche stated, that he had anchored off the road, and had fired at the frigate in defiance; that he had carried all the sail he could with safety to the ship, then on a lee shore, and close in with it; that it behoved him to be cautious, as the *Minerve* had been captured by running ashore upon the same spot;² and that the *Uranie* was foul in her bottom and could not sail, and that, while she carried "only thirty-six 12-pounders, the enemy's frigate carried fifty 18-pounders." Here there must certainly be a mistake. The force of the *Uranie*, as far as we can get at it, has already been stated; and we know that the force of the *Manche*, when captured by the British a year or two afterwards, was officially reported at 44 guns. At all events the sentence pronounced upon the *Uranie's* captain

¹ See *Naval Chronicle*, vol. xviii., p. 158.

² See vol. lii., p. 183.

was: "The charge being in part proved, Captain Laroche is sentenced to be dismissed from the command of his majesty's ship *Uranie*."

On the 6th of August, late in the evening, the British 38-gun frigate *Hydra*, Captain George Mundy, cruising off the coast of Catalonia, chased into the harbour of Begur three armed vessels, a polacre ship, and two polacre brigs. On the following morning, the 7th, the *Hydra* reconnoitred the port, and discovered that the vessels were strongly defended both by nature and art, lying in a narrow harbour, under the close protection of a battery and tower upon a cliff on one side, and of rocks and bushes, admirably calculated for musketry, on the other. But having great faith in the firmness and resources of his people, Captain Mundy resolved to attempt cutting out the vessels.

Accordingly, at 50 minutes past noon, the *Hydra* came to an anchor, with springs on her cables, at the entrance of the harbour, and began the attack. A smart fire was returned by the battery and shipping; but which, after an hour's continuance, began to abate. Perceiving this, Captain Mundy despatched a division of his boats, with 50 seamen and marines, under the command of Lieutenant Edward O'Brien Drury, second of the ship, assisted by Lieutenants of marines John Hayes and Edward Pengelly, midshipman John Finlayson, and captain's clerk (a volunteer) Robert Hendrick Goddard, with orders to land on the flank of the enemy, and drive him from the battery. Notwithstanding the heavy fire kept up by the *Hydra*, the detachments became exposed to a cross discharge of langridge from the shipping and fort, and of musketry from the rocks. Unshaken, however, the British advanced; and, having mounted the cliff, which was of most difficult access, attacked the fort with so much intrepidity, that the enemy, having spiked the guns, consisting of four long 24-pounders, rushed out on one side, as the *Hydra's* officers and men entered at the other.

This gallant achievement enabled the *Hydra* to direct her fire solely at the vessels, which still maintained a steady cannonade upon the party on shore. Leaving Lieutenant Hayes and nearly the whole of the marines in charge of the guns in the battery, with orders to occupy the heights which commanded the decks of the vessels, as well as the opposite side of the harbour, where the enemy was numerously posted, Lieutenant Drury, with the remainder of the marines and the whole of the seamen of his division, advanced towards the town. As soon as the town was cleared, the French crews abandoned their vessels, and, formed

in groups among the rocks and bushes, fired on the seamen, as the latter, having seized the boats on the beach, were boarding the polacres. Meanwhile another party of French sailors, having gained a height above Lieutenant Hayes and his men, annoyed the latter excessively, notwithstanding that some of the Hydra's guns kept playing upon the spot.

By 3 h. 30 m. p.m. Lieutenant Drury was in complete possession of the vessels; and the seamen, with characteristic intrepidity and coolness, deliberately carried out hawsers to the very rocks occupied by the enemy, and continued warping out their prizes in the teeth of a fresh breeze, and in defiance of a galling fire of musketry. On seeing this, Captain Mundy despatched his third-lieutenant, James Little, with the remainder of the boats, to assist Lieutenant Drury and his little party; and at 4 p.m. the three prizes rounded the point of the harbour. The marines then re-embarked, under a heavy discharge of musketry from the enemy, who had collected his whole force to harass the British rear.

The captured polacres were the ship Prince Eugene of 16 guns and 130 men, brig Belle-Caroline, of 12 guns and 40 men, both belonging to Marseille, and brig Carmen-de-Rosario, of four guns and 40 men. Among the fortunate circumstances attending this very spirited and well-conducted enterprise, was that it was achieved with so slight a loss as one seaman killed and two wounded on board the Hydra, and Mr. Goddard and three seamen and marines wounded of the detachment on shore. The frigate's damages, also, were confined to a few shot in the hull, slightly wounded fore and mizentopmasts and foretopsail-yard, and some trifling injury to her rigging. The name of Lieutenant Drury in the list of commanders at the latter part of the year 1807, shows that his gallantry met its due reward.

On the 18th of August the British 18-gun ship-sloop *Confiance*, Captain James Lucas Yeo, cruising within a few miles of Guardia on the coast of Portugal, received information that a lugger privateer was in that port. It being calm, Captain Yeo despatched, to cut the vessel out, the boats of the *Confiance*, under Lieutenant William Hovenden Walker, assisted by master's mate, Massey Hutchinson Herbert and midshipman George Forder. Although the privateer was moored under two forts, one of four 24-pounders, and the other of six 18-pounders, with 150 troops stationed at them, and that both the latter and the forts opened a heavy fire upon the boats long before they reached the vessel, Lieutenant Walker and his party, in the most gallant

manner, boarded and carried her, without the slightest loss. She proved to be the *Reitrada*, of one long 12 and two 4-pounders, with a crew of thirty men; one of whom was killed, and several wounded: the remainder leaped overboard and effected their escape.

On the 25th of August the British 38-gun frigate *Clyde*, Captain Edward William Campbell Rich Owen, cruising off the French coast between Ypont and Fécamp, despatched her boats, under the orders of Lieutenant Thomas Strong, to intercept a coasting-sloop passing along the shore from the westward. As soon as she found the boats in pursuit of her, the sloop ran on shore near Ypont; where she was defended by a battery, also by two parties of men with musketry, one stationed on the beach, the other on the cliff, and by a field-piece and a mortar. Notwithstanding the opposition thus experienced, Lieutenant Strong and his party boarded and floated the sloop; and, although the boats were struck in several places, and were forced by the strength of the tide to tow the sloop within point-blank shot of the batteries at Fécamp, not a man of the British was hurt.

On the 23rd of August, at 8 h. 30 m. P.M., while the 18-gun brig-sloop *Weasel*, Captain John Clavell, was lying becalmed within five or six miles of the harbour of Corfu, waiting for one of her boats, which, about an hour before, she had detached to the town, an officer of the Russian navy came on board from Mr. Kirk, the late British consul at Corfu, with information that a French garrison was in possession of the island. This brig, thus fortunately apprised of her danger, immediately made the signal of recal to her boat, and repeated it with several guns. At length the boat returned; and at 10 P.M. the *Weasel* crowded sail for the north passage, intending to proceed direct to Malta with the intelligence which had reached her at so critical a moment.

On the 24th, at 3 h. 30 m. A.M., the brig observed three trabacculos, working in between Corfu and some adjacent rocks. Supposing the vessels to contain French troops, the *Weasel* fired a shot at them, and eventually compelled all three vessels to run on shore among the rocks, where they must have been considerably damaged. Observing three other trabacculos just outside the rocks, the *Weasel* made sail after, and at 5 A.M. captured them. The prizes were found to have on board between them 251 French soldiers, commanded by Colonel Devilliers, going as a reinforcement to the garrison of Corfu. Captain

Clavell took on board the brig, for their better accommodation, the French colonel and his family, and several other officers; and, for the safety of the Weasel and her little crew, he caused the arms and ammunition of his numerous prisoners to be also brought on board.

On the same afternoon, having hoisted French colours by way of a decoy, the Weasel captured another small vessel, having on board a courier with despatches and a party of 20 French soldiers. This vessel, being of no value, was destroyed; as, for the same reason, was one of the trabacculos. With the remaining two in tow, the Weasel made sail for Malta, and on the 29th anchored in Valetta harbour.

No small share of credit was due to Captain Clavell for his address as well in capturing the prizes as in overawing and keeping in subjection, for the space of six days, upwards of 280 male prisoners, with a crew, admitting all the Weasel's complement to have been on board, of only 120 men and boys. There being no Gazette account of this affair, we freely confess that it would have entirely escaped us but for the notice taken of it by a contemporary. Whether or not our contemporary's account, when we came to search the Weasel's log-book for particulars, caused us any disappointment, will appear by a reference to the account itself:—"After the peace of Tilsit, the Russians gave up Corfu to the French. A garrison was despatched to take possession of it, but meeting with Captain Clavell, in the Weasel brig-of-war, the whole force was defeated and taken by that officer."¹

On the 1st of October, in the morning, as the British Leeward-island packet Windsor Castle, acting Captain William Rogers, was in latitude 13° 53' north, longitude 58° 1' west, on her passage to Barbadoes, with the mails, a privateer was seen approaching under all sail. The packet used her utmost exertions to escape; but, finding it impossible, began to prepare herself for making a stout resistance. At noon the schooner got within gun-shot, hoisted French colours, and opened her fire; which was immediately returned from the chase-guns of the Windsor Castle. This was continued until the privateer came near, when she hailed the packet in very opprobrious terms, and desired her to strike her colours. On meeting a prompt refusal, the schooner ran alongside, grappled the packet, and attempted to board. In this the Frenchmen were unexpectedly defeated by the pikes of the packet's crew, and sustained a loss of eight or

¹ Brenton, vol. iv., p. 159.

10 in killed and wounded. The privateer now endeavoured to cut away the grapplings and get clear; but the packet's main yard, being locked in the schooner's rigging, held her fast.

Great exertions continued to be made on both sides; and Captain Rogers evinced considerable judgment and zeal in ordering a part of his men to shift the mails as circumstances required, or to cut them away in case the privateer should succeed in the conflict. At about 3 P.M. one of the packet's guns, a 9-pounder carronade loaded with double-grape, canister, and 100 musket-balls, was brought to bear upon the privateer, and was discharged with dreadful effect at the moment the latter was making a second attempt to board. Soon after this Captain Rogers, followed by five men of his little crew, leaped upon the schooner's decks, and, notwithstanding the apparently overwhelming odds against him, succeeded in driving the privateer's men from their quarters, and ultimately in capturing the vessel.

The Windsor Castle mounted six long 4-pounders and two 9-pounder carronades, with a complement of 28 men and boys; of whom she had three killed and 10 severely wounded; her main yard and mizenmast were carried away, and her rigging, fore and aft, greatly damaged. The captured schooner was the *Jeune-Richard*, mounting six long 6-pounders and one long 18-pounder on a traversing-carriage, with a complement, at the commencement of the action, of 92 men; of whom 21 were found dead on her decks, and 33 wounded.

From the very superior number of the privateer's crew still remaining, great precaution was necessary in securing the prisoners. They were accordingly ordered up from below, one by one, and were placed in their own irons successively as they came up. Any attempt at a rescue being thus effectually guarded against, the packet proceeded, with her prize, to the port of her destination; which, fortunately for the former, was not very far distant.

This achievement reflects the highest honour upon every officer, man, and boy that was on board the *Windsor Castle*; and, in particular, the heroic valour of her commander, so decisive of the business, ranks above all praise. Had Captain Rogers stayed to calculate the chances that were against him, the probability is, that the privateer would have ultimately succeeded in capturing the packet; whose light carronades could have offered very little resistance at the usual distance at which vessels engage; and whose very small crew, without such a *coup-*

de-main, ay, and without such a leader, could never have brought the combat to a favourable issue.

On the 7th of October, in the evening, the British 22-gun ship *Porcupine*, Captain the Honourable Henry Duncan, having chased a *trabaculo* (one of the many variously-rigged small vessels employed in the Mediterranean), into Zupiano, a harbour of the small island of that name in the Adriatic, despatched her cutter and jollyboat, under the orders of Lieutenant George Price, first of the ship, assisted by Lieutenant Francis Smith, to endeavour to bring the vessel out. As the two boats were rounding the point which forms the entrance of the harbour, a gun-boat, under the Italian flag, opened a fire of round and grape upon them. Observing this, Captain Duncan recalled the boats; but, as soon as it was dark, detached them again to attack the gun-vessel.

Having taken a guard-boat, sent by the latter to look out for them, mounting a 4-pounder swivel, and manned with French soldiers, the boats pushed on for the gun-vessel; which, expecting the attack, had moored herself to the shore with four cables. In spite of this preparation, and of a heavy fire of grape and musketry opened upon them, Lieutenant Price and his party gallantly boarded and captured the Venetian gun-boat *Safo*, mounting one long 24-pounder and several large swivels, and commanded by Anthonio Ghega, *enseigne de vaisseau*, with a crew of 50 men, most of whom leaped overboard. This very gallant enterprise was executed with so slight a loss as one seaman and one marine wounded.

On the 27th of November Lieutenant Price, in the cutter of the *Porcupine*, then cruising between Ragusa and the island of Curzola, captured two small vessels from the first-named port, under a fire of musketry from the shore, by which one of his men was wounded. On the 29th the same enterprising officer went with the boats into the harbour of Zuliano, and destroyed a number of small vessels, together with the wine that was in the magazines for the use of the French troops. A *trabaculo*, laden with wood, was the only vessel afloat in the harbour, and she was brought out.

While the boats were returning, another *trabaculo* was seen coming down. The *Porcupine* gave chase; but Lieutenant Price, anticipating the wishes of his captain, pulled to windward and captured the vessel. She proved to be from Ragusa, bound to Curzola, having on board stores of every description for guns and mortars, two 6½ inch brass mortars, two 5½ inch

brass howitzers, four new 18-pounder gun-carriages, plank and every material for constructing a battery on the island to which she was bound, and a great quantity of shot and shells. Both this and the former service were performed without a casualty.

On the 25th of October the British 18-gun ship-sloop *Herald*, Captain George M. Hony, cruising off the fortress of Otranto in the Adriatic, observed an armed trabaccolo at an anchor under it. Conceiving it practicable, under cover of night, to cut the vessel out, Captain Hony detached his boats, commanded by Lieutenant Walter Foreman; who, in the face of a heavy fire of great guns and musketry, both from the vessel and the shore, gallantly boarded and brought out the French privateer *César* of four 6-pounders. The crew defended her until the boats were alongside, when all except four escaped by a stern hawser. Of Lieutenant Foreman's party, Mr. James Wood, the carpenter, was the only person hurt: he was wounded dangerously. On board the *Herald* two men were slightly wounded by shot from the fortress, and the ship's hull and rigging slightly damaged.

On the 24th of November, at 9 h. 30 m. A.M., the island of Terriffa in sight bearing north-east by north, and the wind very light from the west-north-west, the British hired armed brig *Anne*, of ten 12-pounder carronades, Lieutenant James M'Kenzie, having in her company the late Spanish lugger-privateer *Vansigo* of seven guns (six long 4, and one long brass 12 pounder), with nine of the *Anne's* 39 men on board as a prize-crew, observed 10 Spanish gun-boats rowing towards her from the shore. At 10 A.M. the headmost vessel fired a shot, and hoisted a red flag. Finding that, owing to the calm state of the weather, it was impossible to escape, Lieutenant M'Kenzie shortened sail to receive his opponents.

At 10 h. 15 m. A.M., the three headmost gun-boats closed, and commenced the action. At 10 h. 30 m., the remaining seven closing, the lugger, after having previously hailed the *Anne* to say she had three men killed, struck her colours. At 11 A.M. the *Anne* succeeded in dismasting one of the gun-boats. Finding that two others had struck, she now discontinued the action; but Lieutenant M'Kenzie did not think it prudent to attempt to take possession, the *Anne* having on board 42 prisoners, with only 30 men to guard them, and being, moreover, charged with despatches.

At 11 h. 10 m. A.M., having got round by the assistance of her sweeps, the *Anne* re-opened her fire upon five gun-boats that

had taken possession of the *Vansigo*, and were again closing on the *Anne's* starboard-quarter, as if with an intention to board. Meeting with a warmer salute than they expected, and observing that the British were prepared to repel any attempt at boarding, the Spaniards, at about 1 P.M., swept out of gun-shot, carrying with them the *Anne's* prize.

Notwithstanding that six of the largest of these 10 gun-boats were, for nearly an hour and a half, within pistol-shot of the *Anne*, their fire did not injure a man on board. The official account contains no statement, nor even supposition, relative to the force, in guns or men, of these Spanish gun-boats. By a little research, however, it is discovered, that several Spanish vessels of this class, captured nearly in the same quarter, and about the same time, mounted four guns each, generally two long 24 and two long 8 pounders, with a complement of from 40 to 60 men. Hence Lieutenant M'Kenzie's performance, in repulsing 10 such opponents, did him and the 29 officers and men of the *Anne* very great credit.

On the night of the 6th of November the boats of the British 12-pounder 36-gun frigate *Renommée*, Captain Sir Thomas Livingstone, Bart., and 18-gun brig-sloop *Grasshopper*, Captain Thomas Searle, cruising in company in the neighbourhood of Carthagena, were sent under the orders of Lieutenant William Webster, of the former ship, to endeavour to cut out some enemy's vessels lying at anchor under the Torre de Estacio. By 4 A.M. on the 7th a Spanish brig and a French tartar, each mounting six guns, with a proportionate number of men, were in possession of the British boats; but the wind was so light and the current so strong, that both vessels ran aground without the possibility of getting them off. While the boats and captured vessels were in this state, a constant fire of grape and canister was maintained upon them from the guns on the tower; whereby several of the prisoners were wounded, as well as two of the British, Mr. Thomas Bastin, purser of the *Grasshopper*, who was a volunteer and commanded a boat upon the occasion, and Henry Garrett, cockswain of the *Renommée's* pinnace, both very badly. Under these circumstances, especially as there were several women and children in the prizes, some of whom were badly wounded, Lieutenant Webster was induced to abandon the vessels without setting them on fire.

On the 11th of December, at 11 A.M., as the *Renommée* and *Grasshopper* were cruising on the same station, the latter, being on the look-out, descried a brig under way, and two settees at

anchor, off Cape Palos, and immediately made sail to cut off the former. On observing the Grasshopper's intention, the two settees also weighed and stood towards their consort. The Grasshopper continued working to windward, and at noon lost sight of the *Renommée*.

At about half an hour after noon, having got within range, the Grasshopper opened a heavy fire of round and grape upon the brig. A running fight was maintained (about 15 minutes of it close) until 2 h. 30 m. p.m.; when the latter, which was the Spanish brig of war *San-Josef*, of ten 24-pounder carronades and two long sixes, commanded by Lieutenant Don Antonio de Torres, ran on shore under Cape Negrete, and struck her colours. The greater part of her crew, which, upon leaving Carthagená on the preceding evening, numbered 99 men, then swam on shore, and effected their escape. Seeing the fate of their companion, the two settees, which were the *Medusa* of 10 guns and 77 men, and the *Aigle* of eight guns and 50 men, tacked and made sail to the eastward.

The Grasshopper now shortened sail and anchored, in order to attempt getting her prize afloat. This was at length effected, in the face of a body of troops assembled on the cliffs; and who, by their constant discharges of musketry, severely wounded one of the Grasshopper's men, the only loss she sustained. It was not, however, with entire impunity, for the Grasshopper fired at the musketeers several well-directed broadsides. This was a very creditable little affair on the part of Captain Searle, his first-lieutenant, Cornelius Willes, of whom he speaks in the highest terms, and his remaining officers and men.

On the 3rd of December, at 10 A.M., latitude $14^{\circ} 48'$ north, longitude $59^{\circ} 14'$ west, the British brig-sloop *Curieux*, mounting 10 carronades, 18-pounders, and eight long 6-pounders, with a crew on board of rather less than 100 men and boys, commanded by Captain John Sherriff, while standing on the starboard tack with the wind from the north-east, discovered in the north-north-west, or right ahead, a strange ship steering under easy sail on the opposite tack. This was the late Liverpool slave-ship *British Tar*, but now the French privateer *Revanche*, of 24 long guns, chiefly, it is believed, English 9-pounders, and one long French 18-pounder upon a traversing-carriage on the fore-castle, with a crew of 200 men, commanded by Captain Vidal.

At 11 A.M., as the ship passed almost within gun-shot to leeward of her, the *Curieux* made the private signal. That not being answered, the brig soon afterwards tacked in chase, and

at 1 P.M. discharged her bow gun at the *Revanche*; who fired one stern-chaser in return, hoisted her colours, and set more sail, edging away to the southward. At 2 P.M., having arrived abreast of the ship on the larboard and weather side, the brig brought her to close action. This continued for an hour; by which time the *Curieux* had her braces, bow-lines, and tiller-ropes shot away. Seeing the unmanageable state of her opponent, the *Revanche*, at 3 h. 15 m. P.M., ran on board the *Curieux* on the starboard side a little before the mainmast. In this position the ship discharged her traversing-gun and musketry, by which the brig's main boom was shot away, Captain Sherriff and four or five of the men killed, and several wounded.

Finding themselves too warmly received, the privateer's men would not board, but retreated to the quarter-deck; whence they kept up, for the space of ten minutes, an incessant and a very destructive fire of musketry. Lieutenant Thomas Muir, upon whom the command of the brig had devolved, now prepared to board; but, being supported by only 10 seamen, the marines, and the boatswain, he was obliged to relinquish the attempt. At about this time, one of the *Curieux*'s men having hove the ship's grappling overboard (in doing which he lost his right arm by a shot), the *Revanche* dropped astern. Presently afterwards, hauling up, the privateer crossed the stern of the *Curieux*, and, after firing into her two great guns and a volley of musketry, crowded sail to the north-west. Nor was the *Curieux*, whose shrouds and back-stays were shot away, and two topmasts and jib-boom wounded, in a condition to make sail in pursuit.

The loss on board the *Curieux* amounted to eight killed, including her captain, and 14 wounded. That on board the *Revanche*, according to a paragraph in the *Moniteur*, amounted to two killed and 13 wounded. The *Curieux*, as soon as she had partially refitted herself, made sail for Barbadoes, and anchored the next day in Carlisle bay.

Lieutenant Muir was subsequently tried by a court-martial at Barbadoes, for the escape of the privateer, and was slightly reprimanded for not having done his utmost, after the death of his captain, to take or destroy the enemy's ship. Had, by any chance, the *Revanche* been captured and carried into Carlisle bay by one of the cruisers upon the station, her force would have been fully known: and we cannot conceive that the commanding officer of a gun-brig (for, virtually, the *Curieux* was

no more) would, under all the circumstances of this case, have been otherwise than honourably acquitted.

We are now entering upon a case which some may think not quite pertaining to Naval History. It was, however, an occurrence that happened on board a British ship-of-war, and one which, for a considerable time after it became generally known, excited an intense interest in the public mind.

In the summer of the present year Robert Jeffery, a native of Polpero in Cornwall, aged 18 years, entered on board the Lord Nelson privateer of Plymouth, and about eight days afterwards, when the privateer had put into Falmouth, was pressed by an officer belonging to the British 18-gun brig-sloop, *Recruit*, Captain the Honourable Warwick Lake. The *Recruit* soon afterwards sailed for the West Indies. In the month of November, when the crew of the *Recruit* were on short allowance of water, Jeffery, who was armourer's mate on board, took, according to Captain Lake's account, "a bottle with some rum in it," from the gunner's cabin; and on the 10th of December, by his own acknowledgment, went to the spruce-beer cask and drew off about two quarts. A shipmate saw and informed against Jeffery, and Captain Lake ordered the sergeant of marines to "put him in the black list."

On the 13th of December the *Recruit* was passing the desert island of Sombbrero, which stands about 80 miles to the southwest of St. Christopher. Captain Lake then ordered Jeffery to be landed upon that island. Accordingly at 6 P.M., the poor fellow was placed in a boat, with the second-lieutenant of the brig, Richard Cotton Mould, a midshipman and four seamen, and landed upon the uninhabited island of Sombbrero, without shoes on his feet, or any other clothes than those on his back, and without even a biscuit for food. Observing that his feet were cut by the rocks, Lieutenant Mould gave him a pair of shoes, which he had begged of one of the men, together with a knife, and his own and the midshipman's pocket handkerchiefs for making signals. The lieutenant then advised this victim of tyranny and oppression to keep a sharp look-out for vessels, and pulled back to the *Recruit*. Her captain's vengeance being thus gratified, the brig filled and made sail from an island until then little known except as a land-fall or point of bearing for navigators, but subsequently blazed about in every quarter of the globe, and never named without an execration upon the (must we say?) British officer who had acted so inhuman a part.

Rear-admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, the commander-in-chief at the Leeward Islands, the instant the brig joined him, reprimanded Captain Lake for his conduct, and sent back the Recruit to Sombrero, to bring away the man if he should chance to be alive. On the 11th of February the Recruit anchored off the island, and her officers landed and searched it over; but neither Jeffery, nor his body, nor his bones were anywhere to be found. By almost a miracle, as it will appear, the man's life was spared.

After he had been thus left to perish by his tyrant of a captain, Jeffery wandered about for eight days, subsisting upon some limpets that he found among the rocks, the crevices of which also afforded him rain-water to drink. He saw several vessels pass, but was too weak to hail them at the distance at which they were. At length, on the morning of the 9th day, the schooner Adams, of Marblehead, Massachusetts, John Dennis, master, came to the island, saved the poor fellow from a lingering death, and landed him at Marblehead.

There Jeffery resided, following his trade of a blacksmith, until the summer of 1810, when the noise which his case made in England induced the British government to send for him home. He was brought first to Halifax, Nova Scotia; and thence, in the 10-gun schooner Thistle, Lieutenant Peter Procter, to Portsmouth. On the 22nd of October, Jeffery attended at the admiralty, where he received his discharge, and had the R taken off his name; by which he became entitled to all arrears of pay. The friends of the late (for he had then, as will be seen presently, ceased to bear the title) Captain Lake made him a liberal compensation for the hardships he had undergone, and Jeffery returned to his native village of Polpero a much richer man than he had quitted it three years before.

On the 5th and 6th of February, 1810, which was soon after it had become known that Jeffery was living, a court-martial assembled on board the Gladiator at Portsmouth, to try Captain Lake for having put a seaman of the Recruit on shore upon an uninhabited island. Captain Lake admitted that he landed Jeffery upon Sombrero, but urged as his excuse, that he "thought the island was inhabited;" thereby not only exposing his own ignorance, but impugning the professional knowledge of his two lieutenants, and particularly of his master, of whom, as Captain Lake admits, he had to inquire the name of the island. The court, which was numerous and respectably composed, found Captain the Honourable Warwick Lake guilty of the

charge and sentenced him to be dismissed from the British navy.

Colonial Expeditions.—Coast of Africa.

As a necessary consequence of the occupation of Portugal by the French, the island of Madeira fell into the hands of the British. On the 24th of December a British squadron, consisting of the

Gun-ship.		
74	{ Centaur	{ Rear-admiral (b.) Sir Samuel Hood,
	{ York	{ Captain William Henry Webley,
	{ Captain	{ Robert Barton,
64	{ Intrepid	{ Isaac Wolley,
		{ Richard Worsley,
<i>Frigates, Africaine, Alceste, Shannon, and Success,</i>		

escorting some transports having a body of troops under Major-general Beresford, anchored in Funchal bay, within a cable's length of the forts, to be ready to act hostilely, should any opposition be experienced. None, however, was offered; and before dark the troops were landed and in possession of all the forts. On the next day the terms of capitulation were agreed to, and on the following day, the 26th, duly signed by the governor of the island, Pedro Fagundes Bacellar d'Antas e Meneres, as he signs himself, on the one part, and the commanding officers of the British sea and land forces on the other.

West Indies.

On the 29th of November, 1806, Captain Charles Brisbane, of the 38-gun frigate *Arethusa*, accompanied by the *Latona*, of the same force, Captain James Athol Wood, and the 44-gun frigate *Anson*, Captain Charles Lydiard, sailed from Port Royal, Jamaica, with orders from Vice-admiral Dacres, the commander-in-chief on that station, to reconnoitre the island of Curaçoa, and sound the minds of the inhabitants respecting the sincerity of their alleged inclination to ally themselves to Great Britain. Owing to the continued violence of the trade-wind and the strength of the north-westerly current, it was not until the 22nd of December, in the evening, that the squadron reached the west end of Aruba, a small island situated about a degree to the westward of, and a dependency upon, Curaçoa. There the three frigates anchored, and on the following evening were joined by the 38-gun frigate *Fisgard*, Captain William Bolton, then on

his way to Jamaica, but whom Captain Brisbane had received permission from the admiral to take under his orders.

Having more taste, as well as more talent, for fighting than for diplomatizing, Captain Brisbane naturally conceived that he could effect less by the latter mode than by the former. He was fully sensible, too, that the way to get possession of a place so strongly fortified, both by nature and art, as Curaçoa, with only four frigates and their crews, was not to lie to off the port, there to make a display of his weakness, and wait while the Dutch governor and his council slumbered through the forms of a negotiation, and the Dutch forts and soldiers got ready more effectually to resist an attack, but to dash right into the harbour, and, pointing the muzzles of his guns into the windows and doors of the burghers, carry everything by a vigorous storm.

This was the plan which Captain Brisbane resolved to adopt, and every preparative arrangement was soon made for facilitating its execution. Each frigate had her allotted station. The bulk of her crew was divided into storming-companies, commanded by lieutenants and by the captain as their leader. The boatswain was placed at the head of a party with ladders and crowbars; and the master, with the necessary number of hands, was to have charge of the ship, while the boarders and stormers were performing their part of the enterprise. To prevent any confusion from the different crews casually mixing together when on shore, each ship's company, with the officers attached to them, wore some peculiarity of dress, or some badge or mark that could be readily distinguished. On the 24th, at 8 A.M., Captain Brisbane, with his four frigates, weighed and made sail, intending to strike the blow at daybreak on New Year's Day, the previous eve being that on which every loyal Dutchman makes it a point to steep his senses in forgetfulness. On the 1st of January, at 1 A.M., the high land of St. Barbary's on the east end of Curaçoa made its appearance. It was necessary to make this end of the island, to have the benefit of the regular trade or south-east wind in running for the harbour of St. Ann, situated on the south-east side of Curaçoa; and which, as being the capital of the colony and its principal naval depôt, was to be the first object of attack. The frigates now hove to, hoisted out their boats, and took them in tow with small cablets.

Of the nature and extent of the difficulties that stood in the way of success, some idea may be formed by a brief description of the harbour of St. Ann, and its sea-defences. The entrance to the harbour, according to Mr. Mantor's chart, is only 50

fathoms wide, and is defended by regular fortifications; the principal of which, Fort Amsterdam, standing on the right of the entrance, mounts 60 pieces of cannon, in two tiers. Athwart the harbour, which nowhere exceeds a quarter of a mile in width, were the Dutch 36-gun frigate *Halstaar*, Captain Cornelius J. Evertz, and 20-gun ship-corvette *Surinam*, Captain Jan Van-Nes, exclusive of two large armed schooners. There was a chain of forts on Misselburg height; and that almost impregnable fortress Fort République, situated upon a high hill at the bottom of the harbour, and almost within grape-shot distance, enfiladed the whole.

At 5 A.M., every preparation having been made for an immediate attack by storm, the four British frigates, the *Arethusa* leading, followed in close order by the *Latona*, *Anson*, and *Fisgard*, bore up, with an easterly wind, for the mouth of the harbour. At daylight the *Arethusa*, with a flag of truce at the fore, entered the port; but the Dutch forts and shipping, taking no notice of the flag, opened upon the British frigate a smart though ineffective fire. Just at this moment the wind shifted to north, and checked at once the further progress of the *Arethusa*. Fortunately, however, not many minutes elapsed ere the wind, in a squall, changed back to north-east; thereby enabling the whole of the squadron, except the *Fisgard*, which frigate grounded on the west side, to lay up along the harbour. The three remaining British frigates, after an unavoidable delay of some minutes on the part of the *Anson*, then anchored in positions for opening their several broadsides upon the Dutch forts, frigate, and corvette.

Upon the capstan of the *Arethusa*, whose jib-boom was over the wall of the town, Captain Brisbane now wrote, and sent off to the governor, the following summons: "The British squadron are here to protect, and not to conquer you; to preserve to you your lives, liberty, and property. If a shot is fired at any one of my squadron after this summons, I shall immediately storm your batteries. You have five minutes to accede to this determination." No notice being taken of this summons, the flag of truce was hauled down; and at 6 h. 15 m. A.M. the British squadron commenced the action. As soon as the ships had fired about three broadsides each, Captain Brisbane, at the head of a portion of his crew, boarded and carried the Dutch frigate; whereupon the *Latona* warped close alongside and took possession. Meanwhile a party of the *Anson's* men, headed by Captain Lydiard, had boarded and secured the *Surinam*.

This done, Captains Brisbane and Lydiard pulled straight for the shore, and, landing together, proceeded, at 7 h. 30 m. A.M., to storm Fort Amsterdam. The vigour of the assault was irresistible. Some of the British breaking open the sea-gate with their crowbars, while others escalated the walls, the fort, although garrisoned by 275 regular troops, was carried in about ten minutes; as, shortly afterwards, and with equal quickness and facility, were one or two minor forts, the citadel, and the town. On the return of Captains Brisbane and Lydiard to their respective ships, a fire was opened upon Fort République, which fire the fort might have silenced in half an hour; and 300 seamen and marines were landed to attack it in the rear, which service they would have found a very difficult one to execute. By 10 A.M., however, or a little after, the British flag waved on the walls of Fort République; and, by noon, the whole island of Curaçoa had capitulated to the British arms.

This unparalleled morning's work was achieved with no greater loss to the British than two seamen killed and five wounded belonging to the *Arethusa*, one killed and two wounded belonging to the *Latona*, and seven wounded belonging to the *Anson*; total, three killed and 14 wounded; and the only spar shot or carried away was the spritsail-yard of the *Arethusa*. The loss on the part of the Dutch was much more severe. The *Halstaar* had her captain and two petty-officers killed, and three others badly wounded; the *Surinam*, one seaman killed, her commander (dangerously), one lieutenant, one midshipman, and one seaman wounded; and the schooner *Flying Fish* (*Viligende-Vis*) one killed and one wounded; total, five killed and eight wounded, exclusive of the loss on shore, represented to have amounted, in killed and wounded together, to nearly 200 men. The Dutch ships were bravely defended; and so probably would have been the forts, had not the hour and the suddenness of the attack completely scared the drowsy garrisons, and the occupation of the harbour by the enemy's ships prevented the junction of a considerable reinforcement which had assembled at *Otra-Bandy*.

The capture of a valuable Dutch colony, by four British frigates and their ships' companies, was an exploit of which even four British sail of the line, and a dozen transports with troops, might have been proud. Captain Brisbane, the planner and leader of the enterprise, was knighted by his sovereign, and all four captains received medals commemorative of the brilliant service they had performed. Nor were the most distinguished of the subordinate gallant participators overlooked. Lieutenants

John Parish, first of the *Arethusa*, and Thomas Ball Sullivan, first of the *Anson*, both of whom assisted at the storming of Fort Amsterdam, were made commanders.

As soon as war was declared by Denmark for the attack upon her capital and the seizure of her fleet, her powerful enemy proceeded to gain possession of the Danish colonies. Accordingly, on the 16th of December, an expedition, the naval force under the command of Rear-admiral the Honourable Sir Alexander Cochrane, and the military under that of General Bowyer, sailed from Carlisle bay, Barbadoes, and on the 21st anchored off the island of St. Thomas. A summons was then sent in to the Danish governor, Colonel Van-Scholten; who after a short parley acceded to the terms, and the island and its dependencies were on the same day formally surrendered to Great Britain. On the 25th the island of Santa-Croix followed the example of its neighbour. No ships-of-war were found in the harbours of either island, but a great many merchant-vessels, nearly the whole of them under the Danish flag.

South America.

In our last year's account of the proceedings in the Rio de la Plata, we left Commodore Sir Home Popham and Brigadier-general Backhouse in the possession of Maldonado harbour, and of the small island of Gorreti near its entrance. On the 5th of January Rear-admiral Stirling, in the *Ardent* 64, with a small convoy, arrived at Maldonado, to supersede Commodore Sir Home Popham. The rear-admiral also brought out Brigadier-general Sir Samuel Auchmuty to take the command of the troops. On the 13th Maldonado was evacuated without opposition, and a small garrison only was left in Gorreti. It was now determined to invest Monte Video, a strong town, mounting on its different batteries 160 pieces of cannon, and respectably garrisoned; and the following was the British naval force ready to co-operate in the attack:—

Gun-ship.

	Diadem . . .	{ Rear-admiral (w.) Charles Stirling.
		{ Captain Samuel Warren.
64	Raisable . . .	,, Josias Rowley.
	Ardent . . .	,, Ross Donnelly.
	Lancaster . . .	,, William Fothergill.

Gun-frig.

38	Leda . . .	,, Robert Honeyman.
32	Unicorn . . .	,, Lucius Hardyman.
	Medusa . . .	,, Honourable Duncombe Pleyden Bouverie.

Sloops, troop-ships, gun-brigs, &c.

Accordingly on the 16th, in the morning, the ships having assembled off the island of Flores, a landing was effected in a small bay a little to the westward of the Caretas rocks, and about eight miles to the eastward of the town. The strength of the breeze, and the intricacy of the navigation, rendered it very difficult for a covering force to approach near enough to be of much use; but the frigates, under the directions of Captain Lucius Hardyman of the Unicorn, got so close as to command the beach, had any opposition been offered by the body of troops in view on the heights.

On the 19th the army, including about 800 seamen and marines under the orders of Captains Ross Donnelly and John Palmer (the latter of the ship-sloop Pheasant), moved forward, and in the evening the ships-of-war and transports dropped off Chico bay; near to which, and at about two miles from the town, the troops encamped, having during the march had a slight skirmish with parties of the enemy. Such was the shallowness of the water in front of Monte Video, that the ships could lend no effectual co-operation in the siege, beyond landing a part of their men, guns, and stores, and cutting off all communication between Colonna and Buenos Ayres. On the 25th the general opened his breaching-batteries, and the lighter vessels of the squadron opened a distant cannonade. The siege continued, with doubtful result, until the 2nd of February, when a breach was reported practicable. In the evening a summons was sent to the governor, to which no answer was returned; and on the morning of the 3rd, before day, the breach was most gallantly stormed, and the town and citadel carried. The loss sustained by the army, from its first landing to the termination of the siege, amounted to 192 killed, 421 wounded, and eight missing.

The distance from the shore at which the ships were obliged to anchor, the constant high wind and heavy swell, and the distance which the guns, when landed, had to be dragged over a heavy sandy road, rendered the duty of the seamen particularly arduous. For these and other services, so many were required, that the daily number of men absent from the squadron, including the division embodied with the army, was about 1400; and the Diadem herself was frequently left with only 30 men on board. The loss sustained by the navy on shore amounted to six seamen killed, one sub-lieutenant (George Stewart), three midshipmen (the Honourable Charles Leonard Irby, Henry Smith, and John Morrison), and 24 seamen and marines wounded, and four seamen missing.

So low was the stock of powder reduced by the protracted length of the siege, that, when the breach was made, no greater quantity remained on board the ships-of-war, transports, and fleet of English merchantmen in company, than would have furnished two days' further consumption. None of the few Spanish vessels-of-war found in the harbour were of much value. A corvette of 28 guns was burnt by the crew. There were two or three other unserviceable corvettes, and some schooners-of-war; also 21 gun-boats. The remaining vessels were merchantmen.

In the course of May a reinforcement of about 5000 British troops arrived, under Brigadier-general Crawford: who thereupon superseded Sir Samuel Auchmuty. On the 15th of June Brigadier-general Crawford himself was superseded by Lieutenant-general Whitelocke, and Rear-admiral Stirling, by Rear-admiral George Murray, whose flag was on board the 64-gun ship Polyphemus, Captain Peter Heywood. An attack upon Buenos Ayres was to be the next object of the expedition. The small share which the navy, on account of the shallowness of the approaches by water, was enabled to take in the disgraceful campaign that ensued, relieves us from the task of recording particulars. It may suffice to state, that on the 28th of June a landing was effected, without opposition, within 30 miles of Buenos Ayres; that on the 5th of July an attack was made on the town; that the British troops, under Brigadier-general Crawford, were overwhelmed by numbers, and compelled to surrender, with the loss of 2500 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners; and that on the 6th the commanding officer of Buenos Ayres, General Liniers, offered to deliver up all prisoners, if the attack was discontinued and the British would consent to evacuate the river Plata in two months.

These terms were immediately submitted to by General Whitelocke; and thus ended all the hopes of the British in this quarter. The Buenos-Ayrean campaign had not, however, passed wholly without benefit: it showed the folly of relying upon the specious representations of traders and renegadoes, respecting the dissatisfied state of the people of any country which they had visited or fled from. It showed, also, the advantage of noticing, in a proper manner, the first symptom of shyness that an officer discovers. Had some little qualm of this kind, which notoriously affected Lieutenant-colonel Whitelocke at St. Domingo, stripped him of his uniform, Lieutenant-general Whitelocke would not have been present at Buenos

Ayres, to sacrifice a gallant army and cast a slur upon the British name.

East Indies.

Being desirous to ascertain if the information was correct, that the two Dutch 68-gun ships, which had escaped from Batavia in the preceding year,¹ were at Gressie, or Griesse, on the river Sourabaya, at the eastern extremity of Java, and distant about 540 miles from the capital of the island, Rear-admiral Sir Edward Pellew, in the month of June, despatched from Madras the 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Caroline*, Captain Peter Rainier, and 12-pounder frigate *Pysché*, Captain Fleetwood Broughton Reynolds Pellew, with orders to reconnoitre the port. On the 29th of August the two frigates arrived off Point Panka, the eastern extremity of Java, and, by a ship from Batavia captured on the 30th, ascertained that the *Pluto* and *Revolutie* were not merely lying inactive at Gressie, but they were in too bad a state to admit of repair.

Having executed the primary object of their mission, the two frigates stood to the westward; and at midnight the *Pysché* alone, the *Caroline* having parted company in chase, anchored off the port of Samarang, which lies about 200 miles nearer to Batavia than Sourabaya. At daylight on the 31st the *Pysché* weighed and stood into the road. The boats, having in the mean time been got ready, were despatched, under the orders of Lieutenant Lambert Kersteman, assisted by midshipman Charles Sullivan, to bring out the vessels at anchor in the road. This service Lieutenant Kersteman gallantly executed, towing out, from under a heavy but ineffectual fire opened upon the boats by the batteries of the town, an armed schooner of eight guns, and a large merchant-brig.

The early part of the morning having discovered two ships (one evidently a cruiser) and a brig at anchor outside, the *Pysché*, as soon as she had collected her boats and destroyed their two prizes, made sail after the strange vessels, which by this time had weighed and were endeavouring to escape. At 3 h. 30 m. P.M., finding the frigate was overtaking them, the three vessels bore up and ran themselves on shore about nine miles to the westward of Samarang, opening upon the *Pysché* a well-directed fire. This, on anchoring in three fathoms, the latter returned, but, on account of the distance at which the

¹ See p. 181.

shoal water obliged her to keep, with little apparent effect. In a few minutes, however, one of the ships, which proved to be the *Resolutie*, armed merchant-ship of 700 tons, with a valuable cargo on board, struck her colours. At 4 h. 30 m. P.M., just as the *Psyché* was hoisting out her boats to attempt carrying the second ship by boarding, she also struck, and proved to be the Dutch national corvette *Scipio*, of 24 guns and 150 men, Captain Carrage, who was mortally wounded on the occasion. Shortly afterwards the brig, which was the *Ceres*, a remarkably fine vessel in the Dutch company's service, mounting 12 guns, with a crew of 70 men, fired a broadside and hauled down her colours. By the persevering exertions of the *Psyché*'s officers and men, all three of the prizes were got afloat the same night without injury. This was a very spirited, gallant affair; and we find, after a lapse of nearly thirty years, the captain of the *Psyché* knighted. The companionship of the *Bath*, which he wore previous to his late reward, was very inadequate for the service he had rendered.

With the intelligence communicated by his son, Rear-admiral Sir Edward Pellew, on the 20th of November, sailed from Malacca with the *Culloden* and *Powerful* 74s, frigates *Caroline* and *Fox*, sloops *Victoire*, *Samarang*, *Seaflower*, and *Jaseur*, and transport *Worcester*, having on board a detachment of troops under Lieutenant-colonel Lockhart. On the 5th of December the squadron arrived off Point Panka; and a commission, with a flag of truce, was immediately sent to the commandant of the Dutch naval force, for the surrender of the ships-of-war lying at Gressie. The Dutch commodore thought fit to detain the boat, and to place in arrest the persons on board of her: he then sent one of his officers to Sir Edward, with information of the unwarrantable step he had taken, accompanied with a flat refusal to deliver up the ships, although they were all in a dismantled state, with their guns on shore.

On the next morning, the 6th, the *Culloden* and *Powerful*, having been lightened, sailed up, accompanied by the remainder of the squadron, to Gressie, cannonading a battery of twelve 9 and 18 pounders at Sambelangan on the island of Madura; the fire from which, with hot shot, struck several of the ships, but hurt no person on board, and was very soon silenced. The governor and council of Sourabaya, a settlement about 15 miles higher up the river, and to which Gressie was subordinate, released the gentlemen of the commission, and the boat's crew, disclaimed the violent measures pursued by the commodore, and

offered to treat. A treaty was accordingly concluded for delivering up the ships-of-war, consisting, as already mentioned, of the two 68-gun ships *Pluto* and *Revolutie*, also a sheer-hulk (late a 68-gun ship), the *Kortenaar*, together with the *Rutkoff* company's ship, pierced for 40 guns. But the Dutch commodore had previously scuttled the whole of them. On the 11th the British completed the destruction of the ships, by setting them on fire; and then proceeded to destroy the guns and military stores in the garrison of *Gressie*, and at the battery of *Sambelangan*.

BRITISH AND FRENCH FLEETS.

THE number of line-of-battle ships, in commission as cruisers at the date of the Abstract for the present year,¹ has attained an amount not previously equalled, nor subsequently exceeded. This abstract also exhibits, in its larger line total, the greatest number of line-of-battle ships to be found in the same compartment of any other abstract of the series; and among the ships are 19 of that fine class, the N or middling sized 74, exclusive of 16 other ships of the same class, that remained unfinished of those which had been ordered in antecedent years. The number of national prizes, purchased into the service during the year 1807, will be found to be nearly double that of any other year within the limits of this work;² and the Casualty-column on the Decrease side displays a total, greater by a trifle than has appeared, or than, probably, will again appear. Of the 38 British vessels so lost, no fewer than 29 foundered at sea or were wrecked; and, unhappily, a great proportion of their crews perished with them.

The number of commissioned officers and masters, belonging to the British navy at the commencement of the year 1808, was,

Admirals	48
Vice-admirals	55
Rear-admirals	58
,, superannuated 31	
Post-captains	700
,, superannuated 27	
Commanders, or sloop-captains	501
,, superannuated 49	
Lieutenants	2912
Masters	549

¹ See Appendix. Annual Abstract, No. 16.

² See Appendix, Nos. 14, 15, and 16.

And the number of seamen and marines, voted for the service of the same year, was 130,000.-

A new era was commencing in the navy of France. Such had been Napoleon's exertions since the disastrous affair of Trafalgar, that the spring of this year saw him possessed of upwards of 80 sail of the line, including 20 recently ordered to be laid down at Antwerp, Brest, Lorient, Toulon, and other ports. In Brest a squadron of eight sail of the line and four frigates was, in the course of the summer, got ready for sea, and only remained in port because unable to elude the vigilance of the Channel fleet under Admiral Lord Gambier, who, since March, had succeeded to the command of it. Early in the year, as will be presently more fully noticed, a French squadron of six sail of the line sailed from the road of Isle d'Aix, and large and powerful frigates were occasionally slipping out of other ports along the French Channel and Atlantic frontier. Of the minor parts of France, Cherbourg was fast rising into importance: the basin there constructing, and nearly finished, would, in a year or two, it was expected, be capable of holding a fleet of line-of-battle ships. It had long been a celebrated port for frigates, and several very fine and powerful ones had sailed from and were constructing within it. The five French sail of the line and one frigate, so long shut up in the harbour of Cadiz, met a peculiar fate; a fate that was the opening scene of a most interesting era in the annals of freedom, and of which we shall presently give some account.

The French Mediterranean ports were again becoming objects of enticement to British squadrons. Toulon, Venice, and even Spezzia, were in full activity. In the former port a ship of 120 guns, the *Commerce-de-Paris*, and another of 80, the *Robuste*, had recently been launched; and a new 74, the *Genois*, had arrived there from Genoa. These, with the *Borée* and *Annibal* 74s already in the road, made five sail of the line. There were also three or four line-of-battle ships on the stocks, two of which, one a three-decker, were nearly ready for launching. At Genoa a 74, the *Breslaw*, was expected to be launched in the autumn, and one or two others were building at Venice; and, in the language of the *Exposé*, Spezzia would soon be a second Toulon. To the five French sail of the line already at anchor in the last-named port, and which were under the command of Vice-admiral Ganteaume, five others were added in the course of the spring. Whence these came we will proceed to relate: but how it hap-

¹ See Appendix, No. 17.

pened that they escaped the numerous British cruisers scattered over the ocean, is not so easily to be explained.

The British squadron, which, towards the end of the year 1807, was stationed off Rochefort to watch the motions of the French squadron at anchor in Aix road, was composed of seven sail of the line under the command of Rear-admiral Sir Richard John Strachan in the *Cæsar*. In order the better to enforce the blockade, Sir Richard anchored his ships in Basque roads. On the 29th of November, being short of provisions, the squadron weighed and stood to the offing, in the hope of falling in with some victuallers, which Sir Richard had appointed to meet him at the distance of 10 or 12 leagues south-west of Roche Bonne. Being driven by strong north-east gales rather beyond the rendezvous, and some delay having occurred in the departure of the victuallers from England, the squadron did not get its wants supplied before the 12th of January; nor was it until the 18th that the state of the weather would permit the *Mediator* to be cleared, and the provisions which she had brought out to be divided among the ships.

In the interim some important occurrences had happened in the port, the entrance to which Sir Richard Strachan's squadron had thus been compelled to leave unguarded. On the 4th of January the French 74-gun ship *Patriote*, Captain Joseph-Hyacinthe-Isidore Khrom, from Chesapeake bay, as recently as the 16th of December, had anchored in the road of Isle d'Aix; and on the 17th of January, at 8 A.M., Rear-admiral Allemand, observing that only a frigate and a brig cruised off the port, took advantage of a moderate breeze at north-east by north, and put to sea with the 120 gun-ship *Majestueux*, 74 gun-ships *Ajax* (newly launched), *Jemmappes*, *Lion*, *Magnanime*, and *Suffren*, one frigate, and one brig-corvette.

The British frigate off the port, which was the *Phoenix*, Captain Zachary Mudge, lay to about 20 minutes to watch the motions of the French ships; when, finding that the latter were in chase of her, she signalled the 18-gun brig-sloop *Raleigh*, Captain Joseph Ore Masefield, to close, and made all sail west by north. At 11 A.M. the *Phoenix* lost sight of the French squadron, and at noon despatched the *Raleigh* to England with the intelligence. On the 19th, while in search of Sir Richard's squadron, the frigate fell in with the *Attack* gun-brig, Lieutenant Thomas Swain, and communicated to her the important information. On the 20th the *Phoenix* reconnoitred Isle d'Yeu, and discovered lying in the road one line-of-battle ship, partially

rigged, and three brigs, two of which appeared ready for sea: she then steered for England, and on the 24th anchored in Cawsand bay.

It was only on the day previous to the arrival of the Phoenix in England, that the Attack succeeded in finding Sir Richard Strachan; who was then about 50 miles south-west of Chasseron lighthouse, striving his utmost against a strong north-east wind to regain his station. Scarcely had the squadron made sail in the direction of Cape Finisterre ere the wind shifted to the westward, from which quarter it blew a tempest during several successive days. The loss of the Cæsar's main yard was, however, the principal damage sustained by the squadron; and on the 29th Sir Richard took as a substitute the main yard of the Donegal, who being leaky and very short of provisions, had been ordered to proceed to England. This left with the rear-admiral the

Gun-ship.

80	Cæsar	{	Rear-admiral (b.) Sir R. John Strachan, Bart., K.B.
		{	Captain Charles Richardson.
74	{ Spartiate	,,	Sir Francis Laforey, Bart.
	{ Colossus	,,	James Nicoll Morris.
	{ Cumberland	,,	Honourable Philip Wodehouse.
	{ Renown	,,	Samuel Jackson.
	{ Superb	,,	Thomas Alexander, acting.

The squadron was unable to clear the bay until the 1st or 2nd of February, when Sir Richard crowded sail towards the Straits of Gibraltar, rightly judging that to have been the course steered by the French admiral. On the 4th the rear-admiral spoke Sir Richard King's squadron off Ferrol, consisting, with the Achille, of the 74s Audacious, Captain Thomas Le Marchant Gosselyn, and Theseus, Captain John Poer Beresford; and on the 9th spoke the fleet of Rear-admiral Purvis off Cadiz. On the 10th the squadron passed the rock of Gibraltar, and on the 21st, anchored in Palermo bay, there joining the

Gun-ship.

100	Royal Sovereign	{	Vice-admiral (b.) Ed. Thornborough.
		{	Captain Henry Garrett.
98	Formidable	,,	Francis Fayerman.
74	{ Eagle	,,	Charles Rowley.
	{ Kent	,,	Thomas Rogers.
	{ Thunderer	,,	John Talbot.

The bad weather, of which Sir Richard Strachan had to complain in the bay of Biscay, had assailed with equal if not greater violence the squadron of M. Allemand. The latter in conse-

quence, had been obliged to send back to Rochefort one of his ships, the *Jemmappes*, in a crippled state. With his remaining five sail of the line, the French admiral continued his voyage to the Mediterranean. Passing the Straits on the night of the 26th, unseen from the rock, or, it is believed, by any British cruiser, M. Ganteaume, on the 6th of February, anchored in the road of Toulon, having chased from before the port the 38-gun frigate *Apollo*, Captain Edward Fellowes, and destroyed, during the 20 days' passage, one Portuguese and six English merchant-vessels; none of them, however, of any great value.

On the 7th, Admiral Ganteaume sailed out of the harbour, with a fleet composed of 10 sail of the line, three frigates, two corvettes, and seven armed transports of 800 tons each, having on board troops, ordnance stores, and provisions. On the 23rd the fleet arrived off the island of Corfu. The admiral immediately sent detachments of his smaller vessels to Taranto, Jacente, Brindisi, and other adjacent ports, to afford protection to the trade and bring the vessels to Corfu; where, in the mean time, Vice-admiral Ganteaume landed his troops, stores, and provisions. While lying at Corfu, the fleet experienced very stormy weather; from which the *Commerce-de-Paris* suffered so much in her masts, that the vice-admiral shifted his flag to the *Magnanime*, and leaving the former ship to be repaired, sailed on the 25th with his remaining nine sail of the line and frigates. He ran down to the latitude of Sicily; thence through the different passages between Zante and the other Ionian islands, and on the 15th of March returned to Corfu.

On the 23rd, the day on which the French admiral arrived at Corfu, he was fallen in with by the British 22-gun ship *Porcupine*, Captain the Honourable Henry Duncan, then on her way to join the 64-gun ship *Standard*, Captain Thomas Harvey, stationed off Corfu. Having, at the great risk of capture by one of the 74s, stayed until he had clearly ascertained that the ships were enemies, Captain Duncan made sail to join Lord Collingwood at Syracuse. On the 24th at noon, the *Porcupine* fell in with the 38-gun frigate *Active*, Captain Richard Hussey Moubray; who, knowing that the *Standard* had gone to the admiral, took the *Porcupine* under his orders, and stood back to look after the French fleet. From the 26th of February to the 13th of March, amidst some severe gales of wind, the *Active* and *Porcupine* kept company with M. Ganteaume's fleet; and, for several successive days, the *Porcupine* alone performed this bold and perilous service.

On the 16th, the day after the admiral's return to Corfu, having rehoisted his flag on board the *Commerce-de-Paris*, M. Ganteaume again set sail with his whole fleet: he ran along the coast of Africa, Sicily, and Sardinia, watched, for a part of the time, by the 38-gun frigate *Spartan*, Captain Jahleel Brenton, and on the 10th of April re-anchored in the road of Toulon. Since the 23rd of February the *Spartan*, accompanied by the 40-gun frigate *Lavinia*, Captain John Hancock, had been detached to gain intelligence respecting the Rochefort squadron, by Vice-admiral Thornborough, just before the latter with 11 ships of the line in his company, weighed from Palermo, and made sail in search of Lord Collingwood.

On the 3rd of March, having received intelligence from a Maltese privateer of the sailing of the Toulon fleet, Captain Brenton joined Lord Collingwood off Maritimo. The vice-admiral immediately sent the *Lavinia* for further intelligence, and stood with the fleet towards the bay of Naples; whence his lordship detached the *Spartan* to Palermo. On arriving at Palermo, the *Spartan* was ordered by Rear-admiral Martin, at anchor there with three sail of the line, to cruise between Cape Bon and Sardinia; "where," says Captain Edward Brenton, "on the 1st of April, she discovered the French fleet carrying a press of sail to get to the westward. Captain (now Sir Jahleel) Brenton, placing his ship about two leagues on the weather-beam of the French admiral, under an easy sail, watched his motions during the day; the enemy chased, but without gaining on him: in the evening, having previously prepared his launch with a temporary deck, he hove to, and sent her under the command of Lieutenant Coffin with despatches to Trepani, then 130 miles distant. This officer narrowly escaped capture by the enemy's fleet, which, before he had got two miles from the ship, came close upon him; he very judiciously lowered his sails and lay quiet until they had passed. He reached Trepani on the following evening, whence, despatching the launch agreeably to his orders to Malta, he set off for Palermo, and gave the intelligence to Rear-admiral Martin. The launch reached Malta on the third day, and vessels were detached in every direction in search of the British fleet; the enemy in the mean time continued in chase of the *Spartan*, dividing on opposite tacks, to take advantage of any change of wind, so frequent in the Mediterranean. Confident in the sailing qualities of his ship, the captain at night again placed himself on the weather beam of the French admiral, and at daylight made sail from

him on the opposite tack, to increase the chance of falling in with the British fleet. The enemy tacked in chase: the Spartan was becalmed, whilst they were coming up with the breeze, and for a short time her capture appeared almost inevitable; but as she caught the breeze, she again took her position on the admiral's weather-beam. This was the close of the third day; when a frigate was seen to run along the French line, and speak all the ships in succession: soon after the whole of them bore up, steering with the wind a-beam; and the captain of the Spartan concluding that the French admiral had shaped his course for the gut of Gibraltar, and had given up the chase, steered the same way with a strong breeze at N.N.W. The night was excessively dark, and a most anxious look-out was kept for the enemy: at half-past seven they were discovered on the lee-quarter, close hauled, and very near; this was evidently a stratagem of Ganteaume's to get to windward of his enemy; but the manoeuvre failed. All hands were on deck, and at their stations; the Spartan wore and crossed the enemy within gunshot, before they could take any advantage of their position; the French squadron also wore in chase, and the next morning were hull down to leeward. The fourth day was passed in the same manner; the Spartan keeping a constant and anxious look-out for the British fleet, while the enemy crowded every sail in pursuit of her; in the evening a shift of wind brought them to windward, and the night being very squally and dark, Captain Brenton lost sight of them, &c."¹

Upon his return to Toulon, as we have stated, on the 10th of April, M. Ganteaume found an accession to his force in two fine frigates, the *Pénélope* and *Thémis*, which had arrived since the 28th of the preceding month. These frigates had escaped from the road of Bordeaux on the 21st of January, cruised off Madeira and the African coast until the middle of March, passed the Straits on the 17th, anchored at Ajaccio on the 23rd, and sailed thence on the 26th for Toulon; having captured or destroyed British vessels to the alleged value of six millions of francs, including four or five straggling West Indiamen from a homeward-bound convoy under the protection of the British frigate *Franchise*.

What the British admiral was about to suffer a French fleet to traverse the Mediterranean in all directions, and to possess a whole month's command of the Adriatic, has been a question often asked. Our researches have enabled us to collect a few

¹ Brenton, vol. iv., p. 239.

facts that may throw some, although a very faint, light upon the subject. When the French fleet, on its way to Corfu, was rounding Cape Passaro, Lord Collingwood, with the following five sail of the line, was at anchor in the port of Syracuse :—

	un-ship.		
98	Ocean	{	Vice-admiral (r.) Lord Collingwood.
			Captain Richard Thomas.
80	{ Canopus	{	Rear-admiral (b.) George Martin.
	{ Malta	{	Captain Charles Inglis.
			William Shield.
74	{ Repulse	{	Hon. Arthur Kaye Legge.
	{ Montagu	{	Robert Waller Otway.

On the 24th of February, the day after M. Ganteaume had arrived at Corfu, the British admiral, with the Ocean, Canopus, Malta, and Montagu, sailed from Syracuse, bound to Palermo. On that very evening a line-of-battle ship was seen standing into Syracuse from the eastward. This was the Standard from off Corfu, with the important intelligence that the French fleet was in that neighbourhood. Unfortunately the Standard could not see Lord Collingwood's squadron under the land; and, still more unfortunately, his lordship could not be persuaded, that there was the least necessity for communicating with Captain Harvey. The Standard entered Syracuse in the dark, and was unable, owing to the state of the wind, to sail out again for two or three days. Immediately on the 64's arrival, Captain Legge, who, as we have seen, had been left in the port, sent an express to Cape Passaro, but the admiral had passed to the westward.

On the 2nd of March, when about 11 leagues to the north-westward of the island of Maritimo, Lord Collingwood was joined by Vice-admiral Thornborough and Rear-admiral Sir Richard Strachan. This reinforcement augmented his lordship's force to 15 sail of the line and two or three frigates. On the next day the British fleet steered towards Palermo, still without any knowledge that the French Toulon fleet was even at sea. On the 6th, when off Cape St. Vito, Lord Collingwood was joined by the Apollo, with the intelligence of M. Ganteaume's departure from Toulon a month back. The British fleet immediately stood across to the bay of Naples, where the Standard's intelligence at length reached Lord Collingwood; who thereupon stood back to the southward; but, instead of proceeding through the straits of Messina, his lordship sailed round the west end of Sicily.

On the 21st Lord Collingwood arrived off the harbour of Syracuse, and such of the ships as were in want of water went

in and obtained it. On the next day, the 22nd, the British fleet sailed towards the entrance of the Adriatic; and on the 23rd, having detached Rear-admiral Martin with three sail of the line to Palermo, Lord Collingwood was a few miles to the northward of Cape Spartivento, with 12, expecting every moment to meet Vice-admiral Ganteaume on his way from Corfu and Taranto.¹ On the 28th, by which time the British fleet had got within a few miles of Cape Rezzuto, information was received that the French fleet, eight or nine days before, had quitted the Adriatic for the Mediterranean. The British ships immediately turned their heads to the westward, and on the 10th of April were abreast of the southern extremity of Sardinia. Between this island and Sicily Lord Collingwood cruised until the 28th; when the 32-gun frigate Proserpine, Captain Charles Otter, joined with intelligence that M. Ganteaume was at anchor with his fleet in the road of Toulon. The British fleet then steered for that port, and on the 3rd of May arrived off Cape Sicie.

It was certainly a very extraordinary circumstance that these fleets should have so missed each other. On the 16th of March, when M. Ganteaume sailed from Corfu, Lord Collingwood was about a degree to the northward of the island of Pantalaria. From these points the two fleets continued to approach each other, until the British fleet, directing its course for Syracuse, entered the bight formed by the capes Passaro and Spartivento, while the French fleet stood over to the coast of Tripoli, and, passing wide of the island of Malta, made Cape Bon. The time subsequently spent by M. Ganteaume, in cruising off Sicily and the eastern coast of Sardinia, might yet have been taken advantage of, had the British admiral steered straight for Toulon; but, six days after M. Ganteaume had anchored in that road, we find Lord Collingwood putting back from the longitude of Minorca, to seek him on the coast of Sicily: nor was it until 17 days afterwards that the British fleet arrived off Cape Sicie.

Leaving Vice-admiral Thornborough with a sufficient force to blockade Toulon, Lord Collingwood sailed for Gibraltar and Cadiz, to contribute his aid to the cause of the Spanish patriots. It does not appear that M. Ganteaume, during the remainder of the year, did more than make a few demonstrations of sailing out, and yet the French naval force in the Mediterranean was rapidly augmenting. A three-decker, the *Austerlitz*, and an 80,

¹ As appears by a general order respecting the mode of attack to be adopted, which Lord Collingwood issued on that

day, and for a copy of which see Appendix, No. 18.

the Donawerth, were launched at Toulon in the summer; as in the course of the autumn, was the Breslaw 74 at Genoa, and one or two other 74s, either in that port or in Spezzia.

The British squadron stationed at Palermo consisted, in the latter part of the year 1807, of the 98-gun ship Windsor Castle, Captain Charles Boyles, and the 74-gun ships Eagle, Captain Charles Rowley, and Thunderer, Captain John Talbot, together with a few frigates and smaller vessels. The success of General Regnier in Lower Calabria obliged the British and Neapolitan troops, composing the garrison of Reggio, to abandon that fortress and retire upon Scylla. On the 30th of January, 1808, the 16-gun brig-sloop Delight, Captain Philip Cosby Handfield, one of the above squadron, while engaged in endeavouring to recapture four Sicilian gun-boats which General Regnier had a few days before taken, grounded under the batteries of Reggio. Captain Handfield, a very promising young officer, whose name has before appeared in these pages, was killed; and Captain Thomas Secombe, of the Glatton, who was serving on board the brig, was mortally wounded and taken prisoner. The Delight was, however, of no use to the enemy, having been burnt by the survivors of her crew.

On the 17th of February the little fortress of Scylla, the only remaining post possessed by the British in Lower Calabria, was evacuated by the commandant, Lieutenant-colonel Robertson; and the garrison, of whom not more than 200 were British troops, was safely withdrawn from the power of General Regnier by the able management of Captain Robert Waller Otway, of the 74-gun ship Montagu, and Captain George Trollope, of the 16-gun brig-sloop Electra, with the assistance of a few transports and men-of-war launches.

The degrading situation to which, at the commencement of the present year, Spain had been reduced by the arts of Napoleon, is an historical fact too notorious to require repetition. At length the Spanish character recovered its tone; and, by her struggles to free herself from the yoke of her powerful neighbour, Spain found a friend in every independent breast throughout the civilized world. It was to England in particular that Spain looked for support, and that support England gave, in the most cordial, prompt, and efficacious manner.

On the 4th of June the supreme junta of government at Seville, acting in the name of their imprisoned king, the miserable Ferdinand, issued a declaration of war against France. The French admiral in the port of Cadiz, as soon as the news

of this event reached him, removed his vessels, which, it will be recollected, were the Neptune of 80, Algésiras, Argonaute, Héros, and Pluton, of 74 guns, Cornélie frigate, and a brig-corvette, out of the range of the batteries at the town, and took up a defensive position in the channel leading to the Caraccas. At this time Rear-admiral Purvis, with a British fleet of 10 or 11 sail of the line, cruised off the harbour, and, from several previous communications with the Spanish authorities on shore, had been anticipating the glorious epoch that was now arrived. The British admiral of course offered to assist in bringing the French admiral to terms; but the Spaniards, feeling themselves quite adequate to the task, preferred acting alone.

On the 9th of June, at 3 P.M., a division of Spanish gun and mortar boats, and the batteries erected for the purpose on the isle of Leon and at Fort Louis, commenced hostilities against the French ships, and a mutual firing, without intermission, was kept up until night. On the following morning, the 10th, the cannonade recommenced, and was continued partially till 2 P.M., when the French flag-ship, the Héros, hoisted a flag of truce. Shortly afterwards Vice-admiral Rosily (who had, on the preceding day, modestly enough, proposed "to quit the bay," provided, as was well added, "the British would permit him") addressed a letter to General Morla, offering to disembark his guns and ammunition, but to retain his men, and not to hoist any colours. These terms were considered inadmissible, and the Spaniards prepared to renew the attack upon the French squadron with an increase of force. On the 14th, at 7 A.M., an additional battery of 30 long 24-pounders being ready to act, and numerous gun and mortar vessels having taken their stations, the French ships struck their colours, which in the course of the forenoon were replaced by those of Spain.

Soon after this event the Spanish commissioners, of whom General Morla was one, embarked for England to treat with the British government. Their reception fully equalled their expectations; and on the 4th of July the British government issued an order, directing that all hostilities between England and Spain should immediately cease. Those cruisers, hitherto so much dreaded along the coast of the latter, were hailed as deliverers; and never, surely, were the skill and enterprise of British seamen more zealously nor more successfully exerted than in rooting out the French invaders from the sea-defences of a country which they had entered but to enslave and despoil.

Portugal, as a fellow-sufferer with Spain, soon followed the

latter's example in making an effort to free herself from French thralldom; and deputations from every part of the country, soliciting succours, were sent to Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, who, with a British squadron, cruised off the Tagus, to watch the motions of the Russian squadron at anchor within it. The call of Portugal upon her ancient ally was not made in vain. In the early part of August a body of British troops, under Lieutenant-general Sir Arthur Wellesley, landed on the coast; on the 21st the celebrated battle of Vimeira was fought; on the 22nd Lieutenant-general Sir Hew Dalrymple arrived, and took the command of the British forces; and on the 30th was concluded the famous convention of Cintra, so discreditable to the victorious party.

By the second and third articles it was stipulated, that the French troops should not be considered as prisoners of war, and that, on their arrival in France, whither they were to be conveyed at the expense of the British government, they should be at liberty to serve again. With respect to the Russian squadron, consisting, as already stated, of nine sail of the line and one frigate,¹ a convention, concluded between Sir Charles Cotton and Vice-admiral Seniavin, placed the ships, as a deposit, in the hands of his Britannic Majesty, to be held until six months after the conclusion of peace between Russia and England; and the Russian vice-admiral, his officers, seamen, and marines, without any condition or stipulation whatever, were to be conveyed to Russia at England's expense.

The close alliance, cemented between France and Russia by the treaty of Tilsit, naturally suspended all friendly relations between the latter and Great Britain. If Russia, in the course of the three months that succeeded that treaty, made no public avowal of her sentiments, it was because the fleets and troops of England were then in the Baltic or in the inlets to it. No sooner had Admiral Gambier and General Lord Cathcart quitted the Sound, and the season become so far advanced as to prevent the British navy from operating in the Baltic, than Alexander spoke aloud the language of defiance. The emperor's declaration, which issued at St. Petersburg on the 31st of October, was received in London on the 3rd of December, and replied to on the 18th by a counter-declaration, clearly, forcibly, and elegantly drawn up; a state-paper, indeed, that might serve all future cabinets for a model.² On the same day reprisals were ordered against Russian ships, vessels, and goods; but the time of

¹ See pp. 235, 238.

² See the *New Annual Register* for the year 1807, p. 293.

the year prevented the immediate undertaking of any active measures.

As the firm ally of England, Sweden necessarily became involved in war with her two neighbours, Denmark and Russia. The first, happily for Sweden, having only two line-of-battle ships, a 74 and a 64, and some armed Indiamen, brigs-of-war, and gun-boats, was without a navy to molest her; but the second possessed a fleet, already in ports of the Baltic, and of far greater strength than any that Gustavus could send to sea. For instance, the Russian Baltic fleet, according to the official report of the minister of marine, consisted, on the 9th of November, 1807, of 20 new ships of the line carrying 1588 guns, and 14 frigates and corvettes carrying 426 guns, besides brigs and smaller vessels. Among the line-of-battle-ships were three or four three-deckers, and nearly the whole of the others were 74-gun ships. Several of the frigates also mounted 50 guns.

The Swedish fleet consisted of 11 or 12 sail of the line and six or seven frigates; not more than half the former in an effective state. The following account of the recommended, if not of the actual, gun-force of Swedish ships-of-war, is extracted from the work of the celebrated naval architect Chapman:—

	SHIPS OF THE LINE.				
	Guns. Pdrs.	Guns. Pdrs.	Guns. Pdrs.	Guns. Pdrs.	Guns. Pdrs.
First deck	30 48 ¹	30 42	30 42	28 36	26 36
Second deck	32 36	32 30	32 24	30 24	28 24
Third deck	30 24	32 18
Qr.-deck and fore-castle .	18 12	18 12	16 12	12 12
	110	94	80	74	66

	FRIGATES.				
	Guns. Pdrs.	Guns. Pdrs.	Guns. Pdrs.	Guns. Pdrs.	Guns. Pdrs.
Main deck	26 30	26 24	24 18	24 12	22 12
Qr.-deck and fore-castle .	18 12	14 8	12 6	8 6	6 4
	44	0	36	32	28

Towards the middle or latter end of May the British naval force assembled in the Sound, Great Belt, and Baltic, and which was under the command of Vice-admiral Sir James Saumarez, consisted of the

¹ For the English caliber of the Swedish pounder see vol. i., p. 45.

On the 20th of August Rear-admiral Sir Samuel Hood, with the *Centaur* and *Implacable*, arrived and anchored in company with the Swedish fleet. On the same afternoon the Russians made their appearance off the road, and presently anchored outside. On the 21st, in the evening, the Russian fleet, numbering, as before, nine sail of the line, three 50-gun ships, eight frigates and ship-corvettes, two brigs, and two cutters, got under way, and stood off and on the road. On the 22nd four Swedish sail of the line came down from Jungfur sound, and joined their companions in Oro road. Although the force of the Swedish admiral was thus augmented to 11 sail of the line, five frigates, and one brig, yet upwards of a third of the crews were ill in bed with the scurvy, of which many died daily.

On the 23rd, in the afternoon, the Russian fleet, making a very formidable appearance, stood close in to Oro road, with a fine west-south-west wind; then tacked, and stood off. On the 25th, at 6 A.M., the Swedish fleet, accompanied by the *Centaur* and *Implacable*, got under way, with a fresh breeze at north-east, and made sail in pursuit of the Russian fleet; which, at 9 A.M., to the number of 23 sail, was seen in the south-east, off Hango-Udd. At about noon, as had been previously arranged, the Swedish 70-gun ship *Frederic-Adolph*, with a great proportion of the sick on board, parted company from the fleet, and steered for Carlscrona. This left with the Swedish admiral the

Gun-ship.		
78	Gustav. IV. Adolph	{ Rear-admiral Nauckhoff. Captain Lagerstrale.
		{ ,, Krusenstjerna.
76	Uladislaffe . . .	{ ,, Grubb.
	{ Adolph-Fredric . . .	{ Commodore Jagerfelt. Captain Count Wrangel.
	{ Aran	{ ,, Jagerschold.
74	{ Dristigheten	{ ,, Toruquist.
	{ Faderneslandet	{ ,, Blessing.
	{ Gustav, III.	{ ,, Petterson.
	{ Manligheten	{ ,, Nordenankar.
66	{ Forsigtigheten	{ Baron Cederstrom.
	{ Tapperheten	{ Ficerstroud.

Frigates, *Euridice* 46, *Chapman* 44, *Camilla* and *Bellona* 42, and *Janamas* 34, and *cutter-brig* *Dolphin*.

The Anglo-Swedish fleet now consisted of 12 sail of the line and five frigates, mounting 1156 guns; while the Russian fleet, of nine sail of the line, three 50s, and eight frigates and corvettes (not reckoning the two brigs), mounted 1118 guns. Here was no great disparity, especially considering the ineffective state of

the Swedish ships; but the Russian admiral not knowing this, or considering the two ships with British ensigns flying, and who soon became the most conspicuous objects, as a host in themselves, made all sail to get away. A windward chase was not the thing for wooden-bottomed ships; nor, where so much nicety was required in trimming sails, for weak and inexperienced crews. Hence the Centaur and Implacable, by 8 P.M., were five miles to windward of the Swedes, notwithstanding the latter carried every stitch of canvas that their ships would bear.

The night's chase increased that distance to nearly 10 miles; and at 4 A.M. on the 26th the Implacable had advanced two miles to windward of the Centaur. This brought the former ship within four or five miles of the Russian fleet, then bearing from east-north-east to south-south-east, evidently much scattered, and still crowding sail to escape. At 4 h. 30 m. A.M. the Implacable, then on the larboard tack, observed a Russian two-decker considerably to leeward of her fleet. At 5 h. 30 m. A.M. the latter, which was the 74-gun ship Sewolod, Captain Rudnew, or Roodneff, being on the starboard tack, passed the bow of the Implacable, who immediately tacked after her. At 6 h. 30 m. A.M. the Sewolod tacked. In about a quarter of an hour the two ships again crossed each other; when the Russian 74 opened her fire, which was quickly returned by the Implacable. The latter again tacked; and at 7 h. 20 m. A.M., having overtaken the Sewolod, and closed her within pistol-shot to leeward, the Implacable commenced the action with the utmost vigour, and with such decided effect, that in less than half an hour the Sewolod, whose colours had been shot away early in the combat, ceased firing and hauled down her pendant. At this moment, observing that the Russian admiral, who with his fleet had bore up since the commencement of the close action, was within two miles of the Implacable, Sir Samuel threw out the signal of recal. The Implacable thereupon made sail to close the Centaur, then upwards of a mile and a half to leeward. This the Implacable effected at 8 A.M., and the two British 74s ran on in company, to join the Swedish fleet, the van-ship of which was nearly 10 miles to leeward when the Implacable compelled the Russian 74 to make the signal of surrender.

The loss incurred by the Implacable in this short but smart engagement consisted of six seamen and marines killed, one master's mate (Thomas Pickerwell), the captain's clerk (Nicholas Drew), and 24 seamen and marines wounded. The first-lieu-

tenant of the Implacable, and of whom Captain Martin speaks in the highest terms, was Augustus Baldwin. The loss which the Sewolod sustained, as admitted by her captain, amounted to 48 officers, seamen, and marines killed, and 80 wounded; a sufficient proof that the guns of the Implacable had been both quickly fired and well directed.

Admiral Hanickoff sent a frigate to tow the Sewolod, whose rigging and sails were in a terribly shattered state, and then again hauled his wind. About this time the Implacable having repaired the slight damage done to her rigging, the two British ships again made sail in chase, and soon obliged the Russian frigate to cast off her tow, and the Russian fleet a second time to bear up in support of their friend. It not, however, being the intention of the Russian admiral to bring on a general engagement, he, at about 9 A.M., availed himself of a favourable change of wind to the north-east, and stood for the port of Rogerswick; leaving the Sewolod, who had grounded on a shoal not far from the entrance of the harbour, to take care of herself, although the Swedish fleet, except the Tapperheten and frigates, was still nearly three leagues to leeward.

At about noon the Russian fleet came to an anchor in Rogerswick roads, and the Sewolod soon afterwards got afloat and rode at her anchors. The wind moderating in the afternoon, the Russian admiral sent out a division of boats to tow the disabled 74 into the road. The Centaur, followed by the Implacable, immediately bore up, to endeavour to cut off the ship before the boats could effect their object. By great activity and perseverance on the part of her officers and crew, the Centaur, at 8 P.M., just as the Sewolod, towed by the Russian boats, was about to enter the port, ran her on board. The starboard fore rigging of the Centaur was caught, and partly carried away, by the Sewolod's bowsprit; and the latter's starboard bow gradually swept along the Centaur's starboard side, the guns of which, as the Sewolod's bow successively pressed against the muzzles, discharged their contents with destructive effect. As soon as the bowsprit, in its course astern, had reached the Centaur's mizen rigging, it was there lashed, by the joint exertions of Captain Webley, first-Lieutenant Paul Lawless, and Mr. Edward Strode, the master, and under a very heavy fire from the Russian musketry, which wounded, among others, Lieutenant Lawless severely. The two ships being in six fathoms water, Sir Samuel had hopes that he should have been able to tow off the Sewolod while lashed to her; but the Sewolod had previously let go an

anchor, which held her fast. Much valour was here displayed on both sides, and each ship tried in vain to board the other. At 8 h. 30 m. P.M. the Implacable arrived up, and anchored at the distance of about 300 yards from her consort; and in another 10 minutes, after affording a proof of courage and perseverance highly creditable to her officers and crew, the Sewolod hauled down her colours.

The Centaur had three seamen and marines killed, her first lieutenant (already named), boatswain (Mr. Morton), and 25 seamen and marines wounded. The Sewolod, whose original complement was 600 men, but to whom the Russian admiral had sent 100 sailors and soldiers to supply the place of those killed or wounded in her action with the Implacable, had 180 killed, wounded, or missing, in her action with the Centaur; making the total loss of the Russian ship, in killed, wounded, and missing, 303, and the total killed and wounded of the two British ships 62.

Both the Centaur and Sewolod took the ground soon after the latter's surrender. This being observed by the Russian admiral, two ships of his fleet were detached to attempt to recover the Sewolod and capture the Centaur; but, owing to the prompt exertions of the Implacable, the Centaur was soon hove into deep water, and the Russian ships returned to their anchorage. No efforts on the part of the British being able to get the prize afloat, the Sewolod, in the course of the ensuing night, after the prisoners and the wounded had all been removed, was set fire to and destroyed.

On the 30th, while still blockading the port of Rogerswick, the Anglo-Swedish fleet was joined by Vice-admiral Sir James Saumarez, with the Victory, Mars, Goliath, and Africa. In the mean time the Russian admiral, well aware of the enterprising character of the British, was employing himself in mooring his fleet and fortifying his position. The ships were secured by cables to the shore, and strong batteries were erected at Baltic Port and at the island of East Raga, the latter of which completely commands the entrance to the harbour.

An attempt to burn the Russian fleet was intended to be made; and the 18-gun ship-sloop Erebus and 14-gun cutter Baltic (late Russian cutter Apith) were prepared as fire-ships by the British, and four fire-vessels were sent from Carlscrona by the Swedes. As a preliminary measure, the port was reconnoitred, first by the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate Salsetto (late Pitt), Captain Walter Bathurst, and then by the Swedish

44-gun frigate *Camilla*, Captain Trolle. It was now discovered that an extensive boom had been run out from the front of the Russian ships, calculated, in all respects, to prevent the approach of fire-ships.

The attempt to destroy the fleet by vessels of this description being, in consequence, deemed impracticable, the *Erebus* and *Baltic* fire-vessels were dismantled and restored to their former state, and the four Swedish fire-vessels were sent to Carlsrona. The advanced season of the year rendering the situation of the blockading fleet extremely critical, Sir James Saumarez and the Swedish admiral, early in October, retired from before the harbour of Rogerswick, leaving only a small reconnoitring force. Soon afterwards the Russian fleet also made sail, and reached Cronstadt in safety.

Before taking our leave of the Baltic, we have to give some account of the successful operations of the British fleet in aiding a band of Spanish patriots found in this quarter. Desirous to assist Spain in every way that would be most beneficial to the cause of the patriots, England turned her attention to the Spanish troops, which Napoleon, under the false pretence of securing Hanover, had drawn from their country, to the northern parts of Germany, and afterwards to the Danish islands in the Baltic. It was known that the troops were anxious to join their countrymen and assist in overthrowing the tyrant to whom they owed their banishment. The Spaniards in Zealand no sooner learnt the atrocious aggression which their native land was suffering, than they instantly formed a circle round their colours, and swore on their knees to be faithful to their country. Men possessed of such feelings, and inspired with such a determination to act up to them, were well worthy of all the assistance which England, with her immense naval means, could afford. It fortunately happened, where so much depended upon zeal and ardour in the cause, that the British commanding officer in the immediate vicinity of the Spanish troops was Rear-admiral Keats. Besides his own ship, the *Superb*, the rear-admiral had under his orders the *Brunswick* and *Edgar* of the same force, Captains Thomas Graves and James Macnamara, and five or six smaller vessels.

According to a plan concerted between the rear-admiral and the Marquis de la Romana, the commander-in-chief of the Spanish forces in Denmark, the latter, on the 9th of August, with nearly 6000 men, took possession of the fort and town of Nyborg, in the island of Furøen. Immediately afterwards Rear-

admiral Keats addressed a letter to the Danish governor, promising to abstain from any hostile or offensive act so long as similar treatment was experienced by the Spaniards from the troops of Denmark and France; but declaring that, if any opposition should be offered to the embarkation of the Spanish troops, measures would be taken that might eventually lead to the destruction of the town of Nyborg.

The Danish garrison prudently yielded to circumstances; but a Danish man-of-war brig, the *Fama*, of 18 guns, and a cutter of 12, the *Salorman*, moored themselves across the harbour near the town, and rejected all remonstrances and offers of security. The reduction of these vessels being absolutely necessary, and the Spanish general being unwilling to act hostilely against Denmark, such small vessels and boats as could be collected were put under the command of Captain Macnamara; and the latter and his party attacked and captured both the brig and cutter, with the loss to the British of one lieutenant (Robert Harvey, of the *Superb*) killed and two seamen wounded, and to the Danes of seven killed and 13 wounded. It should be mentioned, that the Spanish troops, irritated at the opposition which their friends experienced in giving them aid, departed in some measure from the general's intention, and fired from the fort several shot at the Danish vessels before the latter struck.

Expedition being now of the greatest consequence, and none of the ships of the line, from circumstances of weather, being able to be brought near, the rear-admiral shifted his flag to the *Hound* bomb-vessel, Captain Nicholas Lockyer, in the harbour. Fifty-seven sloops or doggers, found in the port, were fitted by the seamen of the squadron, under the direction of Captain Macnamara; and in the course of the same night and of the following day, the 10th, a great party of the artillery, baggage, and stores belonging to the Spaniards was embarked, and removed to the point of *Slypsarn*, four miles from Nyborg, where the army was to embark.

Captains Jackson and Lockyer undertook the execution of this service; and the troops, having embarked without an accident on the morning of the 11th, were soon under the protection of the British squadron at the anchorage off the island of *Sproe*. In the course of the same day more than 1000 Spaniards joined the British ships by sea from *Jutland*; and another 1000 were thrown into *Langeland*, to strengthen the fort held by the Spanish forces in that island. One of the Spanish regiments in *Jutland* was situated too remotely and critically to admit more than a

part of it to effect its escape; and two regiments in the island of Zealand were unfortunately disarmed, after having fired on the French general and killed one of his aides-de-camp. The Spaniards embarked at Nyborg, and those that escaped to the squadron from Jutland were landed at Langeland; whence the whole, numbering about 10,000 men, were carried to England, and subsequently to Spain. For the zeal and ability he had displayed, in bringing to a happy termination the delicate and arduous service intrusted to him, Rear-admiral Keats, immediately on his arrival in England, was created a knight of the Bath.

Light Squadrons and Single Ships.

On the 16th of January, in the forenoon, Cape Barfleur bearing west by north six or seven leagues, the British gun-brig *Linnet*, Lieutenant John Tracey, mounting twelve 18-pounder carronades and two long sixes, with a crew of 60 men and boys, saw a French lugger in chase of an English merchant-ship and brig. The *Linnet* immediately joined the ship and brig, intending to keep company with them until night should favour her in closing the lugger. At 6 h. 30 m. P.M. the lugger, which was the *Courier*, of 18 guns and 60 men, belonging to Cherbourg, commenced a fire upon the ship, which the latter promptly returned. At 7 P.M. the *Courier* attempted to haul off; but the *Linnet*, being now within musket-shot, prevented her. At 7 h. 10 m. P.M. a broadside of round and grape from the *Linnet*, accompanied by a volley of musketry, carried away the *Courier*'s main lug. The latter was now hailed to strike, but, instead of doing so, rehoisted her lug. A steady and well-directed fire was then commenced by the *Linnet*, and continued for an hour and a half; during which the *Courier*'s lugs were knocked down ten times, and as often rehoisted. At 8 h. 50 m., being in a sinking state, the *Courier* hailed that she surrendered. The loss on the part of the latter amounted to her second captain killed and three men wounded; but the *Linnet* was fortunate enough to escape without any loss whatever.

On the 7th of February, at 1 P.M., the British schooner *Decouverte*, of eight 12-pounder carronades and 37 men and boys, Lieutenant Colin Campbell, when running down between *Altavella* and the main land of St. Domingo, chased two French schooner-privateers and a ship their prize. One privateer made her escape to windward; but after a running fight, the *Decouverte* drove the other and the ship on shore. The latter, which

was the *Matilda* of Halifax, bound to Jamaica, Lieutenant Campbell directed the master of the *Decouverte*, John M'Intyre, with a detachment of small-arm men, to set fire to and destroy; a service which, in spite of a very spirited opposition from the schooner and the shore, he fully executed.

On the 9th, while still cruising off St. Domingo, the *Decouverte* discovered and chased a French armed schooner in Bottomless Cove. It was not until 3 P.M. that the *Decouverte* was enabled to bring her opponent, the *Dorade*, Captain Netley, mounting one long 18-pounder on a pivot, and two long eights, with 72 men, to close action. In the second round, three of the *Decouverte's* carronades on the side engaged were dismounted, which gave the *Dorade* a great advantage over her. Notwithstanding this, and the immense superiority of the enemy in musketry, the *Decouverte*, in three quarters of an hour, compelled the *Dorade* to haul down her colours.

This very gallant exploit on the part of Lieutenant Campbell, his officers and crew, was performed after a loss of five seamen wounded, three of them dangerously, and one mortally. Lieutenant Campbell himself was also slightly wounded, but did not communicate the circumstance in his official letter. The omission was caused by a feeling highly honourable to Lieutenant Campbell as a man: his wife was in England in a poor state of health, and he rightly judged, that uncertainty about the full extent of his wound might prey upon her feelings and protract her recovery. Of the privateer's 72 men, seven were found on her decks dead and three wounded; and it was understood that about seven others had been thrown overboard during the progress of the action.

On the 8th of February, in the evening, the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Meleager*, Captain John Broughton, cruising off the port of San-Jago de Cuba, detached her barge, cutter, and jollyboat, with 41 men, commanded by Lieutenants George Tupman and William Sainburn, and Lieutenant of marines James Denne, to capture a felucca-rigged privateer at anchor under the shore. The three boats gallantly boarded and captured without loss on either side, although the enemy was perfectly prepared, the French privateer *Renard*, armed with one long 6-pounder and a large proportion of muskets, and 47 men, 18 of whom jumped overboard and swam for the shore.

On the 13th of February, in the evening, the British 20-gun ship, *Confiance*,¹ Captain James Lucas Yeo, being off the *Tagus*,

¹ Made a post-ship by her commander's promotion to post-rank on the 19th of December, 1807. See p. 36.

sent her cutter and jolly-boat, under the command of master's mate Robert Trist, with 14 men, to row guard at the mouth of the river, in consequence of a report, current at Lisbon, that the Russian squadron was about to put to sea. No sooner had Mr. Trist arrived at his station, than he perceived a French gun-vessel at an anchor under Fort San-Pedro, between the forts Belem and San-Julien: he instantly, in a most gallant manner, boarded, and after an ineffectual resistance on the part of the enemy carried, the French gun-vessel No. 1, commanded by Enseigne de vaisseau Gaudolphe, and mounting one long 24-pounder and two brass sixes, with 100 stand of arms, and 50 men; of whom three were killed and nine badly wounded; but the British, notwithstanding they had been hailed and fired at in their approach to the gun-vessel, did not lose a man. This truly gallant exploit, performed as it was in opposition to a force so superior, and almost under the guns of several heavy batteries, deserved every praise that was bestowed upon it, and fully entitled Mr. Trist to the promotion which he in consequence obtained.

On the 2nd of March, in the morning, the British 18-gun brig-sloop Sappho, Captain George Langford, standing to the eastward from off Scarborough, discovered and chased an armed brig, that was steering a course as if with the intention to cut off several merchant-vessels to leeward. At 1 h. 30 m. P.M. the Danish brig-of-war Admiral Yawl, Captain Jorgen Jorgenson, substituting Danish for English colours, which she had previously hoisted to deceive, discharged her broadside at the Sappho, in return for a shot fired over her by the latter. The Sappho immediately bore down, and brought her antagonist to close action, which was obstinately sustained for half an hour, when the Admiral Yawl struck her colours.

The Sappho's force was 16 carronades, 32-pounders, and two sixes, with a complement of 120 men and boys; of whom she had two wounded. The Admiral Yawl was singularly armed for a brig, her guns being mounted on two decks. On her first deck she had 12 carronades, 18-pounders, and on her second or principal deck, 16 long 6-pounders, total 28 guns; with a complement of 83 men and boys, of whom the second officer and one seaman were killed. The wounded, if any, do not appear in the gazette-account.

On the 4th of March, at 11 h. 30 m. A.M., the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate San-Fiorenzo, Captain George Nicholas Hardinge, sailed from Pointe de Galle, Ceylon, on her return to Bombay.

On the 6th, at 7 A.M., latitude $7^{\circ} 32'$ north, longitude $77^{\circ} 58'$ east, the San-Fiorenzo passed, off Cape Comorin, the three East India Company's ships, Charlton, Captain George Wood, Metcalfe, Captain Matthew Isacke, and Devonshire, Captain James Murray, from Bombay bound to Columbo; and shortly afterwards discovered on her starboard beam, in the north-east, the French 40-gun frigate Piémontaise, Captain Epron, advancing to intercept the Indiamen. The San-Fiorenzo immediately hauled to the wind in-shore, under all sail, and the French frigate, finding herself pursued, changed her course and stood away. The Piémontaise had sailed from the Isle of France on the 30th of the preceding December. Her intended mode of attack upon the Indiamen is represented to have been, to board the first with 150 men, and then stand on and cannonade the two others until they surrendered.

At 5 P.M., having previously made the private signal, the San-Fiorenzo hoisted her colours, but the French frigate paid no attention to either. Captain Hardinge now pressed forward in pursuit; and at 11 h. 40 m. P.M., being still on the larboard tack, the San-Fiorenzo ranged alongside the Piémontaise and received her broadside. After a ten minutes' action fought within 200 yards, the Piémontaise made sail ahead out of the range of her opponent's shot. The San-Fiorenzo, whose loss, owing to the high firing of the Piémontaise, amounted to only three seamen slightly wounded, made sail in chase, and by daylight on the 7th had so gained upon the French frigate, that the latter, seeing a renewal of the engagement was unavoidable, hoisted her colours and wore, in order to bring her broadside to bear.

At 6 h. 20 m. A.M., being within half a mile of the San-Fiorenzo, who had also wore, the Piémontaise fired her broadside, and the action recommenced, the two frigates gradually closing to a quarter of a mile. The fire was constant and well-directed on both sides, until 8 h. 5 m. A.M., when that of the French frigate visibly slackened. At 8 h. 15 m., having discharged her whole broadside, the Piémontaise ceased firing, and made sail before the wind, leaving the San-Fiorenzo with her maintopsail-yard shot through,¹ mainroyalmast shot away, both maintopmast-stays, the spring-stay, and the greater part of the standing and running rigging and sails cut to pieces, and therefore not in a condition for an immediate chase. Under these circumstances, the fire of the British frigate could only continue while her retreating

¹ So says Lieutenant Dawson's official letter, but the log says: "foretopsail-yard shot in two."

opponent remained within gun-shot. The San-Fiorenzo's loss, by the morning's action, amounted to eight seamen and marines killed and 14 wounded. The remainder of the day was occupied by the San-Fiorenzo in repairing her damages, and in a vain pursuit of the Piémontaise, who crowded sail to the eastward, and at 9 P.M. disappeared.

At midnight the French frigate again showed herself, bearing east, and at daylight on the 8th was about four leagues distant. At 9 A.M., being perfectly refitted, the San-Fiorenzo bore up under all sail. At noon the Piémontaise hoisted a Dutch jack, but at 2 h. 15 m. P.M. changed it to an English ensign. The San-Fiorenzo was now fast approaching; nor did the Piémontaise avoid the British frigate until the latter hauled athwart her stern, in order to gain the weather-gage and bring on a close action. To frustrate this manœuvre, the French frigate, who now appeared with her proper colours, hauled up also, and made all sail. Perceiving, however, that the superior sailing of the San-Fiorenzo rendered a battle unavoidable, the Piémontaise, tacked; and at 4 P.M.¹ the two frigates, when passing' each other, on opposite tacks, at the distance of not more than 80 yards, re-opened their fire.

In the second broadside from the French frigate a grape-shot killed Captain Hardinge; whereupon the command of the San-Fiorenzo devolved upon Lieutenant William Dawson. As soon as she had got abaft her opponent's beam, the Piémontaise wore; and at 5 h. 49 m. P.M., after a well-fought action, one hour and 20 minutes of it close, and during which she had all her rigging and sails cut to pieces, her three masts and bowsprit badly wounded, and a great proportion of her numerous crew placed *hors de combat*, the French frigate hauled down her colours; some of her people, at the same time, waving their hats for a boat to be sent to them.

The loss sustained by the San-Fiorenzo in the third day's action, although numerically less than that on the second day, was more serious, as it included among the killed her truly gallant captain:² the remaining killed of that day consisted of four seamen and marines, and the wounded, of one lieutenant (Henry George Moysey, severely) and seven seamen and marines. This made the total British loss, on the three days, 13 killed and 25 wounded. The Piémontaise, besides her regular crew of 366 Frenchmen, had 200 Lascars (prisoners

¹ According to the San-Fiorenzo's log; but the Gazette says "three."

² See vol. iii., p. 266.

taken out of some captured Indiamen), to work the sails. Out of these 566 in crew and supernumeraries, the French frigate lost 48 officers, seamen, marines, and Lascars killed, and 112 wounded.

The force of the *San-Fiorenzo*, in guns and men has already appeared.¹ In her armament there was no alteration; but, in respect to crew, the ship was so greatly deficient, owing to the sickness of some men and the absence of others in prizes, as to muster no more than 186 men and boys; a circumstance which, singularly enough, the British official account has omitted to notice.

The force of the *Piémontaise* has also been fully stated at a former page;² but, instead of 46 guns, as there particularized, Lieutenant Dawson in his letter says: "She (the *Piémontaise*) mounts fifty guns, long 18-pounders on the main deck, and 36-pound carronades on her quarter-deck." No other of the few accounts that have been published is more precise; and yet, according to the navy-office draught of the *Piémontaise*, the ship could mount 24 carriage-guns only of a side, 14 on the main deck, seven on the quarter-deck, and three on the forecastle. Her two main deck bow-ports, if filled, would make 50 guns in all, but even this would add nothing to her broadside force. Under these circumstances, and particularly as it is a French ship whose force is to be stated, we shall consider the *Piémontaise*, in her action with the *San-Fiorenzo*, to have mounted the same guns as she did a year and nine months before, in her action with the *Warren Hastings*.

We cannot pay a higher compliment to the victorious party in this case, than to rank the action of the *San-Fiorenzo* and *Piémontaise* with that of the *Phoenix* and *Didon*.³ The odds in each action, except in point of crew, were nearly the same. The *Piémontaise* was certainly not so manfully fought as the *Didon*. The former began to run from the first; and it was that constant avoidance of her opponent, which protracted the contest to the third day. The actual engagement, however, did not, as it appears, last altogether more than four hours and five minutes; ten minutes on the first day, two hours and five minutes on the second, and one hour and fifty minutes on the third. The action, on the part of the British frigate, was conducted with as much skill as gallantry; but neither skill nor gallantry would have availed, had the *San-Fiorenzo* not excelled her antagonist in a third quality, swiftness of sailing.

¹ See p. 20.

² See p. 150.

³ See p. 66.

Soon after daylight on the morning of the 9th the three masts of the *Piémontaise* fell over her side. In this state she was taken in tow by the *San-Fiorenzo*; and on the 13th the two frigates cast anchor in the road of Columbo, island of Ceylon, where, by order of the governor, Lieutenant-general Maitland, the highest military honours were paid to the remains of the *San-Fiorenzo's* late youthful captain. Her present commanding officer received, we believe, the customary promotion, but did not long survive the reward of his gallantry. The *Piémontaise* was afterwards purchased for the British navy, and classed among the large 38s.

Aware of the latitude allowed to a "Biographical Memoir" in the "Naval Chronicle," we should not feel disposed to find fault with its editor for stating, even in the high-flown, and not always intelligible, language of the Reverend James Stanier Clarke, one of the co-authors of the "Life of Nelson," that "a superannuated frigate of thirty-eight guns," had captured a French frigate armed with "fifty long 18-pounders;"¹ but our duty compels us to reprobate the introduction of so gross a falsehood into a solemn memorial presented to the king in council. A document of this kind, presented by Mr. George Hardinge, uncle to the deceased captain, praying for an augmentation to the armorial bearings of the family, contains the following statement: "Your memorialist represents to your majesty, that your ship, the *St. Fiorenzo*, carried thirty-eight guns, and mustered 186 men, including officers; that *la Piédmontaise* carried fifty guns, long 18-pounders, and had on board 566 men." It is not added, that 200 of these were Lascars and prisoners. Had this memorial met the fate of thousands of others, no harm would have been done; but, unfortunately for the cause of truth, in the next London Gazette appears an order, in which the king himself is made to declare, that his frigate carried "only thirty-eight guns."

On the 13th of March, at 5 P.M., the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Emerald*, Captain Frederick Lewis Maitland, being off the harbour of Vivero, in Spain, discovered lying there a large French armed schooner, and immediately stood in with the view of attempting her capture or destruction. At 5 h. 30 m. P.M. the first fort on the right, mounting eight 24-pounders, opened upon the ship; and as soon as the frigate got within range, another fort, situated about a mile further in on the left, and mounting five 24-pounders, also commenced firing. Find-

¹ Naval Chronicle, vol. xx., p. 385.

ing it impossible to place the ship so as to act against both batteries at once, Captain Maitland detached a party of seamen and marines, under First-lieutenant Charles Bertram, assisted by Lieutenants of marines Giles Meech and John Husband, and master's mates Matthew Mildridge and Edward Saurin, to storm the outer fort, while the frigate stood in as near as the depth of water would admit, and opened her fire upon the inner one.

Lieutenant Bertram having, without much difficulty, driven the Spaniards out of the right-hand fort and spiked the guns, Lieutenant William Smith, the third-lieutenant, with another party of men, proceeded to do the same to the left-hand fort. On landing about a mile from the fort, Lieutenant Smith was opposed by a party of soldiers, most of whom, with their leader, are represented to have fallen, and the remainder to have retreated. These the British followed; but, owing to the nature of the ground, the darkness of the night, and a temporary cessation of firing by the battery, missed their way to it and returned. Meanwhile midshipman Daniel Baird had been sent with a party to take possession of the schooner; which, to avoid being captured, had run herself on shore upon the rocks. This party was joined by that under Lieutenant Bertram, and the united detachments were presently met by the principal part of the schooner's crew. After an exchange of musketry, the pike and bayonet of the British put the French to flight, and occasioned several of them to be left dead on the road.

Lieutenant Bertram now advanced towards the schooner, which was the *Apropos*, of eight 12-pounder carronades and a complement of 70 men, from the Isle of France with despatches; but, as the vessel had gone on shore at high water, no efforts on the part of the British, although persevered in until a party of soldiers opened a galling fire upon them, could get her afloat. Notwithstanding the attack thus made upon them, Lieutenant Bertram and his men managed to set the *Apropos* on fire; and at 1 A.M. on the 14th the vessel exploded. This enterprise was attended, unfortunately, with a serious loss to the British. Nine of the *Emerald's* seamen and marines were killed; and Lieutenant Bertram (severely), the two lieutenants of marines, one of the master's mates (Mildridge), and 11 seamen and marines were wounded. For the gallantry he had displayed, Lieutenant Bertram was immediately promoted to the rank of commander.

In the month of March the port of Lorient, in which were three or four ships of the line ready for sea or fitting, and the

neighbouring port of Concarneau, in which lay Jérôme Buona-parté's late ship, the *Vétéran*, were watched by the two 74-gun ships *Impétueux*, Captain John Lawford, and *Saturn*, Captain Thomas Boys, the 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Aigle*, Captain George Wolfe, 18-pounder 32-gun frigate *Narcissus*, Captain Charles Malcolm, and two or three smaller vessels. On the 22nd of the month this squadron lay at an anchor in an excellent harbour formed by the Glénan islands, receiving provisions out of some transports which had lately arrived there from Plymouth.

At about 3 h. 45 m. p.m. the 4-gun schooner *Cuckoo*, Lieutenant Silas Hiscutt Paddon, being about midway between the island of Groix and the Glénans, made the signal for an enemy in the south-east. The *Aigle*, from whose maintop the enemy was also visible, got under way and made sail in chase, followed by the *Impétueux* and *Narcissus*; but the *Saturn* was directed by telegraph to remain at anchor and watch the *Vétéran* in Concarneau.

The strange vessels were the two 40-gun frigates *Italienne* and *Seine*, standing close hauled on the larboard tack, with the wind from the north-north-west, and bound to Lorient. At about 7 h. 30 m. p.m., while passing the *Cuckoo*, Captain Wolfe directed Lieutenant Paddon to acquaint the commodore, then about two miles astern, that he should run between Groix and the main, in order, if possible, to cut off the two frigates, who were then closing with the island. For this purpose the *Aigle* made all sail, with the wind on her larboard beam, and, on entering the passage, was fired at by the batteries on both sides. At 8 h. 30 m. p.m. the *Aigle* got within half gun-shot of the sternmost of the two French frigates, both of which had just then rounded the north-west point of the island. After receiving a fire from the *Aigle*'s starboard guns, this frigate bore up, and anchored under the protection of the batteries on the north-east side of Groix, near Pointe de Billery.

The *Aigle* immediately stood after the other French frigate, then standing directly in for Lorient. At a few minutes past 9 p.m., in a very dark night, Captain Wolfe got within 50 yards of this frigate to windward; and, after burning a blue light to show her own and the enemy's situation to the *Impétueux*, then coming up astern, the *Aigle* opened her starboard broadside. This the French frigate, who had now the dockyard's boats on board, and was standing right into the harbour, returned. As the *Aigle* was already in four fathoms water, and, by continuing

longer on this course, would soon be in Port-Louis road, Captain Wolfe resolved to board his enemy, and bore up for the purpose. Seeing the *Aigle's* intention, and being determined to defeat it, the French captain bore round up before the wind. By that manœuvre the French frigate brought the *Aigle* astern with the latter's jib-boom abreast of her larboard mizen rigging; thus adroitly avoiding a mode of attack, which experience had shown was generally successful.

As the two contending frigates were now crossing ahead of the *Impétueux*, Captain Wolfe burnt a second blue light, in the hope that, upon seeing the position of the French frigate, the *Impétueux* would run on board: an operation that, with the way then upon the 74, would have cut the frigate to the water's edge, and insured her capture. Being now, however, very near the island, with a dark night to add to the difficulties of the navigation, the *Impétueux*, instead of doing so, wore round on the starboard tack, fired her larboard guns, and then, wearing again, followed the *Aigle* through the passage. The French frigate, shortly afterwards, as the only means of escaping from her persevering antagonist, ran with all sail set upon *Pointe des Chats*, on the isle of *Groix*, under very high and formidable batteries. The *Aigle* and *Impétueux* shortly afterwards anchored to the south-west of the island, and were presently joined by the *Saturn*; who, as well as the *Narcissus* and *Cuckoo*, had also passed through between *Groix* and the main.

In this her gallant action with the French frigates and batteries, the *Aigle* was a considerable sufferer, having had three guns split and dismantled, a bower-anchor cut in two, and her mainmast and bowsprit irreparably injured. Her loss amounted to Captain Wolfe (severely in the left arm and hip), one Lieutenant (*John Lamb*), and 20 seamen and marines wounded; seven of them so badly that they were invalided as unserviceable.

On the next day, the 23rd, at daylight, the *Impétueux* and squadron weighed and stood into the passage, and discovered the French frigate on *Pointe des Chats*, with her yards and topmasts struck, and her mizenmast cut or carried away, heeling very much. Several shells were thrown at the British ships from the batteries, but none struck them. In the course of the forenoon the people on board the *Aigle* saw seven coffins landed from the frigate, and carried to a church that stood on the top of a neighbouring hill: a tolerable proof that the shot of the *Aigle* had done some execution. By the aid of two large vessels

and sundry smaller ones from the dockyard at Lorient, this French frigate was at length got afloat and towed into Lorient. The other frigate, also, on the morning of the 29th, taking advantage of a shift of wind to the westward, slipped her cable, and in 20 minutes was safe at anchor in the same port. Although it is not in our power to state positively which of these two frigates it was that got on shore, we believe it to have been the *Seine*, as that frigate did not again go to sea, except as an *armée en flûte*, or store-ship.

Notwithstanding the fate of the "sloop-of-war" *Lily*,¹ vessels of that denomination, inferior in force to a gun-brig, were still suffered to remain in the British navy. One of the "cruisers" of this class was the *Childers*, a brig of 202 tons, built as long ago as the year 1778; a vessel so unseaworthy as to have been obliged, on more than one occasion, to throw overboard her guns, 4-pounders, in order to save the lives of her crew. The brig at length became so crazy, that 18-pounder carronades were found too heavy for her, and she was fitted with fourteen 12-pounders. In this state, and manned with a crew, nominally, of 86, but really of 65 men and boys, including only one lieutenant (there not being accommodation for more), the *Childers*, Captain William Henry Dillon, in the month of January of the present year, lay in Leith roads, waiting to give her "protection" to the trade proceeding to Gottenburg. But the merchants, the instant they knew the force and qualifications of the *Childers*, objected to place their property under her care; supposing, very naturally, that so small and ill-armed a vessel was incapable of beating off the privateers that infested the northern waters. Ludicrous as the application would have appeared, the merchants, had they wished for a vessel of nearly double the force of the one they had rejected, might have requested the board of admiralty to appoint, instead of the "sloop-of-war" *Childers*, the "gun-brig" *Insolent*, then cruising on the Downs station. What vessel the merchants at last obtained we know not; but the *Childers* proceeded by herself to the Baltic, to effect as much, in the way of annoying the enemy, as her small powers would admit.

On the 14th of March, at 4 P.M., as the *Childers* was standing towards the coast of Norway, with a fresh breeze from the eastward, a sail was discovered in-shore, and immediately chased. The stranger hauled in among the rocks, out of sight, for the purpose of taking shelter in the small port of Midbe. Imme-

¹ See vol. iii., p. 277.

diately a number of boats came out, with the apparent intention of removing the vessel's cargo. To prevent this, Captain Dillon despatched the cutter, well armed, under the command of William Wilson, the master, accompanied by master's mate Thomas Edward Knight, also the jolly-boat, with Robert Nicholl the gunner, and Augustus William Henry Le Neve the purser, a volunteer. The near approach of these two boats was the signal for the shore-boats to disperse; and, although opposed by the inhabitants with musketry, as well as with stones hurled from the top of the precipice under which the vessel lay, the British boarded and carried her. She proved to be a Danish galliot, partly laden with oil and fish.

Scarcely had the Childers descried the galliot, thus taken by her boats, coming out from among the rocks, than she also observed a large brig, evidently a vessel of force, sail out of Hitteroe. The latter soon bore down towards the Childers, with the apparent design of fighting her and rescuing the prize. At about 6 p.m. the stranger, which was the Danish brig-corvette Lougen, mounting 18 long 18-pounders, and two long 6-pounders through the stern-ports, with a crew of 160 men and boys, commanded by Captain Wulff, got upon the weather beam of the Childers, at about gun-shot distance.

Being aware that the convoy, of which the Childers was to have been the escort, would very soon approach, Captain Dillon felt it incumbent upon him, notwithstanding the evident superiority of the Danish brig, to strive his utmost to drive her into port. By way of defiance, therefore, the Childers fired a shot over the Lougen; who immediately hauled close to the wind, and stood in-shore. As soon as she had secured her prize and hoisted in her boats, the Childers followed the Danish brig; and, when the two vessels were within half a mile of the shore, they exchanged broadsides, on opposite tacks, at about half gun-shot distance. Soon after the Childers had discharged her broadside, the Dane was discovered to be on fire forward; and, had the Childers been near enough to profit by the confusion evidently caused by the accident, the contest might have been brought to a speedy termination.

The Lougen now kept so near to the Norwegian shore, that she became hid from the view of the Childers, and could not at any rate be weathered by her. It was only, indeed, by the flash of the Lougen's guns, that Captain Dillon knew in what direction to fire his own. In this manner the engagement lasted for three hours; during which the heavy metal and well-directed

fire of the Dane did the Childers considerable damage. Many of the Danish 18-pounders struck the British vessel between wind and water; while the shot of the Childers, being discharged from 12-pounder carronades, frequently fell short; a circumstance which must have greatly reanimated her opponent.

Despairing of accomplishing anything while the wary Dane hugged the land so closely, the Childers stood out under easy sail, in the hope of enticing the Lougen to sea; where a close, and therefore a more equal, combat could not so well be avoided by the latter. At length the Lougen ventured from the land, and at 11 P.M. was three miles distant from it. The Childers now set her courses, and tacked, with the intention of weathering her antagonist; but the wind presently headed her and defeated the attempt. As the only alternative, the Childers passed close under the lee of the Lougen, and poured into her a broadside of round and grape; receiving in return many destructive shot, several of which entered between wind and water. The Lougen immediately tacked, and made sail to regain the shore; and the Childers, having her lower masts and bowsprit badly wounded, five feet water in the hold, her magazine afloat, and the water gaining on the pumps, was not in a state to renew the action.

Of her crew of 65 men and boys, the Childers had her captain's clerk (Joseph Roberts) and one seaman killed, and her commander (severely in both legs and in his left arm), two midshipmen (John Batten and Charles Parker), three seamen, two marines, and one boy wounded. The Lougen, from declining to continue the engagement, must have suffered some loss; but its amount we are unable to state.

After bearing up to join her prize, the Childers lay to all night on the starboard tack, to stop eight shot-holes between wind and water. This done, and being in too shattered a state to keep the sea, the Childers put back to Leith. In the mean time the merchant-vessels from that port, having had the Lougen driven out of their track, and that by the very vessel whose services their owners had despised, passed in safety to their destination.

The gallantry of the Childers in this affair obtained for her officers and crew the thanks of the admiralty, and for Captain Dillon himself the grand desideratum of a commander, post-rank. Of his first and only lieutenant, Thomas Edmunds Captain Dillon speaks in the highest terms. What honours fell to the share of Captain Wulff, for his conduct on the occasion,

depended very much, no doubt, upon the story he told when he got safe into port.

On the 19th of June, at 2 p.m., the *Nase* of Norway bearing west-north-west seven or eight leagues, the British 16-gun brig-sloop *Seagull* (fourteen 24-pounder carronades and two sixes), Captain Robert Cathcart, discovered in-shore, running to the eastward, with a fresh breeze at west-south-west, the same Danish 20-gun brig *Lougen*, of whom mention has just been made. The *Seagull* crowded sail in chase; and at 4 h. 30 m. p.m., having arrived within gun-shot, hoisted her colours. The *Lougen* did the same, and, knowing that a long range suited her best, immediately opened a fire from her starboard guns. It now falling nearly calm, the *Seagull* was obliged to use her sweeps, in order, by getting between her antagonist and the shore, to prevent the latter from entering Christiansand harbour, off the mouth of which she lay; and more particularly, that the former might gain a position near enough for her carronades to produce effect.

At 5 p.m. the British brig got within musket-shot of the Dane and commenced the action, but soon had most of her sweeps, and the greater part of her rigging, shot away by the *Lougen's* fire. After the engagement had continued in this way for 20 minutes, six Danish gun-boats, each armed with two long 24-pounders, and manned with from 60 to 70 men, and which until now had been concealed behind the rocks, pulled towards the *Seagull*. They soon swept up, and, taking a position on each quarter, raked the *Seagull* at every shot; while the *Lougen* was doing the same on the British brig's larboard bow. By 6 h. 30 m. p.m. five out of seven of the *Seagull's* carronades on the larboard side were dismounted. Every effort was now used to get the brig round; but, as her sweeps were all destroyed, and her rigging and sails, even had there been a breeze to use them, cut to pieces, that object could not be effected. After sustaining the heavy fire of her numerous antagonists until 7 h. 30 m. p.m., at which time she had five feet water in the hold, the *Seagull* struck her colours.

Out of her 94 men and boys, the *Seagull* lost her second-lieutenant (Abraham Harcourt White), master (Andrew Martin), three seamen, and three marines killed, her captain (severely), first-lieutenant (Villiers T. Hatton, dangerously), boatswain (Thomas Wilson), 11 seamen, and six marines wounded. Scarcely could the wounded and the remaining survivors of her crew be removed, ere the *Seagull* went down; thereby affording an in-

contestable proof, that her damages had been of the utmost magnitude, and that, in protracting their resistance so long, her officers and crew had acquitted themselves like British seamen.

The *Lougen*, out of her 160 men and boys, appears to have had one man killed and 13 wounded, and was much damaged. The loss sustained by the gun-boats cannot be ascertained. The *Seagull* was afterwards weighed by the Danes, and added to their navy. For his gallant defence of her, Captain Cathcart, as soon as he returned home, was promoted to post-rank.

On the 22nd of March, at 2 P.M., the British 64-gun ships *Stately*, Captain George Parker, and *Nassau*, Captain Robert Campbell, proceeding towards the Great Belt, descried and chased a strange sail. At 4 P.M., Greenall on the Jutland coast bearing north-west by west distant 40 miles, the stranger was made out to be an enemy, and at 5 P.M., a Danish ship of the line, having evidently the intention, if no other mode of escape offered, of running herself on shore.

At 7 h. 40 m. P.M. the *Nassau* got up with, and opened her fire upon, the Danish 74-gun ship *Prindts-Christian-Frederic*, Captain Jessen; and, in a few minutes afterwards, the *Stately* closed and did the same. A running fight was thus maintained, with great obstinacy on the part of the 74, until 9 h. 30 m. P.M., when the *Prindts-Christian-Frederic* struck her colours. At this time the latter was within less than 500 yards of the shore of Zealand; and, before the first-lieutenant of the *Stately*, Mr. David Sloan, who had gone on board to take possession, could cut away her anchor, the prize grounded. The two British ships, fortunately for them, had already brought up near her. The remaining part of the night was employed in removing the prisoners; but it was found impossible to get the captured ship afloat. On the 23rd, in the evening, as the Danes were preparing their artillery on the coast, and as the wind blew strong on the shore and a good deal of sea was running, the *Prindts-Christian-Frederic* was set on fire by her captors, and in a short time blew up.

The loss on the part of the *Stately* was two seamen and two marines killed, and one lieutenant (Edward Cole), the boatswain (John Liming), one master's mate (James Davis), 23 seamen and two marines wounded. The *Nassau* had one seaman killed and one missing, and one first-class volunteer (Edward J. Johnson), 10 seamen, and five marines wounded; total, on the side of the British, five killed and 45 wounded and

missing. The Prindts-Christian-Frederic, out of a complement on board of 576 men and boys, had 55 killed and 88 wounded; a loss sufficient to prove, that her commander did not surrender his ship earlier than was consistent with the honour of the Danish flag.

On the 23rd of April the British 20-gun-ship *Daphne*, Captain Francis Mason, 18-gun ship-sloop *Tartarus*, Captain William Russel, and 12-gun brig *Forward*, Lieutenant David Sheils, cruising off the coast of Denmark, destroyed a Danish sloop laden with provisions, part of a convoy lying at Flodstrand, and destined for the relief of Norway. It being an important object to attempt getting hold of these vessels, Captain Mason, on the evening of the 25th, detached three boats from the *Daphne* and two from the *Tartarus*, under the direction of Lieutenant William Elliott, first of the former; accompanied by Mr. Hugh Stewart, master, Lieutenant Richard Boger, of the royal marines, and midshipmen George Beazeley, James Durell, Thomas Elliott, John Moore, and George H. Ayton, belonging to the *Daphne*, and Lieutenants Richard Gittens and William Love Patterson, and midshipmen John Septford, Charles Lutman, and Francis Andrews, belonging to the *Tartarus*.

The five boats, towed near the shore by the *Forward*, proceeded to the attack. Lieutenant Elliott and his party found the vessels, consisting of seven brigs, averaging about 160 tons, three galliots of about 110 tons each, and one schooner and one sloop of about 90 tons each, all of which, except two of the brigs, were deeply laden with grain and provisions, moored close under the fort of a castle mounting 10 guns, and made fast to the shore by hawsers; but, the moment the alarm was given by some of the Danish boats, the Danes abandoned their vessels and fled. No sooner, however, had the British set foot in the vessels, than a heavy fire of round, grape, and musketry, opened upon them from the castle and from another battery of three guns, as well as from the crews of the vessels assembled on the beach. Many of the shots struck the hulls and went through the sails of the vessels; but the British maintained their footing, and the five boats, with the 10 laden vessels, cleared the harbour with so slight a loss as five wounded, including Lieutenant Elliott and the *Daphne's* master; one of the seamen "of a punctured wound in the neck by one of the *Daphne's* crew, having mistaken him for a Dane."

A Danish boat, with five men in her, having the temerity to persist in endeavouring to retake one of the vessels, although

repeatedly warned by Lieutenant Elliott, the latter was obliged with his people to fire in self-defence. The consequence was, that three of the five Danes, whose determined conduct in so laudable a cause deserved a better fate, fell to rise no more. The enterprise, upon the whole, was skilfully planned and gallantly executed, and did credit to all who were engaged in it.

On the 29th of April the British 16-gun ship-sloop Falcon, acting commander Lieutenant John Price, being off the island of Endelau, discovered nine large boats on the beach. Observing some troops near them, Lieutenant Price detached three boats, and succeeded in burning and destroying eight of the Danish boats, the soldiers on the island making a poor attempt to defend them. At the island of Thunoe six other small-craft were destroyed by the Falcon's boats without any resistance. On the 3rd of May a large man-of-war schooner attempted to escape from Arbures; but after a long and circuitous chase by the Falcon, she was forced back into her port, where lay three other armed vessels.

Learning from a market-boat he had taken, that the entrance of the harbour of Kyeholm on the island of Samsoe was being strongly fortified; that 50 pieces of heavy cannon had already been mounted on the batteries, and that vessels were expected from Callundborg with mortars for the same purpose, Lieutenant Price detached the boats of the Falcon in-shore every night in the hope to intercept them. On the 7th the boats, which were under the command of Mr. James Ellerton, the master of the Falcon, discovered the two vessels they were seeking at anchor close under the batteries of Lundholm. The vessels were boarded and carried in an instant, under a heavy but ill-directed fire of great guns and musketry. One of the boats, which contained a 13-inch mortar with all its equipment, and 400 shells, grounded in the way out; and, as she lay within range of the batteries, Mr. Ellerton found it necessary to destroy her. The other vessel, similarly laden, was brought safe out; and the whole service was performed with so trifling a loss to the British as one seaman slightly wounded with a musket-ball in the arm. One Dane, who being the artillery officer placed in charge of the mortars and mortar-stores, felt it incumbent upon him to persevere in resisting after all resistance was vain, was unfortunately killed.

On the 24th of May, at noon, the British hired cutter Swan, of ten 12-pounder carronades, and 40 men and boys, Lieutenant Mark Robinson Lucas, being off the island of Bornholm, on her way to Rear-admiral Sir Samuel Hood, with despatches from the

commander-in-chief, observed a cutter-rigged vessel standing from the land towards her. The *Swan* immediately hove to, and hoisted a Dutch jack for a pilot. This decoyed the strange cutter so far from the shore, that, at 2 P.M., the *Swan* found herself in a situation to chase with a prospect of overtaking the vessel before she could get back.

At 4 P.M. the *Swan* got within gun-shot; when the strange cutter opened her fire. The battery of Bornholm also commenced firing at the *Swan*, then about a mile from the beach. Attempting now to get a long gun in her stern to bear upon her pursuer, the strange cutter was caught in the wind. This accident enabled the *Swan* to get within musket-shot; and, after an action of 20 minutes, her antagonist blew up. As the *Swan* now lay nearly becalmed under the land, and as the batteries were still firing, and several boats approaching from the shore, Lieutenant Lucas was under the necessity of quitting the wreck without saving the life of a single individual of the crew. The Danish cutter appeared to be a vessel of about 120 tons, mounted eight or 10 guns, and was apparently full of men. Neither the *Swan* nor a man on board of her sustained the slightest injury.

In transmitting to the secretary of the admiralty the letter of Lieutenant Lucas detailing this action, Sir James Saumarez begins by stating, that the lieutenant was the bearer of despatches from himself to Sir Samuel Hood; and yet the vice-admiral concludes his letter thus: "Great praise is due to Lieutenant Lucas for his spirited attack of a vessel of superior force under the protection of the enemy's batteries." Here, then, upon an important point of service, is an opinion at complete variance with that which, it is pretended, would have been expressed by Admiral Cornwallis, had the *Æolus*, when bearing her despatches, such as they were, pursued and engaged the *Didon*. Much as we have reason to be satisfied, as regards both weight and number, with the private opinions which the complaints against us for dragging into the light that hitherto concealed case have elicited, the few words just quoted from the letter of Sir James Saumarez, in reference to an exactly similar case, are all that we are at liberty to publish.

On the 10th of May the British 18-pounder 32-gun frigate *Tartar*, Captain George Edmund Byron Bettesworth, sailed from Leith roads, to cruise off North Bergen and endeavour to intercept a frigate stated to be lying in that harbour. This was the Dutch frigate *Guelderland*, Captain Pool, of 36-guns, 12 and 6 pounders; which, with a convoy of three or four ships in

charge, had sailed from the Texel on the 8th of March, bound to Batavia, but, having sprung a leak, had since put into Bergen to get it stopped.

On the 12th the Tartar arrived off the coast of Norway, but, on account of a very thick fog, could not stand in until the 15th. On that day the frigate made the islands to the westward of Bergen; and, on hoisting Dutch colours, was boarded by some Norwegians, who came off in two boats, and informed the officers, that the Guelderland, with her small convoy, had sailed for the East Indies eight days before. By the aid of these men as pilots, the Tartar steered through a most intricate and rocky passage, until she arrived within five or six miles of Bergen, when the Norwegians refused to take the ship any further.

It being Captain Bettesworth's intention, now that the frigate had escaped him, to proceed off the town, and bring away the shipping in the harbour, among which were three privateers, the Tartar anchored in the straits; and in the evening Captain Bettesworth, accompanied by his first and third lieutenants, Herbert Caiger and Thomas Sykes, and Mr John Jervis White the master, went up to the town in the frigate's boats. An Indiaman lying under the battery would now probably have been cut out, had not the guard-boat, which was without her, fallen in with and fired upon the launch commanded by Lieutenant Sykes. The launch's crew returned the fire, and, after wounding all the men in the guard-boat severely, took her. This proceeding alarmed the townspeople, who, sounding their bugles, flew to the batteries. Finding that the shipping was protected by a chain, Captain Bettesworth, with all his boats except the launch, left to watch the enemy's motions, pulled back to the frigate.

The Tartar now got under way, with the intention of cannonading the town and batteries. Owing, however, to the intricacy of the passage and the lightness of the wind, the ship, although with a strong current in her favour, had only been able to reach half the distance, when, lying quite becalmed in a narrow rocky strait without any anchorage, she was attacked by an armed schooner and five gun-boats, each of the latter carrying two long 24-pounders, along with a detachment of troops. Having taken their station under a rocky point within half gun-shot of the Tartar, who by the set of the current kept gradually nearing them, these vessels maintained, with entire impunity, a well-directed fire; hulling the frigate in 10 or 11 places, and greatly damaging her rigging and sails. Among the first shots was one

that killed Captain Bettesworth, while he was in the act of pointing a gun; and Mr. Henry Fitzburgh, a fine and promising young midshipman, fell dead nearly at the same instant.

The command of the *Tartar*, thus critically circumstanced, devolved upon Lieutenant Caiger. By great exertions, the broadside of the frigate was at length brought momentarily to bear, and one of the gun-boats was sunk by its discharge. The action continued in this partial manner for an hour and a half; when, a light air springing up, the *Tartar* wore and stood towards the gun-boats, and getting her bow-guns to bear, compelled them to retreat and pull up under the batteries of Bergen. Considering it unadvisable, in the present state of general alarm, to attack the town, Lieutenant Caiger obliged the natives on board to attempt a passage with the ship to the northward. In her way through this channel, the *Tartar* picked up her launch; and, after passing many difficult spots, where it became necessary to boom the frigate off with spars, and occasionally to tow her by the boats, the *Tartar*, at 3 P.M., got clear of the islands and stood out to sea. The whole of the frigate's loss by this perilous enterprise consisted of her captain and one midshipman killed, one man with the loss of his right arm, another man severely, and several slightly wounded. Most of the shot-holes were between wind and water, and one shot had struck the ship two feet under water. On the 20th the *Tartar* returned to Leith roads, with the body of her late gallant and much-lamented captain on board.

On the 19th of May, at 4 P.M., in latitude 46° north, longitude 14° west, the British 38-gun frigate *Virginie*, Captain Edward Brace, standing on the starboard tack with the wind at north-east, saw and chased a sail in the north-north-west. At 4 h. 30 m. P.M. the strange sail, which was the Dutch frigate *Guelderland*, already named as the object of the *Tartar*'s search, bore away. At 7 h. 40 m. P.M. the *Virginie*, coming up fast, fired a gun to leeward: on which the *Guelderland* fired one to windward, and hoisted French colours. At 9 h. 45 m. P.M. the *Virginie* hailed the *Guelderland*; who, shifting her colours, replied that she was a Dutch ship-of-war.

Being now called upon to strike, and refusing, the *Guelderland* was fired into by the *Virginie*, and an action forthwith commenced. During its continuance the Dutch frigate wore three times, and in attempting to do so the fourth time fell on board her opponent; but the night was so dark, and the swell so great, that the British could not act as on such occasions they are wont. After an hour and a half's contest, in which

she had her bowsprit and all three masts shot away by the board, and sustained a very heavy loss in killed and wounded, the Guelderland struck her colours to the *Virginie*; whose principal damage was that caused by the former's running foul of her. The Guelderland, soon after she had struck, caught fire, but, "through the firm discipline of the enemy," says Captain Brace, "the fire was extinguished" before the *Virginie's* boats could get on board to rescue the prisoners.

The *Virginie* came out of the action with so trifling a loss as one man killed and two men wounded; while that of the Guelderland, whose crew numbered 253, exclusive of 23 passengers, amounted to 25 officers and men killed, and 50, including her commander, severely wounded.

Against such a superiority as existed in this action, to delay surrendering until the ship was wholly dismasted, and three-tenths of her crew killed or disabled, showed that there was no want of bravery in the Dutch frigate. There appears, however, to have been one exception among the persons on board; and that, shame to say, the captain himself. On the 28th of November, 1810, Colonel de mer Pool, late captain of the Guelderland frigate, was tried by a court-martial at Amsterdam, for having, during that ship's action with the *Virginie*, quitted his quarters after receiving two slight wounds, one in the face the other in the hand. By the sentence that followed, he was dismissed the service, declared perjured and infamous, and banished for life.¹

In the art of gunnery, the Dutchmen appear to have been miserably deficient. Many a 10-gun privateer, in a running fight, has inflicted a greater loss upon a British frigate than the *Virginie* sustained in her one hour and a half's conflict with the Guelderland. On the other hand, great credit is due to the *Virginie's* officers and crew for the skill they exhibited; especially when it is considered, that the 18-pounders of the *Virginie*, on account of her age and weakness, were of a shorter and lighter description than those usually established upon frigates of her class.

The British captain, in his official letter, calls the defence of his opponent a gallant one, and adds: "If any credit is due to this transaction, I entreat you to bestow it on the officers and men." Here is another instance of that liberal feeling which is ever the characteristic of the truly brave. Captain Brace's commendation of his officers produced its effect, Lieutenant

¹ *Moniteur*, December 14, 1810.

John Davis, first of the ship, being made a commander, and master's mate Nathaniel Norton, who had passed for one, a lieutenant. Dutch ships-of-war are seldom any great acquisition to the British navy; but the Guelderland served, for a few years, as a cruising 12-pounder 36.

On the 4th of April, while the British 38-gun frigate *Alceste*, Captain Murray Maxwell, 28-gun frigate *Mercury*, Captain James Alexander Gordon, and 18-gun brig-sloop *Grasshopper* (16 carronades, 32-pounders, and two long sixes), Captain Thomas Searle, lay at anchor about three miles to the north-west of the lighthouse of San Sebastian, near Cadiz, a large convoy, under the protection of about 20 gun-boats and a numerous train of flying artillery on the beach, was observed coming down close along-shore from the northward. At 3 P.M., the Spanish convoy being then abreast of the town of Rota, the *Alceste* and squadron weighed, with the wind at west-south-west, and stood in for the body of the enemy's vessels.

At 4 P.M., the shot and shells from the gun-boats and batteries passing over them, the British ships opened their fire. The *Alceste* and *Mercury* devoted their principal attention to the gun-boats; while the *Grasshopper*, draying much less water, stationed herself upon the shoal to the southward of the town, and so close to the batteries, that by the grape from her carronades she drove the Spaniards from their guns, and at the same time kept in check a division of gun-boats, which had come out from Cadiz to assist those engaged by the two frigates. Captain Maxwell in his official letter, alluding to this gallant conduct on the part of Captain Searle, says:—"It was a general cry in both ships, 'Only look how nobly the brig behaves!'" The situation of the *Alceste* and *Mercury* was also rather critical, they having, in the state of the wind, to tack every fifteen minutes close to the end of the shoal.

In the heat of the action the first-lieutenant of the *Alceste*, Allen Stewart, volunteered to board the convoy with the boats. Accordingly the boats of the *Alceste* pushed off, under Lieutenant Stewart, accompanied by Lieutenant Philip Pipon, Lieutenant of Marines Richard Hawkey, master's mates James Arscott and Thomas Day, midshipmen J. Stevens Parker, James Adair, Charles Croker, Abraham M'Caul, and Thomas Henry M'Lean; and the boats of the *Mercury*, under Lieutenant Watkin Owen Pell,¹ accompanied by Lieutenant Robert James

¹ In mentioning the wound of this officer when a midshipman of the *Loire* in February, 1800 (see vol. iii., p. 6), we

should have stated that he lost his left leg, and was then under 12 years of age.

Gordon, Lieutenant of Marines James Whylock, master's mates Charles Du Cane and Maurice Keating Comyn, quickly followed. Dashing in among the convoy, the two divisions of boats, led by Lieutenant Stewart, soon boarded and brought out seven tartans, from under the very muzzles of the enemy's guns, and from under the protection of the barges and pinnaces of the Franco-Spanish squadron of seven sail of the line; which barges and pinnaces had also by that time effected their junction with the gun-boats.

Exclusive of the seven tartans captured, two of the gun-boats were destroyed, and several compelled to run on shore, by the fire from the two British frigates and brig, which did not entirely cease until 6 h. 30 m. P.M. All this was effected with so slight a loss to the British, as one man mortally and two slightly wounded on board the Grasshopper. The damages of the latter, however, were extremely severe, as well in hull as in masts, rigging, and sails. With the exception of an anchor shot away from the Mercury, the damages of the two frigates were confined to their sails and rigging, and that not to any material extent.

In the month of April, while the British 12-pounder 36-gun frigate *Nymphe*, Captain Conway Shipley, and 18-gun ship-sloop *Blossom*, Captain George Pigot, were cruising off the port of Lisbon, information was received, that a large brig-corvette, the *Garrota*, of 20 guns and 150 men, late belonging to the Portuguese navy, but since fitted out by the French, was lying at anchor in a bight above Belem castle, waiting for an opportunity to escape to sea. Having rowed up the Tagus at night in his gig, and reconnoitred the position of the brig, Captain Shipley resolved to attempt cutting her out. For this purpose the boats of both ships were detached, and upon a principle highly honourable to him, were placed by Captain Shipley under the command of Captain Pigot; the former merely accompanying the expedition to point out the situation of the vessel. Owing to some cause with which we are unacquainted, the boats returned without effecting their object, or even, we believe, getting within gun-shot of the French brig. A second attempt ended much in the same way.

Captain Shipley now resolved to head the boats himself; and accordingly, on the 23rd, at 9 P.M., eight boats, containing about 150 officers and men, quitted the *Nymphe*, in two divisions, for the Tagus. The larboard division consisted of the *Nymphe*'s gig, Captain Shipley, her large cutter, Lieutenant Richard

Standish Haly, launch, Lieutenant Thomas Hodgskins, and yawl, master's mate Michael Raven. The starboard division consisted of the Blossom's gig, Captain George Pigot, her large cutter, Lieutenant John Undrell, launch, Lieutenant William Cecil, and the Nymph's small cutter, master's mate Thomas Hill. The orders were, for the boats to keep in tow of each other until they were discovered by the brig: then to cast off, and pull alongside as fast as possible; the larboard division to board on the larboard, and the starboard division on the opposite side of the enemy's vessel. As, in the event of success, the Garotta in coming out might not be able, on account of the darkness, to avoid the shoals off the entrance of the river, Mr. Henry Andrews, the master of the Nymph, with the jolly-boat, was directed to station himself on the northern extremity of the South Cachop; and, upon seeing the brig approach, he was to hoist a light by way of beacon.

The British boats entered the Tagus in the order prescribed, and, ascending with the tide, got near enough, by the time it became slack water, to see the vessels in the harbour. Wishing to have a good tide to carry out his prize, Captain Shipley waited until he saw the vessels swing with the ebb. Unfortunately for the success of the enterprise, there was a fresh in the river, and the tide in consequence, when the ebb had fairly made, ran at the rate of seven knots an hour. Notwithstanding this unexpected difficulty, the boats got tolerably close to the enemy's vessel before they were discovered. Upon being hailed by the Garotta (the French captain saying in good English, "My good fellows, you had better keep off, you will all be killed if you come on board"), who lay within pistol-shot of the guns of Belem castle, and had for her additional protection a floating battery carrying long 24-pounders, the boats of the two divisions cast themselves off and severally made towards her.

The gig soon darted out of sight of the other boats, and at about 2 h. 30 m. A.M., on the 23rd, boarded the French brig on the larboard bow. Captain Shipley, having sprung into the Garotta's fore-rigging, was in the act of cutting away the boarding-netting, when he received a musket-ball in his forehead and fell dead into the water. The next in command of the gig was Mr. Charles Shipley, the late captain's brother, but not attached to the Nymph, nor even, we have heard,¹ belonging to the naval profession. His fraternal affection overcoming every other

¹ He is now the Rev. Charles Shipley.

consideration, Mr. Shipley ordered the gig's crew to shove off from the enemy's vessel, and endeavour to pick up their captain. As she dropped from the brig's side, the gig fell foul of the oars of the large cutter, just as the latter was about to lay herself alongside. The large cutter, thus impeded, drifted upon the launch; and all three boats then fell foul of a large calking stage moored astern of the brig, which the French crew instantly cut adrift.

Disengaging the cutter as quickly as possible, Lieutenant Haly again directed his course towards the *Garotta*; but such was now the rapidity of the tide, that the men with all their efforts could not stem it. Having had one seaman killed, and one midshipman (William Moriarty) and a corporal of marines wounded, and seeing no prospect of being supported by the starboard division of the boats under Captain Pigot, which, as well as the yawl belonging to the larboard division, had seemingly been unable to pull up against the tide, Lieutenant Haly abandoned the enterprise, and returned on board the *Nymphe*. At 4 A.M. the boats of each division reached their ship without any additional loss. The body of Captain Shipley was afterwards washed on shore, with his sword hanging to his hand, and afforded a clear proof that, had he fallen into the boat instead of into the water, he could not have survived his wound. Yet a contemporary represents this gallant young officer to have been "drowned."¹ Captain Pigot, fortunately for him, was appointed by Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, the commander-in-chief on the coast of Portugal, to be the late Captain Shipley's successor on board the *Nymphe*; and on the 17th of the ensuing September, he was confirmed in his post-rank.

On the 23rd of April, in the morning, the *Grasshopper*, still commanded by Captain Searle, and now accompanied by the 14-gun brig *Rapid*, Lieutenant Henry Baugh, cruising off Faro, on the south coast of Portugal, fell in with and chased two Spanish vessels, valuably laden from South America, under the protection of four gun-boats. In a short time the chased vessels all anchored among the shoals, and under the cover of a battery close in with Faro. The *Grasshopper* and *Rapid* immediately anchored within range of grape-shot; and, after a very severe action of two hours and a half, compelled the people on shore to desert their guns, two of the gun-boats to surrender, and the remaining two to run themselves on shore.

The two Spanish vessels, the cargo of each of which was

¹ Brenton, vol. v., p. 462.

valued at 30,000*l.* sterling, were immediately taken possession of. The service, thus gallantly performed, was not executed wholly without loss, the Grasshopper having one seaman killed, her captain slightly, and three seamen severely wounded, and the Rapid three seamen also wounded severely. Both brigs likewise suffered much in their hulls, masts, sails, and rigging. The loss of the enemy was very great in the two captured gunboats, amounting to 40 in killed and wounded.

Captain Searle, in his official letter, speaks very highly of his first-lieutenant, William Cutfield; also of his master, Henry Bell, and purser, Thomas Bastin; the first for having taken the brig into so dangerous a navigation, and the last for having, in the absence of the second-lieutenant, commanded the after-guns. Mr. Bastin had, it appears, on a former occasion, been severely wounded, and is described as a very deserving officer.

On the 22nd of April, at 6 A.M., as the British ship-sloop Goree, of 18 long sixes and eight 12-pounder carronades, with 120 men and boys, Captain Joseph Spear, was lying at an anchor in Grande-Bourg bay, island of Marie-Galante, the two French 16-gun brig-corvettes Palinure, Capitaine de frégate Pierre-François Jance, and Pilade, Lieutenant de vaisseau Jean-Marie Cocherel, each mounting fourteen 24-pounder carronades and two sixes, with 110 men and boys then on their way from Martinique to Guadaloupe, made their appearance in the south-east. Having ascertained that they were enemy's vessels, and hoisted a signal to that effect to the brig-sloop Supérieure, of twelve 18-pounder carronades and two long twelves, Captain Andrew Hodge, at an anchor a few miles off in the north-west, the Gorée, at 9 A.M., slipped and made sail in chase, with a moderate breeze at east-south-east.

Confident in their strength, the two brigs waited for the Gorée, and at 10 A.M. the action commenced within pistol-shot. At the end of an hour's cannonade, observing the approach of the Supérieure, and of another vessel or two, the Palinure and Pilade bore up and made all sail; leaving the Gorée with her main yard, and fore and maintopsail yards, shot away in the slings, all her masts and topmasts badly wounded, and the ship in other respects so disabled that she could not follow them. Owing, however, to the high firing of her two opponents, the Gorée's loss amounted to only one man killed and four wounded. Each French brig had four men killed; the Pilade six, and the Palinure 15, including her captain, wounded: total, eight killed and 21 wounded. With no other sail to set than her foresail and

driver, the Gorée now hauled her wind for Marie-Galante, and in about half an hour regained the anchorage she had quitted.

By noon the Supérieure, who had weighed at 10 h. 15 m. A.M., got within three miles of the two French brigs, then in the west-south-west, steering for the Saintes. At about half-past noon a running fight commenced between the Pilade and Supérieure, and continued until 3 h. 30 m. P.M., when the latter, being close to the forts at the Saintes, shortened sail and hauled to the wind on the larboard tack; having sustained no loss, and no greater damage than one carronade disabled, and the axle of one of her 12-pounders broken. At 6 P.M. the Palinure and Pilade anchored in the Saintes; and, in justice to those brigs, it must be stated, that, when the Supérieure gave up the chase, the 12-pounder 32-gun frigate Circe, Captain Hugh Pigot, and 18-gun brig-sloop Wolverine, Captain Francis Augustus Collier, were within a very few miles of them.

On the 3rd of October the British 18-gun brig-sloop Carnation (sixteen 32-pounder carronades and two sixes), Captain Charles Mars Gregory, cruising about 60 leagues to the northward and eastward of Martinique, fell in with the Palinure, still commanded by Captain Jance, and then cruising alone. An action ensued; and, at the end of an hour and a half's cannonade, the Palinure, who was to windward, being greatly disabled in her rigging, fell on board the Carnation.

In common cases this would have been the moment for the British vessel to terminate the contest in her favour, but the Carnation was not so fortunate: her gallant commander was dead, and all her principal officers and several of her crew had been either killed or badly wounded; so that the boatswain, William Triplet, was now the commanding officer on deck. Finding that the British were not, as usual, ready to rush on board their vessel, the French took confidence, and became themselves the assailants. The boatswain advanced boldly to repulse the boarders; but, of the 45 or 50 men then on deck (several, exclusive of the wounded, were on duty below, perhaps about 20), not more than eight or 10 came to his support. The remainder, headed by the sergeant of marines, John Chapman, deserted their quarters and fled below. The consequence was, that the Carnation became a prize to the Palinure, and that too by boarding.

The British brig, out of a crew of 117 men and boys, had her commander, purser (Morgan Thomas), and eight men killed, and her two lieutenants (Samuel Bartlett Deecker and James Fitz-

maurice, severely), master (Anthony Metherell, mortally) and 27 officers, petty-officers, seamen, and marines wounded, no fewer than 15 of them mortally. What loss was sustained by the *Palinure*, whose crew on this occasion certainly did not exceed 100 men, has not transpired. The captain, as it appears, was suffering with the yellow fever; and the active part in the conduct of the engagement had, in consequence, devolved upon *Enseigne de vaisseau* Simon-Auguste Huguet, who is represented to have greatly distinguished himself. According to the French accounts, Captain Jance, in less than an hour after his victory, died on board the *Carnation*, of which, as the preferable vessel, he had taken the command. Both brigs, in the course of the day succeeding the action, arrived at the harbour of Marin, Martinique.

On the 20th of October, the British 74-gun ship *Pompée*, Captain George Cockburn, being within two days' sail of Barbadoes, came up with and captured the French brig-corvette *Pilade*, with a crew of 109 men on board, and still commanded by Lieutenant Cocherel, eight days from Martinique on a cruise.

On the 31st, at daylight, the 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Circe*, Captain Hugh Pigot, cruising off the harbour of Fort Royal, Martinique, observed a brig under jury-masts coming before the wind. The instant the frigate made sail, the brig, which was the *Palinure* on her way from Marin into the harbour of Fort Royal, hauled close round the Diamond rock. It being nearly calm, the brig was enabled, with her sweeps and a boat, to get under the protection of a battery on Pointe Salomon, before the *Circe* could get near her. As soon as the frigate arrived within gun-shot, an action ensued; and in 10 or 15 minutes the *Palinure* hauled down her colours, with the loss, out of her 79 men on board when the action commenced, of seven killed and eight wounded. The *Circe* herself, from the fire of the battery, which was too much above her to be fired at with effect, lost one man killed and one wounded. On board the *Palinure* were found nine of the surviving seamen late belonging to the *Carnation*; which brig had either put back to Marin after sailing, or had been left there by the *Palinure*.

On the 6th of November the late master of the *Carnation*, one of the officers recaptured in the *Palinure*, died on board the 98-gun ship *Neptune*, in Carlisle bay, Barbadoes, of, we believe, the wounds he had received in the action; but a contemporary states, that he died of the yellow fever.¹ On the 1st of February

¹ Brenton, vol. iv., p. 269.

a court-martial was held at Carlisle bay upon a badly wounded quartermaster and a captain of the mast late belonging to the *Carnation*, and they were honourably acquitted. On the 28th, at Fort-Royal bay, Martinique, where, as we shall see presently, the British commander-in-chief, Rear-admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, then was, the remainder of the surviving officers and crew, having been recaptured at the surrender of the island, were put upon their trial; and the two lieutenants, the surgeon, the two master's mates, the three midshipmen, the gallant boatswain, and a few seamen and marines, were honourably acquitted. Others that were on duty or wounded below, including among the former the gunner and his two mates, were also acquitted of all blame.

In justice to the memory of the officers who were killed in the action, or died of their wounds, the following declaration was made by the court: "That the conduct of Captain Gregory from the commencement of the action to the period of his being killed, was most exemplary. And it also appears, that Mr. Anthony Metherell, late master of the *Carnation*, Mr. Morgan Thomas, the late purser, Mr. Thomas Griffiths, the late carpenter, and all those of her crew who were killed during the action, did perform their respective duties as became them." Of the remainder of the late *Carnation's* crew present to take their trial, 32 seamen and marines were found guilty of gross cowardice, and sentenced to 14 years' transportation to Botany bay, except one man, the sergeant of marines, John Chapman: he was condemned to be hanged; and hanged he was, on the day after his trial, at the fore yard-arm of the 44-gun ship *Ulysses*, at anchor in Fort-Royal bay.

Being aware that our chief historical contemporary commanded a sloop-of-war in the West Indies at the period of this disgraceful affair of the *Carnation*; and that, at the date of the court-martial, if not sitting as one of the members, he was at, or very near to, the spot where it was held, we naturally turned to his book, for a full account of the circumstances, under which the sister-brig of the *Amaranthe* had been lost.

We find it stated, that a long chase, and a three hours' running fight, at the end of which the *Carnation* had fired away all her filled powder, preceded the close action; but here comes the statement that surprises and puzzles us: "The master of the *Carnation* ran from his quarters, as did the sergeant of marines." "The vessel was sacrificed to the cowardice of the master and the sergeant of marines." "The facts above stated

came out in evidence before the court.”¹ How this could have been the case, and such a sentence have been pronounced as that of which a faithful transcript has been given in the preceding page, is beyond our comprehension. All we can say is, that, as Captain Brenton calls the *Carnation's* first-lieutenant “Dicker,” instead of Deecker, and acknowledges that he has “unfortunately forgotten the name of the second,” his memory may have been equally treacherous respecting the conduct, and he actually appears not to know the name of the unfortunate master whose memory he has so aspersed.

On the 28th of November, as the British 16-gun brig-sloop *Heureux*, Captain William Coombe, was cruising off the north side of the island of Guadaloupe, information was received that seven vessels, some laden and ready for sea, lay in the harbour of Mahaut at the bottom of the bay of that name. Thinking it practicable to cut out these vessels, Captain Coombe resolved to head his boats in the attack. He had a pilot to carry the boats in, and a guide to conduct the storming-parties to the two batteries, which mounted, one of them one, and the other two, long 24-pounders.

In the dusk of the evening three boats pushed off from the brig; and, after rowing for about six hours, lay upon their oars to await the setting of the moon. At 4 A.M. on the 29th they dashed on; and, after a few minutes of desperate fighting, Captain Coombe, in the barge with 19 men, boarded and carried a schooner of two guns, and a crew of 39 seamen and soldiers. In the meanwhile Lieutenant Daniel Lawrence, assisted by Mr. Robert Daly, the purser, with the remainder of the party, amounting to about 44 officers and men, had landed and spiked the two 24-pounders upon the nearest battery. Having accomplished this, Lieutenant Lawrence and his party boarded the brig; but, before either the schooner or the brig could be got off, the shore was lined with musketry, and three field-pieces were brought to bear upon the two captured vessels. In their way out, these unfortunately grounded, and thus became fixed objects for the enemy's fire, which was presently increased by the remaining 24-pounder.

Finding it impossible to get the vessels afloat, and daylight appearing, Captain Coombe was in the act of giving orders to abandon them, when a 24-pound shot struck him in the left side, and he instantly expired, exclaiming, “I die contented; I die for my country!” Lieutenant Lawrence, who was wounded

¹ Brenton, vol. iv., p. 269.

by a musket-ball in the arm, succeeded, by about 6 A.M., without any additional loss of consequence, in getting all three of the boats beyond the reach of shot.

We formerly submitted some remarks upon the ineligibility of a class of British cruisers, which it was thought advisable to build at Bermuda of the pencil cedar; vessels that were to measure from 75 to 78 tons, and mount four 12-pounder carronades, with a crew of 20 men and boys.¹ These king's schooners, 12 in number, and named Ballahou, Baracouta, Capelin, Grouper, Haddock, Herring, Kingfish, Mackerel, Pilchard, Pike, Snapper, and Whiting, were all launched and at sea in the course of the year 1804. A foreboding, perhaps, that their terms of service would be short, and the British navy, in consequence, suffer a reduction in its strength, caused 18 more of these cock-boats to be constructed; and they were all, before the end of the year 1806, launched, armed, manned, officered, and sent to "take, burn, and destroy" the vessels-of-war and merchantmen of the enemy. Of these 18 "men-of-war" schooners, six only were built at Bermuda, and, like the others, were named after the piscatory tribe: Bream, Chubb, Cuttle, Mullet, Porgay, and Tang. The remaining 12 were built in English dock-yards, and received the names of birds: Crane, Cuckoo, Jackdaw, Landrail, Magpie, Pigeon, Quail, Rook, Seagull, Wagtail, Wigeon, and Woodcock.

When the flimsy and diminutive frames, four or five in a slip, of these tom-tit cruisers came to be viewed amidst the substantial and towering structures standing near them, many a sailor's joke (and a sailor's joke is proverbially a good one) was cracked at the projector. This opened the eyes of the surveyors of the navy, and a slight enlargement of the class took place. Hence came the Adonis, Alpheia, Barbara, Laura, Cassandra, Sylvia, and half a dozen of the like pretty names; schooners (some rigged as cutters) of 111 tons each, pierced to mount, but too small conveniently to carry, ten 18-pounder carronades, with a crew of 50 men and boys. In the course of the year 1808, the schooner class received a more decided improvement, in the construction of the Bramble, Holly, Juniper, Mistletoe, Shamrock, and Thistle, of 150 tons each, with the same guns and complement as the last.

A case or two, which we have now to relate, will show the propriety of our remarks, as to the unfitness of any of the first or 4-gun class of these schooners, to traverse the ocean unat-

¹ See vol. iii., Appendix, note (f) to Abstract No. 13.

tended by a consort to defend her from the attacks of an enemy; or, should a gale come on, and the accompanying vessel not be quite large enough to hoist her in, to take out the crew and let the worthless hull go to the bottom. Some time in the month of January, 1807, the Jackdaw, Lieutenant Nathaniel Brice, cruising off the Cape de Verd islands, was fallen in with, and captured by, "a Spanish row-boat." In the following month the prize was recaptured by the 32-gun frigate *Minerva*, Captain George Ralph Collier; and Lieutenant Brice, on his return to England, was tried by a court-martial and dismissed the service. He was, however, shortly afterwards reinstated in his rank. In fact, there was many a row-boat privateer, that was a full match for the Jackdaw; and 18 or 20 smart hands in a frigate's launch, armed with her 18-pounder carronade, would have felt themselves quite equal to the task of capturing her. Steel has made the affair appear worse than it was, by giving the Jackdaw 10 guns instead of four. In April, the Pike, Lieutenant John Ottley, cruising off Altavella, was fallen in with and captured by the French privateer *Marat*, of four times her force. Shortly afterwards the 18-gun brig-sloop *Moselle*, Captain Alexander Gordon, recaptured the Pike, and restored her to the British navy. A similar fate attended the Kingfish, whereby her valuable services were only lost for a time.

On the 18th of August, 1808, the *Rook*, one of the 4-gun schooners, commanded by Lieutenant James Lawrence, being off the Mole of Cape St. Nicholas, on her way from Port Royal, Jamaica, to England with despatches, was fallen in with and attacked by two French schooner privateers, one of 12, the other of 10 guns. After an action of one hour and a half, during which the lieutenant was killed, the next officer, master's mate Thomas Seaward, mortally wounded, and 13 out of the remaining 18 men of the crew killed or mortally wounded, the privateersman made a prize of the *Rook*. This very gallant action more than redeemed the fate of the Jackdaw. Three other schooners of this class were captured by privateers, but in later years. In short, the whole 30 vessels composing this class, except three sold out of the service, came to an untimely end; some, as already mentioned, by falling into the hands of the enemy, and the remainder by foundering in the deep or perishing on the rocks.

Some of the smaller 10-gun class also became the trophies of French privateers; one case is all we shall relate. On the 17th

of September, 1807, the *Barbara*, Lieutenant Edward A. D'Arcey, after a well-contested action of half an hour, was boarded and taken by the French privateer *Général-Ernouf*, Captain Grassin, and carried into Guadaloupe. On the 17th of July, 1808, in the Gulf of Florida, the *Barbara*, then named *Pératy*, was recaptured by the 38-gun frigate *Guerrière*, Captain Alexander Skene. The privateer had sailed from Charleston about a week before, and, when fallen in with, was in the track of the Jamaica homeward-bound fleet; "of which," says Captain Skene, "she had obtained most correct information, as to their strength, number, and situation, from the master of an American brig, who had himself claimed and received the protection of that convoy, which he betrayed to the enemy in 24 hours after parting company."

On the 7th of May, at daylight, Cape Trafalgar bearing west-north-west distant about six miles, the British 18-gun brig-sloop *Redwing*, of 16 carronades, 32-pounders, and two long sixes, Captain Thomas Ussher, discovered a Spanish convoy of seven armed and 12 merchant-vessels, coming down alongshore. The wind being very light and variable, the *Redwing* was not able to close with the enemy until 7 A.M.; when, the two parties being within point-blank shot of each other, the Spanish gun-vessels, seven in number, handed their sails, formed a close line, and swept towards the *Redwing*, indicating an intention to board. That the Spaniards had good reason to hope for success will be seen when the force of their vessels is described. The *Diligente* and *Boreas* mounted each two long 24 and two long 8 pounders, with a crew of 60 men: gun-boats, No. 3, two long 24 and one long 36 pounder and 35 men; No. 6, one 24 and 40 men, and No. 107, two 6-pounders and 35 men; a *mistico* four 6-pounders and 20 men; and a *felucca* four long 3-pounders and 20 men; total 22 guns and 271 men. Nowise daunted, notwithstanding, the *Redwing* endeavoured also to close, in order to decide the business quickly, and, if possible, secure the merchantmen.

As soon as her opponents had advanced within musket-shot, the brig opened upon them a quick and well-directed fire, her guns evidently doing great execution. At 9 A.M. the gun-boats, completely panic-struck and beaten, pushed into the surf, sacrificing their wounded. To save these, if possible, Captain Ussher despatched one of his boats: but the *Redwing's* men, notwithstanding all their exertions, were unable to rescue a single Spaniard. Seeing the fate of their protectors, two of whom only remained afloat, the merchant-vessels attempted to disperse.

Four of the latter were sunk by the Redwing's shot; seven, with the 4-gun *mistico*, were captured; and the remaining one, with gun-boat No. 107 and the *felucca*, effected their escape, the Redwing being in too crippled a state to pursue them. The brig, indeed, had received two 24-pound shot through her foremast, one through the mainmast, and one through the garning of the bowsprit, which last shot had likewise cut asunder the knee of the head. Notwithstanding that her damages were so serious, the Redwing had only one seaman hurt on board. In her boats, however, she had one seaman killed, and her master (John Davis) slightly, purser (Robert L. Horniman), and the same seaman who had been wounded slightly on board, severely, wounded.

Considering that, among the 22 guns of the Redwing's seven opponents, there were one long 36, and seven long 24 pounders, that the number of men on board of them almost trebled the number in the brig, who had only 98 men and boys on board, and that the weather was in every respect favourable for gun-boat operations, the defeat and destruction of this Spanish flotilla afforded an additional proof of the prowess of British seamen, and of how much may be accomplished by gallantry and perseverance.

On the 10th of May, at 1 P.M., the British brig-sloop *Wizard*, mounting fourteen 24-pounder carronades and two sixes, with 95 men and boys, Captain Abel Ferris, being in latitude $40^{\circ} 30'$ north, and longitude $6^{\circ} 34'$ east, standing to the north-east, with a fresh breeze at west, descried and chased a brig in the east-north-east, steering to the southward under all sail. This vessel was the French brig-corvette *Requin*, mounting also fourteen 24-pounder (French) carronades, with two sixes, and a crew of 110 men and boys, Capitaine de frégate Claude-René Berard. In size, also, the two brigs nearly agreed, the *Wizard* measuring 283, and the *Requin* 332 tons. The pursuit continued throughout the day and night; the *Wizard* shifting her provisions aft, and using every other means to get her trim and improve her sailing, and her crew passing the night at their quarters.

On the 11th, at 4 A.M., the wind being light, the *Wizard* was at her sweeps; and the *Requin*, trusting to her sails alone, was about two miles distant in the south-south-east. At 7 h. 45 m. A.M. the *Requin* fired her stern-chasers, and hoisted French colours; and at 8 h. 10 m. A.M. the *Wizard*, bringing up a fresh breeze from west-north-west, fired her bow guns at the former, and hoisted British colours. At 9 A.M. the *Requin* brought to,

with studding sails set, and fired her broadside: on which the Wizard, who was nearing fast, ran close under her opponent's stern, and, having raked the Requin with guns double-shotted, hove to under her lee-quarter. In this position the two brigs fought at close quarters, from 9 A.M. to 10 h. 30 m. A.M.; and yet, as was a little extraordinary, no spar of either came down. The Requin then filled and made sail, followed by the Wizard; who, being to leeward, had the wind taken out of her sails by the former, and, in consequence, dropped astern; but the British brig still maintained a running fight with her antagonist as long as her guns would reach.

In this smart encounter the Wizard had her lower masts and main yard badly wounded, and her boats, booms, rigging, and sails much cut, and had also one man killed and five wounded. The loss on the part of the Requin must have been much more severe, as the Wizard's guns were directed chiefly at her opponent's hull; while those of the French brig were pointed high, as if to disable the rigging of her antagonist. At 6 P.M., by which time the Wizard had fished her lower masts and main yard, repaired the principal part of her rigging, and was again in chase under every sail she could spread, the island of Toro bore east by south half-south distant 12 leagues, and the Requin south-east half-east distant a mile and a quarter. At 9 P.M., the breeze having nearly died away, the sweeps of the Wizard were again resorted to, and were unceasingly plied until 11 P.M., when, a moderate breeze springing up from the westward, the sails again performed their office, to the great relief of the fatigued but not disheartened crew, whose hammocks, during the whole of a second night, remained lashed in the nettings.

On the 12th, at 5 A.M., the Requin altered her course from south-east by south to south; and at 6 h. 15 m. A.M. the Wizard got near enough to fire her lee-guns, but the former soon increased her distance. At 7 A.M. the Requin was out of gun-shot, and at 8 A.M. one mile ahead; the Wizard still sweeping with all her strength, and who, to quicken her progress in the light air that was blowing, knocked away the stanchions from under the beams of her deck and started the wedges of her masts. Notwithstanding all this, the Requin, with her sails alone, increased her distance, at noon, to a mile and a half, and at 4 P.M. to two miles and a half. The Wizard now ran her sweeps across the deck, and got her bow-guns amidships, but still could do no more than keep way with her opponent. At 9 h. 30 m. P.M., a light breeze springing up from west by north, the Wizard

trimmed sails, and, being near the land, bent the small lower-cable, and got a hawser ready for a spring. This done, midnight left the two brigs still two miles and a half apart, the Requin bearing from the Wizard south by west, and the African coast right ahead, distant about seven miles; and again there was no sleep for the British crew.

On the 13th, at 0 h. 30 m. A.M., the Requin tacked; and the Wizard, on getting abreast of the latter's lee-beam, and nearly within gun-shot, did the same, under all sail. At 5 A.M., the weather becoming foggy, the two vessels lost sight of each other; but at 6 A.M. the Wizard was again cheered with the sight of her enemy, about two miles off right ahead, and apparently going a point free. At noon, after an interval of fog, the weather got more clear, and the Requin was seen bearing east by north, distant three miles and a half, and at 4 P.M. south by east three miles. At 8 P.M. the return of thick weather again concealed the two vessels from each other; but at 10 h. 20 m. P.M. the rising of the moon discovered the Requin in the south, three and a half miles off. The Wizard was once more at her sweeps, and at 11 P.M. fired a gun, to excite the attention of any British cruisers that might be off Cape Bon. This she repeated two or three times. At midnight the wind freshened up, and enabled the sailors again to suspend their labours at the sweeps, but still not a hammock could be moved below.

On the 14th, at 4 A.M., Cape Carthage bore west-south-west four miles, and the Requin was right ahead distant about two miles and a half, steering for the bay of Tunis. At 5 A.M. the French brig anchored close under Fort Goleta in Tunis bay; where, as it was a neutral port, the Requin lay as safe as if in the harbour of Toulon. The Wizard now did all she was empowered to do: she ran under the stern of the fugitive, tacked, and hove to; and, besides reading "Le Requin" upon her stern, observed that the French brig was much cut up by shot about the hull and lower rigging. At 6 A.M. the Wizard filled and made sail out of the bay; and very soon the hammocks were piped down, and her truly gallant crew enjoyed that rest which, during four successive nights, had unavoidably been denied to them.

In this extraordinary chase, the two vessels ran 369 miles in 88 hours, making an average of rather more than four knots per hour; which was as fast as the light and variable state of the wind, during the greater part of the time, would admit. They had run 109 miles when the Requin brought to to engage;

and engage she did, till she was beaten, fairly beaten, by a brig a trifle inferior, but say equal, to herself in force. The usual excuse of being charged with despatches cannot seemingly apply to this case; or why did Captain Berard at length become the assailant? The truth is, the Requin would have captured the Wizard if she could, but found herself unequal to the task; nay, more, the French brig found that her own surrender must ensue, if she did not make use of the only available quality in which she excelled, quickness of sailing. This property carried with it, as we have seen, another advantage: the French crew were under no necessity, at every fall of the breeze, to tug at the sweeps; nor were they, night by night, kept from their natural rest. In a pursuit before a light wind, where every inch of canvas is out, and where the chased is only a short distance ahead, the chaser is obliged to be always on the alert, that she may be ready to shorten sail the instant her enemy begins to take in: whereas the chased knows no such alarms; a head wind is all she dreads, and that only until she has trimmed her sails to meet it. This points out another advantage, and no slight one either, which the Requin possessed over the Wizard.

It must have been peculiarly annoying to the tars on board the Wizard, to see a vessel, that had cost them so many hours of toil and anxiety, so many sleepless nights and tantalizing prospects of reward, moored close to the muzzles of their guns, and yet not be allowed to spring on board of, nor even to snap a trigger at her. So it was; and the Wizard had no alternative but to leave the French captain to enjoy, with the possession of his fine brig, his reflections upon the degrading circumstances under which he had preserved her.

The Wizard was obliged to put into Malta, to get herself new lower masts and a new main-yard. In 15 days she was again at sea, keeping, no doubt, a sharp look-out for her old antagonist; but the latter fell to the share of another British vessel-of-war, the 22-gun ship *Volage*, Captain Philip L. J. Rosenhagen, who captured her on the 28th of July, to the northward of the island of Corsica, after a nine hours' chase. It was confirmed, that the Requin was the brig that had been engaged by the Wizard; but the particulars of her loss were not communicated.

Vice-admiral Lord Collingwood, to evince his opinion of the conduct of Captain Ferris in the arduous and persevering chase and gallant defeat of the Requin, appointed him, on the first vacancy, to the command of the 100-gun ship *Royal Sovereign*;

but, Captain Ferris's commission as post not being dated until two years afterwards, we may conjecture that the board of admiralty did not sanction the promotion, with which the Mediterranean commander-in-chief had thought fit to reward the Wizard's commander.

On the 11th of May, in the forenoon, the British 20-gun ship *Bacchante* (18 carronades, 32-pounders, and two nines), Captain Samuel Hood Inglefield, cruising off Cape Antonio, island of Cuba, chased, and at 3 P.M. brought to action, the French brig-corvette *Griffon*, of 14 carronades, 24-pounders, and two sixes, Lieutenant Jacques Gautier. After sustaining and returning the heavy fire of her superior antagonist for 32 minutes, and persisting in her endeavours to escape until she was within 200 yards of the breakers off the Cape, the *Griffon* hauled down her colours.

The *Bacchante* had no man hurt on board; and the *Griffon*, out of a crew of 105 men and boys, only five men wounded. The brig was afterwards added to the British navy under the same name. The crowd of canvas, under which, owing to the lightness of the breeze, this action was fought by the *Bacchante*, is somewhat remarkable. She carried sky-sails with the wind, abeam, and, above the main sky-sail, a lateen "moon-raker," which hoisted 14 feet above the mast-head. It was the invention, we believe, of Captain Dacres, Captain Inglefield's predecessor in the command of the *Bacchante*.

On the 2nd of May, at daybreak, the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Unité*, Captain Patrick Campbell, cruising off Cape Promontoro in the Gulf of Venice, came up with and captured the Italian brig-corvette *Ronco*, mounting 16 brass carronades, represented as "32-pounders," but, we suppose, French 36-pounders, with a crew of 100 men. No loss was sustained on either side, although the brig fired several broadsides at the frigate, and cut her sails and rigging a good deal. Scarcely had the *Ronco* hauled down her colours, when an Italian frigate and schooner were observed in the north or windward quarter. The *Unité* immediately made sail in chase; but, owing to the lightness of the wind, the ship and schooner escaped into Pola before Captain Campbell could get within two gun-shots of either.

On the 31st, at about 5 P.M., having just weighed from under the island of Lusin, where she had been sheltering herself from a heavy north-east gale, the *Unité* discovered, close under Premuda, three brigs on the starboard tack with the wind at

east. The frigate proceeded in chase, and presently made out the vessels to be three brigs-of-war. On observing the *Unité*, the three brigs, two of which were the Italian corvettes, *Nettuno* and *Teulié*, of the same force as the *Ronco*, and the third a smaller vessel than either, wore, and steered with the apparent intention of gaining the channel of *Zara*; out of which port, it seems, they had been despatched the day before, upon the very feasible enterprise of capturing the British frigate, on a supposition that she was too weakly manned to make an effective resistance.

As the night was likely to be clear, and the wind was moderate, Captain Campbell, although the navigation was extremely intricate and unknown to any person on board, determined to follow the three brigs, trusting to the lead and a good look-out. In this way the *Unité* kept sight of the vessels, until 11 h. 30 m. P.M., when they disappeared. By carrying a press of sail, the *Unité*, at a few minutes past 3 A.M. on the 1st of June, regained a sight of two of the brigs, distant about two miles on her lee-beam. The helm was immediately put up; but the sails were hardly trimmed when the third brig was observed on the star-board tack, upon the frigate's larboard and weather-bow. The *Unité* immediately hauled to the wind, and, passing the brig within musket-shot to leeward, gave her the larboard broadside with such effect, that she hauled down her colours without firing a gun.

While the boats were proceeding to secure this brig, the *Unité* crowded sail after the remaining two, who were making off through one of the passages in the hope to get to sea. The wind falling, and the brigs making use of their sweeps, it was not until 7 A.M. that the *Unité* got within gun-shot of the sternmost; who, after receiving a few of the frigate's broadsides, fired her broadside, struck her colours, and ran on shore. The wind continuing to decrease, and the remaining brig having got among a cluster of small islands, the *Unité* shortened sail to attend to the two that had struck. Of these, the *Nettuno*, out of a crew of 115 men and boys, had seven men killed, two drowned, and 13 wounded; and the *Teulié*, out of a similar crew to her consort's, five killed and 16 wounded. The frigate had not a man hurt. These two brigs, as well as the one captured four weeks before, were transferred to the British navy; the *Ronco*, of 334 tons, under the name of *Tuscan*, the *Nettuno*, of 344 tons, under that of *Cretan*, and the *Teulié*, 333 tons under that of *Roman*.

On the 12th of May, at 9h. 50 m. A.M., the British 18-pounder 32-gun frigate *Amphion*, Captain William Hoste, being on her way from the British fleet off Toulon to the island of Majorca, discovered a frigate lying at anchor in the bay of Rosas, and immediately tacked and stood towards her. This was the *Baleine*, a French frigate-built ship of about 800 tons, constructed purposely as an armed storeship, and mounting from 26 to 30 guns, with a crew of about 150 men. There were four or five of these ships attached to the Toulon fleet. The *Baleine* was last from Majorca, and had, we believe, accompanied Vice-admiral Ganteaume in his voyage to and from the Adriatic.

At 10 h. 10 m. A.M. the *Baleine* hoisted French colours, and at 10 h. 30 m., having a spring on her cable, commenced firing at the *Amphion*; as did also a battery of 16 long 24-pounders to the left of the town of Rosas, a battery of several heavy guns named Fort Bouton, and a low battery of eight 24-pounders at the starboard entrance of the bay. This fire the *Amphion* returned on different tacks, while working up. At 11 A.M., finding the fire of the British frigate, as she closed, getting too warm, the *Baleine* slipped her cables, and, with her fore and mizen topsails, staysails, and jib set, ran on shore, close under the protection of Fort Bouton and the battery on the right.

At 11 h. 30 m. A.M. the *Amphion* shortened sail, and anchored with two springs in seven fathoms, and in shore of the spot on which the *Baleine* had been riding. Having veered to a whole cable, the *Amphion* commenced a smart fire, within point-blank shot, upon the ship, fort, and batteries. This fire they all returned, and presently cut away the *Amphion's* jibstay. At about 30 minutes past noon the latter's starboard-quarter hammocks and maintopmast-staysail caught fire by the enemy's hot shot; and at 1 P.M. a small explosion took place in the marine arm-chest, but fortunately injured no one. At 1 h. 30 m. the *Baleine* herself caught fire abaft, and a part of her men began leaping overboard and swimming to the rocks. Believing that the crew were abandoning her, Captain Hoste despatched Mr. William Bennett, the first-lieutenant, in the jolly-boat, to strike the ship's colours; but, no sooner had the lieutenant arrived near the frigate's stern, than the French crew opened upon the boat a heavy fire of round, grape, and musketry. The *Amphion* instantly threw out the signal of recall, and the jolly-boat put back. Regardless of the shower of shot pouring around him, Lieutenant Bennett stood up in the stern-sheets; and he and his few hands gave the French three hearty cheers. At 2 h. 20 m. P.M.,

finding that nothing further could be done, and the wind beginning to fall, whereby she might have a difficulty in getting beyond the reach of the batteries, the *Amphion* cut her cables and springs and made sail out of the bay.

In this spirited little affair the *Amphion* received no material damage, and had only one man killed and a few wounded. The loss on board, or the eventual fate of the French ship, we have no means of showing. Her loss must, however, have been serious, to induce her to take the step she did; and that the *Baleine* had run herself on shore with some effect is clear, because, at 5 P.M., she struck yards and topmasts, and on the third day after the action lay fast aground. It is a little singular that the *Amphion* had been sent by Lord Collingwood to endeavour to capture this very ship at her anchorage at Majorca; but, under an idea that she was a French frigate of the largest class, Captain Hoste had been directed to take under his orders the 28-gun frigate *Hind*, Captain Francis William Fane, supposed to be cruising off the Spanish coast.

On the 23rd of June, while the British 22-gun ship *Porcupine*, Captain the Honourable Henry Duncan, was cruising off Civita-Vecchia, a vessel under French colours came out of the port, and endeavoured, by crossing the *Porcupine*, to get to the westward; but, failing in the attempt, and finding no means of escape left, the vessel ran herself on shore under two towers mounting two guns each. Captain Duncan immediately detached the boats of the *Porcupine* under Lieutenant George Price, who effectually destroyed the vessel, without sustaining any loss, although under a very heavy fire.

On the 9th of July, at daybreak, as the *Porcupine* lay becalmed off Monte-Circello on the coast of Romania, two French gun-boats, with a merchant-vessel under convoy, were observed going alongshore to the westward. The boats of the *Porcupine*, under the orders of Lieutenant Price, assisted by second-lieutenant Francis Smith, Lieutenant of marines James Renwick, midshipmen Barry John Featherstone, Charles Adam, and John O'Brien Butler, and captain's clerk George Anderson, were immediately despatched in pursuit of the gun-vessels.

After a pull of eight hours in a hot sun, Lieutenant Price and his party drove the merchant-vessel on shore, and compelled the two gun-boats, each of which was armed with one long 24-pounder and 30 men, to take shelter under the batteries of Port Dango. At this moment, three suspicious vessels being seen coming down from the westward before a fresh breeze, the

Porcupine recalled her boats, in order to go in chase: but the former, before they could be cut off, succeeded in getting into the harbour along with the gun-boats.

On the morning of the 10th, observing that a large polacre-ship, one of the three vessels which had last entered, lay further out than the others, Captain Duncan resolved to attempt cutting her out. Accordingly, as soon as it was dark, the Porcupine's boats, commanded as before, pulled towards the harbour; and although the polacre mounted six long 6-pounders, with a crew of between 20 and 30 men, and, expecting to be attacked, had moored herself to a beach lined with French soldiers, and lay within pistol-shot of two batteries and a tower, and three gun-boats, Lieutenant Price and his men boarded and carried her. The next difficulty was to bring the vessel out. Here, although in consequence of baffling winds it was an hour and 20 minutes before the prize got beyond the range of grape, the British also succeeded. In this very gallant exploit the Porcupine had none of her men killed; but she had eight wounded, including (severely on the head and right leg) Lieutenant Price, also Mr. Butler, midshipman. For his good behaviour in this, and in several similar attacks by the Porcupine's boats, Lieutenant Price was promoted to the rank of commander.

On the 21st the Porcupine drove on shore near Monte-Circello a French polacre ship, which was afterwards completely destroyed by the boats under the command of Lieutenant Francis Smith; and that without any loss, although the boats were under the fire of a tower, mounting two guns, within pistol-shot of the grounded vessel.

On the 8th of August the Porcupine chased another polacre ship into a harbour of the island of Planosa, near Elba, which was defended by a tower and a battery. In the evening Captain Duncan sent the Porcupine's two cutters and jolly-boat, under the orders of Lieutenant Francis Smith, accompanied by Lieutenant of marines James Renwick, master's mates Henry Parry and Edward Barry, midshipman George Dawkins Lane, and captain's clerk George Anderson, to endeavour to bring out or destroy the vessel. The boats went into the harbour with muffled oars, and boarded the vessel without loss or difficulty.

The ship was now found to be moored within 30 yards of a battery mounting six or eight guns, which immediately opened upon the boats a heavy fire of round and grape. To this was soon added the musketry of several French soldiers drawn up on the beach, and a fire from one of the polacre's guns which

had been landed for her defence. In the face of all this, the British brought out the vessel, which proved to be the *Conception*, mounting four guns, from Genoa bound to the island of Cyprus with bale goods.

This gallant exploit was not accomplished without loss: one seaman was killed, another seaman and the lieutenant of marines mortally wounded, the latter with three musket balls, and seven men wounded, some of them also mortally. If we have not to add that, for this act of gallantry, as well as for his general zeal and ability in the service, Lieutenant Smith received the customary promotion, it is, we have reason to think, because Captain Duncan's letter on the subject to Vice-admiral Lord Collingwood miscarried, and the duplicate, sent some time afterwards, did not reach his lordship at all, in consequence of his death.

On the 26th of June, at daylight, the British 64-gun ship *Standard*, Captain Thomas Harvey, cruising off the island of Corfu, discovered and chased an Italian gun-vessel and a French despatch-boat. At 9 A.M., the wind failing, Captain Harvey sent the pinnace, with Lieutenant Richard Cull, and the eight-oared cutter, with Captain Edward Nicolls, of the marines, in chase. After rowing two hours, in very hot weather, the British approached the gun-vessel, and received from her a fire of musketry; which the boats returned with their swivels, and on drawing near, with their musketry. As the two boats were advancing on each quarter the gun-vessel pulled short round and fired her long 4-pounder at the cutter, which happened to be the leading boat. Heedless of this, Captain Nicolls, dashed at, boarded, and carried, the Italian gun-boat *Volpe*, commanded by Enseigne de vaisseau Micheli Mangin, and mounting one long 4-pounder, with 20 men, well armed.

The pinnace immediately pushed on in chase of the despatch-boat, which was the *Léger*, having a well-armed crew of 14 men. The *Standard's* yawl, which had been previously sent to cut off this vessel, soon obliged her to run on shore. The French crew, on landing, formed on the rocks, and endeavoured to prevent the yawl's approach, but Lieutenant John Alexander succeeded in getting possession of the vessel, and, assisted by the two other boats, towed her off, under a smart fire of musketry from the shore. This little affair was effected without the slightest casualty on the part of the British, and without any known loss on that of the enemy.

When the news reached England of the failure of Sir John

Duckworth's expedition to the Dardanells, the new ministry sent out an embassy under Sir Arthur Paget, to endeavour to restore peace, in concert with a Russian plenipotentiary, the celebrated Corsican chief, Pozzi de Borgo. To give weight to the negotiation, Vice-admiral Lord Collingwood, with a strong squadron, attended the ambassadors as far as the island of Tenedos; where his lordship anchored, in company with the Russian fleet under Vice-admiral Seniavin. Learning, while here, that the Turkish fleet was outside the Dardanells, Lord Collingwood weighed and stood across to the island of Imbros, as a better station, with the prevailing winds, for getting at his enemy; but, since the moment he had heard of the British admiral's arrival off Tenedos, the Turkish admiral had moved his fleet to an anchorage in the Dardanells above the first castles.

The intelligence of the peace of Tilsit sent the Russian admiral down the Mediterranean, and put an end to the mission of Pozzi de Borgo. After some preliminary conferences, Sir Arthur Paget, went up alone to Constantinople, in the 38-gun frigate *Thetis*, Captain William Henry Gage. Either intimidated or cajoled by the French emperor, the Sublime Porte would come to no terms; and on or about the 19th of October, the *Thetis*, with the ambassador on board, quitted the Dardanells.

Towards the end of the year, upon an understanding between the Porte and Lord Collingwood, that no Turkish men-of-war were to cruise in the Ægean sea, and no tribute to be exacted from the inhabitants of the Greek islands, the British admiral quitted the Archipelago; and, early in the year 1808, detached the 38-gun frigate *Seahorse*, Captain John Stewart, to cruise there, with particular directions to see that the compact entered into with the Porte in favour of the Greeks was strictly complied with.

It appears that a band of Epirots, who had been taken into the pay and service of Russia, upon being disbanded at the peace of Tilsit and thrown upon their former masters the Turks, had taken possession of Dromo and Saraguino, two small islands situated at the mouth of the gulf of Salonica; whence, with large boats, they laid the coast, as far as the Dardanells, under contribution, and made prize of all vessels going to Constantinople. The tribute from these countries, being paid principally in corn, was thus intercepted; and the Turks, having no force outside of the Dardanells sufficient to crush this nest of pirates,

made application to Captain Stewart to know whether he would interfere with any squadron sent for that purpose. Being aware what would be the next object of the Turkish commander after he had put down the pirates, Captain Stewart replied, that he should repel by force any ships attempting, in violation of the treaty, to come out of the Dardanells.

The Porte, however, having received intelligence that no other British ship than the Seahorse was cruising in the Archipelago, despatched a squadron, composed of two frigates, two corvettes, two mortar-vessels, and some xebecs, upon the service in view. In the latter end of June this squadron anchored off the island of Dromo, made a landing, and surrounded the town of the pirates situated upon a peak. But the freebooters, in the mean time, had despatched a fast-sailing boat to the island of Sira near Tino, where the Seahorse lay at anchor.

The intelligence reached Captain Stewart on the 1st of July; and he instantly got under way, and began working up against a north-north-east wind. Nothing of consequence occurred until the 5th, at noon; when the Seahorse spoke a Greek ship, from Gritchery to Malta, the master of which ship confirmed the accounts previously received of a Turkish squadron being in that neighbourhood. Profiting by a light air, which had just sprung up from the south-east, Captain Stewart dismissed the Greek ship and made all sail to the north-west. At 4 p.m., the weather becoming squally from the north-east with rain, the Seahorse was obliged to reduce her canvas to treble-reefed top-sails. At 5 h. 45 m. p.m., by which time the weather had cleared up, two ships and a galley were descried between the islands of Scopolo and Dromo, standing to the southward, with the wind, owing to the mountainous nature of those islands, more to the northward than it blew with the Seahorse. The discovery was very soon made, that the two ships were Turkish men-of-war.

Before we proceed further in the narrative, we will give an account of the force of the parties now approaching each other with, on one side at least, determined hostility. The Seahorse, upon her main deck, mounted the 28 long 18-pounders of her class, with 12 carronades, 32-pounders, upon her quarter-deck, and upon her fore-castle two long brass Spanish 18-pounders, which she had taken on board at Messina in lieu of four long nines; total 42 guns. The net complement of the Seahorse was 281 men and boys; but, having several men absent in prizes, she had at this time on board only 251. The ship measured 993 tons.

The Badere-Zaffer, Captain Scandril Kichuc-Ali, mounted upon the main deck 30 brass guns, of three different calibers; on each side, at the centre or broadest part of the ship, was a French 36-pounder; the two next guns on each side of that gun were French 24-pounders, and the remaining 10 upon the broadside, French 18-pounders. On the quarter-deck, including two stern-chasers, the Turkish frigate had 14 long French 12-pounders, and on the fore-castle, including two bow-chasers, eight guns of the same caliber, all brass; making in the whole 52 guns. Her crew, including some supernumeraries received from the galley, amounted to 543 men; and as a proof that she was well able to carry the armament established upon her, the Badere-Zaffer measured nearly 1300 tons. The Alis-Fezan, Captain Duragardi-Ali, mounted 24 long brass French 12-pounders on the main deck, and two mortars in the centre of the ship, with a crew, partly taken out of the galley (which had been ordered back to a port of safety), of 230 men. In point of size, the Alis-Fezan was about 730 tons.

As single-decked ships and Turkish men-of-war, the Badere-Zaffer and Alis-Fezan excited no alarm on board the British frigate; and, with colours hoisted, the Seahorse continued standing to the eastward to interrupt them in their course to the southward. Either because the Turkish commodore was confident in his strength, or that he had no suspicion of an attack, the two ships did not in the slightest degree deviate from the course they were steering.

At 9 h. 30 m. P.M., the Seahorse having arrived abreast and to windward of the Badere-Zaffer, the weathermost of the two ships, Captain Stewart, by means of the pilot, a native of Gibraltar, who had formerly been a captive in the hands of the Turks, and had afterwards served as a slave on board the Sultan-Selim, hailed the Turkish commodore, and ordered him to surrender to the British frigate. This Captain Scandril flatly refused, and into the hull of the Badere-Zaffer went a whole double-shotted broadside of the Seahorse. Nor was the Turkish frigate slow in returning the fire. In this way, with the wind a light breeze about two points abaft the starboard beam, the two frigates went off engaging; the Badere-Zaffer gradually edging away to close her consort, who was about a gun-shot distant a little before her larboard-beam. (See the diagram at p. 353.)

As soon as she had run far enough to leeward for the Alis-Fezan to join her in the cannonade, the Badere-Zaffer put her helm hard a-port, with the intention of laying the British frigate

on board; but the Seahorse, whose comparatively small crew such a mode of contest would never have suited, suddenly hauled close to the wind (see diagram, pos. 1), and left the Turkish frigate with her sails all aback and in great confusion. In a minute or two the Seahorse tacked, and, bearing up, stood again for the Badere-Zaffer: who, in the meanwhile, had wore and was running nearly before the wind.

At 10 P.M., just as the Seahorse was about to close the Badere-Zaffer upon her larboard quarter, the Alis-Fezan interposed. Taking the wind out of her main and mizen topsails, the Seahorse sheared towards this new antagonist; and, pouring in her starboard broadside, at the distance of not more than 200 yards, made a dreadful havoc on board. After a continuance of the fire until 10 h. 15 m. P.M., there was a great explosion on board the Alis-Fezan near the fore hatchway, and the people on board the Seahorse expected every moment that their opponent would blow up. That, fortunately, did not happen; but the Turks on board this vessel had had fighting enough; and, putting her helm a-starboard, the Alis-Fezan luffed under the stern of the Seahorse, and stood away in the direction of the island of Pelagnisi. In consequence of the smoke and the attention due to her more formidable antagonist, the Seahorse did not again see, or trouble herself any more about, the Alis-Fezan; which ship, however, it may here be stated, got back to Constantinople, but in a very shattered state.

Not long after the abandonment of the action by the Alis-Fezan, or at about 10 h. 35 m. P.M., the Seahorse, favoured by a freshening of the breeze, overtook, and, furling her topgallant-sails, renewed the engagement with, the Badere-Zaffer; who received the starboard broadside of the Seahorse, and returned the fire from her larboard guns, both ships going before the wind. At 11 P.M. the Turks made a second attempt to get on board the British frigate; but the latter was too vigilant, as well as too expert, to be caught. Shooting ahead, the Seahorse passed clear of the Badere-Zaffer's jib-boom and bowsprit, carrying away the former's gaff-vangs and starboard mizen topgallant back-stays. At this moment the bowsprit and fore-castle of the Badere-Zaffer were crowded with men; but a discharge of grape from the stern-chase guns of the Seahorse, as the latter ranged ahead, killed or disabled the greater part of them.

Crossing over, the Seahorse recommenced the action with her larboard guns. About this time the Badere-Zaffer lost her mizen topmast. The two frigates continued engaging broad-


side to broadside, until the Badere-Zaffer became completely silenced. The Seahorse now repeatedly hailed, to know if she would surrender, but no answer was returned. The Seahorse then passed under the stern of the Badere-Zaffer (see diagram, pos. 2), whose fore and main topmasts had by this time fallen, and again hailed. In reply to which, as the Seahorse ranged up on her larboard quarter, the Badere-Zaffer fired a few of her aftermost guns. The British frigate instantly discharged her starboard broadside. It was now 1 h. 15 m. A.M. on the 6th; and Captain Stewart, finding that his shattered antagonist would neither answer nor fire, very prudently, and very humanely too, hauled off; and, after standing on a little further, brought to on the starboard tack to wait for daylight. The Badere-Zaffer soon afterwards did the same. (See pos. 3.)

The British crew now took some rest; and at daylight the Seahorse filled and made sail towards the Turkish frigate, then about a mile distant, steering before the wind under her shreds of courses. The Seahorse soon came up with the Badere-Zaffer, and, hauling athwart the latter's stern (see pos. 4), poured in her broadside. At this time, regardless of the scene of horror and destruction around him, Captain Scandril was sitting in a chair on the awning, or wooden roof, erected across the quarter-deck over the wheel, giving his orders, and exhorting his officers and men to continue their resistance; observing that if they submitted to the infidels, they would all be put to death. Among the surviving officers, however, there were some prudent men, who saw that all further resistance was useless, and who had a knowledge of the English character. Two or three of these seized the person of their stubborn and obdurate chief, and, holding down his hands, made signs of submission; while others, just as the stern-chasers were about to be discharged a second time, hauled down the Turkish colours from the stump of the mizenmast.

The diagram on the next page will illustrate the various manœuvres of the parties, in this long and sanguinary battle.

Lieutenant George Downie, first of the Seahorse, accompanied by Lieutenant of marines John Cook, went in the four-oared boat and took possession of the prize. Upon the arrival of the Turkish captain on board the Seahorse, he was sullen and sad, and seemed all amazement to think that he had been conquered, and his consort defeated or destroyed, by so small a ship. Unacquainted, apparently, with the forms of civilized warfare. Scandril had no idea of delivering up his sword in token of

submission; and, when told that he must do so, the Mahomedan commander complied with great reluctance, observing, as his eyes bent upon the forfeited weapon, that it was a Damascus blade of great value.



Out of her 251 men and boys, the Seahorse had only five men killed and 10 wounded. A 24-pound shot through the middle of her mizenmast, and a few cut shrouds and holes in her sails, comprised all the damage which the British frigate received. The Badere-Zaffer had been very differently treated. Her mizenmast and fore and main topmasts, as we have seen, were entirely shot away: her mainmast had been struck by more than 20, and her foremast by 14, large shot; and, to support either mast, very few shrouds were left. Besides this state of her masts and rigging, the Turkish frigate was so cut up in her hull, as with difficulty to be kept afloat. Her loss of men bore a full proportion to her damage, amounting to no less a number than 170 killed, and 200 wounded, many of them mortally.

Captain Stewart evinced no small share of gallantry in proceeding to attack a force, which, in number and strength, had been magnified at every island at which he had touched in his

way up; and his officers and men, on their part, gave unequivocal proofs of a high degree of skill and steadiness, in the manner in which the Seahorse tore to pieces two opponents, possessing so great a numerical superiority. Nor did the Turks behave amiss: their want of skill may well be attributed to their want of practice; but the obstinacy of the Badere-Zaffer, in protracting the defence until her masts were cut away, her hull reduced to a sinking state, and nearly three-fourths of her crew swept from their quarters, was truly characteristic of that desperate courage which the Mahomedans on several occasions have displayed.

Taking her shattered prize in tow, the Seahorse stood with her to the southward. Scandril, at his own request, had been allowed to return on parole to the Badere-Zaffer; but, before he had been many hours on board, the savage made an attempt to blow up the ship. His diabolical plan was fortunately frustrated; and on the 9th the two ships cast anchor in the principal harbour of the island of Miconi. Here it took the Seahorse three days to place her prize in a seaworthy state. That done, Captain Stewart gave the surviving Turks their liberty; sending them to Constantinople and Smyrna on board Greek vessels, and supplying them with provisions for the voyage. The Seahorse, then, taking her prize again in tow, proceeded with her to Malta. The Badere-Zaffer was a remarkably handsome frigate, built from a French model, and measured 166 feet on the main deck, and 44 feet in breadth of beam; but, owing to the loose manner in which she had been put together, the prize was not purchased for the use of the British navy. Some merchants of Malta, however, bought the Badere-Zaffer, and sent her to England with a cargo of cotton. She afterwards made one voyage to the Brazils, and was then broken up at Deptford.

The first-lieutenant of the Seahorse, as was most justly his due, was promoted to the rank of commander. The two remaining lieutenants were Thomas Bennett and Richard Glyn Vallack; and the master was Thomas Curtis, the same officer who served in a similar capacity on board the *Wilhelmina* when she beat off the *Psyché*.²

After the business of the Badere-Zaffer, a fresh attempt was made to negotiate a peace; and for that purpose Mr. Robert Adair was sent by the British government to Constantinople. The Seahorse herself carried up the ambassador; and her

¹ [Probably 414 feet, if her tonnage is considered.—H. Y. POWELL.] ² See vol. III., p. 271.

officers saw their old opponent, the *Alis-Fezan*, lying dismantled in the harbour. After some delay, occasioned by one or two of those revolutions so frequent in Turkey, peace between England and the Sublime Porte was signed on the 5th of January, 1809.

We left the French frigate *Sémillante* just as her voyage to Mexico had been rendered impracticable, in consequence of the attack made upon her at St. Jacinta by the British frigate *Phaëton* and brig-sloop *Harrier*.¹ This was the more unfortunate for the *Sémillante*, as the south-west monsoon then blew with extreme violence. Greatly, however, to his credit, Captain Motard persevered against contrary winds and currents, and amidst a very dangerous navigation, until he cleared the sea of Celebes by the narrow and difficult strait of Aloo. The *Sémillante* then steered direct for the Isle of France, and anchored, on or about the 5th of November, in the harbour of Port Louis.

In the midst of her refit, the *Sémillante* was joined by the French frigate-privateer *Bellone*, of 34 guns, Captain Péroud, whose capture a few months afterwards has already been related;² and, towards the close of the year, the port, with these two ships within it, became blockaded, by the British 18-pounder teak-built 36-gun frigate *Pitt* (afterwards *Salsette*), Captain Walter Bathurst, and 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Terpischore*, Captain William Jones Lye. On the 5th of January, 1806, having got on shore in watering at Flat island, and thrown several of her guns overboard, and being in a very leaky state, the *Terpischore* parted company for Ceylon; and the *Pitt*, whose effective crew were reduced by sickness to less than one half, cruised alone off the Isle of France. Here Captain Bathurst took several prizes; and on the 26th, in chase of a vessel to windward, the *Pitt* got so near to the fort upon *Pointe Canonnière*, situated about eight miles to the northward of Port Louis, as to have one seaman killed, and her starboard night-head shot away. Nor was the frigate, although she lay for nearly 20 minutes within gun-shot of the fort, able, owing to the direction of the wind, to bring a single gun to bear in return.

No sooner did M. Motard, as he tells us, ascertain that the *Pitt* was cruising alone off the port; no sooner did the French captain, as he does not tell us, learn from a countryman of his, who had recently been liberated from her, that the *Pitt*, having 90 men sick (chiefly with scurvy and contracted limbs), and a great many absent in prizes, had scarcely a sloop-of-war's

¹ See p. 53.

² See p. 156.

complement on board, than he determined to go out and engage her. For this purpose Captain Motard hastened the repairs of his ship, and in three days the *Sémillante* was ready for sea. But, it appears, so disproportionate in point of force were the two frigates still considered; not by the French captain, who, if we are to believe him, was all fire to engage, but by General Decaen, the governor of the island, that Captain Péroud was persuaded to add the force of the *Bellone* to that of the *Sémillante*.

On the 27th, accordingly, at about 9 P.M., the two ships put to sea from Port Louis, and in about one hour afterwards were descried and chased by the *Pitt*, then 12 or 13 leagues south-east by east of the port. At 11 h. 30 m. the *Pitt* made out the strangers to be two frigates, and soon afterwards they were no longer to be seen. "*Elle (the Sémillante) sortit à la recherche de l'ennemi, qui evita constamment le combat; la nuit ayant favorisé sa fuite, il disparut.*"¹ The English of this is, that Captains Motard and Péroud, glad at an escape to sea, left the British frigate to herself, and proceeded to excuse the service upon which alone they had been ordered out by governor Decaen. The *Sémillante* and *Bellone* steered straight for Isle Bourbon: and, arriving off the bay of St. Paul, took charge of several prizes and merchant-vessels, which had been detained at that anchorage by the knowledge that one or two British frigates were cruising off the Isle of France. With these vessels under convoy, the French frigate and privateer made sail on their return; and, as the *Pitt*, having scarcely men enough left to work the ship, had been obliged to return to Pointe de Galle, Captain Motard re-entered without difficulty the harbour of Port Louis.

On the 7th of April, having completed the repairs which she had only partially undergone at her departure upon the successful mission we have just related, the *Sémillante*, accompanied by the *Bellone* and *Henriette* privateers, again succeeded in putting to sea. The *Bellone* and *Henriette*, after cruising for a month or two, fell into the hands of their enemies; but the *Sémillante*, in spite of her captain's fighting propensity, managed on every occasion, as the sequel will show, to avoid a similar fate. During her cruise in the Indian Ocean, the *Sémillante* captured eight merchant-vessels, valued at upwards of 32 millions of francs. Early in the month of September, with her eight prizes in company, the *Sémillante* arrived in the

¹ Dict. Historique, tome iv., p. 6.

neighbourhood of the Isle of France ; but, gaining intelligence that a strong British force was cruising off Port Louis, Captain Motard bent his course towards Isle Bourbon. On the 9th, the *Sémillante*, with her valuable convoy, anchored in the road of St. Paul's bay ; where already were lying, bound also to the Isle of France, four other vessels, prizes to some of the French cruisers.

The British force, at this time stationed off the Isle of France, consisted of the 74-gun ship *Sceptre*, Captain Joseph Bingham, 24-pounder 40-gun frigate (late teak-built Indiaman) *Cornwallis*, Captain Charles James Johnston, and 12-pounder 36-gun frigate *Dédaigneuse*, Captain William Beauchamp Proctor. On the 16th, in the afternoon, the *Cornwallis* arrived off the entrance of St. Paul's bay, and discovered the *Sémillante* and her charge at anchor. On the 17th, at 9 A.M., the *Cornwallis* bore up, and ran as far into the bay as the wind would allow. At 10 A.M., when three or four miles only from the *Sémillante*, the British frigate became nearly becalmed ; and, in short, Captain Johnston was totally unable to effect anything against the French frigate at her well-protected anchorage.

On the 26th the *Sceptre* appeared off the entrance of the bay. Well knowing that Captain Bingham would use his utmost endeavours to capture or destroy the French frigate, and the valuable property of which she had despoiled British commerce, Captain Motard removed his prizes close to the shore, and moored the *Sémillante*, with springs on her cables, outside to protect them, "pour les protéger." But Captain Motard has entirely forgotten to state, that the *Sémillante* herself was protected by upwards of 100 pieces of cannon, including 37 long 24-pounders, and seven or eight heavy mortars ; and which guns were mounted upon seven distinct batteries, all by their positions admirably calculated to prevent an enemy from approaching the road. Under these circumstances, no attempt was or could be made by the British force at present on the station, to molest the *Sémillante* and her prizes at their fortified anchorage.

On the 11th of November, however, while on his way, with the *Sceptre* and *Cornwallis*, from off Mont Brabant, the southwest extremity of the Isle of France, to Isle St. Mary on the coast of Madagascar, to get a supply of water, Captain Bingham called off St. Paul's with the intention of making a demonstration, rather, we believe, than a serious attack, upon the shipping in the road. At about 2 h. 30 m. P.M., having cleared for action and got springs on their cables, the *Sceptre* and *Cornwallis* ran

into the bay, and at 4 P.M. opened a fire upon the French frigate and vessels within her. This was immediately returned by the *Sémillante* and shore batteries, both with shot and shells. The heavy cannonade soon hushed the little breeze there had been, and the two British ships could with difficulty manœuvre. At 4 h. 30 m., by signal from the *Sceptre*, the *Cornwallis* repeated several signals made by the latter as if to ships in the offing; Captain Bingham expecting, probably, that the French captain would run his frigate and prizes on shore. Captain Motard, however, knew better the strength of his position, than to resort to so ruinous a measure; and at 5 h. 30 m. P.M. the *Sceptre* and *Cornwallis* ceased firing, and without, we believe, any loss or damage, made sail for Isle St. Mary.

In a few days afterwards, finding a clear coast, Captain Motard got under way with the *Sémillante* and his fleet of prizes, and stood across to the Isle of France. On the 21st, at sunset, the *Sémillante* was discovered from the mast-head of the *Dédaigneuse*, who immediately crowded all sail upon a wind in chase, with light airs. At about midnight the two frigates crossed each other on opposite tacks, and were not more than half a mile apart. As the *Sémillante* approached on the larboard tack, the *Dédaigneuse* fired two or three bow-chasers at her; and, on hearing the French frigate beat to quarters, the British frigate discharged her broadside as the guns would bear. Putting her helm a-lee, the *Dédaigneuse* then prepared to tack after her opponent; but, owing to the lightness of the wind, the ship would not come round. A quarter-boat was lowered down to tow; and at length, by wearing, the *Dédaigneuse* got on the same tack as the enemy. In the mean time the *Sémillante* had greatly increased her distance. All sail was again set in chase; but, having lost a great deal of copper from her bottom, being very foul, and at best a bad working ship, the *Dédaigneuse* kept gradually dropping astern. Finding this to be the case, Captain Proctor, at about 5 P.M., shortened sail and hauled to the wind on the starboard tack. Very soon afterwards the *Sémillante* anchored in Port Louis; and such vessels of her convoy as did not enter with her succeeded in gaining *Rivière Noire*.

The *Dédaigneuse* cruised off the Isle of France until her water and provisions were nearly expended; which was only a short time longer. The frigate then steered for St. Mary's, Madagascar, and afterwards proceeded to Bombay. In the mean time some insinuations, thrown out by a portion of his officers, had induced Captain Proctor to apply for a court-

martial on his conduct when in the presence of the *Sémillante*. The court sat on board the *Culloden*, in Bombay harbour, on the 27th of March, 1807; and, after the fullest investigation, declared that the conduct of Captain Proctor appeared to have been marked by the greatest activity, zeal, and anxiety for the service; that the manœuvres of the *Dédaigneuse*, while in the presence of the enemy, were directed with judgment and skill, very honourable to Captain Proctor; and that the escape of the enemy's frigate resulted entirely from the bad sailing of the *Dédaigneuse*. An honourable acquittal of course followed; and the president of the court returned Captain Proctor his sword, with a very handsome eulogium on his character.

In the month of June Captain Motard quitted Port Louis upon a cruise in the bay of Bengal; but, having in her way thither lost one of her topmasts and sprung her bowsprit, the *Sémillante* was obliged to bear away for the isles of Nicobar. From the forests of the principal of these islands, Captain Motard procured a bowsprit and topmasts for his frigate; and as soon as they were fitted upon her, the *Sémillante* sailed for her destination. While cruising in the bay of Bengal, Captain Motard was so fortunate as to capture three richly-laden country ships on their way to China. With these valuable prizes in her company, the *Sémillante* sailed on her return to the Isle of France, and in the month of November arrived with them at Port Louis.

In the month of February, 1808, the *Sémillante* quitted port for another cruise in the bay of Bengal. On the 15th of March, in the morning, Captain Motard captured a British merchant-vessel, and despatched her to the Isle of France. On the same day, at 3 h. 30 m. P.M., Great Bassas, in the island of Ceylon, bearing north by west, distant 64 miles, the British frigate *Terpsichore*, Captain William Augustus Montagu, having just tacked to the east-south-east, with the wind fresh from the north-east, on her way from Pointe de Galle to Madras, discovered from her mast-head a strange ship, under a press of sail, about two points on the weather beam. At 5 h. 50 m. P.M. the latter, which was no other than the *Sémillante* herself, hoisted English colours, and fired a shot at the *Terpsichore*; from whom she then bore north-east by north, and whose disguised appearance indicated that she was an Indiaman. At 6 h. 45 m. P.M. the *Sémillante* fired a second shot; whereupon the *Terpsichore* hauled up her mainsail, and hove to on the larboard tack.

Having, in the course of the next ten minutes, ascertained

that the *Sémillante* was an enemy, and got all clear for action, the *Terpsichore*, who from age and weakness had been obliged to leave at Madras the whole of her upper-deck guns but two, and consequently mounted with her 26 twelves, only two 6-pounders, opened a fire upon the *Sémillante*, now with French colours hoisted, and distant about 100 yards upon the *Terpsichore*'s larboard and weather beam. The fire was immediately returned, and a smart engagement ensued. At 7 h. 10 m. P.M., when the two frigates were close on board each other, the *Sémillante* threw into the *Terpsichore* some combustible materials, which, falling on the main deck, communicated to the salt-boxes, and occasioned a dreadful explosion, that entirely unmanned the seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth guns, and set the ship on fire in several places.

Having, by an expedient which, fair as it may be in a ship of inferior force, can never be pronounced honourable when resorted to by an enemy who possesses ever so slight a superiority, thrown his antagonist into temporary confusion, Captain Motard did not, as might have been expected, attempt to carry the *Terpsichore* by boarding; but, as if alarmed by the discovery that she was a British frigate, hastened to get away from her. At 7 h. 20 m. P.M., having, by great exertions on the part of her officers and crew, extinguished the flames, the *Terpsichore* made sail as well as she could, and recommenced the action. Determined, now, to avoid again approximating too closely, the *Sémillante*, at 7 h. 30 m. P.M., bore away obliquely across the bows of her antagonist, and, wearing round, came to on the starboard tack. Following the manœuvre of the *Sémillante*, the *Terpsichore* also wore round, and steered a course the best adapted for bringing her guns to bear with effect; but the *Sémillante* constantly evaded every attempt of the latter to close. At 7 h. 45 m. P.M. the fire of the French frigate began to slacken, and at 8 P.M. wholly ceased. At this moment, taking advantage of the crippled state of her antagonist, the *Sémillante* bore up and made all sail to the southward and westward.

Being left with scarcely a brace, bowline, tack, or sheet, having her mizen-rigging, fore and main stays, back-stays, maintopsail, and spanker cut to pieces, and her maintopmast and fore and mizen-masts much wounded, the *Terpsichore*, to the mortification of her officers and crew, was unable, until 8 h. 15 m. P.M., to set any sail in pursuit of the flying enemy; who, by a well-directed fire from her stern-chasers, did additional damage to the rigging of the *Terpsichore*, and at 10 P.M. dropped the

latter out of gun-shot astern. At midnight the two ships were about one mile and a half apart, the British crew sleeping at their quarters. At 4 A.M. on the 16th the Sémillante, who had changed her course frequently, bore from the Terpsichore west by south, distant nearly two miles. During the 16th, 17th, and 18th, the French frigate kept gradually increasing her distance, until sunset on the last-named day, when she was no longer to be seen. On the next morning, however, the two frigates again descried each other, both still running, under a press of sail, to the west-south-west. They continued in mutual sight during that day and the succeeding night. On the 20th, at 10 h. 30 m. A.M., favoured by a heavy squall, the Terpsichore, who by this time had repaired the principal damages in her rigging and sails, was coming up fast with the Sémillante: whereupon the latter re-opened a fire from her stern-chasers, double-shotted. That not checking the progress of her persevering adversary, the Sémillante was compelled, in order to lighten herself, to cut away her stern-boat, throw overboard several of her guns, and a considerable quantity of lumber, and start the principal part of her water and provisions. This produced the desired effect, and by midnight the Sémillante had run her pursuer effectually out of sight.

Out of her reduced crew of 180 men and boys, the Terpsichore lost, and that almost wholly by the explosion, one lieutenant (Charles Tanes) and 20 men killed, and 22 men wounded, two of them mortally. A French account of the affair represents the Sémillante as having suffered so much in her rigging, as to be obliged to discontinue the action, but states nothing further respecting the loss which the French frigate must have sustained, than that Captain Motard was wounded in the head and shoulder, and compelled, in consequence, to quit his quarters. The captain's wound was, indeed, of a very serious nature, if, as is alleged, it prevented the Sémillante from making a prize of the Terpsichore. "Ce combat eût été infailliblement terminé par la reddition de l'ennemi, si son feu, principalement dirigé pour dégréer, n'eût mis la frégate de sa majesté dans l'impossibilité de manœuvrer au moment décisif, et si le capitaine, blessé à la tête et à l'épaule, n'eût été mis hors de combat."¹

Little do French officers imagine what a permanent injury they do to their reputations by this habit of boasting, or rather, for such it is, of telling downright falsehoods; and all merely to gain a little temporary applause from the credulous and un-

¹ Dict. Historique, tome iv., p. 7.

inquisitive part of the community. For his activity as a cruiser, and his ability as a navigator of the Indian seas, Captain Motard claims from us the meed of praise. Had he given anything like a fair account of the different meetings of the *Sémillante* with British ships-of-war, we could have excused him for running away from them all; because we know that, what, in one navy is looked upon as disgraceful and brings down the severest punishment, is, in the other navy, not merely overlooked, but almost enjoined. The captain of a French frigate, that runs from a dozen English frigates in succession, and executes his mission, or returns home from his cruise, receives five times as much applause as the captain who gallantly engages, and after a hard struggle is compelled to yield to, a decidedly superior force.

For a contrast to the conduct of Captain Motard, we need look no further than to the behaviour of Captain Montagu in the case we have just done relating. With a frigate, carrying 28 guns and 180 men, he was cruising in the hope to fall in with a frigate mounting 48 guns, of a much heavier caliber than his own, and carrying a crew of at least 340 men; and although, fortunately for him, he did not encounter the *Canonnière*, Captain Montagu met, fought, and fairly beat, a French frigate mounting 40 guns, with a crew of at least 300 men. Could the *Terpsichore*, at any one time during the five days' chase that succeeded the battle, have got fairly alongside the *Sémillante*, the officers and crew of the former would, we have no doubt, have had their wishes realised. As it was, the *Terpsichore* returned to *Pointe de Galle* to refit, and the *Sémillante*, early in the month of April, re-anchored in *Port Louis* for the same purpose. The *Sémillante*, however, was found to be too much cut up in her hull to serve again as a cruiser; especially as, to escape from the *Terpsichore*, she had thrown overboard a great part of her armament. Captain Motard, therefore, as soon as his frigate was repaired, loaded her with a cargo of colonial produce, valued at seven million of francs, and set sail for Europe. The same good fortune, which had attended the *Sémillante* ever since she escaped from the British frigate *Venus* in May, 1793,¹ still accompanied her; and, in the month of February, 1809, this richly-laden French frigate succeeded in entering a port of France.

Although, from the damages she had received in her action with the *Terpsichore*, the *Sémillante*, after her return to *Port*

¹ See vol. I., p. 104.

Louis in April, was unable to put to sea as a cruiser, there still remained upon the Isle of France station two French national ships. One was the 40-gun frigate *Canonnière*, Captain César-Joseph Bourayne, of whom mention has already been made; the other, the ship-corvette *Jéna*, of 18 long 6-pounders and 150 men, commanded by Lieutenant Nicolas Morice. This vessel had sailed from Europe as a privateer, but had since been purchased by Governor Decaen to be employed as a national corvette.

Some time in the month of August, 1808, the *Canonnière* joined the *Sémillante* in the harbour of Port Louis; and on the 5th or 6th of September the British 22-gun ship *Laurel*, Captain John Charles Woolcombe, arrived off the Isle of France from the Cape, whence she had been despatched by Vice-admiral Bertie, the new commander-in-chief on that station, with provisions for two ship-sloops expected to be cruising upon the Isle of France station. Not finding these sloops, nor any other British cruiser, off Port Louis, Captain Woolcombe conceived it to be his duty, till relieved as he soon expected to be, to watch the motions of the *Sémillante*, then supposed to be the only French frigate in the harbour.

In a day or two after her arrival off the island, the *Laurel* recaptured a Portuguese ship, bound last from the rendezvous of French prizes in St. Paul's bay to Port Louis. On board this ship, as passengers from Bourbon, were some ladies belonging to the Isle of France. The gallantry of Captain Woolcombe induced him to despatch one of his boats with a flag of truce to Governor Decaen, requesting the general to send out a vessel to bring on shore the ladies and their baggage. In the middle of the night the second captain of the *Canonnière*, as he afterwards proved to be, came on board the *Laurel* in a flag of truce; and, having to remain until seven or eight in the morning before the baggage could all be embarked, monsieur made himself thoroughly acquainted with the *Laurel's* force in guns and men.

On the 12th, in the afternoon, the *Laurel* chased a ship almost under the batteries to the north-east of Port Louis harbour, and, discovering the vessel to be a cartel, was about to wear off the shore with a light breeze from the east-south-east, when a sail was discovered on the lee bow steering nearly the same course as the *Laurel*. The latter consequently stood on, but, from the position of the stranger, could only make out that she was a ship. A difference of opinion prevailed as to her force; some of the officers taking her for a prize Indiaman, others for

the *Sémillante*, frigate. In a little while the strange ship hove in stays; and her pursuers saw at once that she was a large French frigate with a commodore's broad pendant.

This was, as may be conjectured, the *Canonnière* herself. Upon the return to Port Louis of the flag of truce with the ladies on board, the French officer made such a representation of the *Laurel*'s insignificant force, that Governor Decaen resolved to send out the *Canonnière* to endeavour to bring her in. In order, too, that the contest might be quickly decided, and the least possible damage done to the prize, whose services as a French cruiser were so much in request, a party of at least 70 soldiers from the garrison, with a captain to command them, were added to the 340 or 350 officers and seamen composing the crew of the *Canonnière*. Armed, as has elsewhere appeared, with 48 guns,¹ manned, as we have just shown, with full 420 men, and, as a proof that she had no other object in view than the capture of the *Laurel*, supplied with only a few days' provisions, the *Canonnière* put to sea from Port Louis. The force of the *Laurel* was precisely that of her sister-ship, the *Comus*;² 22 long 9-pounders on the main deck, with six carronades, 18-pounders, and two long sixes on the quarter-deck and fore-castle. But, of her complement of 175 men and boys, having quitted the Cape short-handed and since manned a prize, the *Laurel* had only 144 on board, and a few of these were sick. In point of relative size, one ship was 526, the other 1102 tons.

Notwithstanding all this, the *Laurel* stood on to meet the *Canonnière*; and, as the two vessels approached each other on opposite tacks, Captain Woollcombe called out to the master, "Lay me as close to her as you can." It was now about 6 h. 30 m. P.M.; and, just as the *Laurel*, edging away on the larboard tack for the *Canonnière*'s starboard bow, was about to discharge her foremost starboard main-deck guns, the *Canonnière* wore. Either from the lightness of the wind, or, as was considered to be the case on board the *Laurel*, from the mismanagement of her crew, the French frigate came so slowly round, that the former was enabled to pour into her stern a deliberate, and, as acknowledged, a destructive fire. At length the *Canonnière* came to on the larboard tack, and discharged her broadside. So well, however, did the master obey the directions given him by Captain Woollcombe as to running close to his antagonist, that, after that first broadside, nearly all the *Canonnière*'s shot flew over the heads of the British crew. In this way, the wind

¹ See p. 144.

² See p. 203.

gradually sinking by the cannonade to nearly a calm, did the two vessels engage, until a few minutes before 8 P.M.; when, having had her rigging of every sort completely destroyed, the slings of her main yard and her gaff shot away, and her mizen-mast left tottering, the *Laurel* hauled down her colours.

Out of her 144, or, adding a passenger, Lieutenant Henry Lynne, who shared the danger of the quarter-deck with Captain Woolcombe, 145 men and boys, the *Laurel*, as with every attempt at explanation must still appear extraordinary, sustained the comparatively slight loss of nine wounded: her master (James Douglas), six seamen, and two marines. Three of the seamen lost each a leg, and one, a boatswain's mate, died after amputation, but entirely through his own fault. The inconsiderate man swallowed a large quantity of raw spirits: the consequent enlargement of the vessels about the stump burst the bandages, and he bled to death.

The loss on board the *Canonnière*, as acknowledged by Captain Bourayne, amounted to five men killed and 19 wounded; but it is believed that the French captain's report referred to his proper crew only, and that the captain of the detachment of *troops* had also to report to General Decaen a loss of some serious amount. Indeed the British officers afterwards understood, that the killed and mortally wounded alone in the *Canonnière* exceeded 20. Among the damages received by the French frigate, was considerable injury to her stern-frame and quarters, and so many shot in her mizenmast that her crew had to fish it to prevent its falling.

As soon as Captain Woolcombe, Lieutenant Lynne, and the *Laurel's* first-lieutenant, William Ingle Woodman, were brought on board the *Canonnière*, Captain Bourayne, an experienced seaman of the old French school, and a brave officer, returned them their swords, with a suitable compliment to their gallantry. On a subsequent day, when these officers and others of the late *Laurel's* crew got back to the Cape of Good Hope, the sentence of a court-martial most honourably acquitted them of the loss of their ship; and the president, Captain Josias Rowley, passed a very handsome encomium upon Captain Woolcombe, for his brave and able defence of the *Laurel* against an enemy's ship, that was acknowledged to be more than doubly superior to her.

Until the statement of a contemporary met our eyes, we could almost have sworn, that every officer in the French, as well as in the English naval service would have praised the defence of the *Laurel*, and have concurred in the opinion, that no efforts of

Captain Woolcombe, even could they have been more skilfully directed than they were, would have enabled him to succeed against such a ship as the *Canonnière*. Of all things, too, the individual, who, in dissenting from that opinion, argues against physical impossibility, is the brother of the gallant officer that once commanded the *Canonnière*; and who, we are sure, would have gladly encountered, in the *Minerve*, as was then the frigate's name, two French ships armed and manned like the *Laurel*. Indeed there was not an 18-gun brig in the British navy, that with her 32-pounder carronades, would not have considered herself a match for her. After narrating, in his usual brief manner (including an omission of the date), the action between the *Laurel* and *Canonnière*, our contemporary proceeds thus: "The character of Captain Woolcomb received no blemish from this misfortune, a court-martial having honourably acquitted him: in his mode of fighting he appears to have adhered to the old English maxim, of firing at the tier guns. In a case of this sort, where the opponent was of so much greater force, perhaps it would have been better to have directed the whole fire at the mainmast-head; that fallen, the ship might have become an easy prey to the *Laurel*."¹

As the absurdity of this statement is so glaring, as to deprive it of any noxious effect upon the memory of Captain Woolcombe (for, as was the case with Lieutenant Edwards of the *Boston*, Captain Barker of the *Tribune*, Captain Brown of the *Asia*, and Mr. Metherell, the master of the *Carnation*, he also was dead when his conduct was impugned), we shall quit the subject with remarking, how unfortunate it was, that Captain Edward Pelham Brenton himself did not command the *Laurel* when she fell in with the *Canonnière*.

On the 8th of October, in the evening, the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Modeste*, Captain the Honourable George Elliot, cruising off Sandshead, bay of Bengal, after a nine hours' chase, and a running fight of nearly one hour, captured the French corvette *Jéna*, still commanded by Lieutenant Morice.² The corvette, when she struck, was a complete wreck in her sails and rigging, and had cut away her stern boat and booms, and thrown three of her remaining boats overboard; but suffered no loss. The *Modeste* was not so fortunate, having had her master, Mr. William Donovan, represented as a very valuable and gallant officer, killed, and one seaman wounded.

The *Jéna* was afterwards added to the British navy, in

¹ Brenton, vol. iv., p. 273.

² See p. 363.

lieu, and under the name of the ship-sloop *Victor*, which it had been found necessary to break up; and whose 18 guns (16 carronades, 32-pounders, and two sixes) and crew were placed on board the former. As the new *Victor* was neither so large nor so fine a vessel as the old *Victor*, and the latter was a similar vessel, except in point of rig, to the British 18-gun brig-sloop, it is probable that the statement in Captain Elliot's letter, that the *Jéna* was "pierced for 24 guns," is a mistake. Unimportant as this error may appear, the facility with which Mr. Steel could change "pierced for" into "mounting," or "of," contributed, we verily believe, when this corvette again got into the hands of the French, to dignify her with the appellation of "frigate."

On the 11th of June, in the evening, the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Euryalus*, Captain the Honourable George Heneage Lawrence Dundas, and 18-gun brig-sloop *Cruiser*, Captain George Charles Mackenzie, being in the Great Belt, discovered off the entrance of the river Naskon several vessels at anchor very close to the shore. Captain Dundas immediately despatched four boats from the frigate and brig, under the orders of Lieutenant Michael Head, assisted by midshipmen Francis Wemyss, James William Otto Ricketts, Bernard Yeoman, Jacob Richards, Philip Gaymore, Richard Moffat, and Edward Loveday, to endeavour to destroy them.

Lieutenant Head and his party, in a very gallant manner, boarded and carried a large Danish gun-vessel, mounting two long 18-pounders, with a crew of 64 men, and moored within half pistol-shot of a battery of three long 18-pounders, and of a body of troops that lined the beach. Besides bringing off the gun-boat, the British set fire to and destroyed two large vessels fitted for the reception of troops; and the whole service was executed with so slight a loss to the British as one man slightly wounded. On the part of the Danes, however, the loss was serious, amounting to seven men killed and 12 wounded.

Although, since the last affair at Copenhagen, the Danes had lost all, or nearly all, of their line-of-battle ships and frigates, they possessed some very stout brigs-of-war, and an immense number of well-armed gun-boats. In the calms that frequently prevailed in the Danish waters, the latter were particularly destructive to the British cruisers and convoys. The convoys were generally under the protection of one or more gun-brigs, a description of vessel, from their light carronade-armament, peculiarly exposed to successful attacks by the 18, 24, and in

some cases 36, pounders of the gun-boats. On the 4th of June, during a calm in the Great Belt, the Tickler gun-brig, commanded by Lieutenant John W. Skinner, was attacked by four Danish gun-boats, and, after a conflict of four hours, in which she had her commander and 14 men killed and 22 wounded, out of a complement of 50 men and boys, was obliged to surrender. For the loss of their vessel under such imperative circumstances, the surviving officers and crew obtained an honourable acquittal.

On the 9th of June, at 2 P.M., the British bomb-vessel Thunder, Captain James Caulfield, accompanied by the gun-brigs Charger, Lieutenant John Aitkin Blow, Piercer, Lieutenant John Sibrell, and Turbulent, Lieutenant George Wood, and a homeward-bound convoy of 70 merchant-vessels, got under way from Malmo road, with a moderate northerly wind. At 4 h. 30 m. P.M. the wind began to fall, and at 5 P.M. entirely subsided. At 5 h. 20 m., just as the convoy had arrived abreast of the south end of the island of Saltholm, 25 Danish gun-vessels commenced an attack upon the Turbulent, whose station was in the rear. As the gun-boats approached, the Turbulent opened a fire upon them from her 18-pounder carronades, and the Thunder threw shells and one-pound balls from her mortars, but the Charger and Piercer were at too great a distance to co-operate. At 5 h. 40 m. P.M. the Turbulent's maintopmast was shot away. The gun-boats shortly afterwards pulled close alongside the British brig, and boarded and captured her.

At 6 P.M. having secured their prize, the Danes formed on both quarters and astern of the Thunder, and kept up, as they rapidly advanced, a heavy fire. The Thunder got her two 6-pounders out of the stern-ports, and returned the fire both from them and from her broadside carronades (24-pounders) as the latter could be brought to bear. At 9 h. 30 m. P.M. she cut away her launch and jollyboat, they having been shot to pieces. At 10 h. 10 m., finding they could not induce the bomb to haul down her colours, the gun-boats ceased firing, and retired with the 10 or 12 rear vessels which they had been enabled to capture. We have no means of showing the loss, if any, sustained by the Turbulent or Thunder; but we find that, for his gallant defence, Captain Caulfield received the public approbation of Vice-admiral Sir James Saumarez, the commander-in-chief in the Baltic, and that Lieutenant Wood, for the loss of his brig, was honourably acquitted by the sentence of a court-martial.

On the 2nd of August the gun-brig Tigress, Lieutenant

Edward Nathaniel Greenswood, after a contest of one hour's duration, and a loss of two men killed and eight wounded, was taken in the Great Belt by 16 Danish gun-vessels. Of this action, as well as of that which preceded the capture of the *Tickler*, we should have been glad to have been enabled to give a more particular account, but our researches have failed us in procuring details of either.

On the 1st of October the British 18-gun brig-sloop *Cruiser*, acting commander Lieutenant Thomas Wells, being off the *Wingo* beacon at the entrance of *Gottenbourg*, fell in with about 20 armed cutters, luggers, gun-vessels, and row-boats. Having, as we suppose, a commanding breeze, the *Cruiser* dealt with this Danish flotilla much in the same manner as, three or four years previous, she was accustomed to deal with the famous French flotilla in the neighbourhood of *Ostende*. So far from capturing her, she captured one of them, a schuyt-rigged vessel, of ten 4-pounders and 32 men, and compelled the remainder of the flotilla to take shelter under the batteries of the island of *Læsø*.

As, instead of the letter of Lieutenant Wells, an abstract only (a practice at this time becoming frequent) was published in the *London Gazette*, and as we have been unable to supply the deficiency in the account from our usual sources of information, we are again prevented from giving details. It gratifies us, however, to be able to state, that, in seven or eight weeks after his successful encounter with the Danish gun-boats, Lieutenant Wells was promoted to the rank of commander.

On the 15th of October the British 64-gun ship *Africa*, Captain John Barrett, accompanied by the *Thunder* bomb-vessel and one or two gun-brigs, sailed from *Calserona* in Sweden with a homeward-bound convoy of 137 sail. On the morning of the 20th the whole of this convoy, except one vessel captured and three which had run on shore and were destroyed, got safe into the channel of *Malmö*. While the smaller vessels-of-war and the convoy anchored in that roadstead, the *Africa*, for their better protection, anchored about eight miles to the southward of the town of *Drago*, on the Danish island of *Amag*. At about 40 minutes past noon, observing a flotilla of gunboats advancing to attack the convoy, the *Africa* got under way and stood to meet them. At 1 P.M. the little wind there had been died away to a calm; and the Danish flotilla, rowing towards the *Africa*, was now seen to consist of 25 large gun and mortar boats, and seven armed launches, mounting between them, upon a moderate

estimate, 80 heavy long guns, and manned with upwards of 1600 men.

At 1 h. 15 m. p.m. the *Africa* shortened sail and cleared for action; and at 2 h. 55 m. the gun-boats advanced within gunshot upon the ship's quarters and bows, and commenced an animated fire of round and grape. The *Africa* returned the fire by such of her guns as she could bring to bear; and in this way the engagement continued without intermission until 6 h. 45 m. p.m., when the darkness put an end to it. During the action the *Africa* had her colours twice shot away; and each time the Danes advanced cheering, thinking they had gained the day. The British crew quickly rehoisted the colours, and, cheering in their turn, gave the Danish crew such a salute as sent them quickly back to their secure retreat upon their motionless opponent's quarters and bows.

The *Africa* had her lower masts and lower yards badly wounded, and the greater part of the standing and running rigging and sails cut to pieces. Her two cutters were entirely destroyed, and her remaining boats disabled. Her hull was struck in many places, several large shot had entered between wind and water, and her stern was much shattered. The loss on board the *Africa* was proportionably severe. It amounted to nine seamen and marines killed, the captain (slightly), two lieutenants of marines (Thomas Brattle and John George Richardson), the captain's two clerks, one midshipman, and 47 seamen and marines wounded. The loss among the Danes it is impossible to state; but one or two of their boats were seen to go down. The difficulty of hitting such small objects, and the care the gun-boats took to station themselves where few shot could reach them, render it probable that the Danish loss was comparatively trifling.

Captain Barrett walked the deck during the whole engagement, perfectly cool and composed, and kept exhorting the men to persevere in their resistance. After the action was over, he gave up both his cabins to the wounded; and, following their captain's example, the officers gave up their cots for the same humane purpose. Had the daylight and calm continued two hours longer, the *Africa* must either have sunk or surrendered. As it was, her disabled state sent the ship back to Carlsrona to refit.

One salutary effect of the restriction imposed by Great Britain on neutral commerce was, that it obliged France to carry on, in the best manner she could, her own trade with her colonies

Hence the frigates and corvettes, of the latter power, instead of, when they got to sea, roaming about the ocean to capture or destroy the merchant-vessels of the former, ran straight for Guadalupe or Martinique, deeply laden with troops, ordnance-stores, and provisions, and, in consequence, were less likely to escape from a chasing force.

On the 11th of August, at 8 h. 30 m. A.M., latitude $45^{\circ} 58'$ north, longitude $5^{\circ} 4'$ west, the British 18-gun ship-sloop Comet, Captain Cuthbert Featherstone Daly, observed three strangers in the north-north-east. These were a small French squadron, which had sailed from Lorient on the 9th, bound to Martinique with a supply of flour for the colony, and consisted of the 18-gun ship-corvette *Diligente*, Captain Jean-François Lemaesquier, and 16-gun brig-corvettes *Espiégle* and *Sylphe*, Captains Joseph François-Léon Maujouen and Louis-Marie Clément, all armed, we believe, with French 24-pounder caronades, and long sixes for bow-chasers.

At 9 A.M. the Comet, having approached nearer to the strangers, made them out to be three enemy's corvettes; and, considering it likely that if he altered his course they would chase and overpower him by their united superiority, Captain Daly boldly stood on. Whether alarmed by the frigate-built appearance of the Comet, or that he considered himself bound by his orders to hasten to his destination, the French commodore tacked from the Comet, and with his two consorts, made all sail to the north-north-east. At noon the *Diligente*, having much out-sailed the two brigs, tacked again and stood to the southward.

Feeling no hesitation about attacking the two brigs, Captain Daly made all sail in chase of them. At 3 h. 30 m. P.M. the *Espiégle*, which was the headmost brig, tacked and passed to windward of the Comet at the distance of about two gunshots. At 5 P.M. the *Sylphe*, in pursuit of which the Comet continued, hoisted French colours and commenced firing her stern-chasers. At 5 h. 20 m. P.M., having got within pistol-shot of her, the Comet opened her fire; and at the expiration of 20 minutes, being much disabled, and having, out of her crew of 98 men and boys, lost one midshipman and five men killed, and two midshipmen and three men wounded, the *Sylphe* hauled down her colours.

In this very gallant affair on the part of Captain Daly, the Comet had not a man hurt; but her main and maintop masts were badly wounded, and her sails and rigging cut. The

Sylphe, a fine brig of 343 tons, was afterwards added to the British navy under the name of Seagull. Lieutenant James Tomkinson, first of the Comet, was much commended, by Captain Daly in his official letter, and became a commander, as the lists inform us, in March, 1810. To the additional credit of the crew of the Comet on this occasion, they consisted chiefly of newly-raised men.

The *Espiègle* afterwards succeeded in joining her remaining consort, and the two vessels proceeded in company to the westward. On the 16th, however, they were fallen in with by the British 38-gun frigate *Sibylle*, Captain Clotworthy Upton. After a chase of some continuance, the *Diligente*, by her good sailing, escaped; but the *Espiègle* was captured, and, under the name of *Electra*, became added to the British navy.

Proceeding alone to her destination, the *Diligente* met no further obstruction until the 6th of September, in latitude $17^{\circ} 50'$ north, longitude from Greenwich $58^{\circ} 20'$ west. On this day, at 6 A.M., the British 18-gun brig-sloop *Recruit*, Captain Charles Napier, standing close hauled on the starboard tack with the wind from the east by north, discovered the *Diligente* in the north-east, going free on the larboard tack, or in the direction of the island of Martinique. The *Recruit* immediately tacked, and made all sail in chase; and at 7 h. 30 m. A.M. fired two shot at the strange ship, and hoisted her colours. At 8 h. 15 m. A.M. the *Diligente* tacked to preserve the weather-gage, and in less than a quarter of an hour afterwards hoisted a French ensign and pendant.

At 8 h. 30 m. A.M. the two vessels, the *Recruit* on the larboard, and the *Diligente* on the starboard tack, passed each other within pistol-shot, and exchanged broadsides. On this occasion Captain Napier was wounded, but not, we believe, so as to oblige him to quit the deck. At 8 h. 40 m. both vessels, having passed out of gun-shot, tacked, and again exchanged broadsides. The *Diligente* then wore, with the intention of raking the *Recruit* astern; but the brig wore also, and brought her antagonist to close action with the larboard guns. At 9 h. 20 m. A.M. the second-lieutenant (Moses de Willetts) was wounded. In this way, broadside to broadside, the action continued until 11 h. 30 m. A.M.: when the *Recruit* had her mainmast shot away. While this lay over the stern the brig continued the action with her foremost guns, and made several attempts to board her antagonist; but the *Diligente* every time sheered off. The French ship then backed her mizentopsail,

and, shooting up under the brig's stern, raked her. As the Diligente stood along her starboard beam, the Recruit returned this fire: but the Diligente reserved her next broadside, until, bearing up athwart the bows of her disabled antagonist, she was enabled to bestow it with more effect. The Diligente then stood along the brig's larboard beam, with the intention probably of running round her a second time; but a well-directed fire from the Recruit blew up a part of the ship's quarter, and cut away her stern-boat filled with small-arm men. Immediately on this the Diligente put her helm up, and ran away before the wind.

The Recruit quickly set about clearing the wreck, refitting her rigging, re-breeching and re-mounting her carronades, many of which had upset, and preparing herself to renew the action with the French ship; who then lay upon her lee-beam repairing her damages. At 2 p.m., having got ready to engage, the Recruit bore up to close; but the Diligente, setting courses, topsails, and topgallantsails, hauled to the wind on the starboard tack. At 4 p.m. the Recruit got up a jury mainmast and set a royal upon it, and hoisting her foretopsail, endeavoured again to close; but every effort was in vain, and by 7 h. 30 m. p.m. the Diligente had run herself completely out of sight.

Notwithstanding the very serious nature of her damages, the Recruit does not appear to have had more than one man killed, and a few, besides the captain and second-lieutenant, wounded. The brig was of course obliged to make the best of her way into port to get a new mainmast, and on the 10th she anchored in Carlisle bay, Barbadoes. The extent of the loss which the Diligente sustained has not been made public; but we must suppose it to have been very heavy, to excuse Captain Lemaesquier for having abandoned the action after he had knocked away his antagonist's mainmast. He, indeed, takes care to assign a sufficient reason for his retreat; no less than that several enemy's vessels were in sight, although not a sail of any kind, except the Diligente herself, could be discovered from the Recruit. His opponent the French captain takes to have been "le Curieux, de 20 carronades de 32,"¹ and says: "Ce dernier a été totalement déséparé, et n'a échappé que parce que la Diligente, ayant une mission importante et voyant plusieurs bâtimens ennemis, n'a pas dû s'exposer en poursuivant son avantage, à ne voir couper le chemin de sa destination." This

¹ See p. 271. The brig was at this time lying at an anchor in the harbour of Halifax Nova Scotia.

destination the *Diligente* reached in safety, and, at the surrender of Martinique a few months afterwards, was one of the few French national vessels that fell into the hands of the conquerors. The *Diligente* was a ship of 371 tons, and became added to the British navy by the name of *St. Pierre*, the port in which she was found by her captors.

On the 29th of September, at 6 A.M., Pointe Antigua, island of Guadeloupe, bearing south-west, the British gun-brig *Maria*, of twelve 12-pounder carronades and two long fours, with 65 men and boys, commanded by Lieutenant James Bennett, saw and chased a sail bearing south-east by south, in the hope to cut her off from the land, towards which the vessel, supposed to be a French letter-of-marque, was then steering. Instead, however, of being a letter-of-marque, the stranger was the ship-corvette *Département-des-Landes*, now mounting 16 carronades, 24-pounders, and four long 8-pounders¹ on the main deck, and two brass 6-pounders on the quarter-deck, besides a large swivel on the fore-castle, with a crew of at least 160 men and boys, commanded by Captain Joseph-François Raoul.

Just as the *Maria* had got within gun-shot of her opponent, a flaw of wind from the land took the brig aback. The weather almost immediately afterwards fell dead calm, and the *Maria*, in consequence, lay with her stern exposed to the broadside of the corvette; who, hoisting her ensign and pendant and raising her ports, poured into the British brig a most destructive raking fire. Before the *Maria* could get her sweeps to act, the *Département-des-Landes* was enabled to give her a second broadside; and, when the brig did sweep herself round, her fire was too insignificant to be of much avail, while the effect of that of her opponent was soon visible in the shattered state of the *Maria*'s masts, yards, rigging, and hull. Owing to the latter's ensign-halyards having been shot away, her colours came down. On this the French captain asked if she had struck. Lieutenant Bennett replied "No." Presently afterwards this gallant officer received three grape shots into his body, and fell dead beneath the colours which he had re-hoisted.

The action was still maintained with spirit for several minutes, by the master, Mr. Joseph Dyason; when the *Maria*, being in a sinking state, and having lost, besides her captain, one midshipman (Robert O'Donnel) and four seamen killed and nine wounded, surrendered. One or two men slightly wounded appears to have been the extent of the loss sustained by the

¹ For her armament in 1805, see p. 38.

French corvette; and, considering the unmanageable state of her opponent at the commencement of the action, and her very inferior force, that was as much as could be expected. Scarcely had the Département-des-Landes taken possession of the *Maria* and removed the prisoners, than the prize-crew were compelled to run the vessel on shore to prevent her from sinking under them. Nothing could better testify the gallantry with which the *Maria* had been defended, and that against a ship in every respect but gallantry so decidedly her superior.

Mr. Dyason, who writes the official letter to Sir Alexander Cochrane, calls, or by the Gazette is made to call, his opponent "le Sardis." As the Département-de-le-Manche French frigate was mostly, for shortness, called *Manche*;¹ so the Département-des-Landes, we have no doubt, was named by her officers, and crew "les Landes." This accounts pretty well for the name given to the corvette in Mr. Dyason's letter; and our contemporary, having no better guide, is excusable for adopting the same name, or rather "le Sardè," a word, by-the-by, as here spelt, not French. But how happens Captain Brenton to call the *Maria*'s opponent a "brig-of-war,"² when Mr. Dyason and Sir Alexander Cochrane had both officially stated that she was a ship? We know, too, from the French captain's account, that she was the Département-des-Landes. This very corvette, it will be recollected, was one of Captain Mudge's "two frigates";³ and, if any person was justified in applying that term to the French ship, it was the officer who lay alongside of her in a brig of 172 tons. Nowhere, however, in Mr. Dyason's letter, nor in Sir Alexander Cochrane's, does the word "frigate" appear.

After carrying his prize into Martinique, Captain Raoul sailed again on his voyage to France. On the 9th of November, in latitude 21° north, longitude (from Paris) 64° west, the Département-des-Landes, according to the French accounts, fell in with an English brig-of-war, "carrying 32-pounder carronades," and, after an action of two hours, dismasted and would have taken the brig, but for the appearance of "two British frigates" advancing to her relief. Captain Raoul states his loss on this occasion at only two men killed and a few wounded. Although we have searched the logs of six or seven of the 18-gun brigs at this time cruising in the West Indies, we have not been so successful as to discover the brig engaged by the Département-des-Landes. There were, however, three or four brig-sloops with 24-pounder carronades, and

¹ See p. 260.

² Brenton, vol. iv., p. 272.

³ See p. 43.

some gun-brigs with only 18-pounders, stationed off the French islands. Having escaped from the two British frigates, the Département-des-Landes hastened towards Europe, and on the 8th of December was fortunate enough to reach the river of Bordeaux.

On the 10th of November, at 6 h. 42 m. P.M., while the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate Amethyst, Captain Michael Seymour, with the wind at east-north-east, was standing from the north-west point of the island of Groix towards the main land of France, a battery at Larmour fired several shot apparently at her. In three or four minutes afterwards a sail was observed astern, running about west by south. The Amethyst immediately wore in chase, and presently fired two muskets to bring to the strange vessel, now discovered to be a large ship. The latter was, in fact, the French 40-gun frigate Thétis, Captain Jacques Pinsum from Lorient, bound to Martinique, with troops and 1000 barrels of flour, besides other stores. It was therefore the object of the Thétis to pursue her course, and she did so under all sail. We may here mention, that it was at this ship that the French battery had fired, not having received notice of her intended departure.


At 9 P.M. the Amethyst, having got within a quarter of a mile, discharged her bow gun at the Thétis, who smartly returned the fire from one of her stern-chasers. Convinced now that the latter was an enemy, Captain Seymour, as his duty prescribed, let off one or two rockets, and soon saw them answered by three flashes in the east-north-east. The ship that did this was the Triumph, 74, Captain Sir Thomas Masterman Hardy, and who instantly made sail in the direction of the rockets. Shortly after firing her stern-chasers, the Thétis took in her lower studding-sails, and the Amethyst the whole of her studding-sails and her royals. At 9 h. 15 m. the Thétis, then going nine knots, suddenly luffed to on the starboard tack, with the intention of raking the Amethyst, who was advancing upon her weather-quarter. To avoid the rake, and yet be ready to close, the Amethyst put her helm hard a-starboard; and, the instant the Thétis had discharged her starboard broadside, the Amethyst shifted her helm to hard a-port, and, just clearing the French ship's starboard-quarter, shot up in the wind right abreast of her to windward. In this way a close and furious action commenced between the two frigates; who, losing their way, fell round off and stood again to the westward, engaging broadside to broadside.

At 9 h. 40 m. P.M., the Amethyst shooting a little ahead, the Thétis attempted to cross her opponent's stern, and rake or gain the wind of her; but, not having room, ran her jib-boom between the Amethyst's main and mizen rigging. After being a few minutes in this position, the two ships separated, and went off in hot action, steering nearly the same course as before. At 10 h. 5 m. P.M., having got sufficiently ahead to execute the manœuvre, the Amethyst put her helm hard a-starboard, and, crossing her opponent's hawse, raked her severely. The Amethyst then put her helm hard a-port, and brought the Thétis a little before her starboard beam, still running with the wind about a point on the starboard-quarter. At 10 h. 20 m. P.M. the mizenmast of the Amethyst came down, and, falling in-board, broke and damaged the wheel, and encumbered the whole quarter-deck. Scarcely had the Thétis increased her distance by this disaster of her antagonist, than her own mizenmast fell over the side, and the two ships again lay abreast of each other.

At 11 P.M., having for the last half-hour been gradually sheering closer, the Thétis put her helm hard a-starboard, and steered to lay the Amethyst on board. Aware that the Thétis, after striking the Amethyst on the bow, would rebound off and bring the quarters of the two ships together, Captain Seymour reserved his fire. The ships met at the bows, and then at the quarters, and off went the whole broadside of the Amethyst, with double round from the main-deckers and grape from the carronades. As, just before the discharge, the French officers, troops, and seamen were assembled on the quarter-deck ready to spring on board the British frigate, its destructive effect may be partly imagined: one proof of it was, that four guns only were returned by the Thétis. In a minute or two afterwards the outer arm of the Amethyst's best bower-anchor entered the foremost main-deck port of the Thétis, and held her fast. In this way the action was maintained, with destructive effect on both sides, particularly to the Thétis, who had been set on fire in several places, until about 20 minutes past midnight; when, having completely silenced the guns of her antagonist, the Amethyst boarded and carried her.

The following diagram will explain the manœuvres that took place in this action; but we must observe, that the straight tracks, as in many other similar cases, are necessarily shortened to suit the space to which we are restricted. The difference in the time, and the rate at which the ships may be supposed to

have been sailing, will show the impracticability of an adherence to truth in this unessential point:—



It was not until 45 minutes past midnight, after several prisoners had been received by the Amethyst, that her cable was cut and the Thétis disentangled. In five minutes afterwards the fore and main masts of the Thétis went over the side. At 1 h. 15 m. A.M. on the 11th, a light was observed in the north-east, and the Triumph soon came up under a press of sail. In about another quarter of an hour the 38-gun frigate Shannon, Captain Philip Bowes Vere Broke, joined from the westward, and, after receiving on board several prisoners, took the prize, now wholly dismasted, in tow.

The Amethyst (of same force as San-Fiorenzo, at page 20 had her rigging and sails cut to pieces, and, besides the fall of her mizenmast, had her fore and main masts greatly injured. She had also three feet and a half water in the hold from the number of shot-holes in her hull. Her loss, out of a crew of 261 men and boys, amounted to one second-lieutenant of marines (Bernard Kindall), 10 seamen, and eight marines killed, and one first-lieutenant of marines (Samuel John Payne, dangerously), one master's mate (Richard Gibbings, mortally), one midshipman (Lawford Miles, severely), her boatswain (Leonard Taylor), captain's clerk (Thomas Gilson), 32 seamen, 12 marines, and two boys wounded; total, 19 killed and 51 wounded. The Thétis (same force as Minerve, at page 141) was dreadfully shattered as well as dismasted; and, out of a crew, including 106 French soldiers, of 436 men and boys, had her

captain, and 134 officers, seamen, and soldiers killed, and 102 wounded.

Comparative Force of the Combatants.

		Amethyst.	Thétis.
Broadside-guns.	No.	21	22
	lbs.	467	524
Crew	No.	261	436
	Size	1046	1090

Here stands another frigate action, in which the comparative statement, in every line of figures on the French side, exhibits a superiority of force, particularly in crew. There is, however, a circumstance or two, which, fairly considered, will be allowed to bring the odds a little nearer to an equality. The object of the Thétis, from the first, was to gain her destination, not to fight; and even, had it been otherwise, an exchange of night signals, at the commencement of the chase, must have informed her that a friend to her antagonist, and consequently a foe to her, was not many miles distant. Still the Thétis fought manfully, and did not surrender until every hope had fled.

The crew of the Amethyst, in the heavy loss and damage they inflicted upon the Thétis, proved the high state of discipline to which they had been brought by their commander and his officers. If anything can add to the merits of Captain Seymour on the occasion, it is the modesty of his published account, and the handsome eulogium he pays to the gallantry of Lieutenant Joseph Dedé, the surviving commander of the Thétis; who, he says, acted with singular firmness, and was the only Frenchman on the quarter-deck when the British boarded.

Unfortunately, Lieutenant Dedé lost the esteem of his generous captor, by uniting with the two officers who were next to himself in command on board the Thétis, in swearing before the prize-court, by way of making the thing go down better with the French government, that the Thétis was captured by a 74 and two frigates. This is easily disproved. When the Thétis had been, not only taken possession of by, but cut clear from, the Amethyst, the appearance of a large ship, coming down under a press of sail from the eastward, occasioned Captain Seymour to ask Lieutenant Dedé, if he had previously seen any ship, or expected any other to sail from Lorient. The lieutenant answered decidedly, that he had seen no ship, and did not know that any was to sail that night. But a more satisfactory refutation of the sworn assertion of the French officers is contained in the following extract from a letter written by an officer on

board the *Triumph*, and published at or about the same time as Captain Seymour's official letter: "At 12 they ceased firing, and at 1 A.M. we saw the two ships close to us." And the *Shannon*, it is admitted, did not join until a quarter of an hour or 20 minutes after the *Triumph*.

Soon after the return of the *Amethyst* to port, her first-lieutenant, Mr. Goddard Blennerhasset, was promoted to the rank of commander. Captain Seymour, in his official letter, speaks also in high terms of his second and third lieutenants, William Hill and Edward Thomas Crouch; as well as of the master of the *Amethyst*, Mr. Robert Fair. The prize was purchased for the British navy, and, under the name of *Brune* (a *Thétis* being already in the service), was subsequently added, as a cruising frigate, to the large class of 38s.

On the 12th of November the three new French 40-gun frigates *Venus*, Commodore Jacques-Felix-Emmanuel Hamelin, *Junon*, Captain Jean-Baptiste-Augustin Rousseau, and *Amphitrite*, with whose captain's name we are unacquainted, accompanied by the brig-corvettes, *Cigne* and *Papillon* and two armed schooners, put to sea from the road of Cherbourg; the *Venus* bound to the Isle of France, and the remaining two frigates and smaller vessels to Martinique and Guadeloupe, with ordnance stores and provisions.

Just as this squadron reached the Antilles, a separation, either by accident or design, appears to have taken place. At all events the *Cigne*, and the two schooners, at 11 A.M. on the 12th of December, were discovered at anchor off the Pearl rock, by the gun-brig *Morne-Fortune*, Lieutenant John Brown; who immediately made a signal to that effect to Captain Francis Augustus Collier, of the 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Circe*, the commodore of a small British squadron stationed between that rock and the town of St. Pierre.

Immediately the *Circe*, accompanied by the 18-gun ship-sloop *Stork*, Captain George Le Geyt, 16-gun brig-sloop *Epervier*, Captain Thomas Tudor Tucker, and advice-schooner *Express*, Lieutenant William Dowers, made sail towards St. Pierre's; which one of the French schooners was endeavouring to reach, by being towed alongshore under cover of a body of troops on the beach. Finding it impossible, owing to the near approach of the *Stork*, to get between the port of St. Pierre and the *Circe*, the schooner ran on shore under a battery of four guns, flanked by two smaller ones, and defended also by the troops that had accompanied her from her anchorage at the Pearl. Immediately

the *Circe*, followed by the *Stork* and *Morne-Fortunee*, stood in to attack the batteries: and, engaging them within pistol-shot, soon silenced the two smaller batteries and drove the troops from the beach.

Observing at this time that the French brig and the schooner in her company were unloading, Captain Collier directed the *Morne-Fortunee* to watch the motions of the schooner on shore, and to give similar orders to the *Epervier* on her coming up; and then, with the *Circe*, *Stork*, and *Express*, he made sail towards the *Cigne* and her consort, now lying well to windward, close to the rocks, and under the protection of four batteries and a considerable number of troops, with field-pieces, assembled on the beach. Having manned her barge and two cutters, with 68 officers and men, under the command of Lieutenant Charles Henry Croke, Mr. William Collman, the purser, and Mr. William Smith, the master, and directed Lieutenant Croke to lie off until the French brig's fire slackened, the *Circe*, followed by the *Stork* and *Express*, stood in and opened a close and well-directed fire upon the brig, the batteries, and the troops on the beach.

As soon as the *Circe* and *Stork*, which latter ship had manned her boats to assist those of the former, had run past the batteries and brig, Lieutenant Croke, without waiting for the *Stork's* boats, dashed on, in the most gallant manner, and boarded the *Cigne*. It happened, in this instance, that gallantry did not meet its accustomed reward. The three boats were defeated with dreadful slaughter. One boat was taken, another sunk, and the third entirely disabled; and, out of the 68 men detached from her, the *Circe* lost nine killed, 21 wounded, and 26 missing: total 56, including, among the badly wounded, Lieutenant Croke in four places, and Mr. Collman the purser. It being, when the issue of this unfortunate business was known, quite dark, the *Circe* stood off from the shore; leaving the 18-gun brig-sloop *Amaranthe*, Captain Edward Pelham Brenton, who had just joined company, to watch the *Cigne* during the night.

At daylight on the 13th the French brig got under way, and, aided by her sweeps and boats, stood alongshore for St. Pierre's. Captain Brenton having in the handsomest manner volunteered to bring out the *Cigne*, the *Amaranthe*, towed by the boats of the *Circe* and *Stork*, used her utmost endeavours to close with her. At 10 A.M. the *Cigne* grounded near several batteries to the northward of St. Pierre's: whereupon the British brig tacked and worked in under a heavy fire from the French brig, and particularly from the batteries, by which the *Ama-*

ranthe had one man killed and five wounded. The *Circe* and the rest of the squadron, meanwhile, were engaging the batteries to leeward. By her close and well-directed fire, the *Amaranthe* soon obliged the crew of the *Cigne* to quit their vessel and take to the shore: immediately on which the boats of the *Amaranthe*, *Circe*, and *Stork*, led by Lieutenant James Hay, first of the *Amaranthe*, gallantly boarded and carried the *Cigne*, in the face of a heavy fire from the batteries and troops on the beach.

The prize having bilged, it was impossible to get her off: the British, therefore, were obliged to be contented with destroying her. Captain Brenton, having again volunteered, proceeded with a party to destroy the French schooner, then also on shore. By 9 A.M., after overcoming a resistance that wounded Mr. Joshua Jones, the master of the *Amaranthe*, and killed one and wounded three seamen belonging to the *Express*, the British set fire to and burnt the schooner. But for the rash act of Lieutenant Croke (and yet who, under such circumstances, could refrain?) the whole of this enterprise would have been accomplished with a very slight loss. As it was, the loss amounted to 12 killed, 31 wounded, and 26 missing; a part of the latter probably drowned—the remainder prisoners.

The other corvette, the *Papillon*, appears to have reached St. Pierre unseen by any British ship; and on the 19th, in the morning, the *Amphitrite* was discovered, close to Pigeon island, by the British 38-gun frigate *Ethalion*, Captain Thomas Cochrane, 18-gun ship-sloop *Star*, Captain William Paterson, and advice-boat *Express*. The French frigate, being to windward and ably manœuvred, managed to escape into Fort-Royal bay, after receiving a few ineffectual shot from the *Ethalion* and *Star*. The remaining French frigate, the *Junon*, arrived safe at Guadaloupe.

On the 14th of November, at 8 h. 30 m. A.M., the British 64-gun ship *Polyphemus*, Captain William Price Cumby, cruising off the city of Santo-Domingo, despatched her boats in chase of the French national schooner *Colibri*, of three carriage-guns and 63 men, commanded by a lieutenant de vaisseau, which was attempting to enter the road. At 9 h. 20 m. Lieutenant Joseph Daly, with the barge, in the face of a heavy fire of grape and musketry, boarded and carried the schooner. In accomplishing this very gallant service, the barge had one marine killed; and the French, in defending their vessel, had one man killed and five wounded.

On the 1st of August the British 74-gun ship *Kent*, Captain Thomas Rogers, and 16-gun brig-sloop *Wizard*, Captain William Ferris, running along the coast of Italy from Genoa to Cape del Melle, discovered a convoy of 10 sail of coasters deeply laden, lying at anchor, under the protection of a gun-boat, close to the beach abreast of the town of Noli. As there appeared a chance, by a prompt attack, of bringing out the vessels before the enemy had time to collect his force, Captain Rogers despatched the boats of the *Kent* and *Wizard*, under the orders of Lieutenant William Cashman, second of the *Kent*, assisted by Lieutenants James Lindsay and Fairfax Moresby, Captain of marines Henry Rea, and Lieutenants of marines John Hanlon and Patrick Grant, also of that ship, and Lieutenant Alexander Bissett, of the *Wizard*; which latter vessel, as there was very little wind, was to tow the boats, as well as cover them in their approach to the shore.

By great exertions, the boats were towed by the *Wizard*; close to the vessels, when it was found impossible to bring them out without landing, most of the vessels being fastened to the shore by ropes from their keels and mast-heads. The boats, therefore, pulled to the beach with great resolution, exposed to the fire of two guns in the bow of the gun-boat, of two field-pieces placed in a grove which flanked the beach, of a heavy gun in front of the town, and of a continued fire of musketry from the houses. But all this was no check to the ardour and intrepidity of British seamen and marines, who leaped from the boats and rushed upon the enemy with a fearless zeal that was not to be resisted.

The gun in front of the town was soon taken and spiked by Lieutenants Cashman and Hanlon; and the French, who had drawn up a considerable force of regular troops in the grove to defend the two field-pieces, were dislodged by Captain Rea and Lieutenant Grant, of the marines; who took possession of the guns and brought them off. In the mean time, Lieutenants Lindsay, Moresby, and Bissett, who had equally distinguished themselves in driving the enemy from the beach, were actively employed, first in taking possession of the gun-boat, which was the *Vigilante*, commanded by an enseigne de vaisseau, with a crew of 45 men, and then in freeing the merchant-vessels from their fasts to the shore. The whole was soon accomplished, and the party re-embarked under the protection of the *Wizard*; who by her judicious manœuvres and well-directed fire contributed very essentially to keep the enemy in check, both in the

advance and in the retreat of the boats. Notwithstanding the perilous nature of this very gallant enterprise, Lieutenant Cashman and his party accomplished it with so comparatively slight a loss, as one seamen killed and one mortally wounded. The French, on the other hand, left many dead upon the ground.

Among the British cruisers appointed to harass the French army in its movements along the east coast of Spain, was the 38-gun frigate *Impérieuse*, Captain Lord Cochrane. This description of service, requiring, with great boldness and nautical experience, no slight share of military knowledge, was peculiarly adapted to the genius of that zealous and enterprising officer: and never did Lord Cochrane exert himself more strenuously, more effectually, or more honourably, than in the aid he afforded to the cause of the Spanish patriots. Of one quality in Lord Cochrane, we, in common with other compilers, have to complain: the brevity of his accounts; all of which appear to be written more to recommend to notice his gallant companions in arms than to blazon his own feats to the world.

On the 31st of July the *Impérieuse* silenced, and Lord Cochrane landed with his marines, under Lieutenant James Rivers Hore of that corps, and took possession of the castle of Mongal; an important post completely commanding a pass in the road from Barcelona to Gerona, then besieged by the French, and the only post between those towns occupied by the enemy. The Spanish militia are represented to have behaved admirably, in carrying an outpost on a neighbouring hill. Lord Cochrane demolished the works, and gave up to the Spanish militia the arms of the 71 prisoners made on the occasion.

In the latter part of September, cruising off the coast of Languedoc, Lord Cochrane landed with a portion of his officers and men, and blew up and completely demolished the semiphoric telegraphs at Bourdique, La Pinde, Saint-Miguire, Frontignan, Canet, and Foy, with their telegraph houses, 14 barracks of the gens-d'armes or douanes, one battery, and the strong tower upon the lake of Frontignan. The telegraphs being of the utmost consequence to the safety of the numerous convoys that passed along the coast, their destruction was a serious blow to the French, and particularly beneficial to the patriots, and those who espoused their cause, by preventing about 2000 troops, intended for the important fortress of Figueras, from advancing into Spain.

Always anxious to do justice to those who embark with him in services of danger, Lord Cochrane, in his official letter attributes the successful result of the enterprise just recorded to the exertions of Mr. David Mapleton, the first, and Mr. Urry Johnson, the second lieutenant, Mr. George Gilbert, assistant-surgeon, Mr. William Burney, gunner, and Messrs. Houston Stewart and George Charles Stovin, midshipmen of the *Impériuse*.

On the 7th of November a body of about 5000 French troops occupied the heights around the bay of Rosas, at the north-eastern extremity of Spain; and at noon on the same day, a small detachment entered the town of Rosas, the inhabitants of which had fled for protection either to their boats or to the citadel. At this time the British 74-gun ship *Excellent*, Captain John West, and bomb-ship *Meteor*, Captain James Collins, lay within point-blank shot of the town. A well-directed fire from these ships soon compelled the French precipitately to retire towards some houses and ruins in the rear of the town, which they occupied as an advanced post. On the 8th at noon, observing that the French were hard pressing a body of Miguelets, Captain West made a sortie from the citadel at the head of 250 of the *Excellent's* seamen and marines; but the superior force of the French, who endeavoured, with their cavalry, to surround the British, compelled the latter, after being successful in their object of rescuing the Miguelets, to retire within the fortress. The seamen and marines, who, throughout this to them novel engagement, behaved in the bravest manner, had several of their number wounded, and Captain West himself had his horse shot under him.

On the 15th, at 8 A.M., the French about 200 strong, with a reserve of 2000, made a most resolute, but unsuccessful assault upon Fort Trinidad, one of the defences of Rosas, and part of the garrison of which consisted of one officer and 25 privates of the *Excellent's* marines. In a second assault, with increased numbers, two of the outer gates were broken open; but, by a steady and galling fire of musketry and hand-grenades from the fort, the French were, a second time, obliged to retire, leaving their leader, a chief of brigade, and several other officers and men, dead under the walls. Expecting a third assault, Captain West, by means of a rope ladder, threw in a reinforcement of two officers and 30 marines; of whom one man only was slightly wounded, although the party had bravely entered during an incessant fire of musketry from the besiegers. On the 26th the

French opened a battery of three guns from a height that commanded the fort; and, although these guns made no sensible impression on the fort, they succeeded in driving away the bomb-ship *Lucifer*, Captain Robert Hall; which vessel had recently joined, and during the two preceding days had been throwing her shells, to obstruct the enemy in his works. Another battery, erected nearer to the citadel, shortly afterwards compelled the British 74 also to retire from the shore. The loss sustained by the *Excellent* and *Meteor*, in these different attacks, amounted to 21 seamen and marines wounded, but none killed.

On the following day, the 21st, the *Excellent* was relieved by the 74-gun ship *Fame*, Captain Richard Henry Alexander Bennett; a portion of whose marines supplied the place of those of the *Excellent* which had been thrown into, and since withdrawn from, Fort Trinidad. On the 22nd both the latter and the citadel of Rosas were more than half invested, and a breach was nearly effected in Trinidad. The Spanish garrisons were also in a deplorable situation. In this state of things, it was considered necessary, on the 23rd, to withdraw the marines of the *Fame*, and that ship soon afterwards retired from the coast.

On the 24th or 25th the *Impérieuse* arrived in the bay, and joined the *Lucifer* and *Meteor* bomb-vessels. Lord Cochrane went himself to examine the state of Fort Trinidad; and, finding that the garrison, composed of 80 Spaniards, was on the point of surrendering, threw himself into the fort, with 50 seamen and 30 marines belonging to the *Impérieuse*. The resources of Lord Cochrane's active mind must, indeed, have astonished the Spaniards. Among other substitutes which he made use of, about 1000 bags, together with barrels and palisadoes, supplied the place of walls and ditches. So that the French, when on the 30th they assaulted the castle with 1000 picked men, were repulsed with the loss of their commanding officer, their storming equipage, and all who had attempted to mount the breach.

The whole of this daring and important service was effected without any loss to the British. On the 5th of December the citadel of Rosas capitulated; and, considering further resistance in Fort Trinidad impracticable against the whole French army, Lord Cochrane fired the trains for exploding the magazines, and re-embarked his men. As usual, he speaks in the highest terms of his officers; among whom he names Lieutenant Urry Johnson, Lieutenant of marines James Hore, William Burney, gunner,

William Lodwick, carpenter, and midshipmen Houston Stewart, George Charles Stovin, and Frederick Marryat.

Colonial Expeditions.—West Indies.

In the month of February the British 18-pounder 32-gun frigate *Cerberus*, Captain William Selby, 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Circe*, Captain Hugh Pigot, and 20-gun ship *Camilla*, Captain John Bowen, cruised off Point-à-Pitre, Guadeloupe. Finding the impossibility of preventing the French privateers and their prizes from gaining that port, while they were enabled to shelter themselves under the batteries of Marie-Galante until an opportunity offered for them to run over, Captain Selby resolved to attempt the surprise of Grand-Bourg, the principal town on the island.

Accordingly, on the 2nd of March, early in the morning, the three ships weighed from Petite-terre, and soon after daylight disembarked, with very slight opposition, 200 seamen and marines, under the orders of Captain Pigot, at a spot about two miles from the town. The British, as soon as they appeared in sight of Grand-Bourg, were met by an officer with a flag of truce. The unconditional surrender of Marie-Galante immediately followed, and Captain Selby garrisoned the island with a detachment of marines from his little squadron.

The ease with which Marie-Galante had been obtained determined Rear-admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, the British commander-in-chief at the Leeward islands, to send an expedition, under Captain Selby, against the island of Désirade, another spot that afforded shelter to the Guadeloupe privateers. Accordingly, on the 29th of March, the *Cerberus*, accompanied, this time, by two sloops, two gun-brigs, and a schooner, weighed from off Marie-Galante; and on the 30th the boats of the squadron, under the command of Captain William Henry Shirreff, of the ship-sloop *Lily*, stood towards the shore of Désirade, which was defended by two 8-pounders, that completely commanded the narrow entrance of the harbour: where also was posted a detachment of national troops and militia, about 70 men in number, and who opened a smart fire upon the boats as they approached.

Seeing this, the *Cerberus* and the vessels with her anchored with springs on their cables, and commenced a cannonade upon the shore. The islanders soon ceased their fire; and by 4 h. 30 m. p.m., the British were in quiet possession of Désirade. The

neutrality of the island being all that was required on the part of Sir Alexander Cochrane, Captain Selby did not retain possession: he merely destroyed the batteries (mounting but seven guns altogether), and, to prevent a garrison arriving from Guadaloupe, stationed a sloop and gun-brig off the coast.

On the 3rd of July, while the British 18-gun ship-sloop *Wanderer*, Captain Edward Crofton, and 4-gun schooners *Subtle* and *Ballahou*, Lieutenants George Augustus Spearing and George Mills, were cruising between the islands of Anguille and St. Martin, some intelligence was received which induced Captain Crofton to expect that he should succeed in an attack upon the French part of the last-named island. For this purpose, soon after midnight, the boats of the ship and two schooners, containing 135 men placed under the orders of Lieutenant Spearing, pulled towards the shore.

With a trifling loss, the British landed and obtained possession of, and spiked, the six guns mounted upon the lower fort. On ascending the rocky heights, covered with the prickly pear, to storm the upper battery, a number of brave fellows fell, and among them Lieutenant Spearing himself, who was shot through the chest within ten yards of the ramparts of the fort he was rushing forward to assault. The remainder of the party now reluctantly retreated to the boats; but, unable to resist the overwhelming force that assailed them, the survivors were obliged to surrender.

The *Wanderer*, who with the two schooners had been firing at the batteries, to cover the party on shore, now ceased her fire and hoisted a flag of truce. By a communication with the French commandant it was soon ascertained, that the regular force on the island amounted to 900 men, and that the detachment from the little squadron had lost seven officers and men killed, and nearly 30 wounded. The French commandant behaved in a very honourable manner; not only giving to the remains of the gallant young English officer a funeral with military honours, but himself attending his late enemy to the grave, and permitting a part of the *Subtle's* crew to pay their last duty to their late commander. The three British vessels, in the meanwhile, as with their colours at half-mast they lay at anchor in Marigot bay, united with the French batteries in firing minute guns.

BRITISH AND FRENCH FLEETS.

THE abstract which now comes under notice is so far remarkable, that several of its principal totals have arrived at their maximum of height.¹ The number of cruising line-of-battle ships in commission remains the same as in the preceding abstract; but an increase of one in the "Ordinary" column makes 127 as the sea-service total. The increase of five in the line grand-total is of far less consequence.

The number of cruisers, line and under-line, in commission, appears to have been 684; and the numbers that approach the nearest to it are to be found in the abstracts on each side, No. 16 showing 618, and No. 18, 664. The total of sea-service cruisers belonging to the British navy, at the commencement of the year 1809, stands at 728; and the two next highest numbers appear also in abstracts Nos. 16 and 18, one being 673, the other 699. As the difference between the grand and the minor totals at the foot of the columns is made up entirely of vessels that are unseaworthy, or deemed to be so, it will be unnecessary to dwell upon the excess of the grand-total of cruisers in this abstract, over the corresponding total in any other.

The general grand-total, of which the cruising and only effective total forms, in the present abstract, scarcely two-thirds, and in some of the others much less, might also be passed over without notice, were it not, in addition to being the highest in amount that occurs throughout the series, the only total usually referred to as indicative of the strength of the British navy. The total that Steel gives, in his February list for the present year, is 1140, including 59 hired vessels. These deducted, leave 1081, 20 more than the abstract total; a difference discoverable,

¹ See Appendix, Annual Abstract, No. 17.

almost wholly, among the building ships, those in the abstract being 82, while Steel enumerates 100. Among the latter he includes 50 instead of 47 line-of-battle ships. The three surplus ships were the Akbar, Julius, and Orford; the first, ordered but countermanded; the two others, not ordered at all. As a further proof of his imperfect information, Steel names 14 only out of his remaining 50 under-line building ships. Nor does the list, as usual, notify the yards or places at which the unnamed vessels are constructing. The abstract for the present year shows the launching of the Caledonia, a ship of very large dimensions, and as a first-rate, of extraordinary qualifications. Some interesting particulars respecting her will be found in the Notes to Abstract No. 17, pp. 482, 483.

The 20 captured enemy's national vessels purchased into the service will be found among those in the foreign prize-lists of the year 1808;¹ as will the 34 vessels lost by the British navy during the same period, in the list appropriated to them.² The number of the latter still continues to be of serious amount; of which the wrecked cases, with all their attendant calamities, constitute full two-thirds.

The number of commissioned officers and masters belonging to the British navy at the commencement of the year 1809, was,

Admirals	46
Vice-admirals	59
Rear-admirals	71
„ superannuated	45
Post-captains	689
„ superannuated	32
Commanders, or sloop-captains	543
„ superannuated	49
Lieutenants	3036
Masters	491

And the number of seamen and marines voted for the service of the same year, was 130,000.³

We last year left in the road of Brest, waiting an opportunity to put to sea, a squadron of eight sail of the line and some frigates. The continued prevalence of westerly gales, during the latter part of January and the commencement of February, having driven Admiral Lord Gambier from his station off Ushant, afforded that opportunity; and accordingly, on the 21st of February, at daylight, Rear-admiral Willaumez weighed and put to sea with the following squadron:—

¹ See Appendix, Nos. 19 and 20.

² *Ibid.*, No. 21.

³ *Ibid.*, No. 22.

Gun-ship.

120	Océan . . .	{	Rear-admiral Jean-Bapt.-Philibert Willaumez.
		{	Captain Pierre-Nicolas Rolland.
80	{ Foudroyant . . .	{	Rear-admiral Antoine-Louis Gourdon.
		{	Captain Antoine Henri.
	{ Varsovie , ,		Jacques Bergeret.
	{ Tourville , ,		Charles-Nicolas Lacaille.
	{ Jean-Bart , ,		Charles Lebozec.
74	{ Tonnerre , ,		Nicolas Clément de la Roncière.
	{ Aquilon , ,		Jacques-Remy Maingon.
	{ Regulus , ,		Jean-Jacques-Etienne Lucas.

Gun-frigate.

40	{ Indienne , ,		Guillaume-Marcellin Proteau.
	{ Elbe , ,		Jacques-François Bellenger.

Brig-corvette Nisus; *schooner* (late British) Magpie.

At 9 A.M. the rearmost ship doubled the Vendrée rock, and the French squadron, in line of battle, stood for the Raz, with a fresh breeze at north-north-east. Just as the headmost ships had cleared the Raz passage, they were descried by the British 74-gun ship *Revenge*, Captain the Honourable Charles Paget. The latter immediately steered for the Glenans to give information to Captain John Poer Beresford; who, with the *Theseus* 74, and the *Triumph* and *Valiant*, of the same force, Captains Masterman Hardy and Alexander Robert Kerr, was blockading three sail of the line and three frigates in the road of Lorient. At 30 minutes past noon the *Revenge* lost sight of the French ships, but at 3 h. 15 m. P.M. again discovered them, and a minute or two afterwards exchanged numbers with the *Theseus*, in the south-west, off Isle Groix.

The instructions to M. Willaumez were to chase from off the port of Lorient the British blockading squadron, stated to be of four sail of the line besides frigates, in order that Commodore Troude, with his three sail of the line and five frigates, might join the former. If, however, the tide should happen not to suit at the moment that he appeared off the port, the rear-admiral was to proceed straight to Basque roads, and dispossess of that anchorage a British squadron, stated also to consist of four sail of the line. M. Willaumez was then to anchor in the road of Isle d'Aix, and there wait for further orders. So far the *Moniteur*. But those orders had already issued. Adding to his 11 sail of the line the Rochefort squadron of three, and the *Calcutta* armed en flûte and frigates, M. Willaumez was to make the best of his way to Martinique; and, with his fleet and the troops that were on board of it, he was to save that island from

falling into the hands of the British, who, by the last accounts, were on the eve of attacking it.

It was at about 4 h. 30 m. p.m. that the squadrons of Rear-admiral Willaumez and Commodore Beresford fully discovered each other. The latter was then steering about east-south-east, with a fresh breeze at north-north-east, and the former was nearly close hauled on the same tack. Rear-admiral Gourdon's division, consisting of four sail of the line, immediately bore up in chase, and the remaining division soon afterwards did the same. Whereupon the British squadron tacked, and steered west-north-west, formed in line of battle, the *Theseus* leading, followed by the *Revenge*, *Triumph*, and *Valiant*. A short continuance of the British squadron upon this course leaving open the port of Lorient, the French ships, by the time they had approached within four or five miles of the enemy, again hauled their wind. At 6 p.m., neither squadron then in sight of the other, the British ships tacked and shortened sail; and at about the same time the French squadron, which had been partly delayed by the falling of the breeze, arrived off *Isle Groix*.

A calm during the night kept both squadrons stationary; but at daylight on the 23rd a fresh breeze from the north-west enabled M. Willaumez, after sending in the *Magpie* schooner to apprise Commodore Troude of his arrival off the port, to steer for the *Pertuis d'Antioche*. At about 9 a.m. the two squadrons regained a view of each other, and continued in sight until late in the afternoon. The French ships then, passing inside of *Belle-Isle*, steered for *Isle d'Yeu*, with the wind back to north-east; and at 10 h. 30 m. p.m., just as they had arrived abreast of the *Tour de Baleine*, were discovered by the 36-gun frigate *Amethyst*, Captain Michael Seymour, the look-out ship of Rear-admiral Stopford's squadron, at anchor to the north-west of the *Chasseron* lighthouse, consisting of the 80-gun ship *Cæsar*, Captain Charles Richardson, and 74-gun ships *Defiance*, Captain Henry Hotham, and *Donegal*, Captain Peter Heywood, acting for Captain Pulteney Malcolm, who was in England attending a court-martial. A flight of rockets soon conveyed the information to the rear-admiral, and the British squadron got under way and stood to the north-west, the direction in which the *Amethyst* lay. At about midnight the British rear-admiral gained a sight of M. Willaumez's squadron to the eastward, standing into the *Pertuis d'Antioche*. The former went in chase, and at daylight on the 24th saw the French in the act of entering *Basque roads*. Rear-admiral Stopford, rightly considering

that the squadron had escaped from Brest, despatched by signal the 38-gun frigate *Naiad*, Captain Thomas Dundas, to acquaint Lord Gambier with the circumstance. At 7 A.M. the *Naiad*, having run a few miles to the north-west, made the signal of three suspicious sail coming down from the northward; whereupon, leaving the *Amethyst*, in company with the 36-gun frigate *Emerald*, Captain Frederick Lewis Maitland, to watch the squadron of M. Willaumez, Rear-admiral Stopford wore and made sail in the direction pointed out by the *Naiad*.

Shortly after Rear-admiral Willaumez had sailed from Isle Groix, the three French 40-gun frigates *Italienne*, Commodore Pierre-Roch Jurien, and *Calypso* and *Cybèle*, Captains Louis-Léon Jacob and Raymond Cocault, sailed from Lorient with the wind at about east-north-east. Finding, on clearing the road, that Commodore Troude, owing to the state of the tide, had not a sufficient depth of water to enable him to get under way, Captain Jurien stood to sea, and in the evening, when off Belle-Isle, steering along the coast to the south-east, descried in the offing the squadron of Commodore Beresford. On the 24th, at daylight, the *Tour de Baleine* made its appearance; and the British 38-gun frigate *Amelia*, Captain the Honourable Frederick Paul Irby; accompanied by the 18-gun brig-sloop *Dotterel*, Captain Anthony Abdy, both of whom had been in chase during the whole of the night, now approached so near to the *Cybèle*, the rearmost French frigate, that her two consorts hauled up for her support. It was about this time that Captain Jurien observed the squadron of Rear-admiral Stopford, approaching from the south-east. Being thus completely cut off, the French commodore, with the wind now at about south-east by east, steered for the *Sable d'Olonne*, and was followed closely by the *Amelia* and *Dotterel*. At 9 A.M. the two latter tacked to the north-east, as the three French frigates had previously done; and in ten minutes more the *Amelia*, having wore round, hauled under the stern of the *Cybèle*, and opened a fire in passing. At 10 A.M. the *Amelia* tacked and steered after the enemy, in company with the *Cæsar*, *Defiance*, and *Donegal*, who had just joined.

In a minute or two afterwards the three French frigates came to anchor in line of battle, with springs, close under the powerful batteries of the town of *Sable d'Olonne*. At 10 h. 30 m. A.M. the British ships stood towards the former in the following order:—*Defiance*, *Cæsar*, *Donegal*, *Amelia*. At 11 A.M. the *Defiance*, as drawing less water than either of the other line-of

battle ships, anchored in seven fathoms water, within about 600 yards of the three French frigates, and opened her fire, receiving in return the fire of the latter, as well as of the batteries on shore. In about 20 minutes after the *Defiance* had commenced firing, the *Cæsar* and *Donegal* opened their broadsides, and in another ten minutes the *Amelia* joined in the cannonade; the batteries, all the while, keeping up a heavy fire at the British.

At 11 h. 50 m. A.M., unable to withstand the fire of their opponents, particularly of the *Defiance*, some of whose wads had set them partially in flames, the *Italienne* and *Cybèle* cut their cables and ran on shore. Immediately the *Defiance* veered her cable, that her guns might again bear upon her opponents; and while the *Cæsar* to get into deeper water had wore to the southwest, the *Defiance*, *Donegal*, and *Amelia*, continued the engagement for a few minutes longer, until the weathermost French frigate, the *Calypso*, that she might not mask the fire of the *Italienne*, and feeling sensibly the effects of that of the *Defiance*, veered her cable, and soon drove on shore stern foremost. The ebb-tide making, and the water falling fast, the rear-admiral, at noon, signalled his ships to stand out. At about 15 minutes past noon the *Defiance* cut her cable and made sail towards the *Cæsar*, then, with the *Donegal* and *Amelia*, nearly two miles to the southward. The three latter ships soon afterwards tacked: and the *Donegal*, while in stays, fired a broadside at the enemy. After this, the British squadron stood off-shore and the action ceased.

The *Cæsar* had her bowsprit wounded, her fore spring-stay shot away, and her rigging a good deal cut, but had not a man hurt. The *Donegal* suffered also in her rigging and sails, and had one man killed and six wounded. The *Defiance*, who bore the brunt of the action, had all her masts badly wounded, her rigging cut to pieces, and two men killed and 25 wounded. Of the French frigates, the *Italienne* had six men killed and 17 wounded, the *Calypso*, 10 killed and 18 wounded, and the *Cybèle*, eight killed and 16 wounded; total, 24 killed and 51 wounded; and all three frigates had their hulls much shattered. The loss, if any, that was sustained on shore, does not appear in the French accounts. The three French frigates, having taken the ground nearly at the top of high water, could not be got off, and were consequently wrecked; but the crews, and probably the stores, were saved.

At sunset Rear-admiral Stopford returned to his station off

the Chasseron lighthouse, and observed the squadron of M. Willaumez at anchor in Basque roads. On the next day, the 25th, Captain Beresford and his three ships joining company, the rear-admiral, with his force thus augmented to seven sail of the line and five frigates, resumed the blockade of the port; in which now lay, in two divisions, a fleet of 10 sail of the line, four frigates, and a 50-gun ship, the *Calcutta*, armed en flûte. On the 26th the Brest squadron weighed and stood for the road of Isle d'Aix. While proceeding thither, the *Jean-Bart* grounded on the Palles shoal near Isle Madame; and, although an attempt was made to force her off by a press of sail, the ship became wrecked. The remaining ships of the Brest squadron anchored between the southern extremity of Isle d'Aix and the Boyart shoal, in company with the following squadron:—

Gun-ship.

74	{	Cassard	Commodore Gilbert-Amable Faure.
		Jemmappes	,, Joseph Fauveau.
		Patriote	,, Jean-Michel Mahe.
50		<i>Calcutta</i> (flûte)	,, Jean-Baptiste Lafon.

Gun-frigate.

40	{	Pallas	,, Amand-François Le Bigot.
		Hortense	,, Emanuel Halgan.

With his nine French line-of-battle ships, M. Willaumez was blockaded by Rear-admiral Stopford, with eight British (the *Hero* having joined him), until the 7th of March, when the latter was relieved by Admiral Lord Gambier; who had received the first intelligence of the escape of the Brest squadron on the 23rd of February, while, with nine sail of the line, on his way to resume the blockade of that port. The admiral then detached Vice-admiral Duckworth, with eight ships, in quest of the French squadron, and returned to Cawsand bay with the *Caledonia*. In his way thither Lord Gambier fell in with the *Naiad*, bearing the intelligence of the arrival of the French squadron in Basque roads; and on the 3rd of March, with five ships of the line, sailed for that station.

On joining Rear-admiral Stopford, his lordship's force became increased to 13 sail of the line; but, the *Defiance* and *Triumph* shortly afterwards parting company, the following 11 sail only remained:—

Gun-ship.

120	{	<i>Caledonia</i>	Admiral (b.) Lord James Gambier.
			Captain Sir Harry Neale, Bart.
			,, William Bedford.

Gun-ship.

80	{ Cæsar	{ Rear-admiral (b.) Hon. Robert Stopford.
	{ Gibraltar	{ Captain Charles Richardson.
	{ Hero	{ Henry Lidgbird Ball.
	{ Donegal	{ James Newman Newman.
	{ Resolution	{ Pulteney Malcolm.
	{ Theseus	{ George Burlton.
74	{ Valiant	{ John Poer Beresford.
	{ Illustrious	{ John Bligh.
	{ Bellona	{ William Robert Broughton.
	{ Revenge	{ Stair Douglas.
		{ Alexander Robert Kerr.

On the 17th of March Lord Gambier anchored his fleet in Basque roads, stationing his frigates and smaller vessels about a mile in advance, either towards Isle d'Aix or the town of Rochelle, according to the direction of the wind. As an additional guard against any attempt upon the fleet by fire-vessels, the ships were to be in constant readiness for action, and for slipping their cables, leaving buoys upon them. Two boats from each ship of the line, with fire-grapnels, were also to be sent every night after sunset on board the advanced frigates, to be ready to tow off the French fire-vessels the instant they approached. Although neither M. Willaumez, nor M. Allemand his successor, had, as far as we can learn, any idea of resorting to such a mode of attack against the British fleet, Lord Gambier, nearly a week before he began his defensive preparations, had himself suggested to the British admiralty the employment of fire-ships against the French fleet. His lordship's letter to Lord Mulgrave is dated on the 11th of March, and the following is the paragraph on the subject: "The enemy's ship lay very much exposed to the operation of fire-ships; it is a horrible mode of warfare, and the attempt very hazardous, if not desperate; but we should have plenty of volunteers for the service."¹

The admiralty, however, had anticipated Lord Gambier's wishes; for, on the 7th of March, the board ordered a number of fire-ships to be prepared, guided, no doubt, by a report delivered in by Captain Richard Goodwin Keats; who, in the month of April, 1807, when the *Majestueux* and four two-deckers were lying at anchor in the road of Isle d'Aix, had suggested to the admiralty the probable success of "an attack of bombs, fire-ships, and rockets, covered and protected by a squadron;" and which squadron, adds this able and distinguished

¹ Minutes of a court-martial on the Right Honourable James Lord Gambier *Admiral of the Blue, &c.*, p. 114.

officer, should be kept "as close to Isle d'Aix with easterly, and to the Boyart with westerly winds, as possible, in order that it may be in constant readiness to act decisively, should an opportunity present itself." Thus resolved, the board of admiralty, on the 19th, by their secretary inform Lord Gambier, that 12 transports are fitting as fire-ships; that Mr. Congreve is to proceed in a transport, with a supply of rockets and of men skilled in the management of them; and that five bomb-vessels are under orders to fit for sea with all possible expedition and proceed to Basque roads. The letter of directions then proceeds thus: "All these preparations are making with a view to enable your lordship to make an attack on the French fleet at their anchorage off Isle d'Aix, if practicable; and I am further commanded to signify their lordships' direction to you, to take into your consideration the possibility of making an attack upon the enemy, either conjointly with your line-of-battle ships, frigates, and small-craft, fire-ships, bombs, and rockets, or separately by any of the above-named means."

On the same day on which these orders were written, arrived at the admiralty Lord Gambier's letter of the 11th, suggesting the use of fire-ships; and on the same day also arrived at Plymouth, from the Mediterranean, the 38-gun frigate *Impérieuse*, Captain Lord Cochrane. About an hour after the frigate had dropped anchor, her captain, by a telegraphic communication from the admiralty, was ordered to attend the board, it being known to their lordships, by the records in their office, that Lord Cochrane was well acquainted with that part of the French coast in which the operations were to be carried on.

On the 21st, having arrived by express from Plymouth, Lord Cochrane waited upon Lord Mulgrave, who confidentially conferred with him on the means of destroying the French fleet at their anchorage under Isle d'Aix. Lord Cochrane was decidedly of opinion that the attempt by fire-ships would succeed. The first lord of the admiralty then asked Lord Cochrane if he would undertake to execute the plan which they had so discussed. "This, in the first instance, Lord Cochrane declined, offering, as a reason, the jealousy which such an appointment might excite in the breasts of his brother-officers serving on that station. But, at a subsequent interview, the first lord of the admiralty having stated to Lord Cochrane, that he was the only officer with whom he had communicated who deemed the enterprise of easy execution and little risk, and having renewed his offer of command, Lord Cochrane acquiesced, conceiving

that Lord Mulgrave might have considered a final refusal as originating in motives not creditable to an officer, who had expressed so decided an opinion of the practicability of the undertaking." On the 25th the board of admiralty addressed a letter to the British admiral in Basque roads, acquainting him that they had thought fit to select Lord Cochrane, for the purpose of conducting, under his, Lord Gambier's, directions, the fire-ships to be employed in the projected attack on the enemy's fleet. This letter was delivered to Lord Cochrane; and, as soon as that active officer could reach Plymouth, the *Impérieuse* sailed upon her destination.

On the 26th Lord Gambier received the board's letter of the 19th, directing him to endeavour to destroy the enemy's fleet in the manner described. On the same day his lordship wrote two letters in reply. In the first Lord Gambier admits that the French fleet lay exposed to an attack by fire-vessels; but, in the second, his lordship says: "The enemy's ships are anchored in two lines, very near to each other, in a direction due S. from the fort on the Isle d'Aix; and the ships in each line not farther apart than their own length; by which it appears, as I imagine, that the space for their anchorage is so confined by the shoalness of the water, as not to admit of ships to run in and anchor clear of each other. The most distant ships of their two lines are within point-blank shot of the works upon the Isle d'Aix: such ships, therefore, as might attack the enemy would be exposed to be raked by the hot shot, &c., from the island; and, should the ships be disabled in their masts, they must remain within the range of the enemy's fire until destroyed, there not being sufficient depth of water to allow them to move to the southward out of distance." The admiral concludes his letter thus: "I beg leave to add, that, if their lordships are of opinion that an attack on the enemy's ships by those of the fleet under my command is practicable, I am ready to obey any orders they may be pleased to honour me with, however great the risk may be of the loss of men and ships."¹ It is clear from the tenour of this letter, that Lord Gambier was averse to the plan of attack by the line-of-battle ships, conceiving it impracticable, both on account of the strength of the batteries on Isle d'Aix protecting the French anchorage, and of the supposed shallowness of the water within, or a little beyond, point-blank range of them to the southward. Hence, as the mode of destroying the French fleet in the Isle d'Aix was left discretionary with

¹ Minutes, &c., p. 120.

Lord Gambier, he chose that mode which he had himself suggested, the attack by fire-ships.

It being discovered from the anchorage of Lord Gambier in Basque roads, that the French were endeavouring to strengthen their position in Aix road by throwing up works on the south end of the Boyart shoal, the 38-gun frigate *Amelia*, Captain the Hon. Frederick Paul Irby, was directed to dislodge them. Accordingly, on the 1st of April, at 9 A.M., the frigate got under way and stood for the spot: and at 10 h. 15 m. A.M., wearing round, fired a broadside and drove the French away. The *Amelia* then sent her boats and completely destroyed the works. In a day or two afterwards Captain Irby was detached to another part of the French coast.

On the 3rd Lord Cochrane, in the *Impérieuse*, arrived in Basque roads, and delivered to Lord Gambier the board's letter to the admiral. Twelve of the fire-ships to be employed were at this time lying in the Downs waiting for a fair wind; and six transports, to be fitted as fire-ships by the fleet, had been ordered to sail from Plymouth. The board of ordnance had also been directed to send from Woolwich a ship laden with combustible matter, including a quantity of Valenciennes composition, also 1000 carcasses of an 18-pound caliber. The Plymouth transports not being likely to join for some days, Lord Gambier ordered eight of the largest transports of the 30 sail then in company, to be fitted as fire-ships in their stead; and it happened very opportunely that three French *chasse-marées*, laden with tar and rosin, had recently been captured by the fleet.

With this supply of combustibles, and with such other materials as the fleet could furnish, the eight transports, and also, at the suggestion of Lord Cochrane, the *Mediator*, frigate-storeship, were fitted as fire-ships; the latter by her own officers and crew, and the former by the officers and crews of the line-of-battle ships. Three explosion-vessels were also equipped, under the immediate inspection of Lord Cochrane. On the 6th the *Ætna* bomb-vessel anchored in the road, and on the 10th the 12 fire-ships from the Downs, escorted by the *Beagle* and *Redpole* sloops; who had also under their charge the *Cleveland* transport, laden with Congreve rockets, the ingenious inventor of which had previously arrived in the *Ætna*. Having already given a list of the line-of-battle ships, we here present a list of the frigates and smaller vessels, employed on this expedition.

Gun-frigate.

44	Indefatigable . . .	Captain John Tremayne Rodd.
38	Impérieuse . . .	„ Lord Cochrane.
36	{ Aigle . . .	„ George Wolfe.
	{ Emerald . . .	„ Frederick Lewis Maitland
32	{ Unicorn . . .	„ Lucius Hardyman.
	{ Pallas . . .	„ George Francis Seymour.
	{ Mediator (flûte) . . .	„ James Wooldridge.

Gun-brig-sloop.

18	{ Beagle . . .	„ Francis Newcombe.
	{ Doterel . . .	„ Anthony Abdy.
	{ Foxhound . . .	„ Pitt Barnaby Greene.
10	{ Lyra . . .	„ William Bevians.
	{ Redpole . . .	„ John Joyce.
Bl.	{ Thunder . . .	„ James Caulfield.
	{ Ætna . . .	„ William Godfrey.

Gun-brig.


14	Insolent . . .	Lieutenant John Row Morris.
12	{ Encounter . . .	„ James Hugh Talbot.
	{ Conflict . . .	„ Joseph B. Batt.
12	{ Contest . . .	„ John Gregory.
	{ Fervent . . .	„ John Edward Hare.
	{ Growler . . .	„ Richard Crossman.

Schooner, Whiting; *hired cutters*, Nimrod and King George.

Some attention is now due to the party against whom all these formidable preparations are making. Among the officers of the Brest squadron, who disapproved of the forbearance of Rear-admiral Willaumez to attack the four 74s under the command of Commodore Beresford, was Captain Jacques Bergeret, already so well known to us. What ship of the squadron that officer commanded we are unable to state, as he afterwards quitted her for Paris, and the captain's names assigned to the ships in the list given at a preceding page are as they stood subsequently to the appointment of Captain Bergeret's successor.

A letter from the last-named officer to the minister of marine occasioned Rear-admiral Willaumez to be recalled. On the 16th the latter struck his flag on board the *Océan*, and went on shore, and on the morning of the 17th Vice-admiral Allemand hoisted his flag on board the same ship. Rear-admiral Gourdon remained as second in command; but two or three of the captains, including M. Bergeret, were superseded by others, leaving the whole as they stand in the list already referred to.

When M. Allemand joined the fleet, he found it moored in three lines at the entrance of the passage, and too far out. He ordered the ships to weigh, and dropping lower down, anchored

them in a double indented line “*ligne endentée*;” which may be explained by considering each point in the following figure as a ship with her broadside bearing against it:  the two parallel lines of ships bore about north-north-east and south-south-west; and the ship's heads were to the northward. The van-ship of the outer line bore due south of the battery at the southern extremity of Isle d'Aix, and was distant from it about 640 yards. The two lines were about 250 yards apart, and the ships of each line from the stern of one to the head of the other full 170 yards; thus making the distance from the stern of the rearmost ship in the outer line to the fort (reckoning each ship's length upon an average at 70 yards) 1520 yards, or nearly seven-eighths of a statute mile. Each ship was moored with one cable to the north-west and another to the south-east. At about 740 yards in front of the outer line lay the three frigates Pallas, Hortense, and Indienne. The fourth frigate, the Elbe, was moored as the headmost ship in the second or inner line. The method here taken will show, without the aid of a diagram, how the different ships were stationed:—

Indienne.	Hortense.	Pallas.	
Foudroyant.	Varsovie.	Océan.	Regulus.
		Cassard.	Calcutta.
Tonnerre.	Patriote.	Jemmappes.	Aquila.
		Tourville.	Elbe.

At the distance of about 110 yards in front of the line of frigates, a boom, half a mile in length, and composed of cables secured by anchors and floated by buoys, was thrown across the channel leading from Basque to Aix road, having its northern end within rather less than 1000 yards of the rocks that lie off the south-western extremity of the island. The anchors employed in mooring the boom were of the enormous weight of $5\frac{1}{4}$ tons English, and the cables $31\frac{1}{2}$ English inches in diameter. For the information of such as are unacquainted with the subject it may be useful to add that the bower-anchor of the Caledonia, the largest ship in the British navy, weighs $4\frac{3}{4}$ tons, and that her bower-cable measures in diameter, or did measure before iron ones were adopted, 25 inches. For anything that

appears in the accounts, the existence of this formidable boom was not known to the British until after the attack which we are about to relate had commenced.

The strength of the batteries that protected the anchorage has been variously stated at from 13 to 50 guns. It is probable that the number of guns did not exceed 30; but the greater part of these were long 36-pounders; and there were also several mortars of the largest description in use. The island was garrisoned with 2000 troops; but they were all conscripts and not to be relied upon. Nor was Isle d'Aix strong in any other part than that which protected the fleet. On its north-east side, or the side which fronts the bay of Rochelle, there were only a few guns mounted, and those in bad condition and at a great distance apart. Exclusive of the batteries on Isle d'Aix, the isle of Oleron, distant three miles and a half to the west-south-west of the citadel of Aix, contained three or four gun and mortar batteries, one of which, named Saumonard, could throw its shot and shells nearly within the range of the former. Besides these artificial defences, the road of Isle d'Aix had a shoal at a short distance in its rear, and another, at a somewhat greater distance, stretching along its southern extremity. The latter was named Palles, and was in several parts hard and rocky. The former was a bank or bar of mud, thrown up at the mouth of the river Charente.

The arrival of the 12 fire-ships, on the afternoon of the 10th, leaving no doubt in the mind of M. Allemand as to the nature of the attack in contemplation, he directed the armed launches and boats of the fleet, 73 in number, to be assembled in five divisions, in order to be ready, at the close of day, to take their stations near the boom, for the purpose of boarding and towing away the fire-ships, and of engaging any British boats that might be sent down to assist the latter in their operations. Some very excellent regulations were drawn up for the guidance of these boats, as appears by a copy of them which afterwards fell into the hands of the British. The French admiral also ordered the ships of each line to strike their topmasts and get their topgallantmasts on deck, and to unbend all useless sails: the advanced frigates, however, were to keep their topmasts an-end, and to be in readiness to get under way the instant the signal to that effect should be made. The line-of-battle ships were also directed to be prepared to land the few troops they had on board, in case any attempt should be made by the British to possess themselves of Isle d'Aix.

On the 11th, early in the afternoon, the British admiral having completed his arrangements, the different frigates and smaller vessels moved to the stations assigned them. The *Impérieuse* ran down towards the inner end of the Boyart, and came to, in nine fathoms, close to the shoal; having the north point of Isle d'Aix bearing east, the south point, south-east by east, and the centre of the French fleet south-east by south; the latter at the distance of about two and a half miles. The bearing of the *Impérieuse*, as taken from the French frigate *Indienne*, was nearly north-west, distant about a gun-shot and a half from the boom. The *Aigle*, *Unicorn*, and *Pallas* anchored a short distant above, or to the north-west of the *Impérieuse*; in order to receive the crews of the fire-ships on their return, to support the boats of the fleet which were to accompany the fire-ships, and to render assistance, if required, to the *Impérieuse* herself. The Whiting schooner, Lieutenant Henry Wildey, and the King George and Nimrod cutters, master's mates Thomas Mekeek and Edward Tapley, which had been fitted for throwing rockets, also took their stations near the Boyart shoal. The *Ætna*, the only bomb-vessel present, although four others (*Fury*, *Hound*, *Thunder*, and *Vesuvius*) had been promised, and eight would not have been one too many, placed herself to the north-west of Isle d'Aix, as near to the fort as possible in that direction, and was covered by the *Indefatigable* and *Foxhound*. The *Emerald*, *Beagle*, *Dotterel*, *Conflict*, and *Growler* were stationed, to make a diversion, at the east end of the island; and the *Redpole* and *Lyra*, with lights hoisted, and properly screened from the enemy's view, were stationed, the one near the shoal to the north-west of Isle d'Aix, the other close to the Boyart shoal, in order to guide the fire-ships in their course to the attack. Each of these brigs was distant rather less than two miles from the extremity of the French line on her side.

The 11 British line-of-battle ships, which lay at a distance of from eight to nine miles from the French fleet, also unmoored, to be ready to co-operate, if necessary; but, having unavoidably anchored in a strong tide-way, and the wind blowing hard from the north-west, the ships were again moored when the weather-tide made, in order to prevent them from falling on board of each other. Mr. Edward Fairfax, the master of the *Caledonia*, considered the distance of that ship and those around her from the enemy's anchorage to be only six miles: but, when the French telegraphed from the citadel on Isle d'Aix, as they did every morning, they stated the distance at three leagues.

The wind, although in its direction as favourable as it could blow for the progress of the fire-ships, the whole of which had dropped to an anchorage about a mile nearer than the British fleet, was too violent to admit one part of the plan to be carried into effect—that of chaining the vessels together in divisions of four. Each fire-ship, therefore, was left to act an independent part; and at about 8 h. 30 m. P.M., the night uncommonly dark, the wind even fresher than it had been, and the tide flowing at the rate of more than two knots an hour, the Mediator, and the other fire-ships that had anchored around her, cut their cables and made sail. Of the three explosion-vessels, one was swept from the stern of the *Impérieuse* by one of the too early abandoned fire-ships; and, although the crew of the explosion-vessel were on board ready to proceed, and did afterwards set fire to the fusee, the fusee appears to have failed. In the meanwhile the remaining two, one of which was conducted by Lord Cochrane, assisted by Lieutenant William Bissell and four seamen, proceeded towards the road of Isle d'Aix. These two explosion-vessels appear to have been ignited when within less than three-quarters of a mile from the French line: how near to it they exploded, and what effect the blast produced, the French themselves are the most competent to state. The effect that such machines were calculated to produce may be conceived from the manner in which they were prepared. Lord Cochrane's vessel alone contained about 1500 barrels of gunpowder, started into puncheons placed end-upward, fastened to each other by cables wound round them, and jammed together with wedges, having moistened sand rammed down between them, so as to render the whole, from stem to stern, quite solid, and thereby increase the resistance; besides which, on the top of this mass of gunpowder, lay between 300 and 400 shells charged with fusees, and nearly as many thousands of hand-grenades.

Several of the fire-ships were ignited and abandoned long before they got abreast of even the northernmost of the two vessels stationed as guides. Others, again, were admirably conducted; especially the Mediator, the largest and most efficient of all of them. This ship, from her great weight, and the strength of the wind and tide, which had by this time increased to nearly four knots, broke the boom, and thus afforded a clear passage to the remainder of the fire-ships. So resolved was the Mediator's gallant commander to see the service he had engaged in properly executed, that himself and the officers and men who had volunteered to accompany him nearly perished

with their vessel; one officer, the gunner (James Segges), was killed, and Captain Wooldridge, Lieutenants Nicholas Brent Clements and James Pearl, and one seaman, were blown out of the ship; the three latter slightly, but the captain very severely, scorched. The loss sustained on board the other fire-ships appears to have been, two seamen killed, belonging to the *Cæsar*, by the bursting of an explosion-vessel near the fire-ship, and an acting-lieutenant (William Flintoft) and one seaman, who died from fatigue in the boat, one master's mate (Richard Francis Jewers) of the *Theseus*, and another (John Conyers) of the *Gibraltar*, both scorched by powder.

The five or six officers in command of fire-ships, who, besides Captain Woollcombe, had the judgment and presence of mind to wait till the proper time before they set fire to the trains of their vessels, and among whom we can name Captains Newcome of the *Beaver*, and Joyce of the *Lyra*, and Lieutenant John Cookesley of *Gibraltar*, were exposed to imminent danger in their endeavours to regain the advanced frigates. They had to pull against a strong tide and rough sea, which nearly swamped many of the boats; and they were also endangered by flights of rockets, many of the latter, from having been placed in the rigging of the fire-ships, taking a direction quite different from that intended.

The boats of the fleet, under the direction of Rear-admiral Stopford, had been ordered to support the fire-ships, and were assembled accordingly alongside of the *Cæsar*; but, judging from the boisterous state of the weather that their services would not be required, the rear-admiral did not proceed with them. He was so far correct that, although the fourth and fifth divisions of the French boats had been ordered to the boom, there to wait until 2 A.M., nearly the whole of them, owing to the strength of the wind and tide, were obliged to put back. Dark as was the night, the sky soon became illuminated by the glare of so many vast fires; and, what with the flashes of the guns from the forts and retreating ships, the flight of shells and rockets from the fire-vessels, and the reflection of the rays of light from the bright sides of the French ships in the background, a scene was formed peculiarly awful and sublime. But such was the strength of the wind at the commencement of the attack, that, in the British fleet, not even the explosions, loud as they were, could be heard. One of their early effects, however, was to lull the breeze considerably. What other effects the fire and explosion-vessels produced we shall proceed

to relate, as well as we can collect the facts from the published and other accounts.

At 9 h. 30 m. P.M., according to the time kept by the *Indienne*, a floating body at the boom, in the direction of her starboard cat-head, blew up with a tremendous explosion, but, although distant only 110 or 120 yards from the frigate, did not, as we are told, do her the slightest injury. The words of Captain Proteau in his journal are:—"J'étais dans cette position, à trois encablatures et demie de mon escadre, l'amiral dans mes eaux, lorsque nous distinguâmes à 9 heures et demie, sous notre bossoir de tribord, un corps flottant à l'estacade. L'explosion s'en fit tout-à-coup et vomit quantité de fusées artificielles, grenades, et obus, qui éclatèrent en l'air sans nous faire le moindre mal, cependant nous n'en étions qu'à une demie-encablature." What then becomes of the statement of Mr. Fairfax, the master of Lord Gambier's fleet, that the explosion-vessel blew up at "about a mile" from the enemy? What grounds had he for fearing that he should be blown up, instead of the enemy, when he admits that the *Lyra*, the vessel he was on board of, lay two cables' length to windward of the explosion-vessel, while the *Indienne*, who escaped unhurt, lay only half a cable to leeward of her?¹ In 10 minutes more, a second vessel exploded, also on the boom, and almost under the bowsprit of the *Indienne*. We may observe, in passing, that, although in point of absolute time the *Indienne* and *Impérieuse* differ by an hour and ten minutes, in relative time they agree exactly. The last explosion is described to have been more loud and appalling than the first, and to have covered the frigate with a shower of fire; and yet we are not informed of any injury she sustained. It is therefore true, as Lord Gambier has stated, that "the blast of the explosion-vessels, under Lord Cochrane's immediate direction, did not take place by any means so near to the enemy's ships as his lordship had projected."² But it was not because the fuses had been fired too early, as stated by Lord Gambier's witnesses, nor because the fuses had burnt too rapidly, as generally understood, but because the boom had interposed to stop the progress of the vessels. When the *Indienne's* officer on the fore-castle discovered the floating body, it was already at, not advancing towards, the boom. Had this boom been away, another half minute would have carried the vessel amidst the line of frigates; and then, what would have been the effect of the blast; that blast followed in 10 minutes by a second, which

¹ See *Minutes, &c.*, pp. 177, 178.

² *Ibid.*, p. 131.

was even greater and more terrific than the first? At 9 h. 45 m. P.M., the *Mediator* broke through the boom, and, as well as the ships with her, was instantly fired at by the French ships, the shot of the line-of-battle ships passing between the masts of, and no doubt injuring, the frigates in advance. The latter presently cut their cables. The *Hortense*, making sail, passed to windward of many of the fire-ships, and discharged several broadsides into them. This frigate and her two consorts then retreated to the rear of the line-of-battle ships. Of these, the first boarded by a fire-vessel was the *Régulus*, with whom a large brig, in full combustion, is represented to have been grappled for a quarter of an hour; and yet the French 74 escaped, as far as it appears, without any material injury, except some slight damage occasioned by running foul of the *Tourville*. The *Océan* was also grappled by a fire-ship; the particulars of which we will give in the words of one of her own officers, as extracted from the translated copies of several intercepted letters, with a sight of which we have been favoured. "A frigate fire-ship was directing her course towards the *Océan*. We veered out several fathoms of our north-west cable, but the vessel was still nearing us. The *Régulus* had just cut her cables, and was endeavouring to get clear of a vessel which threatened to burn her. This movement of the *Régulus* obliged us to cut our north-west cable. We set the mizentopsail to the mast to assist the ship; but, as soon as we brought up by our south-east anchor, three fire-vessels made towards us. What was to be done? We were obliged to cut this cable also, hoist the foretopmast-staysail, loose the foresail, and steer so as to avoid the *Palles*, the bank of rocks on which the *Jean-Bart* was lost. At 10 we grounded; and immediately afterwards a fire-ship, in the height of her combustion, grappled us athwart our stern. For ten minutes that she remained in this situation, we employed every means in our power to prevent the fire from catching our ship. Our engines played upon and completely wetted the poop: with spars we hove off the fire-ship, and with axes we cut the lashings of her grappnels fastened to the end of her yards; but the *chevaux-de-frise* on her sides held her firmly to us. In this deplorable situation we thought we must be burnt, as the flames from the fire-ship covered the whole of our poop. Two of our line-of-battle ships, the *Tonnerre* and *Patriote*, at this time fell on board of us. The first broke her bowsprit in our starboard main rigging, and destroyed our main channels. Providence now aided us. Just as the fire-ship

athwart our stern began to drive forward along our starboard side, the *Tonnerre* separated herself from us. Unless this had happened, the fire-ship would have fallen into the angle formed by the two ships, and would infallibly have burnt them. The fire-vessel having drifted as far forward as to be under our bowsprit, we held her there some time, in order to afford time to the *Tonnerre* and *Patriote* to get out of her reach. While this fire-vessel was on board of us we let the cocks run in order to drown the magazine, but the flow of water was too slow for the purpose. We lost 50 men at least, through their zealous exertions to disengage the fire-ships: they fell into the sea and were drowned; but our boats saved a number of others. A short time after we had so fortunately escaped being burnt, another fire-vessel was making for our starboard quarter: we fired our broadside and cut away her mainmast. This fortunately occasioned her to wear, and she passed close alongside of us. All the remainder of the night we were surrounded by vessels on fire. Our guns were constantly firing, even on English boats towing some of the fire-vessels. The one that grappled us on the poop was towed by a boat, manned with 15 or 16 men: we fired on her and obliged her to let go the tow. In this disastrous night the *Cassard* had five men killed and 15 mortally wounded by a shot from one of the fire-ships."

In the narrow escape of the French admiral's ship, as here faithfully depicted by one who was on board of her, we may form a tolerable idea of what must have been the situation of several of the others. Such, in fact, was the terror naturally inspired by the fleet of flaming bodies approaching, that every French ship, except the *Foudroyant*, cut or slipped her cables and went adrift. The *Cassard*, however, brought up again in the road, at the distance of about 500 yards ahead of the *Foudroyant*, who had, we believe, cut her north-west cable, and was now riding by her south-east one. By midnight the whole of the remaining 13 French ships were aground; and the following were their situations at daylight on the 12th, as described by the French themselves:—

The *Océan* lay in the mud at the distance of a full half mile to the east-south-east of the anchorage in Aix road. Having on board, in common with the other ships, a quantity of provisions for the supply of the colony to which she had been destined, the *Océan* was very deep, drawing not less, perhaps, than 28 or 29 feet. Hence she grounded while still in a part of Aix road, and not on the *Palles* shoal, as was thought to have been the case,

This accounts for M. Allemand dating his official letter of the 12th, "à bord du vaisseau l'Océan en rade de l'isle d'Aix."

At about 500 yards to the south-west of the Océan, upon a rocky bed named Charenton, lay the Varsovie and Aquilon, and close to them, but upon somewhat better ground, the Régulus and Jemmappes. The Tonnerre, with her head to the south-east, lay on a hard bottom about 200 yards to the eastward of the rock of Pontra, and bore north-west of Isle Madame, situated on the south-west side of the entrance to the Charente, and north-east of the isle of Enette, which forms the northern extremity of the opposite side of the same river. This ship, since 2 A.M., had thrown all her guns overboard except 10 of her 36-pounders, and had cut away her mainmast; but nothing could save her, as she had already bilged. At some distance to the south-west of the Tonnerre, nearly on the extremity of the Palles in that direction, and close to the wreck of the Jean-Bart, lay the Calcutta, with her head to the south-east. The Calcutta first took the ground at 11 h. 30 m. P.M., floated again at 1 A.M., and soon afterwards grounded a second time upon the rocky bottom on which she at this time lay. The Patriote and Tourville lay on the mud off Isle Madame, and at no great distance from the channel of the Charente. With respect to the four frigates, the Indienne lay about three-quarters of a mile to the eastward of the Océan, upon the mud off Point Aiguille, near Enette isle. The Elbe and Hortense lay upon the Fontenelles, and the Pallas upon the mud off the little fort of Barques, just at the entrance of the Charente.

All the grounded ships, especially the six on the hard part of the Palles, were more or less upon the heel; and most of them, from the nature of the ground on which they lay, were in a very desperate situation. So that, although the fire-vessels of the British had not caused the immediate destruction of a single ship of the French fleet, they had left nearly the whole of the ships in a comparatively defenceless state; exposed, if promptly acted upon, to an attack of a different description, an attack more conformable to the rules of regular warfare, and more congenial to what is usually the prevailing spirit on board a British fleet.

From her proximity to the scene of disaster, the Impérieuse was the first British ship to observe, and the first to communicate to the commander-in-chief, the grounded state of the French ships. The falling tide obliged the Impérieuse, at daylight, to weigh and stand out. Lord Cochrane then made the

following telegraphic signals to the *Caledonia*, the distance of whose anchorage from the grounded ships was just 12 miles. At 48 m. A.M. "Half the fleet can destroy the enemy; seven on shore." At 6 h. 40 m. "Eleven on shore." At 7 h. 40 m. "Only two afloat." At 9 h. 30 m. "Enemy preparing to heave off." As soon as the tide suited, which was at 10 A.M., the *Impériuse* returned and re-anchored close to the Boyart shoal, the south part of Isle d'Aix bearing south-east by east; which was nearly on the same spot from which the frigate had a few hours before weighed.

Immediately after the last telegraphic signal of the *Impériuse*, Lord Gambier telegraphed the fleet,—“Prepare with sheet and spare anchors out of stern ports, and springs ready.” At 9 h. 35 m. A.M. the British admiral made the signal for the fleet to weigh, but suspended the execution of that signal by making another, calling all captains on board the *Caledonia*. As soon as the conference was ended, the captains returned to their ships; and at 10 h. 45 m. A.M., according to the average time noted down in the logs of the different ships, the fleet got under way. At 11 h. 30 m. A.M. the fleet re-anchored, in 12 and 13 fathoms water, at the distance of three miles from the flag-staff on Isle d'Aix, and consequently of about six miles from the grounded French ships. The reason, officially assigned by the admiral, for anchoring at so great a distance was, that the wind blew fresh from the northward, and combined with the strength of the flood-tide, rendered it hazardous to run into Aix roads; but, according to the evidence of Captain Broughton, examined at Lord Gambier's court-martial, his lordship was induced to anchor so far off, because, “as the enemy were on shore, he did not think it necessary to run any unnecessary risk of the fleet, when the object of their destruction seemed to be already obtained.”¹

As a further proof that the British admiral, whatever may have been his original intention, had now abandoned the idea of employing the fleet to cannonade the works on Isle d'Aix, or the French ships aground on the Palles shoal, Lord Gambier did not make the customary signal for the ships to get springs on their cables, and be ready to anchor by the stern, because that signal (No. 14) began by calling upon the ships to “prepare for battle.” He therefore had recourse to the telegraph, as the only means of making the latter part of the signal without the former. The admiral did, however, direct the *Ætna* bomb, covered by the

¹ Minutes, &c., p. 222.

gun-brigs *Insolent*, *Conflict*, and *Growler*, to proceed towards Aix road, and take a position for bombarding the grounded French ships; and Captain Bligh was directed to take under his orders the *Valiant*, *Bellona*, and *Revenge*, also the frigates and sloops, and to anchor them as close as possible to the Boyart shoal, to be ready to support the bomb-vessel and gun-brigs. While therefore the latter, as they had been ordered, stood on towards the road of Aix, the *Valiant* and her division came to an anchor about a mile nearer to the grounded ships than the spot at which the *Caledonia* and the remainder of the line-of-battle ships were then lying.

This movement on the part of the British fleet auguring an immediate attack, the *Foudroyant* and *Cassard*, who had been since daylight getting up their topmasts, cut their cables and made sail for the *Charente*, the latter at 45 minutes past noon, and the former in a few minutes afterwards; but, in attempting to ascend the river, the two ships grounded on the shoal at its entrance, very near the castle of Fouras. In the mean time, as the tide flowed, all the ships that had previously grounded began to get upright, and their crews to exert themselves anew to float them off the bank. The water and provisions were started, many of the guns and much of the ammunition thrown overboard, and anchors laid out for warping. Since 6 A.M. the *Océan* had carried out a stream-anchor, with six cables. At about 2 P.M., by similar means, the *Patriote*, *Régulus*, and *Jemmappes* succeeded in getting afloat, but grounded again on the muddy shoal at the entrance of the *Charente*. By the time it became nearly high water, the *Océan* also got afloat, and moved herself about 700 yards nearer to the channel of the river, where she was again stopped by the mud.

Seeing the French ships thus gradually getting beyond the reach of attack, whereby the whole object of the enterprise would be defeated, and observing, in particular, that the three nearest ships, the *Calcutta*, *Aquilon*, and *Varsovie*, were laying out anchors and hawsers for the purpose of effecting a similar removal, Lord Cochrane, at 1 P.M., just as the *Ætna* and the three gun-brigs had run past him, got under way with the *Impérieuse*, who had previously hove short, and, without any order or signal to that effect, dropped down towards the enemy. At 1 h. 30 m. P.M. the frigate set her topsails, and stood directly for the group of grounded ships on the *Palles*. Conceiving, now, that no serious attack was intended to be made upon these ships, which were setting their sails to assist in forcing them off the

shoal, Lord Cochrane made the signal No. 405, "The enemy's ships are getting under sail;" and in 10 minutes afterwards, or at 1 h. 40 m. p.m., finding no attention paid to that, he caused to be hoisted the signal No. 378, "The enemy is superior to the chasing ship." At 1 h. 45 m. this was followed by No. 364, "The ship is in distress, and requires to be assisted immediately." The latter was the point aimed at; but there was no disuniting the signal without having recourse to the tedious operation of the telegraph.

At 1 h. 50 m. p.m. the *Impérieuse* shortened sail, and fired a shot at the *Calcutta*; and at 2 p.m. anchored on the *Palles* shoal in five fathoms, veered to half a cable and kept fast the spring. Her starboard broadside being thus brought to bear upon the *Calcutta's* starboard quarter, the *Impérieuse* commenced her fire upon that ship, and occasionally, with her starboard fore-castle and bow guns, upon the *Varsovic* and *Aquilon*. At 2 h. 10 m., finding that the shot from the 24 and 18-pounder carronades of the *Insolent*, *Growler*, and *Conflict* were dropping outside of the *Impérieuse*, and that even the shot from the heavier carronades of the *Beagle*, which brig had since anchored rather within the line taken up by the gun-brigs, were not producing any visible effect, Lord Cochrane wished to order them to come closer in; but, the signal making no distinction between ships and brigs, the *Ætna* would also feel bound to obey it, and she was in a proper situation for throwing her shells. In this emergency, the captain of the *Impérieuse* adopted an expedient more decisive than courteous: he ordered the main-deck guns of the frigate to be fired at, or near to, the brigs. They were so; and the latter took the hint, and dropped down to a more effective position, but still kept outside of the *Impérieuse*.

At a few minutes past 2 p.m., finding that the *Impérieuse* had warmly engaged with the enemy's ships, Lord Gambier gave the signal for the *Indefatigable*, then at anchor with the advanced squadron near the *Boyart* shoal, to weigh. Accordingly, at 2 h. 15 m. p.m., this frigate got under way, and, agreeably to a signal to that effect, stood for the *Impérieuse*; but, the wind though fair being light, and the ebb-tide making, the *Indefatigable* proceeded very slowly, although carrying royal and topgallant studding-sails. Shortly after the *Indefatigable* had weighed, the remaining frigates and smaller vessels did the same, and stood after her; and at about 2 h. 30 m. p.m. the *Valiant* and *Revenge*, by signal from the admiral, got also under way, and proceeded in the direction of the firing.

In the mean time the *Impérieuse* continued engaging the *Calcutta*; and at 3 h. 20 m. P.M., on the near approach of the *Indefatigable* and other frigates, the crew of the *Impérieuse* cheered them. At that moment, finding that the *Calcutta* had ceased firing, and that the Frenchmen were abandoning her, Lord Cochrane sent a midshipman and boat's crew to take possession. At about 3 h. 30 m. P.M. the *Indefatigable* anchored on the inner or starboard quarter of the *Impérieuse*, and, until hailed by Lord Cochrane and informed that the *Calcutta* had struck, directed her fire at the latter. The *Indefatigable* then turned her foremost guns upon the *Varsovie*; and the *Aigle*, *Emerald*, and *Unicorn* presently took their stations ahead of the *Indefatigable*. Shortly afterwards the *Valiant*, *Revenge*, and *Pallas* came up and anchored; the last ahead of the other frigates, the *Valiant* close astern of the *Indefatigable*, and the *Revenge* about 600 or 800 yards to the north-east of the *Impérieuse*. Thus anchored with springs, in the form of a crescent, around the grounded French ships, the British ships opened upon them a heavy and destructive fire. The fire upon the *Calcutta* rendered it requisite to withdraw the boat of the *Impérieuse*, and Lord Cochrane sent others to inform the frigates that the French ship had surrendered.

Determined to show that his object in anchoring where he had was not to avoid close action, Captain Newcome, when he weighed, gallantly ran in between the *Indefatigable* and the wreck of the *Jean-Bart*. There dropping her anchor, the *Beagle* opened a heavy fire upon the grounded French ships, finding, after a while, that his rudder was almost coming in contact with the wreck of the *Jean-Bart*, and that the *Beagle* was in considerable danger from the fire of the *Indefatigable*, Captain Newcome got under way and made sail for the stern of the *Aquilon*. On arriving within pistol-shot of the French 74, the *Beagle* opened upon her a well-directed and destructive fire.

Having sustained the cannonade of the many ships opposed to them, without the means of using more than their stern-chase guns, the *Varsovie* and *Aquilon*, at 5 h. 30 m. P.M., made the token of submission by each showing a union jack in her mizen chains. At this moment the *Theseus*, having weighed from Basque roads by signal at 3 h. 30 m. P.M., anchored between the *Revenge* and *Valiant*. At 6 P.M. the *Tonnerre*, who lay just out of range of the nearest British ship, the *Revenge*, was set on fire by her officers and crew, all of whom landed safe upon Isle

Madame; and at 7 h. 30 m. P.M. the ship exploded. The Calcutta appears to have been set on fire by the midshipman of the Impérieuse without orders, and at about 8 h. 30 m. P.M. blew up with a tremendous explosion, her hold containing an immense quantity of powder and other ordnance stores.

The only British ships that sustained any loss in this attack were the Revenge and Impérieuse. The Revenge had one seaman and two marines killed, and one lieutenant (James Garland), five seamen and nine marines wounded; two of them mortally and nearly the whole with contusions. The ship had her bowsprit severely wounded, a great part of her running rigging and sails cut to pieces, five planks of the quarter-deck cut through and a beam carried away; besides which a number of shot had struck different parts of her hull. The damage in the hull, and the killed and wounded, are stated to have been caused by the fire of the batteries on Isle d'Aix, and the cut rigging by the fire of the Aquilon and Varsovie.

The loss sustained by the Impérieuse consisted of three seamen killed, her surgeon's assistant (Gilbert), purser (Mark Marsden), seven seamen, and two marines wounded. The frigate received several shot in the hull, and had her masts, rigging, and sails a good deal cut: both loss and damage principally the effects of the fire of her three antagonists on the Palles, especially of the Calcutta. The Indefatigable and Beagle, although they escaped without loss, received more or less of damage in their masts and yards from the enemy's shot. It is remarkable that, although the batteries of Isle d'Aix and of Saumonard on the isle of Oleron kept up a constant fire of shot and shells, the Revenge and Indefatigable were the only British vessels of the 14 engaged that suffered from it: the damage to the Indefatigable, indeed, was merely a wounded topmast.

With respect to the French loss in this attack, our information is not of the most certain kind. The Calcutta is described to have had her hull riddled before any assistance came to the Impérieuse, and to have lost, out of a crew of 230 men, none killed, but 12 badly wounded. The captain of the Aquilon appears to have been killed, as he was sitting by the side of Lord Cochrane in the boat of the Impérieuse, by a shot from one of the Tonnerre's guns, which accidentally went off while that ship was burning. The Aquilon's loss on board was considerable, owing, as it was stated, to Captain Maingan, when he found he could not return the enemy's fire, very prudently directing his officers and men to lie down. The Varsovie lost

upwards of 100 in killed and wounded together. The *Océan* sent her boats to save the crew of this ship, but the grape-shot from the British ships prevented the boats from getting alongside.

The discrepancies that occur in the time kept by the British ships, and our inability to remedy the evil by a reference to the minutes kept by the French ships, prevent us from applying to any very useful purpose the following translated extract from the letter written by the officer of the *Océan*:—"During this action (that with the grounded ships), we fired some of our guns from the stern. The flood having borne our ship up for a short time, we ran her on shore a few cables' lengths further up. An English ship of the line tried to come to an anchor under our stern; but she touched the ground, and was with great difficulty got off. Had this not happened, we should have been cannonaded in a pretty style." We cannot discover that any of the British line-of-battle ships sent into Aix road had an intention to molest the *Océan*: but the ship alluded to was undoubtedly the *Revenge*. This ship, however, did not actually take the ground: she only stirred up the mud with her keel. One fact is certain. The *Océan*, at the time she was thus menaced, or supposed to be menaced, with an English line-of-battle ship's raking fire, had retired from a spot nearly half a mile nearer to the British fleet: on which exposed spot the French three-decker had lain aground since long before daylight; where, for four or five hours the ship was heeling very much; and where, in short, a couple of well-handled frigates, one on each quarter, might have nearly destroyed her.

Even after this opportunity had been lost, five French line-of-battle ships and one frigate were still assailable, either by fire-ships or by frigates, gun-brigs, and bomb-vessels. Those ships were the *Océan*, *Cassard*, *Régulus*, *Jemmappes*, *Tourville*, and *Indienne*, all lying aground at the mouth of the Charente. Unfortunately, there having been no reserve of fire-ships, the fleet was now without any, and the only bomb-vessel present was the *Ætna*. However, three transports were hastily converted into fire-ships; and at 5 h. 30 m. P.M. Rear-admiral Stopford got under way with the *Cæsar*, and, accompanied by the three fire-ships, and the launches of the fleet fitted to throw Congreve rockets, stood towards Aix road, receiving from the batteries of Aix and of Oleron a spirited but ineffectual fire. At 7 h. 40 m. P.M., *Isle d'Aix* bearing from north to north-north-east, the *Cæsar* struck on what was supposed to be the south-

eastern extremity of the Boyart shoal. As it was nearly low water, the *Cæsar* did not float again until 10 h. 30 m. P.M.; when she swang to the stream-anchor, which had been let go. The *Valiant* had grounded about half an hour earlier than the *Cæsar*, and got afloat a few minutes later, equally without damage. Neither the *Theseus* nor the *Revenge* appear to have grounded at all. Upon weighing from her first anchorage, which she did shortly after the *Theseus* had brought up astern of her, the *Revenge* unexpectedly kept afloat, until, to the surprise of her captain,¹ she reached a fine anchorage between the Boyart and Palles shoals, in five and a quarter fathoms water, at the dead of a spring-tide ebb, out of reach of shot or shell; and where there was room for five or six sail of the line. It was in endeavouring to reach this anchorage that the *Valiant* grounded on the edge of the Palles. The *Indefatigable* and *Impérieuse* also grounded, but got off in an hour or two without damage. At about 8 P.M. all the remaining frigates and brigs, except the *Impérieuse*, weighed and anchored with the *Revenge* in the Maumusson passage.

It was very near midnight before the three fire-ships were ready to proceed. The wind then became baffling; and, at 2 A.M. on the 13th, began to blow from the south-west, or directly out of the passage to Aix road. Profiting by this circumstance, Rear-admiral Stopford, at 2 h. 30 m. A.M., got under way and made sail; and at 4 A.M. the *Cæsar* came to anchor in Little Basque roads. As the fire-ships, which had been committed by the rear-admiral on his departure to the charge of Captain Bligh, could not for the present be put in operation, nothing further was done beyond setting fire to the *Aquilon* and *Varsovie*; both of which ships, it is said, had the water up to their orlop-decks. Some persons have thought, however, that the *Varsovie*, represented to have been one of the finest two-decked ships in the world, might, with a little exertion, have been saved. But the *Varsovie*, as well as the *Aquilon*, was, by the orders of Captain Bligh, doomed to destruction.

The time occupied in removing the prisoners and their effects made it a few minutes past 3 A.M. before the fire could be put to the two ships. At 3 h. 30 m. A.M. the flames began to ascend; and not being aware that the magazines of the two ships were drowned, the *Impérieuse* got under way, to avoid the effects of the expected explosion: as did also the three

¹ Minutes, &c., p. 167.

fire-ships, which, by the orders of Captain Bligh, had removed to the anchorage of the *Impérieuse*, to be employed, when the time suited, under Lord Cochrane's directions. One of these, while working out, ran aground off *Isle d'Aix*, and remained fast; but it does not appear that the few hands on board of her were either lost or made prisoners.

The appearance of the two flaming bodies led to some extraordinary occurrences on the part of the French. They actually mistook the burning *Varsovie* and *Aquilon* for British fire-ships; and the *Océan*, *Tourville*, *Indienne*, and others of the grounded ships opened a cannonade upon them. This was not all. The captain and crew of the *Tourville* were so alarmed at the seeming approach of those dreadful engines, that they abandoned their ship, without waiting to furl the sails, which had been set to force her off the shoal, or even to see that the fire, which had been put to the ship in two places, had begun to take effect. Observing at daylight from *Pointe des Barques*, where he and his crew had landed, that the *Tourville* had neither suffered by fire from without, nor from within, and that the British line-of-battle ships and frigates were getting under way to return to Basque roads, Captain Lacaille prepared to go back to his ship. In about two hours after he had quitted her, he was again on board with, including three boats' crews that had returned from doing duty on board the *Océan*, about 230 officers and men, out of a crew of at least 660.

The French captain now learnt that during his absence a single British boat would have captured the *Tourville*, had it not been for the prowess of one of her quartermasters, who, unknown to M. Lacaille, had remained in the ship. We are unable to state what ship's boat it was that so nearly made a prize of a French 74; for, certainly, had the officer been aware of the abandoned state of the *Tourville*, a resolute attack must have been crowned with success. The following is a summary of the French quartermaster's story: His name was Eugène-Joseph Romain Bourgeois, and his age 31 years. Being resolved to stand by his ship to the last, he crept from the boat into which he had been ordered to embark, unperceived, through one of the *Tourville's* lower-deck ports. As soon as the boats had all pushed off, he began constructing a raft, in case the two supposed fire-vessels should grapple the *Tourville*; or that the fire which had been put to the ship in two places should take effect. He had just completed his raft, when an enemy's boat approached the *Tourville*. He hailed the boats twice;

and receiving no reply, fired off the musket which the sentry at the gangway had in his haste thrown down. The boat returned the fire; but the intrepid Bourgeois was not to be so daunted: he ran to the captain's cabin, and taking an armful of muskets from the rack, discharged 20 of them in quick succession. This had the desired effect, and the boat pulled away. After he had been on board about an hour, he discovered, lying on the lower deck, three of his shipmates, drunk and insensible. Shortly afterwards three of the *Tourville's* boats arrived from on board the *Océan*; and a young midshipman-volunteer (aspirant de première classe) named Marinier, took the command of the 30 men now present, and made suitable preparations for defending the ship: indeed, every man of this little band is represented to have sworn to defend the *Tourville* to the utmost of his power.

At 5 A.M., agreeably to a signal made by Rear-admiral Stopford, Captain Bligh got under way with the *Valiant*, *Theseus*, and *Revenge*, and was followed by the *Indefatigable*, *Unicorn*, *Aigle*, and *Emerald*. While the *Impérieuse*, in her way to the anchorage she was about to take up, was passing within hail of the *Indefatigable*, Lord Cochrane proposed to Captain Rodd, that, if the *Indefatigable* would go on one quarter of the *Océan* the *Impérieuse* would take the other. Captain Rodd declined to do so; alleging as his reason that the *Indefatigable's* main-topmast had a shot through it, that her draught of water was too great for the service in contemplation, and that he should not be justified in acting without orders, in the presence of two superior officers, Captains Bligh and Beresford. At 6 A.M. the *Impérieuse* anchored in the Maumusson passage; and at 6 h. 30 m. A.M., the *Pallas* passed under sail, on her way to Basque roads after the other ships. Captain Seymour hailed the *Impérieuse*, to know whether or not he should remain. Lord Cochrane directed him to do so, if he, Captain Seymour, had received no orders to the contrary. The *Pallas* immediately anchored; and the *Beagle* and gun-brigs followed her example. At 8 A.M., which was as early as the tide suited, Lord Cochrane despatched the brigs and bomb-vessel to attack the nearest French ships aground at the entrance of the Charente; meaning to follow with the two frigates, if the water, which happened not to be the case, should prove sufficient. At 11 A.M. the *Beagle*, *Ætna*, *Conflict*, *Contest*, *Encounter*, *Fervent*, *Growler*, the rocket schooner *Whiting*, and the two rocket-cutters *Nimrod* and *King George*, coming to anchor, opened their fire upon the *Océan*,

Régulus, and Indienne, as those ships lay aground. The Océan, during the preceding night, had landed all her boys, and the greater part of her soldiers: the faint-hearted (*hommes pleureux*) of her crew had also been allowed the same indulgence. This left on board just 600 officers and men, determined to defend their ship to the last extremity. Since daylight the third tier of water had been started, the shifting ballast, 100 barrels of flour, and a great quantity of salt provisions thrown overboard; but the Océan still remained fast. The Beagle, in the most gallant manner, took a position, in 16 feet water (her draught was $12\frac{1}{2}$ feet forward, and very nearly 15 abaft), upon the French three-decker's stern and quarter, and engaged her for five hours. The Océan returned the fire with her eight stern-chasers; from which, although her two poop carronades, from being overheated, had upset early in the action, she is represented to have fired two hundred and sixty 36-pound shot, three hundred and forty 24-pounders, and three hundred and eighty 12-pounders.

The Beagle appears to have borne the brunt of the engagement. At all events, that brig suffered more than any one of her consorts, having had her hull struck in several places, her mainyard and maintopmast shot through, and her standing and running-rigging very much injured. The Beagle did not, however, sustain any loss of men—none at least that has been recorded. The bomb-vessel and gun-brigs also appear to have escaped without loss, as well as without any material damage; except that the *Ætna*, as was now become an invariable case, had split her 13-inch mortar. At the time that the flotilla ceased firing, the Océan and Régulus, it being then high water, were preparing to push further up the Charente. At 4 P.M., the tide then falling, the Beagle and her consorts weighed and worked back to their former anchorage, exposed, during a part of the time, to a heavy fire from the batteries on Isle d'Aix; but which, nevertheless, appears not to have injured any one of the British vessels.

Among the damages sustained by the Océan in this attack, was a 32-pound shot (one of the Beagle's) right through the mizenmast to the spindle, spankerboom cut in two, six main and two mizen shrouds cut through, maintopsail-yard badly wounded, and two chain plates and all three topgallant yards shot away. The hull had also been struck by several shot and pieces of shell, and even the decks in many places ripped up. But, notwithstanding this heavy damage, the Océan had only one killed, a young midshipman, while standing near the ad-

miral at the commencement of the action. M. Allemande immediately ordered all the hands, not wanted at the stern-chase guns, to go below. Owing to this wise precaution, no other life was lost, and only a few men slightly wounded. The *Régulus* was at too great a distance to be much annoyed by shot, especially when discharged from carronades. Three shells, however, fell on board of her; and one of them went through all her decks, and burst in the hold. Her loss we are unable to state. The *Indienne* had only three men wounded; one with his thigh shot off. Several shot, however, are represented to have struck the frigate's masts. The *Cassard*, *Jemmappes*, and *Tourville* appear likewise to have had a slight share in this engagement, but were too distant to suffer from it.

While this action was going on the *Impérieuse* and *Pallas* lay at the anchorage, unable, from the strength and direction of the wind and the velocity of the tide, to advance with safety to the attack of the grounded ships. At noon the *Dotterel*, *Foxhound*, and *Redpole*, and two more rocket-vessels, from Basque roads, joined Lord Cochrane, and anchored near the two frigates. By these vessels Lord Cochrane received both a public and a private letter from Lord Gambier. The public one directs Lord Cochrane to make an attempt upon the *Océan*, with the bomb and rocket vessels, but expresses a strong doubt about the success of the attack. Lord Cochrane is then ordered to come to Basque roads as soon as the tide turns. The private letter states thus: "You have done your part so admirably, that I will not suffer you to tarnish it by attempting impossibilities, which I think, as well as those captains who have come from you, any further efforts to destroy those ships would be. You must therefore join as soon as you can with the bomb, &c., as I wish for some information which you allude to, before I close my despatches." To the first or public letter Lord Cochrane replied: "I have just had the honour to receive your lordship's letter. We can destroy the ships which are on shore, which I hope your lordship will approve of." Either a few minutes before or after the receipt of Lord Gambier's letter, it was considered on board the *Impérieuse* that her signal of recall was made by the *Caledonia*. The *Impérieuse* answered the supposed signal (for it is doubtful if it was made) and telegraphed that the enemy could be destroyed. It was shortly after this that the *Beagle*, *Ætna*, and smaller vessels, re-anchored near the *Impérieuse* and *Pallas*.

On the 14th, at 2 h. 30 m. A.M., by throwing overboard the

chief part of her guns and other heavy materials, the *Tourville* got afloat and entered the Charente; but presently afterwards, through the alleged carelessness of her pilot, the ship ran on shore on the opposite side of the river, off the town of Fouras, and close to the wreck of one of the largest of the fire-ships, probably the *Mediator*. The *Océan* was equally unsuccessful in her efforts to get into the channel, and grounded on the same side of the river as the *Tourville*; but the *Patriote*, *Hortense*, *Elbe*, and *Pallas* were more fortunate, and ascended the Charente beyond the reach of danger.

At 9 A.M. the *Impérieuse*, it is admitted, was recalled by signal from the *Caledonia*; which signal also directed Lord Cochrane to communicate with Captain Wolfe of the *Aigle*, who had been ordered to supersede his lordship in the command of the Aix flotilla. At noon the *Aigle* joined the *Impérieuse*; and at 4 h. 30 m. P.M., in compliance with the admiral's orders, the latter weighed and stood towards Basque roads. On the 15th the *Impérieuse* sailed for England, having on board Captain Sir Harry Neale with Lord Gambier's despatches. About an hour previous to the departure of the *Impérieuse* from the anchorage in the Maumusson passage, the *Ætna* and five of the brigs had proceeded to attack the *Régulus*, *Indienne*, and the other ships in their vicinity. The bombardment and cannonade continued until 7 P.M., and only ceased then because the *Ætna* had consumed all her 10-inch shells. Very little effect appears to have been produced on either side by this engagement. During its progress, the *Jemmappes* had cleared herself and run up the river.

In consequence of the strong north-west winds which had been blowing, the French expected that the tide of the 15th would be of an extraordinary height. To prepare for this, the *Océan* threw overboard the whole of her third-deck guns, half of those on her first deck, and four 24-pounders from her middle deck. As soon as the ship began to feel the flood-tide, a great strain was hove upon the cables which had been laid out the day before, and the driver and all the after-sails were set, to bring the ship's head to the wind, which still blew strong from the north-west. At 2 A.M. the *Océan* felt the canvas, and got out of her bed. The head-sails were then set, the cables cut, and the French three-decker moved ahead through the mud. After forcing her through it for 500 yards, the *Océan* got into the fair way of the river, and at 3 h. 30 m. A.M. anchored off *Pointe des Barques* in perfect safety. At 4 P.M., by following the same plan as the *Océan*, the *Cassard* met with the same success. So

that the only ships that remained aground at the mouth of the Charente, were the *Foudroyant*, *Régulus*, *Indienne*, and *Tourville*, the latter furthest up of any. Against these ships no effective attack could be made, even had the weather permitted, because there was no bomb-vessel in the British fleet, the *Ætna* having split her 13-inch mortar and used all her 10-inch shells.

On the 16th, at 10 A.M., after more than five days' exertions, highly creditable to her commander, M. Proteau, and his officers and crew, the *Indienne* was set on fire, and in an hour or two blew to pieces. On the 17th at 4 A.M., it being then about high water, the *Foudroyant* and *Tourville* extricated themselves and stood up the river; the latter anchoring off Point Vergeron, and the former a little below Pointe des Barques. There now remained only the *Régulus*; and she lay, as already stated, on the north-east bank of the Charente, just under the town of Fouras.

The 18th and 19th passed, without any attempt to destroy this French ship. On the first day there was no bomb-vessel. On the second day the *Thunder* arrived, but the weather was too violent for the small vessels to co-operate with her. The officer of the *Océan*, whose letter we have before quoted, says, under date of the 19th of April: "We begin to despair of getting off the *Régulus*, which ship is still in the same situation. The enemy continue in Isle d'Aix road, to the number of 20 sail. They have not made any movement whatever for these three days: which is a thing not at all to be understood (*ce qu'il n'en conçoit pas bien*), for they might with ease attack the *Régulus*, and oblige her crew to abandon her."

On the 20th the *Thunder*, covered by the gun-brigs, went to attack the *Régulus*; but a few discharges from the former's 13-inch mortar soon reduced it to the state of the *Ætna*'s. The 21st and 22nd appear to have passed inactively. On the 23rd four gun-brigs took each on board two of the *Aigle*'s long 18-pounders, and, with the two bomb-vessels (the *Ætna* having supplied herself with 10-inch shells from the *Thunder*), used every means, during the whole of the 24th, to drive the French out of the *Régulus*, but without success. This was the last attempt that was made; and at daylight on the 29th the *Régulus* got herself afloat, and soon joined her companions at Rochefort. On the same day Admiral Lord Gambier, in the *Caledonia*, sailed for England; and Basque road soon became thinned of its shipping.

Although rather a ticklish subject to handle, we shall not be deterred from submitting a few observations upon the proceed-

ings which were carried on, for the avowed purpose of destroying the French fleet at anchor in the road of Isle d'Aix. In the first place, we ask, Is it necessary that an attack by fire-ships should take place in the night?¹ It is clear that, if the officers commanding those at Basque roads had had daylight to steer by, fewer of them would have failed in their object. To destroy the French boats at the boom, one or more explosion-vessels were admirably calculated; but, if no boats were assembled at the boom, the blast, however great, could have produced little or no effect, as is evident from the *Indienne's* escaping comparatively unhurt, although not above 110 yards from the vessel that exploded ahead of her. Had it not been for the accidental employment of the *Mediator* as a fire-ship, it is probable that the boom would have been unbroken, and then all the slips, as well as the explosion-vessels, would have expended themselves outside of it. The existence of a boom should have been presumed; and one heavy fire-ship, or explosion-vessel if deemed preferable, should have been sent considerably ahead of the others, to break it down and open a channel for them. The remaining fire-ships, chained in twos or fours, might then have proceeded, with almost a certainty of taking effect, admitting, as we before suggested, that daylight had been the time of the operation. Another question presents itself, applicable to either a day or a night attack: Supposing the attack to have been delayed until the tide had flowed two hours more, would not the French ships have grounded upon the harder parts of the shoal, as well as the shallower at low water, and have been therefore less likely to get afloat at the return of the tide?

The next point for consideration is the attack upon the grounded ships. It must here in justice be stated, that Lord Gambier had not such an effective force in vessels of a light draught of water as, according to the nature of the service, he ought to have been supplied with. In most navies a gun-vessel means a small vessel, carrying from one to four heavy long guns, capable, from the manner in which they are mounted, of being used on either side, and from the extent of their range, of annoying an enemy at a considerable distance; but in the British

¹ Mr. James has asked this question as a landsman, and it is easily answered: Had the attack taken place by daylight, the fire-ships would most probably have been sunk by the well-directed fire of the French ships; the effect of the attack would have been destroyed by the danger being visible, and night, and its darkness

and horrors, adds more to the fear of fire than the inexperienced can imagine; by daylight, the French ships, if they cut their cables, might have run without grounding into security; whereas by night, the marks could not be seen, the danger could not be avoided.—*Ed.*

navy a gun-vessel, or gun-brig, is a vessel that carries on her broadside five or six 18-pounder carronades, whose effective range is scarcely two-thirds that of a long gun of the same caliber. Lord Gambier had five of this description of small-craft; he had also, except just as the affair ended, one, and only one, bomb-vessel. This was not the kind of force which Captain Keats contemplated, when in April 1807, he proposed attacking the French squadron at anchor in the same road. He required small vessels with long guns, and "that class which have been in the custom of throwing 8-inch shells from 68-pounder carronades."¹

Being deficient, as he undoubtedly was, in his force of small vessels, the admiral should have been more vigorous and decisive in his attack by the larger vessels. Next to the *Caledonia* and *Gibraltar*, the *Cæsar* and *Revenge* drew the most water of any ship in Lord Gambier's fleet. What business, then, had the *Cæsar* and *Revenge* in *Isle d'Aix* road, while the *Bellona* and *Resolution* were lying at anchor in *Basque* road? Why was not the water from the transports that were fitting as fire-ships emptied into the sea, instead of being transferred to the line-of-battle ships? Every additional half-foot the latter drew was of consequence, in the service in which they were about to be engaged. Even of the small vessels, the best use was not made, Why were the *Doterel* and *Foxhound*, with their 32-pounder carronades, not sent into the road of *Aix* before the 13th? Then came ignorance of the navigation and of the shore-defences, and disputes about the authenticity of charts. It was at length discovered, but too late to be of any utility, that there was room for ships to act upon a fleet in *Aix* road out of range of the batteries on either side; and it was even doubted whether the fort of *Aix* might not have been silenced by two or three British 74s.² A remark made by the officer of the *Océan* may be here introduced:—"The batteries of *Isle d'Aix* afforded us no protection at all, for the enemy forced a passage up the road with the greatest ease. Two of our line-of-battle ships (*Foudroyant* and *Cassard*) did not think they could maintain their position at the anchorage, and ran aground under *Fouras*. I did not think even the flotilla (alluding to some gun-boats fitting out) can hinder ships from forcing their way into the road; a road with which the enemy, during the 15 days he was at anchor there, made himself so well acquainted, that he went in and out as if it was one of his own harbours."

¹ Minutes, &c., p. 18.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 210, 214, 221, &c.

Upon his return to England, Lord Cochrane, for the gallant part he had performed, was created a knight of the Bath. He shortly afterwards intimated to the first lord of the admiralty, that he should, in his seat in parliament, oppose the passing of any vote of thanks to Lord Gambier for his conduct at Basque roads. Lord Mulgrave communicated this to the admiral; and Lord Gambier, being well advised on the subject, requested that a court-martial might be held upon his conduct between the 17th of March and 29th of April. The court-martial was granted; and on the 26th of July Admirals Sir Roger Curtis and William Young, Vice-admirals Sir John Thomas Duckworth, Sir Henry Edwin Stanhope, Billy Douglas, and George Campbell, Rear-admiral John Sutton, and Captains John Irwin, Robert Hall, Edward Stirling Dickson, and Richard Dalling Dunn, assembled at Portsmouth, to try Admiral Lord Gambier upon the following charge:—"And whereas, by the log-books and minutes of signals of the *Caledonia*, *Impérieuse*, and other ships employed in that service, it appears to us that the said Admiral Lord Gambier, on the 12th day of the said month of April, the enemy's ships being then on shore, and the signal having been made that they could be destroyed, did for a considerable time neglect or delay taking effectual measures for destroying them."

The court sat from the 26th of July to the 4th of August. The minutes of the trial are now before us; and we cannot refrain from observing, that several of the members, particularly the president (Sir Roger Curtis) and Admiral Young, evinced a strong bias in favour of the accused. On two or three occasions Admiral Young attempted to browbeat Lord Cochrane; and the cross-examination of some of the witnesses, whose evidence went in support of the charge, would have done credit to a practitioner of Westminster Hall. Nor must we omit to notice the singular circumstance, that Captain Maitland, of the *Emerald*, who had made no secret of his opinion on the character of the proceedings in Aix road, should happen, when the court-martial was about to take place, to be on the Irish station. It is true that the secretary of the admiralty informed Lord Gambier that Captain Maitland, if his lordship desired, should be ordered to attend. But Lord Gambier, as may be supposed, did not wish to delay the trial on that account; and out of the 17 captains employed in Basque roads, with the exception of Captain Richardson, of the *Cæsar*, Captain Maitland was the only one who was not examined as a witness on the admiral's court-martial.

Upon the whole, therefore, we are not at all surprised at the sentence which that court-martial pronounced upon Admiral Lord Gambier. The sentence was as follows:—"Having heard the evidence produced in support of the charge, and by the said Right Honourable Lord Gambier in his defence, and what his lordship had to allege in support thereof; and having maturely and deliberately weighed and considered the whole, the court is of opinion that the charge has not been proved against the said Admiral the Right Honourable Lord Gambier; but that his lordship's conduct on that occasion, as well as his general conduct and proceedings as commander-in-chief of the Channel fleet in Basque roads, between the 17th day of March and the 29th day of April, 1809, was marked by zeal, judgment, ability, and an anxious attention to the welfare of his majesty's service, and doth adjudge him to be most honourably acquitted; and the said Admiral the Right Honourable Lord Gambier is hereby most honourably acquitted accordingly."

Lord Gambier's assertion at his trial, that the most distant French ship of the two lines was within point-blank shot of the works of Isle d'Aix, we, by giving the exact distance, have shown to be incorrect. Equally untenable are the last two of the four points upon which his lordship rested his defence. One of those two points was: "That three out of the seven of the enemy's ships aground on the Pelles were, from their first being on shore, totally out of the reach of the guns of any ships of the fleet that might have been sent in; and that at no time whatever, either sooner or later, could they have been attacked." The other point was: "That the other four of the 11 ships of which the enemy's fleet consisted, were never in a situation to be assailed after the fire-ships had failed in their main object."¹ To demolish the first of these grounds of justification, it is only requisite to advert to the situation, near the Calcutta, of the Régulus and Jemmappes, two of the above three ships, until 2 P.M. on the 12th;² and the second ground gave way beneath his lordship, when the first British cannon-shot struck the Indienne, described by her commander as half a league to the eastward of the Océan, and she was the north-easternmost of all the grounded line-of-battle ships.

The neglect, or the impossibility, to send out the promised bomb-vessels contributed, undoubtedly, to mar the enterprise, but not to the extent generally supposed, because of the inefficient state of all the 13-inch mortars (chiefly from being too

¹ Minutes, &c., p. 137.

² See p. 411.

light, an evil since remedied) then in use in the British navy. It has been urged, that the admiralty ought to have selected officers acquainted with the navigation of Basque and Aix roads; but it will be recollected that, when the attack was resolved upon, a British fleet already lay at anchor in the former road, and to have substituted officers for others who were on the spot might have led to the inference that there was not merely a lack of information, but a lack of zeal. As it was, the appointment of Lord Cochrane, the junior of so many captains in the same fleet, to conduct the enterprise, created a jealousy, where the utmost unanimity should have prevailed. A little management and address might have effected the object without giving offence to any one: or the thing might have been done boldly; and, as Lord Gambier had expressed a doubt as to the success of the plan in the contemplation of the admiralty, he should have been recalled, and another admiral, who saw no uncommon difficulty in the undertaking, have been sent to relieve him.

The opinion which Napoleon is said to have expressed, when many years afterwards questioned relative to the attack upon his fleet in the road of Aix, is contained in the following extract from a well-known English publication: "Some conversation now took place about Lord Cochrane, and the attempt which his lordship made to capture or destroy the ships in the Charente. I said that it was the opinion of a very distinguished naval officer whom I named, and who was well known to him, that, if Cochrane had been properly supported, he would have destroyed the whole of the French ships. 'He could not only have destroyed them,' replied Napoleon, 'but he might and would have taken them out, had your admiral supported him as he ought to have done. For, in consequence of the signal made by L'Allemand (I think he said) to the ships to do the best in their power to save themselves, *sauve qui peut* in fact, they became panic-struck, and cut their cables. The terror of the *brûlots* (fire-ships) was so great that they actually threw their powder overboard, so that they could have offered very little resistance. The French admiral was an *imbécille*, but yours was just as bad. I assure you that, if Cochrane had been supported, he would have taken every one of the ships. They ought not to have been alarmed by your *brûlots*, but fear deprived them of their senses, and they no longer knew how to act in their own defence.'"¹

The destruction of three French two-deckers and a ship

¹ See O'Meara's *Napoleon in Exile*, vol. ii., p. 292.

armed en flûte seems hardly to have warranted the Nelsonic exordium: "The Almighty's favour to his majesty and the nation has been strongly marked," &c.; much less the high-flown panegyric contained in the secretary of the admiralty's letter to Lord Gambier: "I am commanded by their lordships to congratulate you on the brilliant success of the fleet under your command." And again: "Their lordships, considering that the state of the enemy's force in consequence of the brilliant success of the fleet under your command," &c. The only part of the enterprise in which anything of a *brilliant* nature discovered itself, was when the fire-ships were burning, and the explosion-vessels bursting through the air; unless, giving to the term its intended metaphoric allusion, it was when Captain Wooldridge, in the *Mediator*, broke the boom, and, above all, when Lord Cochrane, in the *Impérieuse*, dashed in, without orders, and attacked the grounded line-of-battle ships.

In the Lords, the thanks of the House were voted to Lord Gambier upon the motion of Lord Mulgrave, with a few dissentients, but without a division. In the House of Commons, Lord Cochrane moved for a copy of the minutes of the trial of Lord Gambier, but lost his motion by the success of the amendment of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that "sentence" might be substituted for "minutes." Mr. Perceval then moved, "That the thanks of the House be given to Admiral the Right Honourable Lord Gambier, for the zeal, judgment, ability, and anxious attention to the welfare of his majesty's service, which marked his lordship's conduct as commander-in-chief of the fleet in Basque roads; by which the French fleet, which had taken refuge under their own batteries, were driven on shore and deserted, and a considerable part of them destroyed on the 11th and 12th of April, 1809." On this resolution being put, a debate ensued; but the resolution was finally carried by a majority of 161 to 39.

The second resolution was, "That the thanks of this House be given to Rear-admiral the Honourable Robert Stopford, Captain Sir Harry Neale, captain of the fleet, and to the several officers and captains of the fleet under the command of Lord Gambier, for their gallant and highly meritorious conduct on that glorious occasion, particularly marked by the brilliant and unexampled successes of the difficult and perilous mode of attack by fire-ships, conducted under the immediate direction of Captain Lord Cochrane." The third resolution went to thank the seamen and marines of the fleet, for their meritorious and gallant



LORD COCHRANE.

(THE EARL OF DUNDONALD.)

FROM A PICTURE BY STIRLING

conduct. These two resolutions passed unanimously. To the last, no objection could be urged; but, with respect to the second, had the words "glorious," "brilliant," and "unexampled," been terms less hackneyed and deteriorated, the resolution would not, we think, have passed as it did. At all events, had the house been aware that the officers, who stayed with Admiral Lord Gambier in Basque road, had as little to do with the "perilous" as with the "gallant" measures which led to the whole of the success that ensued, the strong terms used would have been, if not exclusively, more pointedly addressed to Captain Lord Cochrane and the officers serving with him in Aix road.

But it was not on the British side only that blame was imputed for what had taken place in the neighbourhood of Basque roads. The captains of the *Tonnerre*, *Tourville*, *Indienne*, and *Calcutta* were tried for alleged misconduct. The trial lasted from the 21st of June to the 8th of September, and led to the following sentences. Captain Clément de la Roncière was pronounced, by a majority of eight voices to one, not guilty of the loss of the *Tonnerre*, and was acquitted. Captain Lacaille, the court taking into consideration that he did not lose the *Tourville*, that he returned on board two hours after he had quitted her, and that he afterwards defended his ship against the enemy, and conducted her safe into port, was sentenced, by a majority of six voices to nine, to two years' imprisonment; to be erased from the list of officers, and degraded from the legion of honour. Captain Proteau was unanimously acquitted of the loss of his frigate; but the court, nevertheless, by a majority of five voices to four, condemned him to three months' confinement in his chamber, for having set fire to the *Indienne* without having previously acquainted the admiral with his intention. Captain Lafon was found guilty, by a majority of five voices to four, of having shamefully abandoned the *Calcutta* in the presence of the enemy, and was condemned to suffer death on board the admiral's ship, the *Océan*: a sentence which, at 4 P.M. on the following day, the 9th, was put in execution upon this unfortunate officer.

All the remarks which we think it necessary to offer upon the trial of the French officers may be comprised in a few words. Had the facts disclosed on that trial, respecting the actual position and defenceless state of several of the grounded ships been known to the court-martial which sat upon, and honourably acquitted, Admiral Lord Gambier, the members would certainly

have been better qualified to judge of the merits of the case submitted to their consideration ; but we cannot persuade ourselves that, even in that case, the court, composed as it was, would have pronounced a sentence more consonant to justice, and, as it would then in reality have been, "to the welfare of his majesty's service."¹

We have looked into the account of the business of Basque roads, as it stands in the work of a contemporary ; but the partiality, visible in every line of the few pages devoted to the subject, excites in us so much disgust, that we shall notice it no further than to mention, that the *Jean-Bart*, wrecked six weeks before the fire-ships were sent into Aix road, is declared to have been "lost on the Pallais shoal a few days after, in consequence of this attack,"² and that, among the half a dozen captains upon whom the writer bestows his commendation, is Captain "Prouse," or Prowse, who was not present, nor even in command of a ship.

We will now take a brief view of the state in which the fleet of M. Allemand was left, at Lord Gambier's departure from Basque roads. The *Océan* and *Foudroyant* were moored a full league up the river, and there lay aground ; the latter with only 26 of her guns on board, and the former with scarcely as many. The *Océan* was also in a very leaky and insecure state, from the opening of her seams by the straining she had previously undergone and was still suffering. The *Cassard*, *Tourville*, *Régulus*, and *Patriote*, with the three frigates, were at anchor off Rochefort, and were to remove back to the road of Aix, as soon as they could be supplied with guns and anchors from the imperial foundry, and from among those set apart for the ships on the stocks at Rochefort, consisting of two three-deckers, the *Jéna* and *Ville-de-Vienne*, and a 40-gun frigate. A fine 80-gun ship, the *Triomphant*, had recently been launched, and was fitting for sea.

To protect the anchorage of Aix, as soon as he should be in a state to return to it, M. Allemand had ordered the construction of a fresh boom, composed, in part, of the chains taken out of the wrecks of the fire-ships. There was also to be a second boom, within the principal one ; and both booms were to be protected by a numerous flotilla of heavy gun and mortar boats. By way of encouraging the sailors selected to man them, the minister of marine promised very high rewards to those who should board an enemy's armed vessel ; but, adds the French

¹ See p. 426.

² Brenton, vol. iv., p. 237.

officer, whose excellent letters have been so useful to us, "it is first necessary to inspire our sailors with the spirit with which they were animated previous to this unfortunate affair. As it is, the greater part are completely disheartened: every day I hear them lamenting their situation, and speaking in praise of our enemies. This, in my opinion, is the greatest injury the English have done to us." Having now presented the only details, which have appeared, of the destruction of the French ships in the road of Isle d'Aix, we shall proceed to give an account of another important expedition against a French fleet.

Before we enter upon the Scheldt affair, an intermediate expedition in the northern waters, upon a small scale, demands our brief notice. Early in the month of May a British squadron, consisting of one 64-gun ship, one frigate, three sloops, and a gun-brig, under the command of Captain Askew Paffard Hollis, of the *Standard*, was detached by Vice-admiral Sir James Saumarez, the British commander-in-chief in the Baltic, to effect the reduction of the Danish island of Anholt. A party of seamen and marines, commanded by Captain William Selby of the 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Owen Glendower*, assisted by Captain Edward Nicolls of the *Standard's* marines, was landed. On the 18th, after a smart but ineffectual resistance, which killed one British marine and wounded two, the Danish garrison, consisting of 170 men, surrendered at discretion, and possession of the island was immediately taken. The principal point gained by this conquest was the power to restore the lighthouse upon the island to the use for which, until the war between England and Denmark, it was formerly kept: a matter of no slight importance to the British men-of-war and merchantmen navigating those dangerous seas.

In our account of the proceedings of the year 1807, we had occasion to advert to the formidable naval preparations carrying on by France in the waters of the Scheldt. Finding that the port of Antwerp was not quite deep enough to float an 80-gun ship with her guns and stores on board, Napoleon forced his brother Louis, the king of Holland, to cede to France, by treaty, the port of Flushing. By this acquisition, the French emperor became entire master of the entrance of the Scheldt, and possessed a capacious basin or harbour, in which a fleet of 20 sail of the line could lie in perfect readiness for sea. It has been doubted, whether line-of-battle ships, fully armed and provisioned, could pass in and out of the basin of Flushing; but a

French writer, when speaking of the advantages of the place to France, expressly says: "Elle était un arsenal supplémentaire où s'armaient les vaisseaux construits à Anvers." Admitting, therefore, that there was a sufficient depth of water, the French ships could lie in the basin secure from the ice, and be ready to put to sea in the winter months.

Nor was 20 sail of the line a number that the shores of the Scheldt alone might not very soon furnish. In the summer of the present year there were already at anchor to the south-east of the Calot sand, the following ten 74-gun ships, under the command of Rear-admiral Burgues-Missiessy: Charlemagne (flag), Albanais, Anversois, César, Commerce-de-Lyon, Dalmate, Dantzig, Duguesclin, Pulstuck (late Audacieux), and Ville-de-Berlin, late Thésée. These ships were only waiting for the absence of the British blockading force to put to sea. There were, also, on the stocks at Antwerp, the following two-deckers; one of them just ready to be launched, and several of the others in a very forward state: Auguste, Conquérant, Friedland (just ready), Illustre, Pacification, and Tilsitt, of 80 guns, and Gaulois, Superbe, and Trajan, of 74 guns. There was likewise one 74 on the stocks at Flushing; and, with respect to smaller vessels, two only of the five slips were vacant. The number of slips at the arsenal at Antwerp amounted to 19; ten close under or in front of the citadel, and nine a short distance to the south-west of it. The whole of these slips, it is believed, were calculated for ships of the largest size; and we doubt if a single slip was without the keel of some vessel of war, large or small.

Previous to the year 1804, the site of the arsenal was occupied by 1500 houses; all of which the sovereign will of Napoleon levelled with the dust, in order that he might carry on his ambitious projects against England. Nothing certainly could exceed the eligibility of the situation he had selected, as the resources for building from the Black Forest were inexhaustible. A tolerable idea may be formed of the state of Antwerp as a naval dépôt, from a knowledge of the fact, that, since the summer of 1805, or probably soon after he had begun to discover the impracticability of assembling off Boulogne his fleets from Brest and other western ports, Napoleon had expended upon the fortifications, basin, dockyard, and arsenal, 65 millions of francs, or 2,640,000*l.* sterling.

It was in the latter end of May that the British government first resolved to send an expedition against the French naval force in the Scheldt. A great portion of the English army

being at this time employed in Spain and Portugal, and a strong force, naval as well as military, being required for the purpose in view, it was not until two months afterwards that the expedition was ready to put to sea. In the mean time, principally by the aid of the English journals, its object was about as well known on the continent, as it was at the Horse Guards or the Admiralty.

On the 28th of July, at daybreak, the bulk of this immense expedition, consisting, when wholly assembled, of 37 sail of the line (four-fifths of the ships with their lower-deck guns out and their main hold prepared for the reception of horses), two 50-gun ships, three 44-gun ships, 23 frigates, one 20-gun ship, 31 ship and brig-sloops, five bomb-vessels, 23 gun-brigs, and about 120 sail of hired cutters, revenue-vessels, tenders, and gun-boats, making, in all, 245 vessels-of-war, accompanied by about 400 transports (measuring more than 100,000 tons), sailed from the Downs, the fleet commanded by Rear-admiral Sir Richard John Strachan, and the troops, numbering 39,219 men (including about 3000 cavalry), by Lieutenant-general the Earl of Chatham. The precise object of the expedition, as contained in the admiral's instructions, was, to capture or destroy the whole of the enemy's ships afloat in the Scheldt or building at Antwerp, to demolish the dockyards and arsenals at Antwerp, Terneuse, and Flushing, and, if possible, to render the Scheldt no longer navigable for ships-of-war. To facilitate the passage up the western Scheldt, Cadzand and the islands of Walcheren and Zuid-Beveland were to be occupied by divisions of the British troops.

On the same evening the two commanders-in-chief, in the 74-gun ship *Venerable*, Captain Sir Home Popham, accompanied by the 36-gun frigate *Amethyst*, Captain Sir Michael Seymour and several smaller vessels, anchored in the road of West-Kapelle, and were there joined by the 38-gun frigate *Fisgard*, Captain William Bolton, who had placed vessels as buoys on some of the shoals off the coast. After dark the Roompot channel was sounded, and vessels stationed at its entrance. On the 29th, in the morning, the transports containing Lieutenant-general Sir John Hope's division of the troops joined; and in the evening the whole under the direction of Rear-admiral Sir Richard Goodwin Keats in the 36-gun frigate *Salsette*, Captain Walter Bathurst, presented by Captain Sir Home Popham, who had removed from the *Venerable* to the ship-sloop *Sabrina*, Captain Edward Kittoe, anchored in safety between the islands of

Noord-Beveland and Schouwen, and nearly opposite to the town of Zierikzee upon the latter. On the same evening, and on the morning of the 30th, arrived Rear-admiral William Albany Otway, in the *Monarch* 74, with the left wing of the army, about 17,000 strong, under Lieutenant-general Sir Eyre Coote, destined to act exclusively against Walcheren, and intended to be landed on Domburg beach. The first intention had been to disembark the men in Zouteland bay, but intelligence received at Deal, of preparations to resist a landing, had occasioned Domburg to be preferred.

In the course of the 29th, a strong westerly wind sprang up, and raised such a surf on the western coast of Walcheren, that a landing at Domburg was considered impracticable. The same gale, on the morning of the 30th, obliged the ships-of-war and transports to seek shelter in the Roompot: and in the course of the forenoon the fleet, under the skilful guidance, as before, of Captain Sir Home Popham, anchored in safety off the *Veer-Gat*. Meanwhile the three divisions of the army, under the respective commands of Lieutenant-generals the Marquis of Huntley and Earl of Rosslyn, and Lieutenant-general Grosvenor, had arrived in the *Wieling* passage, preparatory to the meditated disembarkation of a part of that force on the coast of *Cadzand*, and to the passage of the remainder, as soon as the obstructions were removed, up the western *Scheldt*, to proceed to the attack of *Lillo*, *Liefkenshoek*, and finally of *Antwerp*.

On the 30th, at 4 h. 30 m. P.M., the British left wing, under the direction of Captains Lord Amelius Beauclerk of the *Royal Oak*, and George Cockburn of the *Belleisle*, 74s, and covered, in a very gallant manner, by the 10-gun hired cutter *Idas*, Lieutenant James Duncan, landed, with a slight opposition, but without any casualty, on the *Breed-Zand*, which forms the northern extremity of the island of Walcheren. On the same evening the British bomb-vessels and gun-boats, under the direction of Captain Sir Home Popham, then acting on shore with Earl Chatham, proceeded up to the *Veer-Gat*, and on the morning of the 31st opened a cannonade upon the town and fort of *Veer*; which latter mounted 38 guns, and was garrisoned by 600 men. Major-general Brues, the commander-in-chief of King Louis's forces in Zealand, had commanded at this fort; but, on the appearance of the first British column, he abandoned his post and crossed over to Zuid-Beveland. The command then devolved upon Colonel Van-Bogart.

The fire of the British was returned from the fort, and con-

tinued, with mutual spirit, till evening; when, the wind blowing fresh, and the strength of the tide not allowing the bomb-vessels to act, the flotilla fell back, having sustained a loss of three gun-boats, sunk by shot, but without, as it appears, the loss of a man of their crews. In the same evening Captain Charles Richardson, of the 80-gun ship *Cæsar*, and George William Blamey, of the 18-gun brig-sloop *Harpy*, who had landed on the 30th, with a brigade of seamen and nine pieces of ordnance, to co-operate with the army, threw several cases of Congreve rockets from the dike into the town of Veer. Since the peaceable surrender, on that morning, of the defenceless town of Middleburg, Veer had been invested on the land side by a division of troops under Lieutenant-general Fraser, detached for the purpose. The appearance of this force, and the incessant fire of the rockets, induced the Dutch commandant, Van-Bogart, in the course of the night, to send a flag of truce, offering to capitulate. The terms were agreed to: and on the following morning, the 1st of August, the town and fort of Veer surrendered to the British.

The army now marched on towards Flushing, and, by the surrender of Fort Rammekens on the 3rd, was enabled completely to invest the town. In the mean time Lieutenant-general Hope's division, under the able disposition of Rear-admiral Sir Richard Keats, had landed unopposed on the island of Zuid-Beveland, near Wemeldinge; and on the following night the Dutch Major-general Brues evacuated the important fortress of Bathz, without firing a shot, or even seeing the enemy, unless he so considered a patrol of 30 men, whom Lieutenant-general Hope had sent to reconnoitre the coast; and who were not slow in taking possession of a post which, in loyal hands, might have given a much larger force some trouble to reduce.

It was at about 8 h. 30 m. A.M. on the 29th of July, that the signal posts of Walcheren and Cadzand announced the appearance of the British off the coast; and immediately Rear-admiral Missiessy, from his anchorage off the Calot, weighed and stood up the Scheldt. By the next evening's tide the *Anversois*, *Commerce-de-Lyon*, *Dalmate*, *Dantzig*, *Duguesclin*, and *Pulstuck*, passed the boom of Lillo; and the *Charlemagne* would have passed also, but that the French admiral preferred anchoring below it, in order to be ready to succour, if necessary, the *Albanais*, *César*, and *Ville-de-Berlin*, who had been obliged to bring to between Bathz and Waerden. On the 1st of August, late in the evening, six French gun-brigs, that had been lying

in company with the three line-of-battle ships, weighed and made sail towards Antwerp; but the ships of the line remained at their anchors until a very few hours before the British were in possession of a fort, which would have completely obstructed their passage, and have rendered their capture or destruction almost certain. The escape of these ships lessened, in some degree, the importance of Bathz; but still it opened to the British both branches of the Scheldt, and commanded the finest and most extensive anchorage in the river, the bay of Saeftingen, where ships could lie completely out of reach of shot from the shore.

Owing to a defect in the arrangements, or to some misunderstanding respecting the degree of co-operation which was to be afforded, the three divisions of the army, in the transports at anchor in the Wieling passage, intended to occupy the island of Cadzand on the south-west side of the entrance to the Scheldt, were removed to the Veer-Gat, to be landed on Walcheren and Zuid-Beveland. This was a great relief to General Rousseau, commanding at Cadzand, who, until noon on the 30th, had with him only 300 men, and even after that day received but scanty reinforcements. They were sufficient, however, to enable him to take advantage of the seeming remissness of his enemy, and to send across reinforcements to the garrison of Flushing. By means of small schuyts, aided by a southerly wind, he succeeded, on the 1st and 2nd of August, in throwing in 1600 men; but he failed on the 3rd, owing to the gallant behaviour of the 16-gun brig-sloop *Raven*, Captain John Martin Hanchett.¹

At 5 h. 30 m. P.M. this brig, one of the small squadron under the command of Captain Edward William Campbell Rich Owen of the 38-gun frigate *Clyde*, at anchor in Steen-Diep, weighed, by signal, and stood in to cover the boats of the squadron, which, under the orders of Lieutenant Charles Burrough Strong, had been detached to sound and buoy the channel. In 10 minutes after she had weighed, the *Raven* became exposed to the fire of the Breskens battery, mounting, according to the

¹ This service was effectually performed by Captain Hanchett in a style of gallantry seldom surpassed, to the great delight and admiration of a large body of both army and navy, who were spectators of the action that very soon commenced between the *Raven* and the batteries on Cadzand and the whole sea-front of Flushing. The expenditure of the enemy in red-hot shot, grape, and shells upon the little brig, was sufficient to have destroyed fifty such vessels. She was handled and

fought in a manner that reflected the greatest credit and honour on her commander, and every individual on board. Latterly she became unmanageable from the wind falling, and having her topmast knocked over the side, her lower masts and all her spars badly wounded, sails and rigging cut to pieces. The ebb-tide drifted her out of gun-shot on a sand-bank, from which she was not extricated till the following morning."—*Capt. Scott's Recollections of a Naval Life*, vol. ii., p. 186.

French accounts, 20 heavy cannon, and six enormous mortars. The brig returned the fire, and, as she entered the Scheldt, received the fire of four other batteries on the Cadzand side, and of all those forming the sea front of Flushing. Notwithstanding the shower of red-hot shot and of shells and grape, directed against her from both sides of the channel, the Raven gallantly stood on, and assisted by two or three British gun-boats, drove the boats of the enemy back to the Cadzand shore. It was on her return from executing this service that the brig suffered. One shot cut the maintopmast in two just above the cap, and which, in falling, carried away the foretopmast. In this disabled state, the Raven continued exposed to a fire, which cut her sails and rigging to pieces, irreparably injured her mainmast, bowsprit, and main boom, struck her hull in several places, dismounted two of her guns, and wounded Captain Hanchett and eight seamen and marines. At length the tide, and the little sail she could set, drifted the Raven clear of the batteries; but, so unmanageable was the brig, that she struck on the Elboog sand, and did not get off until the following morning. On this day the communication was renewed without interruption, and by the evening of the 6th, as many as 3143 men had crossed over; a reinforcement which augmented the garrison of Flushing to 7000 men.

The surrender of the fort of Rammekens having opened to the British the passage of the Sloe channel, immediate measures were taken to get the flotilla, which had acted against Veer, into the western Scheldt; in order that a portion of it might prevent any further succours from being thrown into Flushing, either from Cadzand or the canal of Ghent, and another portion proceed up the western Scheldt, to co-operate with that under Rear-admiral Sir Richard Keats. Bad weather and the intricacy of the navigation made it the 6th of August before the sea-blockade of Flushing, by means of the flotilla, could be effectually established. On the 9th a strong division, under the orders of Captain Sir Home Popham, was detached up the western Scheldt, with directions to sound and buoy the Baerlandt channel to enable the larger ships to advance; and the following 10 frigates, under the command of Captain Lord William Stuart, were waiting only till the weather permitted, also to proceed up the western Scheldt:—

Gun-ship.

40	Lavinia	Captain Lord William Stuart.
38	{ Perlen	,, Norborne Thompson.
	{ Rota	,, Philip Somerville.
36	{ Statira	,, Charles Worsley Boys.
	{ Amethyst	,, Sir Michael Seymour, Bart.
	{ Aigle	,, George Wolfe.
	{ Euryalus	,, Hon. G. Heneage Law Dundas.
36	{ Dryad	,, Edward Galwey.
	{ Nymphen	,, Keith Maxwell.
32	Heroine	,, Hood Hanway Christian.

On the 11th, in the afternoon, a light air from the westward springing up, Lord William, with his squadron, in the following order of battle in line ahead, Lavinia, Heroine, Amethyst, Rota, Nymphen, Aigle, Euryalus, Statira, Dryad, and Perlen, forced the passage between the batteries of Flushing and Cadzand; and, although from the lightness of the wind and an adverse tide the ships were exposed to the enemy's fire during two hours, no greater loss was sustained than two men killed and nine wounded; namely, the Amethyst, one seaman killed and one wounded; Heroine two wounded, and Perlen the same; and Aigle one marine killed, and one lieutenant of marines (Henry Loveday Vine), one schoolmaster (Thomas Donovan), one seaman, and one boy wounded. The Aigle was the only ship of the 10 that sustained any material damage: a shell fell through her decks into the bread-room, and, exploding there, shattered her stern-frame greatly, and occasioned the whole of her loss.

At the upper part of the Scheldt, a fruitless attack had been made by Rear-admiral Missiessy's flotilla upon the fort of Balthz; and the increased strength of the British flotilla, commanded by Sir Richard Keats, had obliged the French admiral to retire beyond the boom at Lillo. Five of the French 74s subsequently proceeded a short distance above Antwerp, and the whole 10 lay, as plainly seen from the more advanced vessels of the British flotilla, with topgallant-yards across.

It had been arranged that the squadron of seven effective or full-armed line-of-battle ships, under the command of Rear-admiral Lord Gardner, lying at anchor in the Deurloo passage, off Dykeshook, should co-operate with the army in cannonading Flushing. Accordingly, on the 12th, Rear-admiral Sir Richard Strachan hoisted his flag on board the *St. Domingo*, to be ready to stand into the river the instant the British batteries opened their fire. The force under the rear-admiral, assembled for this purpose, consisted of the

Gun-ship.

74	{	St. Domingo . . .	{ Rear-admiral (w.) Sir R. John Strachan, Bart.
			{ Captain Charles Gill.
	{	Blake	{ Rear-admiral (b.) Alan Hyde Lord Gardner.
			{ Captain Edward Codrington.
		Repulse	Hon. Arthur Kaye Legge.
		Dannemark	James Bissett.
		Victorious	Graham Eden Hamond.
	Audacious	Donald Campbell.	
	Venerable	Andrew King, <i>acting</i> .	

On the 13th, at 1 h. 30 m. P.M., a fire was opened upon Flushing from 52 pieces of heavy ordnance, and in the evening from six additional 24-pounders. A division of bomb and gun vessels, under the command of Captain Cockburn of the Belleisle, who had removed for the purpose on board the 18-gun ship-sloop Plover, Captain Philip Browne, was stationed off the south-east, and a similar division, under Captain Owen, of the Clyde, off the south-west end of the town; both divisions maintaining an incessant and well-directed fire. Owing to the scantiness of the wind, Sir Richard Strachan's squadron could not get under way when the bombardment commenced on the part of the army; but on the 14th, at 10 A.M., the ships, in the following order, St. Domingo, Blake, Repulse, Victorious, Dannemark, Audacious, and Venerable, weighed and stood in. The St. Domingo, soon after she had opened her fire, grounded on the inner edge of the Dog sand; and the Blake, in attempting to pass inside of her leader, of whose grounded state she was not aware, was equally unfortunate. The remaining ships, by signal, then hauled off and anchored. In about three hours the St. Domingo and Blake got off and anchored with the others. At 4 P.M. the fire of the garrison ceased. A summons was immediately sent in; but, no satisfactory answer being returned, the bombardment recommenced at night, and was kept up, without intermission, until 2 P.M. on the 15th, when the French commandant, General Monnet, offered to surrender. The terms of capitulation were agreed to in the course of the day, and at 3 A.M. on the 16th the ratifications were exchanged.

The loss sustained by the British, in reducing this important place, was, comparatively speaking, of inconsiderable amount. The St. Domingo and Blake, being, from their having grounded, by far the most exposed, were the only ships of the squadron that suffered any loss, and that consisted of only two men killed on board the Blake, and 18 (nine each) wounded between them. The Blake was several times set on fire by hot shot, and was

considerably damaged in hull, masts, and rigging. The loss on board the flotilla amounted to one lieutenant (George Rennie) and six men killed, and one lieutenant, one surgeon (Robert Russell and Robert Burnside), and 20 men wounded; and the loss on the part of the brigade of seamen serving on shore under Captain Richardson, and who greatly distinguished themselves, was one midshipman (Edward Harrick) and six men wounded. This, with the Raven's loss and the loss by Lord William Stuart's frigate-squadron, makes nine killed and 55 wounded as the aggregate loss on the part of the navy. The lieutenants, serving in the above brigade of seamen engaged at the batteries before Flushing, appear to have been, John Wyborn, Richard St.-Loo Nicholson, Eaton Travers, Stephen Hilton, John Allen Meadway, and John Netherton O'Brien Hall. The army appears to have sustained, at the bombardment and at the different skirmishes that had preceded it, a loss of 103 killed, and 443 wounded; making the total loss on the British side, up to the surrender of Flushing, 112 killed and 498 wounded.

Of the French loss no account has been given, except on one extraordinary occasion. On the 16th of August the British 38-gun frigate *Impérieuse*, Captain Thomas Garth, in ascending the Scheldt after the other frigates, entered by mistake the Terneuse, instead of the Baerlandt channel, and became in consequence exposed to the fire of the Terneuse battery. In returning that fire, the frigate discharged from her carronades some Shrapnel shells; one of which, bursting near the magazine of the fort, containing 3000 barrels of powder, and a great quantity of cartridges, caused an explosion that killed 75 men. The battery fired no more, and the *Impérieuse* passed on.

If we except the peaceable surrender, on the 17th of August, to the combined forces under the Earl of Rosslyn and Sir Richard Keats, of the islands of Schouwen and Duiveland, situated to the northward of the eastern Scheldt, and far enough from the French fleet at Antwerp, the reduction of Flushing was the virtual termination of the campaign. On the 21st the Earl of Chatham removed his head-quarters from Middleburg to Veer; and, crossing the Sloe, arrived on the 23rd at Goes, the head-quarters of Sir John Hope. In consequence of the accumulating force at Cadzand, it had been considered proper to leave as many as 10,000 men in possession of Walcheren; consequently there were 28,000 applicable to the remaining objects of the expedition, the reduction, successively, of Lillo, Liefkenshoech, and Antwerp. Each of the two first-named forts mounted,

according to the French accounts, 40 pieces of heavy cannon, and were at this time strongly garrisoned.

It was now discovered by the British general, that the French forces at these places and at Berg-op-Zoom amounted to upwards of 35,000 men. Moreover an alarming sickness, since the 19th, had begun to show itself in the British camp. The principal cause, no doubt, was the inundation of the country, the French having cut the dike to the right of the town. The Earl of Chatham learnt also, for the first time, that Antwerp was strongly fortified; that the approaches to it could be completely inundated; that the citadel commanded the arsenal and dock-yard; that the ships-of-war, with their guns and stores in, could retire to a spot within one mile of Rupplemonde, which is five miles above Antwerp; and that, by taking out their guns and stores, they could go to Dendermonde, a fortified town situated 15 miles higher. These and other causes led to a council of war on the 26th; and a council of war, as it more commonly does, determined, that to abandon the enterprise was better than to run the risk of failing to accomplish it.

The British immediately began the evacuation of Zuid-Beveland, and by the 4th of September not a sail was to be seen in the road of Saeftingen. Leaving a sufficient force to occupy Walcheren, the Earl of Chatham and the bulk of the army embarked at Veer, Rammekens, and Flushing. Towards the end of the year, when the healthy season was just commencing, the British government gave orders to withdraw the troops from Walcheren. Accordingly, the embarkation took place in the early part of December; the basin, arsenal, and sea-defences of Flushing having previously been blown up and destroyed, and the place rendered, for a time at least, utterly useless to the French emperor as a naval depôt. Of the three vessels on the stocks, two, a frigate and brig, were destroyed; but the timbers of the 74 were brought away, and, being put together at Woolwich dock-yard, produced, by the year 1812, the Chatham, of 1860 tons. A fine new frigate of 1104 tons, the *Fidelle*, also fell into the hands of the British, and was afterwards commissioned as a 38, and named the *Laurel*.

The far-famed expedition to the Scheldt partaking less of a naval than of a military character, we shall not venture many remarks upon the lamentable issue that attended it. We will first transcribe a few observations which a French writer has made upon what he considers ought to have been the plan of the campaign. "Blankenberg," he says, "is the point of the

coast the most conveniently situated for the disembarkation of a body of troops destined for the invasion of Flanders. From this spot a paved road runs straight to Antwerp. Its length is 26 leagues; it passes through Bruges and Ghent. These two cities, at this time the capitals of rich and populous departments, which indirect taxation was harassing more than the conscription, would have supplied few recruits; but, in taking up a position there, the English would give to their plans an air of importance, convert to their use the resources of this fertile country, occasion a momentary inquietude and fear, and paralyze the zeal of those Belgians who, from interest, were devoted to France. From the Downs to Blankenberg is 20 leagues; and the passage could be so managed that the fleet should arrive at the break of day. The disembarkation would be accomplished without striking a blow, and Bruges be immediately occupied. The light detachments would then advance upon Sluis, a dismantled fort, and then by Moldeghem and Caprike, upon Ghent. A division of 10,000 or 12,000 men should also march upon Courtray, with orders to push forward a party and retain a communication with Ghent by the great road of Menin. At length the main body of the army arrives, by forced marches, at the Tête de Flandre and Liefkenshoek, both of which it carries in a trice. Meanwhile the English fleet appears at the mouth of the Scheldt, and is now able, with some prospect of success, to commence operations in combination with the army. Any one may convince himself," says the writer, "by referring to the map, that this object may be attained, as far as relates to the journey, in 72 hours after the disembarkation has been effected at Blankenberg."

Could, as the French writer supposes, all this have been accomplished, the dockyard and arsenal at Antwerp might easily have been destroyed; for, until the 2nd or 3rd of August, the garrison consisted of a mere handful of men. The 10 sail of the line, four frigates, and 40 or 50 gun-brigs, must then either have set fire to themselves or have submitted to be captured. No other alternative remained to them. What a contrast this presents to that which really was done. Nor did the expense, which a million sterling would not cover, nor the disgrace, which no sophistry could gloss over, comprise all the mischief caused by this ill-planned, ill-timed, and ill-executed expedition: the official returns show, that upwards of 14,000 officers and men were made sick by the unhealthy climate of

¹ For the original see Appendix, No. 23.

Walcheren. And although, according to the same returns, not many more than composed a fourth part of that number died of the "Polder fever," scarcely one who is alive at this day but carries in his frame some unsubdued portion of the disease; some rheumatic affection or periodical ague-fit, forcing upon his recollection the share he had in an expedition, which, for the credit of its planners and the honour of their country, it were better, on every account, could be buried in oblivion.

The expedition to the Scheldt was ill-planned, because General the Earl of Chatham, as he admitted in his examination before the Committee of the House of Commons appointed to inquire into the cause of the failure, did not, at the time of his departure from England, know to what extent Antwerp was fortified; nor whether the citadel commanded the dockyard; nor, in short, anything about the place he was going to attack. It was ill-timed, because the sickly season had actually commenced a few days before the expedition sailed from the Downs; and it was ill-executed, as evinced by the manner in which the attack was made (take the failure to occupy Cadzand as one instance), and by the notorious tardiness of the military commander-in-chief. The French say of the Earl of Chatham, that he was the most temporizing general in the British army, "*le plus temporisateur des généraux de l'armée Britannique;*"¹ and further, that "his countrymen reproached him with being occupied almost exclusively about his health and his turtle-soup,* instead of troubling himself with the details of the expedition placed under his command." "*Ses compatriotes lui ont fait le reproche de s'être occupé presque exclusivement de sa santé et du soin d'avoir de bon bouillon de tortue, au lieu de se livrer aux détails de l'expédition qui lui était confiée.*" We now quit the fogs and damp of the Scheldt, for the more genial climate of the Mediterranean.

The rival commanders-in-chief on that station were still, as at the close of the preceding year, Vice-admirals Ganteaume and Lord Collingwood. On or about the 26th of April, during a period of unavoidable absence on the part of the blockading fleet, a French squadron, of five sail of the line, two frigates, one corvette, and 16 brigs and settees, under the command of Rear-admiral Baudin in the 80-gun ship *Robuste*, sailed from Toulon roads with troops and provisions for the relief of Barcelona. It appears that the ships arrived there, landed their succours, and returned to Toulon in the middle of May, followed, at no very

¹ *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xix., p. 268.

great distance, by the fleet of Lord Collingwood; who, with 11 sail of the line, resumed the blockade of the port.

By the early part of October the fleet at anchor in Toulon road consisted of the following 15 sail of the line, exclusive of six Russian sail of the line, six or seven French frigates, and several armed transports and store-ships, either the whole fleet, or a division of it, waiting for a second opportunity to throw supplies into Barcelona.

Gun-ship.

130	Austerlitz . . .	{ Vice-admiral Zac.-J.-Théod. Allemand. Captain André-Louis Gaultier.
		{ Admiral Honoré Ganteaume.
120	{ Majestueux . . .	{ Captain Pierre-François Violette.
	{ Commerce-de-Paris	{ ,, Romain Duranteau.
		{ Rear-admiral Ju.-M. Cosamo-Keijulien.
		{ Captain Gabriel-Auguste Brouard.
80	{ Robuste . . .	{ Rear-admiral François-André Baudin.
	{ Donawerth . . .	{ Captain François Legras.
		{ ,, Louis-An.-Cyprien Infernet.
	{ Ajax . . .	{ ,, Jean-Nicholas Petit.
	{ Gênois . . .	{ ,, Ant.-Marie-Fran. Montalan.
	{ Breslau . . .	{ ,, Joseph Allemand.
	{ Borée . . .	{ ,, Gaspard Laignel.
74	{ Suffren . . .	{ ,, Auguste-François Louvel.
	{ Annibal . . .	{ ,, L.-C.-A. La Marre-la-Meillerie.
	{ Magnanime . . .	{ ,, Nicolas Jugan.
	{ Danube . . .	{ ,, Antoine Henri.
	{ Lion . . .	{ ,, Eus.-Marie-Joseph Bonami.
	{ Ulm . . .	{ ,, C.-J.-César Channay Duclos

Having received information that M. Ganteaume, with his 15 sail of the line and frigates, meant to make the attempt, Vice-admiral Lord Collingwood retired from his station off Cape Sicie, and, with 15 sail of the line and five or six frigates and sloops, proceeded off Cape San-Sebastian; between which and Barcelona he established his cruising-ground, in the full expectation of intercepting the French admiral on his way to the latter port. In the mean time Lord Collingwood had not neglected the usual precaution of stationing frigates off the port of Toulon to watch the movements of the French fleet. The 38-gun frigates Pomone, Captain Robert Barrie, and Alceste, Captain Murray Maxwell, from the tried zeal and activity of their commanders, were well calculated for such a service.

On the 21st, in the morning, Rear-admiral Baudin, with the Robuste, Borée, and Lion, the two 40-gun frigates Pauline and Pomone, and a fleet of armed store-ships and transports, sailed from Toulon, with an easterly wind, bound to Barcelona. At

noon the British frigate Pomone descried the enemy, and made sail to the west-south-west. On the next morning Captain Barrie spoke the Alceste, and at 9 P.M. fell in with Lord Collingwood, then, with 15 sail of the line, three frigates, and a ship-sloop, cruising off the coast of Catalonia, between Cape San-Sebastian and Barcelona.

Judging that as the squadron, or fleet, for Captain Barrie did not know but that the whole French force might be coming out, had sailed with the first of an easterly wind, it was bound to the westward, the British admiral prepared his fleet for battle, and stationed his frigates to windward, to give notice of the enemy's approach. On the 23rd, at 8 A.M., the 38-gun frigate Volontaire, Captain Charles Bullen, made the signal for a fleet to the eastward. As the vessels of it continued to come down before the wind, Lord Collingwood made no alteration in the fleet, beyond advancing two fast-sailing ships, the Tigre and Bulwark. At 10 A.M. the English Pomone made the signal that the enemy, now seen to consist of three ships of the line instead of seven, as had at first been signalled, had hauled to the wind. Immediately Rear-admiral Martin, with eight of the best-sailing ships, was ordered to chase in the east-north-east. At 3 P.M. the three French line-of-battle ships and two frigates separated from the convoy; the latter steering north-north-west, in great confusion, and the former east-south-east, with the wind at north-east. The English Pomone being well to windward, got hold of a part of the convoy, two brigs, two bombards, and a ketch, and in the evening destroyed them; but the remainder of the convoy and the five men-of-war were shortly afterwards lost sight of by the British fleet.

At 8 P.M. Rear-admiral Martin, judging that the French would push for their own coast, tacked to the northward, the wind then about east. Shortly afterwards two of the chasing ships accidentally parted company, leaving the rear-admiral with the following six sail of the line:—

Gun-ship.

80	Canopus	{ Rear-admiral (r.) George Martin.
		{ Captain Charles Inglis.
74	{ Renown	,, Philip Charles Durham.
	{ Tigre	,, Benjamin Hallowell.
	{ Sultan	,, Edward Griffith.
	{ Leviathan	,, John Harvey.
	{ Cumberland	,, Hon. Philip Wodehouse.

The ships continued under a press of sail all night of the 23rd, but saw nothing of the enemy until 5 P.M. on the 24th; when

the *Tigre*, the headmost ship, made the signal for four sail in the north-north-east. These were the *Robuste*, *Borée*, *Lion*, and *Pauline*; the *Pomone* having previously parted company and steered for *Marseille*. Every stitch of canvas was now set by the British ships, in the hope to bring their opponents to an action before dark. But this could not be accomplished; and at dark Rear-admiral *Martin*, owing to the proximity of the land, the shoalness of the water, and the circumstance of the wind blowing directly on the shore, was obliged to haul off for the night.

On the 25th, at 7 A.M., the French ships again discovered themselves in the north, running along-shore with a fresh breeze from the south-east. Instantly all sail was again set in chase; and the British ships, nearing the land as well as the enemy, prepared for anchoring with springs. At 11 h. 45 m. A.M., the *Robuste* and *Lion*, putting their helms up, ran themselves on shore, within pistol-shot of each other, at a spot about six miles north-east of the harbour of *Cette*, and near to the village of *Frontignan*. The *Borée* and *Pauline*, closely pressed by the *Tigre* and *Leviathan*, and the first fired at by the *Tigre*, succeeded in reaching *Cette* harbour; but which scarcely contained depth enough to float them. Owing to the shoalness of the water upon the coast, and the intricacy of the navigation, the British ships, some of which had already got into seven and others into five fathoms, hauled their wind and stood off.

At 1 P.M., finding it impossible to save his ships, *M. Baudin* began dismantling them and landing the crews; and at 4 P.M. the mizenmasts of both ships went by the board. At dark the British ships stood to the southward, and in the night tacked, with the intention of being close in with the wrecks by daylight on the 26th: but, the wind falling, they did not regain a sight of them until evening. At 7 h. 30 m. P.M., both French ships, now with only a foremast between them, were set on fire by their crews. At 8 P.M. the *Robuste* and *Lion* were in flames fore and aft, and at 10 h. 30 m. P.M. blew up with a tremendous explosion; the British squadron then lying nearly becalmed about seven miles from the spot.

Having thus, by his energy and perseverance, caused the entire loss to France of a new 80 and a fine 74 gun ship, and having left in jeopardy a new 74 and a fine large frigate, Rear-admiral *Martin*, with his six sail of the line, stood away to the southward; and on the 30th, in the morning, rejoined Lord *Collingwood*, then, with 10 sail of the line (the *Conqueror* having

recently joined), cruising off Cape San-Sebastian. Lord Collingwood soon ascertained that the five ships-of-war, the failure of whose mission we have just done recording, were the whole that had sailed out of Toulon, the blockade of which port his lordship resumed. It appears, however, that both the *Borée* and *Pauline* afterwards managed to get into the road from their insecure anchorage at Cette.

After the capture of the five vessels of M. Baudin's convoy by the British frigate *Pomone*, the remainder, consisting of seven merchant-vessels, in charge of the armed store-ship *Lamproic*, of 16 long 8-pounders and 116 men, commanded by Lieutenant de vaisseau Jacques-Marie Bertaud-la-Bretèche, two armed bombards, the *Victoire* and *Grondeur*, and the armed xebec *Normande*, put into the bay of Rosas, and anchored under the protection of the castle of that name, of Fort Trinidad, and of other strong batteries in the neighbourhood. Resolving to attempt the capture or destruction of these vessels, Lord Collingwood detached Captain Hallowell, with the *Tigre*, *Cumberland*, and *Volontaire*, also the frigates *Apollo* and *Topaze*, Captains Bridges Watkinson Taylor, and Henry Hope, and brig-sloops *Philomel*, *Scout*, and *Tuscan*, Captains George Crawley, William Raitt, and John Wilson.

On the evening of the 31st of October, after dark, the squadron bore up, with a fresh south-east wind, for the bay of Rosas; and soon afterwards the five ships came to an anchor about five miles from the town of Rosas; but the brigs, as had been ordered, remained under way. The boats of the squadron were then armed and manned; and, owing to the care that, in this instance, had been taken to insert the names of the officers in the London Gazette, we are enabled also to give them.

Boats of the *Tigre*: Lieutenants John Tailour, Augustus William James Clifford, Edward Boxer, William Waterface, William Hamilton, and John Brulton; master's mates James Caldwell and Joshua Kynson; midshipmen Day Richard Syer, Honourable Robert Churchill Spencer, Henry Fawcett, George Francis Bridges, George Sandys, James Athill, Honourable George James Percival, James Montagu, and Frederick Noel; and assistant surgeon Alexander Hosack. *Cumberland*: Lieutenants John Murray, Richard Stuart and William Bradley, Captain of marines Edward Bailie, master's mate John Webster, and midshipmen Charles Robert Milbourne, Henry Wise, William Hollinshed Brady, and Annesley Blackmore. *Apollo*: Lieutenants James Begbie, Robert Cutts Barton, and John Forster;

master's mates Henry William de Chair and William Plant; midshipmen James Dunderdale and Henry Lancaster, and captain's clerk John Oliver French. *Topaze*: Lieutenants Charles Hammond, James Dunn, William Rawlins, and David Lord Balgonie (Ville-de-Paris); lieutenant of marines William Halsted, master's mate Alexander Boyter, carpenter Thomas Cauty, and midshipmen Joseph Hume, Hungerford Luthill, and Harry Nicholas. *Volontaire*: Lieutenants Dalhousie Tait, Samuel Sison, and Honourable J. A. Maude (Ville-de-Paris); lieutenants of marines William Burton and Duncan Campbell, master's mates John Bannatyne and Thomas Randall, midshipmen Richard Stephen Harness, Henry John Leeke, and John Armstead (Ville-de-Paris); and carpenter William Middleton. *Scout*: Lieutenants John Tarrant and Honourable William Waldegrave, and midshipman John Davy; the two latter from the Ville-de-Paris. *Tuscan*: Lieutenant Pasco Dunn, master's mates John M'Dougall and Charles Gray (both from Ville-de-Paris), and midshipman John Stiddy. The names of the officers in the Philomel's boats do not appear in the Gazette.

Every suitable arrangement having previously been made, the boats, commanded by Lieutenant John Tailour, first of the *Tigre*, pushed off, with characteristic ardour, to execute the business assigned them. As if apprehensive that an attack would be made upon him, M. Bertaud-la-Bretèche had made every preparation to meet and repel it. The *Lamproie* was enclosed in boarding-nettings, and a gun-boat, or armed launch, advanced ahead of her, to give notice of the enemy's approach: the bombards and xebec, and the batteries on shore, were also on the alert. The boats approached, the alarm-gun fired; and, rending the air with their cheers, the British seamen and marines stretched out, each division of boats taking its allotted part.

The *Lamproie* was boarded at all points, and, notwithstanding a very spirited resistance, was carried in a few minutes. The *Victoire*, *Grondeur*, *Normande*, and a felucca armed with musketry, defended with equal gallantry, shared the same fate. All this was effected in the face of a heavy fire from the castle of Rosas, Fort Trinidad, and several other batteries,¹ and of repeated volleys of musketry from troops assembled on the beach. Notwithstanding that the force opposed to the British was double what they had reason to expect, such was their alacrity in subduing it, that, at the opening of day on the 1st of Novem-

¹ See p. 344.

ber, every French vessel of the 11 was either burnt at her moorings, or brought off by the aid of a light air of wind from the land.

The loss sustained by the British was severe, but not more so than might have been expected from the opposition they experienced. It amounted to one lieutenant (Tait), one master's mate (Caldwell), 10 seamen, one sergeant and two privates of marines killed, two lieutenants (Tailour and Forster), one midshipman (Syer), seven seamen, one private of marines severely, and three lieutenants (Stuart, Maude, and Begbie), one master's mate (Webster), two midshipmen (Brady and Armstead), 28 seamen, five privates of marines slightly wounded; total, 15 killed and 55 wounded. The loss on the part of the French has not been recorded: but, from the obstinacy of their resistance, it must have been extremely severe. While in the act of boarding the French commodore's ship, Lieutenant Tailour received a most distressing wound by a pike on the side of his head, near the temple, but, stanching the blood by means of a knotted handkerchief, was again among the foremost in the fight. Had he not possessed sufficient presence of mind immediately to apply this ready species of tourniquet, the thrust would have proved mortal. Lieutenant Tailour, as the lists inform us, obtained the just reward of his gallantry, in being immediately promoted to the rank of commander.

In the month of October in this year, the islands of Zante, Cephalonia, and their dependencies, surrendered, without opposition, to a combined naval and military force under the respective commands of Captain John William Spranger of the British 74-gun ship *Warrior*, and of Brigadier-general John Oswald. The island of Cerigo surrendered, upon similar terms, to Captain Jahleel Brenton of the British 38-gun frigate *Spartan*, and a division of troops under the command of Major Charles William Clarke, of the 35th regiment; as did also the island of Ithaca to the brig-sloop *Philomel*, Captain George Crawley, and a small detachment of troops under Captain Church of the army. By these vigorous measures, the inhabitants of these islands were liberated from the oppression of the French, and the septinsular republic was declared to be restored.



APPENDIX.

No. 1.—See p. 59.

By the Honourable William Cornwallis,
Admiral of the White,
Commander-in-chief,
&c. &c. &c.
Channel Fleet.

Your Lordship is hereby required and directed, in the ship you command, to proceed across the Bay of Biscay, with all expedition, to join Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder, who was stationed (before the action) to look out for the enemy from thirty to forty leagues west of Cape Finisterre. Your Lordship will be very careful to obtain intelligence of the Enemy's squadrons, if either of them should have put to sea from Rochfort or Ferrol, and to give the earliest information, where you may from circumstances believe them to be bound. And if you should fall in with a squadron of the Enemy's ships, continue, if possible, in sight, until you can ascertain their route, and then push on before them to make it known to me, or the officer commanding on that station, to which they seem to point their course.

Your Lordship is to follow Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder's orders if you fall in with him; otherwise you are to return and join me off Ushant, when the water on board the ship you command gets low.

Inclosed* is a direction from the Vice-Admiral for any of his Majesty's ships which may be sent to look for him.

Given on board the Ville-de-Paris,
off Ushant, 29th July, 1805,
WILLIAM CORNWALLIS

To the Right Honourable
Lord William Fitz Roy,
Captain of his Majesty's Ship *Æolus*.

No. 1.—*continued.**(*Copy.*)Prince of Wales, 25th July, 1805,
at noon.

I shall part company with you this day, and make the best of my way to the rendezvous off Cape Finisterre, with the hope of falling in with Lord Nelson; if upon not finding his Lordship there in a short time after my arrival, I shall then proceed in search of the combined Squadrons supposed to be gone for Ferrol.

ROBERT CALDER.

To Captain Boyles,
Windsor Castle.

No. 2. See p. 59.

*(*Secret.*)Ville-de-Paris, off Ushant,
29th July, 1805.

My Lord,

In addition to the Orders given you this morning, I now send you, having this moment received it by the Nile, Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder's Rendezvous, No. 52,¹ on which he intends to cruise for a few days, and afterwards to leave the Dragon there for a week.

Your Lordship will therefore proceed, taking charge of the inclosed despatch for the Vice-admiral: but on your not falling in with, or getting any information of him, or intelligence of the enemy, you are, at the expiration of *seven* days, to rejoin me, after looking out for him.

I have the honour to be,

Your Lordship's obedient servant,

WM. CORNWALLIS.

To the Right Honourable
Lord William Fitz Roy,
Captain of his Majesty's Ship *Æolus*.

¹ Cape Finisterre S. E. thirty-eight leagues.

No. 3. See p. 87.

A List of Ships of the Line and Frigates, doubled and sheathed, &c.

Gun-ship.		Strengthened with diagonal braces.	
98	{ Formidable . . . }	From top of the side down to eight strakes	Braced.
	{ London . . . }	under the wale	
	{ Prince George . . . }	
80	{ Cæsar . . . }	From ditto down to six strakes under the wale	Ditto.
	{ Gibraltar . . . }	From lower sill of upper-deck ports to between the floor and first futtock-heads	
74	{ Pompée . . . }	From top of side down to eight strakes	Ditto.
	{ Audacious . . . }	under the wale	
	{ Bellona . . . }	From lower sill of upper-deck ports down to keel	
	{ Canada . . . }	From ditto down to between the floor and first futtock-heads	
	{ Captain . . . }	From top of side down to six strakes under the wale	
	{ Edgar . . . }	From upper part of wales to keel	
	{ Ganges . . . }	Same as Gibraltar.	
	{ Majestic . . . }	Main wales only.	
	{ Powerful . . . }	From lower sill of gundeck ports	
	{ Resolution . . . }	From upper part of wales to first futtock-heads	
64	{ Thunderer . . . }	Ditto.
	{ Zealous . . . }	From lower sill of gundeck to keel	
	{ Africa . . . }	With 3-inch deal from ports to first futtock-heads and thence to keel with inch stuff.	
	{ Belliqueux . . . }	As low as first futtock-heads with 3-inch stuff.	
	{ Dictator . . . }	Same as Africa.	
	{ Nassau . . . }	With 2-inch stuff from gun-deck ports to keel.	
	{ Stately . . . }	Same as Belliqueux.	
Gun-frig.			
38	{ Sibylle . . . }	On bottom with 1½ inch stuff.	
	{ Virginie . . . }	With fir 1½ inch thick, from wales downwards.	
36	{ Thetis . . . }	From ports to keel with 3-inch deal.	
	{ Unité . . . }	On bottom with inch board.	
	{ Thalia . . . }	With inch stuff from second strake below floor heads to keel.	

Also six 12 and 9 pounder frigates and one storeship.

No. 4.—See p. 87.

A List of Ships of the Line and Frigates, late belonging to the French Navy, Captured, Destroyed, Wrecked, Foundered, or Accidentally Burnt, during the year 1805.

	Name.	How, when, and where Lost.
Gun-ship.		
80	(K) Formidable	} Captured, November 3, by a British squadron under Sir Richard John Strachan.
74	(M) Duguay-Trouin	
	" Mont-Blanc	
	" Scipion	} Wrecked, October 24 or 25, off Rota, near Cadiz.
80	" Indomptable	
	.. Bucentaure, <i>rec.</i>	} Captured October 21, at the battle of Trafalgar. The Achille was accidentally burnt before possession could be taken; and the Bucentaure and Algésiras were recaptured, but the former was wrecked immediately afterwards. The remainder of the prizes, except the Swiftsure, were lost or destroyed.
	.. Achille	
	.. Aigle	
	.. Algésiras, <i>rec.</i>	
74	.. <i>Berwick</i>	
	.. Fougueux	} Captured, December 24, by the Egyptienne and Loire, off Roche fort.
	.. Intépide	
	.. Reboutable	
	(O) <i>Swiftsure</i>	} Recaptured with Ville-de-Milan.
Gun-frig.		
	.. Atalante	} Wrecked December, near the Cape of Good Hope.
40	(Z) Didon	
	" Ville-de-Milau	} Captured, August 10, by the Phœnix frigate, off Cape Finisterre.
	.. Libre	
38	.. Libre	} Captured, February 23, by the Leander 50, Halifax station.
	(H) <i>Cleopatra</i>	
32	(G) <i>Psyché</i>	} Captured, February 14, by the British frigate San-Fiorenzo, East Indies.

No Dutch vessel-of-war above a gun-brig taken in 1805.

No. 5.—See p. 87.

A List of Ships of the Line and Frigates, late belonging to the Spanish Navy, Captured, Destroyed, Wrecked, Foundered, or Accidentally Burnt, during the year 1805.

Name.		How, when, and where Lost.
Gun-ship.		
80 (K)	San-Rafaël	} Captured, July 22, by Sir Robert Calder, off Cape Finisterre.
74 (N)	Firme	
130	.. Santisima-Trinidad.	} Captured, October 21, at the battle of Trafalgar, Santa-Ana and Neptuno recaptured; Rayo (captured 24th) wrecked; and Santisima-Trinidad, Monarca, and San-Augustin, destroyed by the British.
112	.. Santa-Ana, <i>rec.</i>	
100	.. Rayo	
80 {	.. Argonauta	
	.. Neptuno, <i>rec.</i>	
74 {	.. Bahama	
	.. Monarca	
	.. San-Augustin	
(N)	San-Ildefonso	
..	San-Juan Nepomuceno.	

No. 6. See p. 87.

An Abstract of French and Spanish Ships of the Line and Frigates, Captured, (not reckoning those recaptured immediately afterwards), &c., during the year 1805.

	Lost through the Enemy.		Lost through Accident.			Total loss to the F. & S. Navies.	Total added to the British Navy.
	Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.		
Ships of the Line	{Fr. 12	..	1	13	5
	{Sp. 10	..	1	11	5
Frigates	Fr. 5	..	1	6	4
Total	27	..	3	.	..	30	14

No. 7.—See p. 87.

A List of Ships and Vessels late belonging to the British Navy, Captured, Destroyed, Wrecked, Foundered, or Accidentally Burnt, during the year 1805.

	Name.	Commander.	How, when, and where Lost.	
Gun-ship.				
54	(S) Calcutta .	Daniel Woodriff .	{ Captured, Sept. 26, by a French squadron, near Scilly. Wrecked, January 7, in a gale off Trincomalée bay, Ceylon: crew saved.	
44	(V) Sheerness .	Lord George Stuart		
Gun-frig.				
36	(C) Blanche .	Zachary Mudge. .	{ Captured, July 19, by a French frigate, two corvettes, and a brig, West Indies. Wrecked, Jan. 21, on a sunken rock in Quiberon bay: crew saved.	
	„	Doris .		Patrick Campbell .
32	(H) Cleopatra .	Sir R. Laurie, Bart.	{ Captured, Feb. 17, by the Ville- de-Milan French frig. off the coast of North America.	
Ship-slp.				
	(Q) Arrow .	Rich. Budd Vincent	{ Captured, Feb. 4, by the French frigates Hortense and Incor- ruptible, Mediterranean.	
Gun sh. slp.				
18	(R) Cyane .	Hon. Geo. Cadogan	{ Captured, May 12, by the French frigates Hortense and Hermione, near Martinique. Foundered, in May or June, in the Channel: crew perished. Foundered, March 1, on passage from Leeward islands: crew saved. Foundered, in October, near Ja- maica: 95 of crew perished.	
	(S) Hawke .	James Tippet . .		
	„	Inogène .		Henry Vaughan .
	„	Orquiza .		Charles Balderson .
16	(T) Fly .	Pownoll B. Pellew.	{ Wrecked, May, on the Carysfort reef, gulf of Florida: crew saved. Captured, July 17, by the Roche- fort squadron.	
	„	Ranger .		Charles Coote . .
14	(X) Orestes .	Thomas Brown .	{ Wrecked, July 11, on the Splinter sand, Dunkerque road: crew saved.	
G. b. slp.				
18	(Y) Raven .	William Layman .	{ Wrecked, January 29, in Cadiz bay: crew, except two men, saved. Foundered, exact date unknown: crew perished.	
	„	Seagull .		Henry Burke .
bb	(d) Acheron .	Arthur Farquhar.		

No. 7—continued.

	Name.	Commander.	How, when, and where Lost.
Gun-brig.			
12	(h) Biter . .	Geo. T. Wingate . .	{ Wrecked, November 10, near Calais: crew saved.
	„ Bouncer . .	Samuel Bassan . .	{ Wrecked, February, off Dieppe: crew saved, but made prisoners.
	„ Plumper . .	James H. Garrety . .	{ Captured, Aug., by five French gun-brigs off St. Mâlo.
	„ Teazer . .	Geo. Lewis Kerr . .	{ Wrecked, November 18, near St.-Valery: crew saved.
	„ Woodlark . .	Thomas Innes . .	{ Wrecked, August, in St. Aubin's bay, Jersey: crew saved.
Gun-sch.			
14	(i) <i>Pigmy</i> . .	William Smith . .	{ Wrecked, August, in St. Aubin's bay, Jersey: crew saved.
10	(l) <i>Redbridge</i> . .	J. Blower Gibbs . .	{ Foundered, March, near Jamaica: crew saved.
6	(n) <i>Dove</i> . .	Alexander Boyack . .	{ Captured, August 5, by the Rochefort squadron.
4	(o) <i>Barracouta</i> . .	J. Orchard . .	{ Wrecked, October 2, on the Jordan quay, Cuba: crew saved, but made prisoners.
	„ <i>Pigeon</i> . .	John Luckraft . .	{ Wrecked, December, off the Texel: crew saved, but made prisoners.

ABSTRACT

	Lost through the Enemy.		Lost through Accident.			Total.
	Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.	
Ships of the line
„ under the line . .	10	..	11	5	..	26
Total	10	..	11	5	..	26

No. 8.—See p. 87.

	£.	s.	d.
For the pay and maintenance of 91,000 seamen and 29,000 marines	5,350,000	0	0
„ the wear and tear of ships, &c.	4,680,000	0	0
„ the ordinary expenses of the navy, including half-pay to sea and marine officers; also the expense of sea-ordnance	1,435,353	12	11
„ additional pay to officers and seamen between May 1 and December 31	193,158	2	4
„ such measures as the exigency of affairs may require for Great Britain and for Ireland.	3,000,000	0	0
„ the extraordinaries; including the building and repairing of ships, and other extra work	1,980,830	0	0
„ the expense of the transport service, and the maintenance of prisoners of war, in health and sickness.	1,695,000	0	0
„ Hospitals for seamen	30,000	0	0
Total supplies granted for the sea-service	£18,864,341	15	3

No. 9.—See p. 112.

Vérone, le 16 Juin, 1805.

Monsieur Decrès, M. Jérôme Bonaparte ne peut être capitaine de vaisseau; ce serait une innovation funeste que de lui permettre de prendre un grade lui-même. Dans ce sens, sa conduite est d'une légèreté sans exemple, et sa justification n'a pas de sens. Non-seulement M. Jérôme n'a pas le droit de nommer un enseigne lieutenant, mais je désavoue cette nomination: cette conduite est tout-à-fait ridicule. Quand il aurait eu un combat et qu'il aurait pris un vaisseau anglais, il n'aurait pas le droit de donner un grade, mais seulement recommander ceux qui se seraient distingués.—*Précis des Evénemens*, tome xi., p. 279.

No. 10.—See p. 193.

A List of Ships of the Line and Frigates, late belonging to the French Navy, Captured, Destroyed, Wrecked, Foundered, or Accidentally Burnt during the year 1806.

	Name.	How, when, and where Lost.
Gun-ship.		
120	.. Impérial	Destroyed, after an action, on February 6, with a British squadron under Vice-admiral Sir J. T. Duckworth, off the road of Santo-Domingo, West Indies.
72	.. Diomède	
80	(K) Alexandre	Captured by the same squadron.
	(M) Brave	
	„ Jupiter	
74	.. Impétueux	Destroyed, September 14, after having been driven on shore by two British 74s and a frigate, near Cape Henry, United States of America.
	(M) Marengo	Captured, March 13, by a British squadron under Vice-admiral Sir J. B. Warren, latitude 26° 16' north, longitude 29° 25' west.
Gun-frig.	(Z) Belle-Poule	
	„ Armide	Captured, September 25, by a British squadron under Commodore Sir Samuel Hood, off Rochefort.
	„ Gloire	
	„ Indefatigable	
	„ Minerve	
	„ Guerrière	Captured, July 19, by the British frigate Blanche, off the Faro islands.
40	„ Présidente	Captured, September 27, by a British squadron under Rear-admiral Sir Thomas Louis, latitude 47° 17' north, longitude 6° 52' west.
	„ Rhin	Captured, July 18, by the British 74 Mars, off Rochefort.
	„ Volontaire	Captured, March 4, by a British squadron under Commodore Sir H. Popham, Cape of Good Hope.

No. 11.—See p. 193.

A List of Ships of the Line and Frigates, late belonging to the Dutch Navy, Captured, Destroyed, Wrecked, Foundered, or Accidentally Burnt, during the year 1806.

	<u>Name.</u>	<u>How, when, and where Lost.</u>
Gun-ship.		
64	.. Bato	{ Destroyed, January 9, by the Dutch, at the surrender of the Cape of Good Hope.
	.. Terrible	
Gun-frig.		
32	{ (G) Maria-Riggersbergen	{ Captured, October 18, by the British frigate Caroline, in Batavia road, East Indies.
	.. Pallas	{ Captured, July 26, with other vessels, by the British frigate Greyhound, and brig-sloop Harrier, East Indies.
	.. Phœnix	{ Destroyed, November 28, on being attacked by a British squadron under Rear-admiral Sir Edward Pellew, Bart., in Batavia road.

A List of Ships of the Line and Frigates, late belonging to the Spanish Navy, Captured, Destroyed, Wrecked, Foundered, or Accidentally Burnt, during the year 1806.

	<u>Name.</u>	<u>How, when, and where Lost.</u>
Gun-brig.		
34	(D) Pomona	{ Captured, August 23, by the British frigates Arethusa and Anson, off Cuba.

An Abstract of French, Dutch, and Spanish Ships of the Line and Frigates Captured, &c. during the year 1806.

	Lost through the Enemy.		Lost through Accident.			Total lost to the F. D. & S. Navies.	Total added to the British Navy
	Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.		
Ships of the line	{ Fr. 4	3	7	4
	{ Du. ..	1	1	2	..
Frigates	{ Fr. 9	9	9
	{ Du. 2	1	3	1
	{ Sp. 1	1	1
Total	16	5	1	22	15

No. 12.—See p. 193.

A List of Ships and Vessels, late belonging to the British Navy, Captured, Destroyed, Wrecked, Foundered, or Accidentally Burnt, during the year 1806.

<u>Name.</u>	<u>Commander.</u>	<u>How, when, and where Lost.</u>
74 (M) <i>Brave</i> . .	Edmond Boger . .	} Foundered, April 12, off the Western islands, on passage from Jamaica: crew, except three, saved.
64 (P) <i>Athénien</i> .	Robert Raynsford . .	
Gun-p. ship.		} Wrecked, October 27, on the rocks, called Esquerques, near Tunis: captain and 396 of crew perished.
22 { (N) <i>Constance</i> .	Alex. S. Burrowes . .	
{ „ <i>Houreux</i> .	John Morrison . .	} Captured, October 12, after getting on shore in action, in the bay of Erqui, coast of France.
G.-sh.-slp.		
8 (R) <i>Favourite</i> .	John Davie	} Foundered, on passage from West Indies to Halifax: crew perished.
{ (T) <i>Martin</i> .	Thomas Prowse . .	
16 { „ <i>Wolf</i> .	George C. M'Kenzie . .	} Captured, January 6, off Cape de Verd Islands, by a French squadron.
{ (U) <i>Serpent</i> .	John Waller	
Gun-brig.		} Foundered, on passage to Barbadoes, with all the crew.
14 (f) <i>Seaforth</i> .	George Steel	
{ (g) <i>Adder</i> .	Molyneux Shuldham . .	} Wrecked, September 5, on Heneaga, one of the Bahama islands: crew saved.
12 { „ <i>Clinker</i> .	John Salmon	
{ „ <i>Manley</i> .	Martin White	} Foundered, on Jamaica station, with all the crew.
Gun-brig.		
10 (h) <i>Papillon</i> .	William Woolsey . .	} Foundered, by upsetting, February, on the Leeward island station: crew, except two, perished.
Gun-sch.		
12 (k) <i>Redbridge</i> .	Edward Burt	} Captured, December 9, near Abreval, where she was driven ashore.
		} Foundered, December, in a cruise off Havre: crew perished.
		} Captured, January, by some Dutch gun-boats, in the river Ems.
		} Foundered, on Jamaica station: crew perished.
		} Wrecked, November 4, on the Providence station: crew saved.

No. 12—*continued.*

	Name.	Commander.	How when, and where Lost.
Gun-sch			
10	(l) <i>Tobago</i> . .	(name unknown) .	Captured, October 18, by the Général-Ernouf French privateer, near Gaudaloupe.
	„ <i>Unique</i> . .	George R. Brand .	Captured, February 23, by a French privateer, on the Leeward island station.
	„ <i>Zenobia</i> . .	(name unknown) .	Wrecked, exact date unknown, on the coast of Florida.
6	(n) <i>Belem</i> . .	James Groves . .	Captured, August 12, at the recapture of Buenos Ayres.
	„ <i>Dominica</i> . .	Robert Peter. . .	Captured, date unknown.
4	(o) <i>Berbice</i> . .	James George Gooding	Foundered, exact date unknown, off Demerara: crew saved.
T.S. (q)	<i>Dover</i> . .	(in ordinary) . .	Burnt, by accident, in August, off Woolwich.

ABSTRACT.

	Lost through the Enemy.		Lost through Accident.			Total.
	Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.	
Ships of the line	1	1	..	2
„ under the line . .	8	..	3	7	1	19
Total . .	8	..	4	8	1	21

No. 13.—See p. 196.

For the pay and maintenance of 91,000 seamen and 29,000 marines, for one lunar month from January 1, and for 98,600 seamen, and 31,400 marines, from January 28	£.	s.	d.
„ the wear and tear of ships, &c.	6,337,500	0	0
„ the ordinary expenses of the navy, including half-pay to sea and marine officers: also the expense of sea-ordnance	1,557,934	9	3
„ the extraordinaries, including the building and repairing of ships and other extra work	2,134,903	0	0
„ the expense of the transport-service, and maintenance of prisoners of war in health and sickness at home and abroad	2,000,000	0	0
„ sick and wounded seamen	300,000	0	0
Total supplies granted for the sea-service	£17,400,337	9	3

No. 14.—See p. 235.

No French or Spanish ship of the line or frigate (properly so called) captured, &c., during the year 1807.

A List of Ships of the Line and Frigates late belonging to the Dutch Navy, Captured, Destroyed, Wrecked, Foundered, or Accidentally Burnt, during the year 1807.

	Name.	How, when, and where Lost.
Gun-ship.		
68	.. Pluto	{ Destroyed, in December, at Greisse in Java, by a British squadron under Vice-admiral Sir Edward Pellew.
	.. Revolutie	
Gun-frig.		
32	{ (H) Halstaar	{ Captured, January 1, by the Arethusa and squadron at the island of Curaçoa.
	.. Utrecht	

A List of Ships of the Line and Frigates, late belonging to the Turkish Navy, Captured, Destroyed, Wrecked, Foundered, or Accidentally Burnt during the year 1807.

	Name.	How, when, and where Lost.
Gun-ship.		
64	Name unknown	{ Destroyed, February 19, off Point Pesquies, Dardanells, by Sir John Thomas Duckworth's squadron.
Gun-frig.		
40	Ditto	
36	{ Ditto	
30	Ditto	

No. 15.—See p. 285.

A List of Ships of the Line and Frigates, lately belonging to the Danish Navy Captured, Destroyed, Wrecked, Foundered, or Accidentally Burnt, during the year 1807.

	Name.	How, when, and where Lost.
Gun-ship.		
80	(K) Christian VII.	Captured, September 7, at the surrender of Copenhagen, by the combined military and naval forces under General Lord Cathcart and Admiral James Gambier.
	„ Waldemar	
	„ Neptunos	
	(M) Dannemark	
	„ Norge	
	(N) Arve-Prints	
	„ Justitia.	
	„ Kron-Prints	
	„ Kron-Princesse.	
	„ Odin	
	„ Princesse-Sophia-Frederica.	
	„ Skiold	
	„ Tre-Kronen	
(O) Princesse-Carolina		
„ Fyren		
64	(P) Syeren	
	„ Dittsmarchen	
Gun-frig.		
38	(Z) Perlen	Captured, August 16, by the British 22-gun ship Comus, off Marstrand, Cattogat.
	„ Rota	
(B) Freija		
„ Har-Fruen		
36	„ Iris	
	(C) Nijaden.	
„ Nymphen		
(D) Venus		
32	(H) Frederickscoarn	

An Abstract of Dutch, Danish, and Turkish Ships of the Line and Frigates Captured, &c., during the year 1807.

	Lost through the Enemy.		Lost through Accident.			Total lost to the Du. Da. & Turkish Navies.	Total added to the British Navy.
	Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.		
Ships of the line.	Du.	2	2	..
	Da.	17	17	15
	Tu.	..	1	1	..
Frigates.	Du.	1	..	1	..	2	1
	Da.	9	9	9
	Tu.	..	4	4	..
		27	7	1	..	35	25

No. 16.—See p. 285.

A List of Ships and Vessels, late belonging to the British Navy, Captured, Destroyed, Wrecked, Foundered, or Accidentally Burnt, during the year 1807

	<u>Name.</u>	<u>Commander.</u>	<u>How, when, and where Lost</u>
Gun-ship.			
74	(L) Ajax . .	Hon. Henry Blackwood	{ Burnt by accident, February 14, in the Mediterranean: 250 of her crew perished. { Foundered, date unknown, off the island Rodrigue, East Indies: crew perished.
	(M) Blenheim	{ Sir Thos. Troubridge, Bt., V.-ad. Austin Bissell, captain	
Gun-frig.			
44	(W) Anson . .	Charles Lydiard	Wrecked, Dec. 29, on a sand-bank off Helstone, Mount's bay: crew, except 60, saved.
38	(A) <i>Blanche</i> .	Sir Thomas Lavie	Wrecked, March 4, off Ushant: crew, except 45 seamen, saved, but made prisoners.
32	(G) <i>Java</i> . .	George Pigot	{ Foundered with Blenheim: crew perished. { Wrecked, January 23, on the Coral reef, Jamaica station: crew saved.
	(H) Orpheus .	Thomas Briggs	
Gun p. ship.			
22	(M) Boreas . .	George Scott	{ Wrecked, December 5, on the Hannots rocks near Guernsey: crew, except 68, perished. { Wrecked, Jan. 4, on Cenigotto, a barren rock in the Levant: part only of crew saved.
	(R) Nautilus .	Edmund Palmer	
3. sh. slp.			
18	(S) Dauntless,	Christopher Stracey	Captured, May 26, by the French, at the surrender of Dantzic.
Gun-b.-slp.			
18	(Y) Leveret . .	Rich. Jas. Laurence O'Connor	{ Wrecked, November 10, on the Galloper rock: crew saved. { Foundered, date unknown, on the Halifax station: crew perished.
	(Z) Busy . .	Richard Keilly	

No. 16—*continued.*

	<u>Name.</u>	<u>Commander.</u>	<u>How, when, and where Lost.</u>
G. bg. slp.			
16	(a) <i>Atalante</i>	John Bower	Wrecked, in February, at Rochefort: crew saved, but partly made prisoners.
	„ <i>César</i>	(name unknown)	Wrecked, in March, on the coast of Gironde: crew, except 45, perished.
	„ <i>Mcucheron</i>	James Hawes	Wrecked, date unknown, in the Mediterranean.
14	(b) <i>Pert</i>	Donald Campbell	Wrecked, October 16, on the island of Santa-Margarita: crew, except 11, saved.
Bb.	(d) <i>Explosion</i>	Edward Ellicot	Wrecked, September 10, on Lundy island, by the ignorance of the pilot: crew saved.
	„ <i>Prospero</i>	William King	Foundered, February 18, in the North Sea.
Gun-brig.			
14	(f) <i>Pigmy</i>	George Montagu Higginson	Wrecked, March 2, off Rochefort: crew saved, but made prisoners.
	„ <i>Speedwell</i>	William Robertson	Foundered, February 18, off Dieppe.
	„ <i>St.-Lucia</i>	Hon. Michael De Courcy	Captured, date unknown, on the Leeward-island station.
12	(g) <i>Ferreter</i>	Henry Weir	Captured, March 31, by seven Dutch gunboats, and carried into the river Ems.
	„ <i>Griper</i>	Edward Morris	Wrecked, February 18, off Ostend: crew perished.
	„ <i>Inveterate</i>	George Norton	Wrecked, February 18, near Saint Vallery en Caux: crew, except four, saved, but made prisoners.
	„ <i>Jackall</i>	Charles Stewart	Wrecked, May 29, near Calais: crew saved, but made prisoners.
Gun-cut.			
14	(i) <i>Netley</i>	William Carr	Captured, December 17 (1806), by the French frigate <i>Thetis</i> and brig <i>Sylphe</i> , West Indies.

No. 16—*continued.*

	Name.	Commander.	How, when, and where Lost.
Gun-cut.	(k) <i>Elizabeth</i>	John Sedley	{ Foundered, date unknown, in the West Indies: crew perished. Wrecked, January 23, in the bay of St. Audero: crew, except three, perished. Foundered, Oct. 17, in a hurricane off the Spanish Main: crew, except the surgeon and three men, perished.
12	„ <i>Felic.</i>	Robert Clarke	
	„ <i>Fire-fly</i>	Thomas Price	
10	(1) <i>Barbara</i>	Edward A. D'Arcey	{ Captured, September 17, by the French privateer Général-Ermoul, in the West Indies. Foundered, date unknown, off Heligoland: crew saved. Captured, March 9, by three privateers in the Straits of Gibraltar. Foundered, date unknown, in the West Indies: crew perished.
	„ <i>Cassandra</i>	George Le Blanc	
	„ <i>Crafty</i>	Richard Spencer	
	„ <i>Maria</i>	John Henderson	
8	(m) <i>Subtle</i>	William Dowers	Wrecked, October 26, on the rocks off Bermuda: crew saved.
4	(o) <i>Jackdaw</i>	Nathaniel Brice	{ Captured, January, by a Spanish row-boat: and retaken, Feb. 15, by the <i>Minerve</i> . Captured, February 19, at Perros, where she was driven through stress of weather. Captured, April 20, by the Murat French privateer, off Altavella. Wrecked, February 13, at St. Michael's: crew saved. Wrecked, February 19, off Dieppe: crew, except four, saved.
	„ <i>Magpie</i>	Edward Johnson	
	„ <i>Pike</i>	John Otley	
	„ <i>Wagtail</i>	William Cullis	
F. V. (w)	<i>Ignition</i>	Philip Griffin	Wrecked, February 19, off Dieppe: crew, except four, saved.

No. 16—*continued.*

ABSTRACT.

	Lost through the Enemy.		Lost through Accident.			Total.
	Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.	
Ships of the Line	1	1	2
„ under the Line	9	..	21	7	..	37
Total	9	..	21	8	1	39

No. 17.—See p. 286.

For the pay and maintenance of 98,600 seamen and 31,400 marines	£.	s.	d.
„ the wear and tear of ships, &c.*	6,337,500	0	0
„ the ordinary expenses of the navy, including half- pay to sea and marine officers	1,142,959	19	10
„ the expense of sea-ordnance	591,500	0	0
„ the extraordinaries, including the building and re- pairing of ships, and other extra work	2,351,188	0	0
„ the expenses of the transport-service, and the main- tenance of prisoners of war, in health and sickness	2,313,000	0	0
„ sick and wounded seamen	281,400	0	0
Total supplies granted for the sea-service	£18,087,547	19	10

Owing to an oversight apparently, the item marked * has been carried out in the London Gazette as 5,000,070, instead of what it is; and the mistake has even extended to the total, which stands at 18,017,617*l.* 19*s.* 10*d.*

No. 18.—See p. 293.

Lord Collingwood's General Order.

From every account received of the enemy, it is expected they may very soon be met with, in their way from Corfu and Tarentum, and success depends on a prompt and immediate attack on them. In order to which it will be necessary, that the greatest care be taken to keep the closest order in the respective columns during the night, that the state of the weather will allow, and that the columns be kept at such a sufficient distance apart, as will leave room for tacking or other movements; so that, in the event of calm or shift of wind, no embarrassment may be caused.

Should the enemy be found formed in order of battle with his whole force, I shall, notwithstanding that, probably not make the signal to form the line of battle, but, keeping the closest order, with the van squadron attack the van of the enemy, while the commander of the lee division takes the proper measures, and makes to the ships of his division the necessary signals, for commencing the action with the enemy's rear, as nearly as possible at the same time that the van begins: to his signals, therefore, the captains of that division will be particularly watchful.

If the squadron has to run to leeward to close with the enemy, the signal will be made to alter the course altogether; the van division keeping a point or two more away than the lee, the latter carrying less sail, and, when the fleet draws near the enemy, both columns are to preserve a line as nearly parallel to the hostile fleet as they can.

In standing up to the enemy from the leeward upon a contrary tack, the lee line is to press sail, so that the leading ship of that line may be two or three points before the beam of the leading ship of the weather line, which will bring them to action nearly at the same period.

The leading ship of the weather column will endeavour to pass through the enemy's line should the weather be such as to make that practicable, at one-fourth from the van, whatever number of ships their line may be composed of. The lee division will pass through at a ship or two astern of their centre, and whenever a ship has weathered the enemy, it will be found necessary to shorten sail as much as possible, for her second astern to close with her, and to keep away, steering in a line parallel to the enemy's, and engaging them on their weather side.

A movement of this kind may be necessary, but, considering the difficulty of altering the position of the fleet during the time of combat, every endeavour will be made to commence battle with the enemy on the same tack they are; and I have only to recommend and direct, that they are fought with at the nearest distance possible, in which getting on board of them may be avoided, which is always disadvantageous to us, except when they are flying.

The enemy will probably have a convoy of ships carrying troops, which

must be disabled by the frigates or whatever ships are not engaged, or whose signals may be made to attack the convoy, by cutting their masts away, and rendering them incapable of escaping during the contest with their fleet.

In fine weather the watch are to bring their hammocks on deck with them in the night, which are to be stowed in the nettings, so that on any sudden discovery of the enemy, they will have only to attend to the duty on deck, while the watch below clear the ship for action.

If any ship is observed by her second ahead to drop astern during the night to a greater distance than her station is, she is to notify it to her by showing two lights, one over the other, lowered down the stern, so that it may not be seen by ships ahead; and, should a ship not be able to keep her station, those astern of her are to pass her and occupy the place she should have been in.

No. 19.—See p. 390.

A List of Ships of the Line and Frigates, late belonging to the French Navy, Captured, Destroyed, Wrecked, Foundered, or Accidentally Burnt, during the year 1808.

	<u>Name.</u>	<u>How, when, and where Lost.</u>
Gun-ship.		
80	.. Neptune	} Captured, June 14, in Cadiz harbour, by the Spaniards.
74	.. Algésiras	
	.. Argonaute	
	.. Héros	
	.. Pluton	
	.. Atlas	} Captured, about the same time, at Vigo, by the same.
Gun-frig.		
40	.. Cornélie	Captured with Neptune and squadron.
	(Z) Piémontaise	Captured, March 8, in the East Indies, by the British frigate San-Fiorenzo.
	.. Thetis	Captured, November 10, off Lorient, by the British frigate Amethyst.
	.. Artémise	Destroyed, after having been chased on shore near Brest by a part of the British blockading squadron.

No. 20.—See p. 390.

A List of Ships of the Line and Frigates late belonging to the Dutch, Danish, Russian, and Turkish Navies respectively, Captured, Destroyed, Wrecked, Fowndered, or Accidentally Burnt, during the year 1808.

	Name.	How, when, and where Lost.
Gun-ship.		
74	.. Prindts-Christian-Frederic, <i>Da.</i>	Destroyed, March 22, on the coast of Jutland, by the British 64s Nassau and Stately.
	.. Sewolod, <i>Russ.</i>	
Gun-frig.		
44	.. Badere-Zaffer, <i>Turk.</i>	Captured, July 5, in the Grecian Archipelago, by the British frigate Seahorse.
36 (D)	Guelderland, <i>Du.</i>	Captured, May 19, in the North Sea, by the British frigate Virginie.

An Abstract of French, Dutch, Danish, Russian, and Turkish Ships of the Line and Frigates, Captured, &c., during the year 1808.

	Lost through the Enemy.		Lost through Accident.			Total lost to the F. Du. Da. R. & T. Navies.	Total added to the British Navy.
	Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.		
Ships of the line	Fr. 6	6	..
	Da. ..	1	1	..
	Ru. 1	1	..
Frigates . .	Fr. 3	1	4	2
	Du. 1	1	1
	Tu. 1	1	..
Total . . .	12	2	14	3

No. 21.—See p. 390.

A List of the Ships and Vessels late belonging to the British Navy, Captured, Destroyed, Wrecked, Foundered, or Accidentally Burnt, during the year 1808.

	<u>Name.</u>	<u>Commander.</u>	<u>How, when, and where Lost.</u>
Gun-ship.			
50 (T)	Jupiter . .	Hon. E. R. Baker . .	} Wrecked, December 10, on a reef of rocks in Vigo bay, coast of Spain: crew saved.
Gun-frig.			
38 (Z)	Leda . .	Rob. Honyman . .	Wrecked, January 31, at the entrance of Milford Haven: crew saved.
36 {	(C) Crescent . .	John Temple . .	Wrecked, December 6, on the coast of Jutland, in a heavy gale: crew, except about twenty, perished.
	„ Flora . .	L. Otway Bland . .	Wrecked, January 19, on the coast of Holland: crew, except nine, saved, but made prisoners.
	„ Meleager . .	Fred. Warren . .	Wrecked, July 30, on Barebushkey, Jamaica: crew, except a midshipman and three seamen, saved.
32 (H)	Astræa . .	Edm. Heywood . .	Wrecked, May 24, on the rocks near the island of Anagada, West Indies: crew, except four, saved.
G. p. sh.			
22 {	(M) Banterer . .	Alex. Shippard . .	Wrecked, December 4, in the river St. Lawrence: crew saved.
	„ Laurel . .	J. C. Woolcombe . .	Captured, September 15, off Isle-de-France, by the French 40-gun frigate <i>Canonnière</i> .
20 (O)	<i>Muros</i> . .	Archibald Duff . .	Wrecked, March 24, in the bay of Honda, in Cuba: crew saved.
G. sh. slp.			
18 (S)	Bermuda . .	W. Henry Bayne . .	Wrecked, April 22, on the Memory rock, Little Bermuda: crew saved.
G. b. slp.			
18 (Y)	Carnation . .	Ch. M. Gregory . .	Captured, October 3, off Martinique, by the French 16-gun brig <i>Palinure</i> .

No. 21—*continued.*

	Name.	Commander.	How, when, and where Lost.
5 b. slp	(a) Delight . .	Philip Cosby Handfield	Wrecked, January 31, on the coast of Calabria.
16	„ Dolphuser . .	Richard Haward . .	Wrecked, August 4, on the coast of Holland.
	„ Electra . .	George Trollope . .	Wrecked, March 25, on the coast of Sicily: crew saved.
	„ Seagull . .	Robert Cathcart . .	Captured, June 19, off the Naze of Norway, by the Danish 20-gun brig Lougen, and six gun-boats.
	16 (a) Volador . .	Francis Geo. Dickins	Wrecked, October 22, in the gulf of Coro, West Indies: crew saved.
Gun-brig.	(f) Hironécile . .	Joseph Kidd . .	Wrecked, beginning of March, near Tunis: crew, except four, saved.
12	(g) Maria . .	James Bennett . .	Captured, September 29, off Guadalupe, by the French corvette Département des Landes.
	„ Netley . .	Charles Burmar . .	Wrecked, July 10, on the Leeward island station: crew, except nine, perished.
	„ Rapid . .	Henry Baugh . .	Destroyed, May 18, by the batteries in the Tagus, while attempting to cut out two valuable merchantmen.
	„ Sparkler . .	J. S. A. Dennis . .	Wrecked, January 15, on the coast of Holland: crew, except fourteen, saved, but made prisoners.
	„ Tickler . .	J. W. Skinner . .	Captured, June 4, in the Great Belt, by four Danish gun-boats.
	„ Tigress . .	{ Edward Nataniel Greensword . .	Captured, August 2, in the Great Belt, by sixteen Danish gun-vessels.
10	„ Turbulen: . .	George Wood . .	Captured, June 10, in the bay of Malmo, by a Danish flotilla.
	(h) Raposa . .	James Violet . .	Destroyed, February 15, after running aground on a shoal near Carthage, to prevent capture.

No. 21—*continued.*

	<u>Name.</u>	<u>Commander.</u>	<u>How, when, and where Lost.</u>
G. out.			
12	(k) Millbrook .	James Leach . .	{ Wrecked, March 25, on the Burlings: crew saved.
10	{ (l) Bacchus .	Henry Murray . .	{ Captured, date unknown, on the Leeward-island station.
	{ „ Pickle . .	Moses Cannadey . .	{ Wrecked, July 27, while enter- ing Cadiz with despatches.
8	{ (m) Firefly . .	(name unknown) . .	{ Wrecked, date unknown, West Indies.
	{ „ Capelin . .	Joseph Bray . .	{ Wrecked, June 30, on a sunken rock off the entrance of Brest harbour: crew saved.
	{ „ Crane . .	Joseph Tindale . .	{ Wrecked, October 26, on the rocks at the West Hoe: crew saved.
	{ „ Rook . .	James Lawrence . .	{ Captured, in October, off St. Domingo, by two French privateers.
	{ „ Tang . .	(name unknown) . .	{ Foundered, on her passage from Bermuda to England: crew perished.
	{ „ Widgeon . .	George Elliott . .	{ Wrecked, April 20, on the coast of Scotland: crew saved.

ABSTRACT.

	Lost through the Enemy.		Lost through Accident.			Total.
	Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.	
Ships of the line
„ under the line . . .	9	2	22	1	..	34
Total . . .	9	2	22	1	..	34

No. 22.—See p. 390.

	£.	s.	d.
For the pay and maintenance of 98,600 seamen and 31,400 marines	8,112,000	0	0
„ the wear and tear of ships, &c.	3,295,500	0	0
„ the ordinary expenses of the navy, including half-pay to sea and marine officers.	1,408,437	13	9
„ the expense of sea-ordnance	591,500	0	0
„ the extraordinaries; including the building and re- pairing of ships, and other extra work	2,296,030	0	0
„ the hire of transports	3,000,000	0	0
„ the maintenance of prisoners of war in health and sickness	556,000	0	0
„ the same of sick and wounded seamen	314,000	0	0
„ enabling his majesty to provide a compassionate list for the navy and marines	5,000	0	0
Total supplies granted for the sea-service	<u>£19,578,467</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>9</u>

No. 23.—See p. 442.

Owing to the bookseller from whom we obtained the loan of the work entitled, “*Victoires et Conquêtes des Français*,” having disposed of it, and our inability to procure the use of another copy without sending over to France, we are obliged to omit the original extract referred to in the body of this volume.

NOTES TO ANNUAL ABSTRACTS.

NOTE TO ABSTRACT, No. 14.

- (a) Teak-built Indiamen.
 - (b) The Salsette (named Pitt for a short time, then restored to her former name), built of teak at the East-India Company's yard at Bombay.
 - (c) Teak-built; had been an Indiaman.
 - (d) The same.
 - (e) The Bermuda and Indian; built at the island of Bermuda, of the pencil-cedar. See vol. ii., p. 482, note S*.
 - (f) Built at Bermuda, also of cedar. These vessels averaged 111 tons, and were a slight improvement upon those built at the same island in the preceding year, and remarked upon at vol. iii., p. 510, note (i).
 - (g) Number of hired vessels about 94.
-

NOTES TO ABSTRACT, No. 15.

- (a) The Clyde; built of fir, after the fir-frigate of the same name launched in 1796. See vol. ii., p. 481, note A*.
- (b) The Alexandria, of fir also, and the last-built frigate of this class.
- (c) A new class; resembling in size and construction the British-built of the *K* class, but registered as "22-gun ships," and too generally called so to be otherwise classed in these Abstracts. The first establishment of the class was 22 long nines on the main deck, and eight 24-pounder carronades on the quarter-deck and fore-castle; but before any of the ships were launched, the establishment was altered to twenty-two 32-pounder carronades, eight 18-pounder carronades, and two long sixes, total 32 guns. The *Comus* and *Laurel*, it is believed, were the only ships armed according to the original plan, and the first was afterwards allowed two additional long sixes for her fore-castle. Of all the classes in the British navy, the 22-gun class exhibits the greatest difference between the rated and the mounted force of its ships.
- (d) In the year 1805, 18 more of these miserable "men-of-war" were ordered to be built; six of them at Bermuda, the remainder in ports of England. See vol. iii., p. 516.
- (e) Number of hired vessels about 80.

NOTES TO ABSTRACT, No. 16.

- (a) The *Atlante*; built at Bermuda, of the pencil-cedar.
 (b) Number of hired vessels about 52.

NOTES TO ABSTRACT, No. 17.

(a) Ordered in the year 1794, to be laid down at Plymouth yard, as a 100-gun ship, but in the following year altered to a 120-gun ship. The *Caledonia* did not, however, begin building until January, 1805; but she then proceeded rapidly, and was launched on the 25th June, 1808. This ship was constructed from a draught prepared by Sir William Rule, at this time one of the surveyors of the navy. An account of some of her dimensions and peculiarities of structure, as compared with those of the *Hibernia*, will be found in vol. xxviii., p. 126. of Mr. Gold's *Naval Chronicle*.

Principal dimensions of the Caledonia.

		Ft.	In.
Length on the range of the first or lower gun-deck, from the rabbet of the stem to the rabbet of the stern-post	}	205	0
Breadth extreme		53	8
Depth of hold		23	2
Light draught of water	{ Afore	15	10
	{ Aft	18	0
Burden in tons 2615 87-94ths.			
Mainmast	{ length	119	0
	{ diameter	3	3 $\frac{7}{8}$
Main yard	{ length	104	4
	{ diameter	2	0 $\frac{5}{8}$
Bowsprit	{ length	75	1
	{ diameter	3	0 $\frac{7}{8}$

The stern of the *Caledonia* is singularly light and neat, having, instead of the profusion of carved work which formerly decorated ships of her rate, simply the unicorn supporting the arms of Scotland. Her head represents the bust of a female figure emblematic of her name, with the plaid bonnet and thistle of the "Saxon green;" also the bagpipes on each side.

Force of the Caledonia when fitted for sea.

	Guns.	Pdrs.
First deck	32 long	32
Second deck	34 ,,	24
Third deck	34 ,,	18
Quarter-deck	6 ,,	12
	10 carrs.	32
Forecastle	2 long	12
	2 carrs.	32
Round-house	2 ,,	18

Net complement of men and boys, 866; subsequently augmented to 891, including 39 boys and 160 marines.

The *Caledonia* stowed 360 tons of iron ballast, 421 tons of water, and six months' provisions for her crew.

Load draught of water for channel service	forward	Ft. 24	In. 8½
	abaft	26	1
Height of midship first-deck port from water's edge		5	6

The result of several trials has proved, that this fine three-decker rides easy at her anchors, carries her lee-ports well, rolls and pitches quite easy, generally carries her helm half a turn a-weather, steers, works, and stays remarkably well, is a weatherly ship, and lies-to very close.

Her rate of sailing is as follows:—

		Knots.	Fathoms.
Close hauled, under whole or single-reefed topsails		9	0
Ditto	double-reefed ditto	7	0
Ditto	under courses . . .	4	0
Large, under all sail that can with propriety be set		11	6
Before the wind, under similar circumstances . . .		9	4

The *Caledonia's* best point of sailing is two points from the wind; and, in a fresh breeze, few line-of-battle ships can beat her. This noble first-rate has thus, on trial, showed herself to be one of the finest, as she and her five sister-vessels, subsequently built, continue to be the largest, ships belonging to the British navy.

In point of dimensions the *Caledonia* was rather exceeded by the *Commerce-de-Marseille*, the latter having been 3 feet 4 inches longer on deck, 1 foot 1½ inch broader in beam, and 1 foot 10½ inches deeper in hold: which made her measure 2747 tons. And we believe there is now constructing at Toulon, under the able directions of Mons. Barrallier, late an assistant surveyor to the British navy, a ship, named the *Royal Louis*, that will considerably exceed the *Caledonia*, or even the *Commerce-de-Marseille*, in dimensions. Her numerical force will, of course, be proportionably greater, but it is doubtful whether she will carry any heavier metal on the third deck. Hitherto, except perhaps in the case of the *Impérial* (see p. 99), the French have made the "rentrée," or inward curve of the top-timbers of their three-deckers so considerable that no larger gun than a 12-pounder had room to recoil.

(b) The *Victory* was ordered to be classed as a second rate, and consequently the two ships building from her draught, the *Boyne* and *Union*, must accompany her: these, indeed, in the official lists, had always classed as 98s. It frequently happens that ships are rated (yachts, for instance) more in reference to the pay of the officers, than to any quality possessed by the ship; a practice which, as it destroys all method and consistency, ought to be abolished.

(c) The *Dreadnought*, *Neptune*, and *Téméraire*; whose anomalous armament has already been remarked upon. The exchange of their third deck


18-pounders for 12s was considered an improvement: all three ships did not undergo the change in the year 1808; but, to prevent multiplying the classes unnecessarily, the whole are removed in the present Abstract.

(d) The *Martin*; built at Bermuda of the pencil-cedar.

(e) This was the first time that the British navy could boast of a "10-gun sloop-of-war." The establishment of the class was eight 18-pounder carronades and two long sixes, with a complement of 75 men and boys. These "sloops-of-war," therefore, were inferior in force to the generality of gun-brigs, and not superior, except in point of size, to many of the 10-gun schooners or cutters. Surely, if the number of guns must be limited to 10, the carronades should have been at least 24-pounders. The size of the vessels, 235 tons, was quite equal to that caliber, and no one can dispute that they would have been much more effectively armed. In addition to all this, the whole class turned out very dull sailers; proving that as little judgment had been employed in modelling the hull as in establishing the armament.

(f) Number of hired vessels about 60.

END OF VOL. IV.



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